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# HISTORY

OF

# PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

VOLUME II.

# HISTORY

OF

# PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

PARTICULARLY IN GERMANY

Viewed according to its Fundamental Movement

AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE RELIGIOUS, MORAL, AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE


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VOLUME II.

*WITH A PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION BY*

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AMS PRESS

NEW YORK

Reprinted from the edition of 1871, Edinburgh
First AMS EDITION published 1970
Manufactured in the United States of America

International Standard Book Number:
Complete Set .....0-404-02147-6
Volume 2 .....0-404-02149-2

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72-133823

AMS PRESS, INC.
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

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# BOOK II.

## THE SEPARATE LIFE OF THE TWO PROTESTANT CONFESSIONS, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITY OF THE REFORMATION PRINCIPLE, FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

# INTRODUCTION.

IT is, at first sight, a more cheerless period which claims our attention in this second Book. The lofty aspirations of the Reformation yield too quickly, for our desires, to a spiritual negligence; its fertile vitality, its bold yet moderate use of liberty, to a certain amount of sterility, narrowness, and scrupulosity. The valour and courage of the heroes in the spiritual conflicts of the sixteenth century were still indeed regarded as models, but were often exchanged for a hateful and narrow-minded love of contention, which regarded trifles as important, and but too often esteemed the weightiest matters trifles. And yet it would ill accord with historical justice if such an impression should induce us to pass hasty judgment upon this post-Reformation period as a time of spiritual relaxation, of declension from the lofty spirit of the Reformation, introductory to an era of decay. That it was not an age of spiritual death which succeeded the Reformation era has been abundantly shown by Tholuck, in his "Evidences of Life in the Lutheran Church," and with regard to the Reformed Church by Göbel, in his "History of Christian Life." The relation of the post-Apostolic to the Apostolic era, and the lack of originality and vigour which the former exhibits in comparison of the latter, are in this respect very instructive. Great as is the inferiority of the earlier Christian centuries to the age of the Apostles, it would be unjust to designate them, as on that account, in a state of declension, spiritual poverty, or lack of faith, and to forget the blood of the martyrs which helped to conquer the world. The Reformation also was succeeded by a period of terrible and bloody conflicts, resulting sometimes, as in France, in defeat, though mostly in victory, but conflicts which could never have been maintained in Holland, Germany, Scotland, and England without the power and courage supplied by faith. The question then with which we have to deal is: Whether the seventeenth century, in the first place, faithfully contributed to the discharge

of that duty which the nature of the case made incumbent? The duty of the age succeeding the Apostles could not have been to equal them in originality and mental productivity; the task set before it was rather to apply and utilize the treasures bequeathed by Apostolic minds. The intensive process having reached its point of rest in the formation of the Canon, must of necessity yield to the extensive. A similar state of things is found in the history of the Protestant Church and its theology, subsequently to the completion of its symbol and the written statement of its confession. There can be no doubt that Holy Scripture contains a rich abundance of truths and views, which have yet to be expounded and made the common possession of the Church, and that the day will surely come when, the necessity and maturity of the Church and the God-enlightened insight being combined, such a result will be attained by means of men of original minds. But if we were to conceive of such as appearing immediately after the Reformation, not only would a receptive soil for their labours have been for the most part lacking, but if they should anywhere attain to extensive influence, the utilization of the gifts bestowed by the Reformers would then have been checked. What was first of all necessary was that the Reformation principle should, in conformity with its world-wide importance, secure itself a lasting history in the midst of the nations of Europe. The question was to carry out the Reformation view of the world by a review of the history of the Church, and by means of the whole series of the documents of revelation, whether of the Old or New Testament, and thus to take, as it were, spiritual possession, and strike at the roots, of the whole preceding world. Controversy, for instance, against the existing Roman Catholic Church could never be successfully carried on, if the Reformation should be suffered to appear only as a protest against the whole preceding history of the Church, and should not rather find its authorization and justification in Christian antiquity. For it would indeed be monstrous to suppose that Apostolic Christianity had never, and nowhere, had any existence in the Church except in Holy Scripture, which the sixteenth century drew from the rubbish that concealed it, and brought to light.[1]

The further task laid upon this age was that of bringing the

[1] That the true Church never did die out has been from the very first the doctrinal principle of the Reformation. It was this that first the Magdeburg

Reformation principle into its rightful relation with the primæval world, and especially with the general reason of mankind, and thus naturalizing it in the world of mind. Hence, both the evangelical confessions were concerned, in the interests of divinity itself, "that queen of the theological sciences," to do ample justice to the demands of human science. Melancthon's *Loci* and Calvin's *Institutio* had indeed already afforded a glimpse of the harmony existing between the several doctrines, as beheld from the point of view of evangelical faith; but the doctrinal writings of the Reformers and their immediate successors were still very deficient in systematic completeness. A great work had yet to be accomplished in bringing into form the treasures excavated by the Reformation, and in so reasoning them out, even to the minutest details, that they might give the impression of an edifice harmonious in all its parts, not merely free from all internal contradictions, but also exhibiting an internal relation of each portion to every other. Lastly, it was impossible that evangelical truth could be generally and deeply implanted in the heart and intellect of the people during the Reformation era, when Protestants were naturally very dependent upon their spiritual leaders. Hence the question now was to lead the people by instruction and discipline, by guidance and custom, to an increasingly independent possession and enjoyment of evangelical truth,—a task which the violence of the German war, and the political agitations in England, Scotland and Holland rendered one of no ordinary difficulty.

It cannot be said that the Protestant theologians of the seventeenth century were equal in all respects to the task thus imposed upon them, and least of all to that last mentioned.[1] Their deficiency was somewhat less with respect to the rightful exhibition of

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centuriators, and afterwards John Gerhard and Calixtus, sought to prove on historical grounds.

[1] The Reformed Churches may here claim the preference over the Lutheran. Christian customs and discipline, as well as a more general habit of becoming acquainted with Holy Scripture, being more energetically and successfully brought to bear in the former than in the latter. It is in such matters that the genius of the Reformed Church was specially evinced, *e.g.* in the sanctification of the Sabbath, which became a widespread popular practice in Great Britain and North America. The legality into which both confessions fell, became among the Lutherans a theoretical, and among the Reformed a practical, tendency to correct doctrine. Thus, each having an eye for the deficiencies of the other, a protest against the degeneracy of the entire Evangelical Church was never silenced.

the relation between reason and Christianity; at least the blame must here be shared between them and philosophy, which was as yet in a state of total dependence. The other tasks pointed out were boldly undertaken and pursued in a manner which must be esteemed most praiseworthy, when the amount of exegetical and critical skill then existing is taken into consideration. This applies chiefly to the Lutheran Church, the great dogmatical works of which may—with the reservation hinted at—be regarded, both for their accurate delineation and subtle elaboration of notions, as works of art and models. Some, *e.g.* Calixtus, also manifest a capacity for large systematic conceptions; others are, through their extensive exegetical and historical apparatus, monuments of persevering industry and loyal attachment to evangelical truth, and could not fail to increase the self-confidence and joyful certitude of Protestant consciousness, as well as its acuteness and enlightenment.

With this praise however, blame must, in many respects, be combined; and chiefly because the theology of this century fails to produce the impression, made by that of the Reformation era, and especially of the leaders of that movement, of having acquired possession of evangelical truth by means of profound labour and internal conflicts—means by which a vital tradition of such truths could alone have been effected. On the contrary, it was by an easier path, viz. by embracing the doctrine of the Reformers, under a strong co-operating influence of mere human authority, that this theology had come into its possessions, which it adhered to and enforced as a fixed and inviolable tradition. It is true that the persuasion that the dogmas of the Protestant Church were in accordance with Scripture, was both exegetically and historically a well-founded one. But even such a perception could not take the place of certainty of the internal truths of Christianity. Where this vital and conscious religious appropriation is wanting, the motive for faith in the chief matter is nothing more than the willingly acknowledged authority of Protestant tradition, *i.e.* of tradition in accordance with Scripture. And this, as well as the fact that the evangelical principle, though religiously appropriated, was not developed, nor applied, as the source of the organic unity of dogmas, involved a further consequence. For while nothing but mental appropriation can form the vital bond between faith and Holy Scripture or Church doc-

trine, because evangelical and scriptural truth in its internal unity and consistency can only be so viewed by *fides divina*, as to leave the latter at liberty to deal intelligently therewith; this truth will, where there is an actual preponderance of *fides historica*, be involuntarily separated into a multiplicity of doctrines and propositions, which may, in the interest of maintaining purity of doctrine and losing no one item thereof, be most scrupulously and carefully preserved, without any correct or certain appreciation of their position or comparative importance with respect to the whole. For, in this case, the unity by which the several doctrinal propositions are supported is no longer the vital Gospel principle, recognized in its truth and become a matter of faith. On the contrary, Holy Scripture has become the connecting but only external bond which equally embraces all dogmas with its formal authority, just as the mantle of the Church equally covers and sanctions all the dogmas of Romanism. In short, transition from the creative energy of the Reformation to the era of the maintenance or preservation of Protestant tradition, thus became a relapse to the *legal* stage, and, in the Lutheran Church especially, a relapse into legal *dogmatism*. With this were combined the disintegration above alluded to, and the impotence of the vital principle of dogmatic organization, and, on the other hand, a scrupulosity about omissions, a want of happy certainty, a fear of all innovation, a horror even of variety,—which was regarded as inimical to the unity of the Church,—nay, in virtue of the connection between Church and State, and the then increasing absoluteness of the latter, a violence to, and depreciation of, individual freedom, that indispensable medium for all genuine appropriation of evangelical truth. So far then as a rather legal than evangelical conservatism takes the place of living tradition, *i.e.* of constantly renewed reproduction, in the theological activity of the seventeenth century, so far is it certainly true that this age exhibits, on the whole, a declension of the Protestant spirit. The subjective factor, which—as is expressed by the material principle of the Reformation—essentially belongs to the character of evangelical piety and theology, was abridged, and received but trifling cultivation. The *Objective* quantities, doctrinal tradition and Holy Scripture, were called into operation. Faith, formerly so free and vigorous, occupied but a passive position with respect to these quantities, which yet are not God, but things given. It

was no wonder then that the subjective principle, lacking a loving care on the part of the Church, should, where it asserted itself, take up a lax position with respect to the latter, as in the varied degeneracy of mysticism, which would not be restrained by the new and scrupulous literalism of orthodoxy, but on the other hand ran wild in every direction.

Happily the onesidedness into which the Evangelical Church fell was contrary to its own nature. For its confessions, as well as Holy Scripture, are born of another than the legal spirit. In both the objective requires the subjective, requires a form of existence not merely in historical faith, but a mode of existence in the spirit. Both urge onwards and beyond this evangelically tinged, but radically catholicizing mode of dealing, betraying as it does the after-effect of the epoch of dominant Catholicism,—a mode which could at most have set up a weakly, anomalous, rival church beside the Church of Rome, and must have ended in a pugnacious but unsatisfactory sectarianism. Hence a reaction could not fail to take place within the Church itself. It appeared among the Reformed in the influence of the Cartesian philosophy, in Coccejus and the mystics of Holland, especially the Labadists; and in Great Britain in the Independents and Quakers. Among Lutherans it was found on the part of the *intelligence* of the Church in Calixtus and the Syncretistic controversies, on the part of the religiously inclined *will* in Spener, on the part of *religious feeling* in mysticism and Zinzendorf. In all these, however, the reaction bore not a merely negative character, but contributed, under different aspects, to the further development of the Reformation principle.

# FIRST DIVISION.

## The Reformed Church.

### SECTION I.

#### ONESIDED OBJECTIVITY, OR THE PREVALENCE OF REFORMED ORTHODOXY TILL ABOUT 1700.

THE old Reformed Orthodoxy of the Continent, after entering upon its scholastic period, maintained itself in France, Holland, and Switzerland, against the ever re-emerging anti-predestinarian tendency. It was however much shaken about 1650 by Coccejanism, and soon after by Cartesianism. Though successful in repressing for a time by legal enactments, and by the *Formula Consensus Helvet.*, every anti-Calvinist movement, its gradual decay was plainly apparent about 1700. In Great Britain, where the spirit of the Reformed Church found a more practical expression, and where two opposing and increasingly irreconcilable forms—viz. Episcopalianism and Presbyterianism —chiefly prevailed, it was but the historical, and especially the patristic sides of theology which were chiefly cultivated. Not till the exigencies of the conflict with *Deism* were experienced was the activity of the intellect aroused, and even then no scientific conquest of the adversary was achieved. We must, however, in the first place, take up again the threads of our history.

The theological leadership was about the year 1600 transferred from Switzerland to Holland, which, for some time after the Edict of Nantes, shared it with France, till at length England appeared in the foreground, and North America also gradually became an important member in the list of Reformed nations.

The small country of Holland, urged by the emulation of its different provinces, founded, during the period of its world-wide prosperity, a series of universities. These foundations were made at the first in the interest of that Protestant faith, to which

Holland was indebted for her deliverance from the Spanish yoke, but after that enlargement of view which resulted from her splendid worldly position, in the interest also of philology and the classics. In this latter respect we need only mention the names of Scaliger, Salmasius, Lipsius, Isaac Vossius, Grävius, Heinsius, and the Orientalists Erpenius and Schultens. In these was felt the after-influence of the spirit of Erasmus and Melancthon, an influence beneficial to theology also. Universities were founded at Leyden in 1575, at Franecker in 1585, at Gröningen in 1614, at Utrecht in 1634, at Harderwyk in 1648, and these in the seventeenth century attracted the more aspiring students of all Protestant countries. To these were added schools in Amsterdam (1631), Deventer, Middelburg, and Breda. The study of the Scriptures in the original languages was, from the first, specially cultivated at the Dutch universities under John Drusius and M. Lydius, and carried on by such men as Louis de Dieu, and even by Andr. Rivetus, Gisbert Voetius, and Amama. Subsequently, however, to the Synod of Dort, and the doctrinal legalism introduced thereby into the Dutch Church, this peaceful and simpler biblical period was followed by one in which a Reformed scholasticism prevailed. Though Sibrand Lubbertus and Francis Gomarus, the victors at Dort, were themselves so far from being scholastics that the former accused his colleague Maccovius on account of his introduction of the scholastic method, it now set in irresistibly, and the most important Reformed scholastics were natives of Holland, *e.g.* besides the above named, John Maccovius, Sam. Maresius, Gisbert Voetius, Hoornbeck, Marck.

We will first enumerate the chief theologians of Holland according to their respective universities. Of Franecker were Martin Lydius, † 1601; John Drusius, the famous exegete and orientalist, formerly of Leyden, † 1616; Maccovius (v. Makowsky),[1] professor from 1614 to 1644; Amesius, † 1633,[2] and Amama. Of Utrecht, Gisbert Voetius, 1634-76;[3] Hoornbeck,

[1] *Collegia theologica*, Amst. 1623-1631. *Loci commun. theolog.*, Fran. 1626.

[2] An opponent of Arminius (*De Arminii Sententia*, 1613; *Medulla Theologiæ; De conscientia et ejus jure, vel casibus; Puritanismus Anglicanus*). He also advocated the strict idea of the Sabbath—*Belarminus enervatus.*

[3] G. Voetii *Selectæ disputationes theol.*, 5 vols. 1648. Though learned and pious he favoured the scholastic method, and zealously opposed Cartesianism, Coccejanism, and subsequently also the *ecclesiolæ in ecclesia* of his associate La Badie.

one of the ablest of controversialists especially against the Socinians, 1644 to 1654, subsequently of Leyden,[1] and Melch. Leydecker, the apologist of the Reformed systems, 1679-1721.[2] Of Gröningen: Francis Gomarus, 1618-41 (of Leyden from 1594-1611), the very strict Supralapsarian and opponent of Arminius;[3] Sam. Maresius, 1643-75,[4] the divine and controversialist, a kind of "Reformed Calovius," who opposed not only Catholicism and Socinianism, but also the Coccejans, Cartesians, Amyraud, and La Badie; John Henry Alting, 1627-44,[5] an anti-scholastic historian and divine, and his son Jacob Alting, a biblical theologian and Old Testament exegete, 1643-97. Of Leyden: Franc. Junius, formerly of Heidelberg and Neustadt on the Hardt, † 1602; Louis de Dieu, 1619-42, the advocate of a strictly grammatical exegesis by the aid of oriental languages and translations of Holy Scripture; Andr. Rivetus; Fred. Spanheim (of Geneva till 1642), the opponent of the Amyraldists, † 1646,[6] and his son Fred. Spanheim the younger, 1670-1701, the prolific and strictly Calvinistic systematizer and controversialist (previously, from 1655, of Heidelberg);[7] Anton. Hulsius, the acute controversialist;[8] the famous scholar Gerh. Joh. Vossius, born 1577, alike distinguished as a philologist, historian, and chronologer, † 1649, at Amsterdam, whither he had retired from Leyden in 1633. He published in 1618 seven books on the Pelagian controversies.[9]

[1] *Summa controversiarum religionis cum Infidelibus, Hæreticis, Schismaticis, i.e. Gentilibus, Judæis, Muhamedanis, Papistis, Anabaptistis, Enthusiastis, et Libertinis, Socinianis; Remonstrantibus, Lutheranis, Brownistis, Græcis,* ed. 2. Traj. ad Rh., 1658. Also *Socinanismus confutatus,* 3 vols. 1650-1664.

[2] *De veritate fidei Reformatæ* (a commentary on the *Heidelberg Catechism*). Ultraj, 1694. *De œconomia trium personarum in negotio salutis, &c.,* 1682.

[3] *Opp. omnia theologica,* Amst. 1664, especially his *Disput. theol.* contained therein, pp. 1-372.

[4] *Syst. theologicum cum annotationis,* Gröningen, 1673.

[5] Alting, *scriptorum theologicorum,* 3 vols. Amst. 1644.

[6] Fr. Spanheimii *exercitationes de Gratia universali* (in opposition to Amyraud), 1646.

[7] *Controversiarum de religione cum dissidentibus hodie christianis, prolixe cum Judæis, elenchus historico-theologicus.* Also his *Collegium theologicum* of the year 1657, his *Decades theologicæ* and his *Disputationes.*

[8] *Systema controvers. theol.* 1677.

[9] Though an opponent of the Remonstrants, he did not satisfy Gomarus. Compare also his *Theses theologicæ et historicæ de variis doctr. chr. capitibus,* 1658 (containing 91 Disp. on *locos dogm.*). Also his famous work *De theologia gentili et Physiologia christiana sive de origine ac progressu idolatriæ deque naturæ mirandis, quibus homo adducitur ad Deum,* Libri ix. ed. nova, Amst. 1658.

The Coccejans of Franecker were, besides Coccejus himself, 1636-1650 (of Leyden 1650-69), Van der Wayen; Campeius Vitringa, the meritorious exegete of Isaiah, † 1722; Hermann Witsius, † 1708,[1] the elegant philologist, the peacemaker in the Coccejan controversy; of Leyden, Gürtler, and others. Besides the Coccejans, we have yet to mention Fred. Ad. Lampe of Utrecht, born 1682, † 1729, Erpenius, the critic of Leyden, Alex. Roëll, the speculative theologian, and the Cartesians, Heidanus, Burmann,[2] and Wittich. The persecutions of the Reformed in France brought a second immigration of French theologians to Holland, among whom the sceptical P. Bayle[3] and the orthodox Jurieu[4] were the chief.

The Reformed Church of Germany, especially of its western part, shared in the various theological movements of Holland, a more active intercourse now taking place between the teachers and learners of either country. Such intercourse was also shared by Lutherans, in accordance with the custom, then prevalent among young men, of making long theological journeys.[5]

In Germany the Reformed system had for some time deeply affected but few countries, and the influence of Holland, of Lasco, and of Erasmus, was scarcely apparent beyond East Friesland and the Lower Rhine. An adherence to Melancthon, however, was on this account only the more deeply rooted. This was especially the case in his birthplace, the Palatinate, and also in Hesse, which, since the time of Philip the Magnanimous, had

[1] *De Œconomia fœderum Dei cum hominibus*, 1693, ed. 4, Herborn, 1712. He subsequently taught in Utrecht and Leyden.

[2] Franc. Burmanni *Synopsis Theologiæ et speciatim Œconomiæ fœderum Dei ab initio seculorum usque ad consummat. eorum*, Traj. ad Rh. ed. 1, 1671, ed. 2, 1681, vol. i. *Die Œcon. d. A. T.*, vol. ii., *N. T.*, with a *Concilium de studio theolog.* as an appendix.

[3] Bayle, *Dictionnaire critique*, appearing from 1694, vol. iii. 1715.

[4] Compare the article Jurieu in Herzog's *Realencycl.* vii. 176, &c., by A. Schweizer, and Schweizer's *Centraldogmen der reformirte Kirche*, ii. He was professor at Sedan from 1674-81, and resided in Amsterdam after the suppression of the Academy. His most important works in the controversy with Arnaud and Nicole, the Jansenists, are—*Apologie pour la morale des Réformés, ou défense de leur doctrine sur la justification, la persévérance des vrais saints et la certitude de leur salut*, 1675, and *Le vrai système de l'Eglise et la véritable analyse de la foi*, 1686. *Traité de la nature et de la grace*, 1687. *Histoire des Dogmes et des Cultes*, 1704.

[5] Comp. Tholuck's excellent work, *Das akad. Leben im 17 Jahrhunderte*, 1853, i. 53, 305-316; ii. 204.

sought to maintain an intermediate position between the Swiss and the Lutherans. The same adherence existed also in many districts in which the numerous disciples of Melancthon had exerted an influence. When then the preparation and completion of the Form of Agreement in 1850 began to separate Philippism or Melancthonian doctrine from the Church, those countries which were most strongly tinged therewith departed from the Lutheran, and approximated more or less to the Reformed, Church. Thus the Church of the Palatinate, with its Heidelberg Catechism and the Reformed arrangements of the university of Heidelberg, was established as a Reformed Church, and remained such even after a brief but violent Lutheran reaction (1578-83). In 1568 the Reformed Church of the Lower Rhine was founded by the synod of Wesel; in 1571, that of East Friesland by the synod of Emden. This example was followed by the county of Meurs in 1580, by Nassau, with Wittgenstein, Solms, and Wied, in 1586, by Anhalt in 1587, by Bentheim, Tecklenburg, and Pfalz Zweibrücken, in 1588, by Hanau in 1596, and Lippe in 1600, not to mention the accession of many Lutheran princes, especially the Elector Sigismund (December 1613). Calvinism prevailed also in Dantzic, and more moderately at Elbing, from 1590 to 1606; it was triumphant in Bremen, though Albert Hardenburg, the Melancthonian, and his patron M. von Buren, yielded to Lutheran pressure. In the Diet the Reformed were relatively still more numerously represented, by reason of the above-named accessions of so many personages of princely rank, who were attracted either, after the example of Philip of Hesse, by their love of peace, and by an ecclesiastical policy which aimed at union, or by the more practically intelligible character of the Reformed confessions, or by the greater refinement, liberality, or skill of Reformed scholars and statesmen. The persecution of the Philippists furnished them with many staunch supporters from Saxony, &c., *e.g.* Christoph. Pezel, who was zealous for Reformed doctrine in Nassau-Dillenburg, Caspar Cruciger, the younger, † 1597, at Cassel, Widebram, Schönfeld, Gregor Franck, Pierius, and others. Still the members of the Reformed confession were in Germany too dispersed and too much exposed to vicissitudes, especially through war and through their Lutheran surrounding, to be able, in their mostly isolated positions, to carry on a joint, connected,

and independent scientific activity. In the west, where they were still most numerous, they depended chiefly on the theological movements of Holland, and partly also on those of Switzerland. In proportion to their numbers indeed they largely increased their establishments for theological education, but their circle was too narrow to permit them to raise themselves to a more widespread importance.

The universities of Heidelberg and Marburg occupy the first rank. These are followed, though at a considerable distance, by Frankfort on the Oder, which always inclined to Melancthonism, became, after the accession of Sigismund, a Reformed university, with at most one Lutheran tutor,—Duisburg, founded by the great Elector in 1655, and the theological schools of Herborn and Bremen; while the academical gymnasia of Steinfurt (1590), Hamm (1650), Lingen (1697), Hanau (1607), are scarcely worth mentioning.[1]

[1] We subjoin a concise review of the scholarship of the Reformed Church in Germany, compiled chiefly from Tholuck's before-named work, ii. 246-314. (Comp. Heppe, *Dogmatik der deutsch. Protest.* 1857, i. 180-204; Schweizer, *Centraldogmen*, ii. 1856, Div. 2, pp. 246-314.) Of Heidelberg, after its university was, in 1557, dedicated to protestant doctrine, were Casp. Olevian and Z. Ursinus, the author of the *Heidelberg Catechism*, Zanchius, who, as a predestinarian, gave place to the Lutheran Marbach of Strasburg, 1561. (Compare H. Zanchii *de religione christ. fides Neost.* 1585; also Tremellius and Boquin.) These were all, however, at first, so moderate, that even a Hestius and a Klebitz were able to co-operate with them. They still endeavoured, on the whole, to maintain a more moderate type. They were, however, driven from Heidelberg, partly by the violent Lutheranization of the country by Louis VI., partly by the introduction of the Form of Concord. They assembled at the *Gymnasium illustre* at Neustadt on the Hardt, founded by Louis' brother, John Casimir, where, strengthened by others, they constituted an important power in theological controversy. Powerful works against the *Form. Conc.* especially the *Admonitio Neostadiensis* and the *Defensio* of the same, proceeded from the theologians here assembled, during their brief exile from Heidelberg, viz. Franz Junius, Dan. Tossanus, Zanchius, A.D. 1590, and Ursinus. Among the theologians of Heidelberg were subsequently numbered Georg Sohn, the systematizer, 1584-1590, David Pareus, the famous advocate of peace, 1584-1622 (*Irenicon sive de unione et synodo evangelicorum concilianda*), Dan. Tossanus, 1586-1602, successor of Grynäus, Hen. Alting, 1612-22, Abr. Scultetus, 1618-22. The earlier of these, including Sohn, were not as yet willing to embrace Swiss doctrines, but desired to stop at those of Bucer and the Wittenburg Conc. of 1536. Ursinus, the Silesian (comp. his *Doctrinæ christ. compend. s. comment. catech.* Genev. 1584) and Pareus desired to be Unionists of Melancthon's type, the latter especially felt nothing impede his efforts after union except the doctrine of ubiquity. In 1603, however, a controversy on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper broke out within the faculty; Pareus desired to embrace a Presence

With regard to the Swiss universities and theological schools of Basle, Bern, Zurich, Geneva, and Lausanne, these have less an independent history than those of France and the Netherlands,

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of Christ with spiritual participation, while the iconoclast Scultetus, (also a Silesian,) and Pitiscus, insisted on the Zwinglian doctrine of a commemorative meal, because it was equally absurd to think of a spiritual participation of what was corporeal, as of a corporeal participation of what was spiritual. This controversy was silenced by the government. Paul Tossanus, a son of Daniel, and Scultetus, belonged at Dort to the strictest Reformed party. The philologists of Heidelberg were Sylberg, and Keckermann, the gifted and original Pomeranian, from Dantzic, 1592-1602, † at Dantzic 1609. He was an Aristotelian and an opponent of Ramus. He insisted on maintaining philosophy in an independent position, and on leaving politics, ethics, &c., to philosophy, while Amesius of Franecker, a Scotchman, would only acknowledge Christian ethics, which he carried out in a puritanical spirit with reference to the Sabbath, amusements, &c. After war had disturbed the university for a quarter of a century (1626), nay, had endeavoured to convert it into a Jesuit establishment, it was restored, in 1652, by the Elector Charles Louis. Joh. Hen. Hottinger, the elder, the great orientalist and church historian, invited from Zurich, now taught in it for a period of six years, 1655-1661, and Fr. Spanheim, the younger (1655-70, when he removed to Leyden), an acute polemic, an opponent of Coccejus and Cartesius, and an anti-unionist; both were strictly Reformed. Hottinger, however, as subsequently Mieg, 1688, and the polished scholar Joh. Louis Fabricius, 1660, was inclined to to a conservative union. When Spinoza was to be called to the professorial chair, Fabricius carried the condition that he should not interfere with the existing state of church teaching, a condition which induced Spinoza to resign.

In the Philippistic university of Marburg also efforts were made, till towards the close of the sixteenth century, to maintain a moderate type of doctrine between that of the Lutherans and the Reformed. This was the aim of the above-named Sohn, 1574 (*Exegesis præcipuorum articulorum Augustanæ conf.*, 1591; *Synopsis corp. doctr. Ph. Melancthonis*, 1588), and of Cruciger of Wittenburg; and the *Conf. Augs.* of 1540 was then all but universally received by the Reformed of Germany. The pious and able methodologist, A. Hyperius, and Lamb. of Avignon, were indeed of a more Reformed turn of mind, though still in a unionist sense. Now, however, when the strict Lutheran Ægidius Hunnius of Wurtemberg (1574-92) was, in virtue of the joint government of both confessions, appointed in the same year with Sohn, the two could not agree. The *Form. Conc.*, however, brought on the crisis. Upper Hesse was for, Lower Hesse against it. Sohn was obliged to yield, because at first no room was left for a more moderate tendency, and Hunnius because of his strict Lutheranism. Since, however, Upper Hesse was for a long time decidedly Lutheran, and the attempt of Moritz to make all Hesse Reformed, and that of his successor to abolish Marburg, and permanently to transfer its students and professors to the Lutheran university of Giessen, both failed, the end was that Hesse was divided into a Lutheran portion with the university of Giessen, and a Reformed, with that of Marburg. Moritz's "points of improvement" having driven B. Mentzer and Winckelmann from Marburg, these theologians found a reception at Giessen. After the Synod of Dort, to which Cruciger, Angelokrator, and Goclenius were sent as deputies on the part of Hesse, the teaching at Marburg became more predestinarian, although the resolutions of

and rather depended, during the seventeenth century, on the latter, until in the eighteenth the German influence became the more powerful. They were able however, in virtue of their

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this synod were regarded as binding in scarcely any part of Germany. This phase of doctrine is denoted by the names of Eglin (about 1618), G. Cruciger, and Heine (1661). The latter, together with Seb. Curtius, conducted the Cassel discussion with Lutheran theologians. John Crocius, † 1659, however, the most famous of all the Marburg theologians, though a staunch defender of the Reformed system against Catholics, Lutherans, and Weigelians, took up a more moderate position. Sam. Andreä, † 1699, favoured, though cautiously, the Coccejan and Cartesian systems, defending Coccejan tenets against Alting, and Cartesian against Zwinger of Zurich, but also predestination against Musæus.

A milder type of doctrine prevailed in the university of Frankfort on the Oder, in spite of Andr. Musculus, the co-operator in the "Torgisches Buch," and the Form of Concord was not accepted. Heidenreich, A.D. 1617, and Pelargus, who represented the standpoint of the union which results from the admission that both confessions equally possess the fundamental and saving truths, ordained both Lutheran and Reformed clergymen, and created both Lutheran and Reformed doctors. John Berg, the court chaplain, was also a universalist and antipredestinarian. Its later theologians, however, *e.g.*, Wolfg. Crell, 1618, and Christoph. Becmann, 1676-1717, were predestinarians, and the first named a supralapsarian. On the other hand, the notion of union was still entertained by Greg. Franck, A.D. 1651, who found the difference between the confessions no greater than that between the Gospel of St. Matthew and those of St. Luke or St. John, and with a leaning towards Anglicanism, by Sam. Strimelius, 1696-1730, and Holzfuss, † 1717.

Of Duisberg, which from the very first was favourable to the Coccejan and Cartesian systems, the following may be mentioned. Joh. Clanberg, expelled from Herborn as a Cartesian, and the first professor who lectured on the new philosophy at a German university, 1656-65. He was the author of the *Ars Etymologica*, and highly esteemed by Leibnitz as an expounder of Cartesius. Hen. Hulsius, 1684-1723, who went as far as Cartesian rationalism, after the manner of A. Roëll, and Martin Hundius, 1655-66, a Coccejan. The most noted theologians of this university were, however, the systematizer Van Diest, 1657-64, and Peter v. Maestricht, subsequently, 1670-77, of Frankfort, and then called to be the successor of Voetius, chiefly famous on account of his work, *Theoretico-practica theologia*, Traj. ad Rh., 1699, 4, in which he combines exegetical and dogmatical with controversial and practical matters, and even gives a sketch of Church history from the beginning of the world, of morals and asceticism; and finally, in the eighteenth century, Gerdes, the Church historian, subsequently, 1726-68, of Gröningen. Duisberg was rather a place of transition to the more famous scholars, and this was still more the case with the academic gymnasia, which must now be briefly noticed.

The high school of Herborn, founded 1584, rose to greater importance than either Duisberg or Frankfort. Its chief ornaments were Olevian and Joh. Piscator. After Zanchi's advocacy of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, Olevian and Piscator wrote doctrinal compendiums as epitomes or aphorisms of Calvin's *Institut. rel. chr.* (Heppe, pp. 184, 185). Olevian also wrote the *Expositio symb. apost.*, 1576, and *De substantia fœderis gratuiti*, 1585, a prelude to the theology

more practical spirit, to keep themselves at a tolerable distance from scholastic theology. A stiffer orthodoxy, however, began to prevail in these universities also towards the middle of the century, when the innovations of French theology threatened

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of the covenant. Piscator, educated at Strasburg and Tubingen, taught at Heidelberg in 1574, at Neustadt on the Hardt in 1578, at Herborn from 1584 to 1625. His government quietly allowed him to bring forward in his public lectures his denial of the redeeming efficacy of Christ's active obedience. This doctrine was however rejected by several French synods, and by most Reformed theologians, though favoured by a few, *e.g.* Pareus, Scultetus, Alting, Cameron, Blondell, Cappell, La Placette. Piscator was, in opposition to Wolleb, Pareus, and others, a decided Ramist. Compare his *Aphorismi doctr. Christ. ex Instit. Calvini excerpti, seu loci comm. theologici*, ed. 2, 1592. It was as an exegete and translator of Scripture that he was chiefly distinguished, as was also Pasor, 1615-26 (subsequently of Franecker), author of the first New Testament lexicon, who denied that there are any Hebraisms in the New Testament, and was the predecessor of Pfochen in such purism. Among the systematic theologians of Herborn were Matthias Martinius, the philologist, † 1630, Bremen (*Christianæ doctrinæ summa capita*, Herb. 1603, of which the *Methodus ss. theologiæ in iv. libros divisiæ* forms a second part; *Summula s. theologiæ*, Bremen, 1610); and especially Joh. Hen. Alsted, from 1619 onwards, and subsequently of Weissenburg in Siebenburgen (*Theologia scholastica exhibens locos comm. theolog. methodo scholastica*), † 1638, deputy to Dort, a stiff formalist, and addicted to a refined kind of Chiliasm. After the devastations of the war he was succeeded by Nethenius, 1669, a strict Voetian and fanatic predestinarian, who could not refrain from expressing in his lectures, sermons, and prayers, his persuasion of Adam's eternal damnation. Subsequently to 1676 John Melchior of Solingen distinguished himself at Herborn. He was inclined to the Coccejan theology, and to a *Chiliasmus subtilis*, was an ardent advocate of practical theology, and specially deserves notice for his clear recognition of the evangelical principle. He based his theology upon the experience of faith (*sensus*), which he intimately combined with *conscientia*. This enabled him, as an orthodox teacher, to maintain in his treatises *De demonstratione veritatis ad conscientiam*; *Principium credendi rationale orthodoxum*, and *De necessitate et sufficientia credendorum*, that the power of accrediting itself to the mind is to be attributed to the *contents* of the Gospel, in opposition to the inner light of enthusiasts, but not less so in opposition to the external authority of the Church. This is effected not merely by the inward certitude resulting from the appeased cravings of the man who embraces the Gospel, but by the purification and strengthening of the conscience by the Holy Ghost, by the increased love of truth which He bestows, and to which the Gospel approves itself on sure grounds as something favourable to the conscience, thus producing a free acquiescence, which is more than mere faith for the sake of the authority of Holy Scripture. To say this is not indeed to assume a faith in the divine nature of Holy Scripture, but this he says is not, at first, necessary; for our Church does not place this faith, but faith in the truths of Holy Scripture in the first place. He also evinces, in his controversy with Nicole, a deeper insight with respect to the fundamental articles (comp. Tholuck, *d. akad. Leben*, ii. 310). In 1690, the eccentric Horch, who was connected with the separatists, was called to Herborn, but dismissed in 1698.

to introduce confusion and separation into the Church.[1] The course of studies at these Reformed institutions, which were provided with two, or at most with three, tutors, consisted,

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The Bremen gymnasium was the scene of the labours not only of its founder Chr. Pezel, but of the above-named Math. Martini, 1610; Ludwig Crocius, † 1655, author of the *Syntagma s. theologiæ* in four books, Brem. 1636, brother of Joh. Crocius of Marburg; Coccejus, 1629-36; and Conr. Berg, son of the famous court chaplain, 1629-42. Among later names that of Nicol Gürtler, 1696-99, author of the *Systema theologiæ propheticæ* is the most famous. He afterwards taught at Deventer and Franecker. Martini, Isselberg and Crocius were the Bremen deputies to Dort, and their instructions were of a moderate character. All three, as also C. Berg, and Herm. Hildebrand, his successor, † 1649, were Universalists, devoted to the Union, and kindred spirits with Calixtus and Coccejus. They were however opposed by the strict John Combach, 1639-43, who was antagonistic to the then prevailing spirit of Bremen, and the result of the resolutions of the Synod of Dort, and of the Dutch controversy against Coccejus was, that a stricter trope of doctrine obtained in Bremen. Flockenius, the Particularist, who followed in Combach's steps, taught there after 1656. Lodenstein, La Badie, and Undereyk, afterwards exerted an influence in Bremen, by means of their hearty and arousing preaching, and this active and earnest tendency, which was akin to Pietism, found its classical advocate in Lampe, 1709-1720 (*Einl. zum Geheimniss des Gnadenbundes*, Brem. 1712; *Comment. zum Evang. Johannis*, 1723), afterwards of Utrecht till 1727, when he returned to Bremen.

Steinfurt was the scene of the labours of Conrad Vorstius, the independent and acute systematic of a freer tendency. His views were anti-predestinarian, nay, approximated to Socinianism, his doctrine of Deity original (comp. my treatise on the Unchangeableness of God in the *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 1857, pp. 478, &c.), and from 1659-65 of the systematic Heidegger, subsequently of Zurich. Of Hanau were Joh. Rud. Lavater, Caspar Waser, Gürtler, of Lingen from 1674, Pontanus, and in the eighteenth century, Stosch and Elsner, the exegetes. In the gymnasium of Zerbst, Mark Fr. Wendelin, whose *Compendium Christ. Theol.* lib. iii. 1634, and *Christianæ theol. systema*, 1656, follow the scholastic method taught from 1611 to 1652.

[1] Basle had in the time of the antistes Sulzer, who also fulfilled the functions of Lutheran superintendent, 1553-85, and Joh. Jas. Grynæus, 1586, &c., maintained a moderate tendency tinged by Humanism and the influence of Erasmus, and occupying no exclusive position with regard to a temperate Lutheranism. It can boast of those distinguished orientalists, the elder and younger Buxtorff, 1590-1629 and 1647-1664. The former in his *Tiberias*, 1620, strictly advocates the genuineness and inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points, a work which his son, Joh. Buxtorff, felt himself obliged, in the honour of his father, zealously to defend against Cappellus. This gave rise to a controversy, said to be settled in favour of Buxtorff in the *Form. Cons. Helv.* The most important systematics of Basle were Polanus, 1596-1610, a native of Silesia, where Philippism prevailed, and Wolleb, 1618-1629, author of a widely-circulated manual of divinity and morals, (*Wollebii Compendium Theol. Christ.*, 1626, a work of classical conciseness, clearness, and acuteness, which may be compared with the Lutheran *Baier*). But most influential in the Church at Basle were the professors, and antistites Zwinger, 1629-54, who accomplished the introduction of the *Confess. Helv.* into

as at Lutheran institutions, in attendance upon lectures on philosophy (especially dialectics and rhetoric) and catechetical theology, by which was understood a popular system of divinity. To this was sometimes added a course on methodical

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Basle, and Gernler, son-in-law of the former. They were the forerunners of a strict confessional epoch in Basle, and it was at Gernler's proposition that the Basle Convention adopted Heidegger's *Form. Cons.*, though favourers of the French theology, *e.g.*, Joh. and Rud. Wetstein the elder, great uncle of the critic, † 1684, were not wanting even in Basle. Gernler's successor, Peter Werenfels, † 1703, was however inclined to more moderation, and, at the instance of the Elector, effected an abolition of the obligation to this new symbol. His son, Sam. Werenfels, 1685-1740, intimately connected with Ostervald of Neufchatel, and Alph. Turretin of Geneva, already represented an accommodation between orthodoxy and Pietism in a unionist sense (Hagenbach, *Jubelsch. der Univ. Basel*, 1860).

Berne entered less deeply than Basle into theology. The divines and exegetes Wolfg. Musculus, 1549-63 (*Loci comm. s. Theologiæ*, 1563), and Bened. Aretius, 1563-1574 (*Problematum theologicum*, pt. ii. Lausanne, 1578), were followed by but few names of note. The council neglected the university, and sought to constrain the conscience by force. Beside Dan. Wyss, the philosopher, who was prohibited from teaching the Cartesian philosophy, need be named only Rud. Rodolph, 1675-1718, the moralist. (Comp. Schweizer, *die Entwicklung des Moralsystems der reformirten Kirche. Stud. und Kritik*, 1850, and Rodolphi *Catechesis Palatina*, 1697.) The *Form. Cons.* remained binding far into the eighteenth century. Cartesianism, in a rationalistic form, however, effected an entrance in Ringier, the disciple of Roëll, while Stapfer was a Wolffian.

In Zurich, as elsewhere, a more biblical and exegetical tendency at first prevailed. This is represented by the names of Bibliander, Pellican, Petr. Martyr (P. Martyr Vermilii, *Loci comm.* Heidelb. 1580), Gualterus, Lud. Lavater, and especially H. Bullinger (comp. *De scripturæ sanctæ auctoritate, certudine, firmitate, et absoluta perfectione*, &c., *Heinrychi Bullingeri*, lib. vii. Tig. 1538.) Rud. Hospinian, however, the Church historian, already assumed a more irritable confessional tone (*Concordia discors seu de origine et progressu Formul. Concord. Bergensis*, 1617 ; *De orig. et progr. controversiæ sacramentariæ*, 1602-1598, 2 vols.). P. Martyr obtained the adhesion of the Church of Zurich to the stricter predestinarianism in 1561, on the occasion of the Zurich memorial on Zanchi's controversy with Marbach of Strasburg, 1561. In the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, Zurich, in spite of the *Consensus Tig.*, did not decidedly advance to the tenets of Calvin, but rather stopped at the doctrine of Zwinglius, and rejected the tenet of the French Synod of Gap: that we are refreshed by the substance of Christ's body and blood. At Dort, Zurich espoused the stricter side. This was greatly owing to the worthy and learned John Jas. Breitinger, who, after 1613, was the actual ruler of the Church of Zurich. He did not, however, refuse friendly relations with Lutherans, while Caspar Waser, the orientalist, † 1625, and John Jas. Huldricus, † 1638, had even a greater leaning towards union, the former because he preferred the simple words of Scripture, the latter because the unanimity of all concerning all passages of Scripture is unattainable. A stricter insistance upon orthodoxy was inaugurated by the antistes Irminger and Prof. Stucki, † 1660, and the Universalism of a Zink was threatened with summary

theology. At first, when the study of Scripture was more cultivated, philology, and especially the Hebrew and the Oriental languages, were sedulously pursued, and dogmatic theology (the science of the *loci*) was esteemed subordinate, the different single *loci* being often deduced, by way of appendix, from single exegetical paragraphs. But in the seventeenth century (among the Reformed after the Synod of Dort, 1618) a great change may be perceived. For then controversial divinity became the chief study for two or three years, and the lectures usually embracing but a single *locus*, it was very long before the whole system was got through. Numerous debates and similar exercises kept the

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punishment. Joh. Heinr. Hottinger (author of the *Hist. ecclesiast. N. T.* vol. ix.), distinguished both as an orientalist and historian, was, subsequently to 1642, an honour to Zurich (see above, Heidelberg), and, in the main, of a more conciliatory disposition. But his successor, J. H. Heidegger, 1667 (till 1661 of Steinfurt, and afterwards Professor of Ethics at Zurich), was the author of the *Form. Cons. Helv.* (also of the *Medulla Theol. Christianæ*, ed. 2, 1713, and of the *Hist. Papatus*, published with Guicciardini's *Hist. Papatus* at Amsterdam, 1684). It was not from harsh scholastic dogmatism, nor for the sake of excommunicating others, but to secure the unity of the Church against innovations, that he advocated the full strictness of the symbolical system, nay, exceeded it, by the tenet concerning the inspiration even of the points and accents of the Old Testament. He had no objection to regard the vowel points as recent, if only the antiquity of the identical sense of the present readings were admitted, but thought it safer to derive the vowel points themselves from Adam, Moses, Ezra, or some other inspired prophet (Tholuck, *d. akad. Leben*, ii. 373). Caspar Suicer, 1649-84, author of the *Thesaurus ecclesiasticus*, 2 vols. fol. 1684, a cyclopedia of information, and the result of twenty years' industry, was another distinguished biblical philologist. Heidegger was succeeded by Joh. Jas. Hottinger, son of the elder Hottinger. He was zealously devoted to the resolutions of the Synod of Dort and opposed to Pietism, which, however, penetrated even into the University of Zurich in the person of Joh. Jas. Ulrich, 1710. The Cartesian philosophy and the doctrines of Coccejus had but little influence in Switzerland. The latter were represented only by Chouet of Geneva, 1666-86.

Among the theologians of Lausanne, where Beza once taught, may be mentioned Will. Bucanus, 1591 (G. Bucani, *Loci Communes*, 1602; *Institutiones Theologicæ*, 1605). The college founded at Geneva by Calvin in 1559, in which not only himself, but also Beza and Danæus the ethicist, 1572-81, had taught (Danæus Lamb. *Ethice Christiana*, and *Isagoge Christiana*, 1591), numbered among its teachers, besides the great philologist Jas. Scaliger, 1572-78, Is. Casaubonus, 1582-96, Diodati, 1609-49, Bened. Turretin, 1612-31, and Theod. Tronchin, 1615-57, the learned Fred. Spanheim the elder, 1631-41, subsequently of Leyden, and Fran. Turretin, 1653 (*Institutio Theologiæ elencticæ*, 1679). They represent the period of strict symbolical orthodoxy in Geneva. The more liberal theology of Saumur then made its influence felt, and advanced in some respects towards rationalism by means of Philip Mestrezat, Alex. Morus, and Louis Tronchin. Basnage, Bayle and Clericus, studied at Geneva at about this time. An anti-

attention alive, and induced much dialectic skill of a formal kind. While this state of things prevailed *Christian ethics* were for a long time unrepresented by any chair, and were either left to the philosophical faculty, or interwoven into divinity as a kind of appendage, or found in practical theology as the ethic element in the *Casus conscientia.* A lively interest in ethics was however earlier manifested in the Reformed than in the Lutheran Church, in which it was not till the times of Calixtus and still more of Spener that this study was sedulously pursued.[1] *Historical theology* too was, like ethics, left to the philosophical faculty,[2] to the professor of history, who was certain to lecture upon it in conformity with the four kingdoms of Daniel, and from the Christian standpoint. The history of doctrines was indeed, in the interest of controversy and of "testimony to correctness of doctrine," at all times made a subject of study. But this practical object obscured, and as it were confused, the historical vision. The Magdeburg centuriators had themselves occupied this position, yet their connected work, grand as it was of its kind, was in the main neglected, till Calixtus, besides whom Micraelius, Kortholt of Kiel, Bebel of Wittenberg and Strasburg, who preceded Pfaff, and Mosheim, may be mentioned as at least respectable. In the Reformed Church, these were equalled by Gerh. Vossius, Joh. Hen. Hottinger of Heidelberg and Zurich, and Gerdes of Duisberg and Gröningen, † 1768. The more practical and biblical feeling of the Swiss and of most of the German Reformed, and the taste for scholastic disputation which for some time prevailed, especially in Holland, was unfavourable to a tranquil absorption in historical contemplations. The branch of the Reformed Church found in France, though here too the controversial interest predominated, did more in this line, as the names

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symbolic but pious toleration was introduced by Joh. Alph. Turretin, 1697 (*Dilucidationes philosophico-theologico-dogmatico-morales;* on the principles of natural and revealed religion, vols. i. ii., 1711, see Basil, 1748), and Bened. Pictet (B. Pictet, *Morale chrétienne*, 1697, *Medulla Theologiæ diduct. et elencticæ*, 1711). Comp. besides Tholuck's above-cited work, especially A. Schweizer's *Centraldogmen*, ii.

[1] Tholuck, *akad. Leben*, i. 85-121 and 231-40. Henke's *Calixtus*, i. 20, &c. 421, &c.

[2] Among Lutheran writers on theological methodology and isagogics are Hyperius of Marburg (*De recte formando Theolog. studio*, 1556, Alsted. 1623), Joh. Gerhard (*Methodus stud. theol.*), and Spener, after Dannhauer's *Hodosophia.*

of Daillé, Blondel, Jas. Basnage, &c. prove. The most favourable soil for historical theology in the Reformed Church was however furnished by England and the Anglican Church (see below). Forbes, a Scotchman, also distinguished himself by his profound historical investigations, *e.g.* concerning the meaning of the Pope's infallibility when speaking *ex cathedra*. In the eighteenth century, the professorship of ecclesiastical history was still frequently combined with that of practical theology, to which actual ministrations were generally united. The exigencies of the Church caused *practical theology* to be much cultivated, especially *Homiletics*, in which the skilful formation of several schemes for sermons from one text was made the chief matter. This was also the case with pastoral theology, to which still belonged, by reason of the retention of private confession in the Lutheran Church till the era of Pietism, the treatment of cases of conscience according to mediæval practice. Subsequently to Coccejus, Calixtus, and especially Spener, catechizing became more general. The treatment of practical theology on scientific principles was still however lacking, and homiletical and catechetical instruction was as yet encumbered by mechanical technology. The Reformed "prophesyings," *i.e.* colloquies with the Bible searching portion of the congregation, at first flourished at Zurich, and in the Lower Rhine. These, which were the forerunners, in church form, of the *Collegia Biblica* of Spener's time, disappeared in the seventeenth century, when the interest in the study of Scripture grew cold. In the time of Spener, this study had almost ceased in the Lutheran universities of Germany.

We now turn, after these introductory notices, to the history of theology in the Reformed Churches. The scholastic method, with its recurrence to Aristotle, was regarded by many with suspicion, as threatening the interests of practical religion.[1] The desire, however, one might even say the necessity, of making sure of the possessions already acquired, had an irresistible influence in the naturalization of a method which was, beyond any other, adapted to direct the scientific instinct, not so much to an investigation of contents, as to an elaboration of the given, to the defence of existing dogmas, as of an unalterable quantity. For a short period, indeed, a reaction against the

[1] Comp. Tholuck, *d. akad. Leben*, ii. 3, &c.

Aristotelian philosophy seemed likely to be successful. Peter Ramus, formerly professor at the Royal College of Paris, born 1515, attacked Aristotle by means both of attractive lectures and violent controversy, and promised a new philosophy. Having, in 1561, seceded to the Protestant Church, and been consequently deprived of his professorship, he began to obtain great influence, especially among the Reformed. He was one of the victims of St. Bartholomew's night. But though numerous attempts were made to introduce his method, *e.g.* into Holland, Geneva, Herborn, and even Helmstedt, it was unable to attain any lasting influence. The obstacle to this was not only that widely spread adherence to Aristotle which made such men as Theodore Beza, Pareus, Ursinus, Keckermann, Gomarus, and Voetius his opponents, but also, and chiefly, the superficiality by which he courted popularity, and that repugnance to an investigation of principles which was peculiar to him, such investigation being impossible without those speculative discussions which he regarded as mere empty subtleties.[1] Thus through the absence of any other kind of scientific method, and the superiority of Aristotelian formal virtuososhiip, his attempt to create a reaction soon succumbed, and only helped to confirm the supremacy of Aristotle in Protestant theology, without respect to confessions, and to introduce its modern scholastic period.

And yet the form of scholasticism which was to establish for all ages the original predestinarian aspect of the Reformed system, and thereby to give it consistency, never attained unquestioned authority. And this not merely because the Lutheran Church, during the seventeenth century, more and more decidedly renounced Predestinarianism, and thus offered an efficient nucleus for opposition especially to the Reformed in Germany, but also because the principle of universalism reacted against that of particularism in the counsel of salvation within the Reformed Church itself. This was the case in Holland, France,

[1] Keckermann (in his *Præcognitorum philosophicorum*, lib. ii. *naturam philosophiæ explicantes et rationum ejus, tum docendæ tum discendæ monstrantes*, Hanov. 1618, i. 11, 8) blames him not only for his intricacy, but also because, while rejecting metaphysics as a barren science, he is incapable of deducing the particular from a general knowledge of the nature of all things, and is, on the contrary, satisfied with superficial definitions and divisions which express nothing decisive. The rejection, he says, of technical terms does not of itself produce profounder knowledge. Comp. Tholuck, *d. akad. Leben*, ii. 3, &c.

and England successively, and at last, in the eighteenth century, in Switzerland also, where by means of Heidegger's *Form. Cons. Helvet.* the attempt was made even in 1675 to decide as far as possible against it. The *Confessio Sigismundi*, 1613, denies an absolute decree of individual reprobation (*decretum reprobationis*), while, even after the Synod of Dort, the Reformed Hessian and Margraviate theologians for the most part went no further than to dwell upon unbelief as the cause of reprobation.

In France patristic scholarship for a period prevailed, being advocated by men so distinguished as David Blondel, 1591-1655 (successor in 1650 to the learned Vossius of Amsterdam), Daillé, 1594-1670, and others, whose writings were for the most part calculated to serve a controversial and apologetic purpose against Catholicism.[1] The influence of Geneva and of Beza was still for some time dominant at the academy of Sedan, where the controversialist P. du Moulin (Molinæus) and Will. Rivet, brother of Andrew of Leyden, taught. In the school of Saumur, on the contrary, an opposition to absolute predestination was commenced by Cameron about 1618, and extended and carried on by his pupils, Moses Amyraud (Amyraldus)[2] and Paul Testard. This called forth the more antagonism, inasmuch as the school of Saumur was speedily attaining that high degree of prosperity which lasted till 1660, through men of a more liberal theology, such as Joshua La Place (Placæus) and Ludovi-

[1] As *e.g.* Blondel's investigations concerning the papistic primacy in 1641, and the episcopate in 1646; his Pseudo-Isidorus, 1628; Daillé's *De usu patrum in decidendis controversiis*, 1656, and others. Basnage answered Bossuet's *Histoire des variations des églises Protest.* by a *History of the Christian Church* in 2 vols. fol. 1699, and a *History of the Reformed Church*, 2 vols. 1690. Jurieu replied to Maimbourg's attack upon Calvinism, 1683, and Arnaud's upon Reformed ethics, 1675. Beausobre's *Histoire critique de Manichée et du Manichéisme*, Amst., has also the apologetic purpose of proving the Christian continuity or apostolical succession of Reformed doctrines, in opposition to Roman Catholicism. We pass over numerous other works by these scholars, dedicated to critical investigations of single articles, such as purgatory, image worship, adoration of saints, the sacrifice of the mass, &c., and name only Dan. Chamier's *Panstratiæ catholicæ seu controversiarum de religione adversus Pontificios corpus*, 4 vols. Geneva, 1626 (to which a fifth vol. on the Church was added by Alsted in 1629), and Claude's *Défense de la Réformation*, 1673, against Nicole, Arnaud, and others.

[2] Amyraud, *Traité de la Prédestination*, 1643. Amyraud was chosen pastor at Saumur in the place of Daillé in 1625, and professor of theology in 1631. Comp. A. Schweizer, art. *Amyraud* in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*, i. 292, &c., and his treatise in Baur's *Theol. Jahrb.* 1852, i. 2.

cus Cappellus.[1] An opposition to the Calvinistic system was now formed among these kindred spirits, who, in the three leading controversies of the French Church, attacked the salient points of this doctrine of predestination, and in a fourth, opposed in an important respect the scholastic view of the principle of Scripture. Reformed orthodoxy was indeed less violently opposed to Amyraldism in France than in Switzerland, where Heidegger and Herminger of Zurich, Gernler and J. Zwinger[2] of Basle, and Fran. Turretin of Geneva,[3] were numbered among its adversaries; and in Holland, where Maccovius, Andr. Rivetus, Fr. Spanheim of Leyden, and others,[4] equally contended against it. They even forbade all intercourse with Saumur, but were unable to carry out a second secession.

An apologetic interest for the doctrine of predestination impelled Amyraud to endeavour to find room for the universalism of grace beside the particularism of effective salvation. His view was, that there was with God a general purpose of grace for believers. In conformity with this, it was possible for all to be saved, if only they believed. This all would have been capable of doing if sin had not existed. All are however under the power of sin (in an infralapsarian sense), and therefore not able of themselves to believe. Hence this general decree still remains quite ineffective, and is regarded only as ideal. God therefore supplements this first decree by a second. This is irresistibly efficacious in spite of sin, but only for the elect. This theory was called hypothetical universalism, inasmuch as salvation was made to depend upon a faith which was in the abstract possible. It is however an unmistakeable inconsistency for the first purpose decidedly to bring forward the universal love of God, which the second, without any reason being pointed out, abolishes and makes merely particular. The dualism thus supposed (*i.e.* unchangeableness and mobility) in the Divine decree is, however, no longer purely Calvinistic; it already reminds of the federal theology, in such wise indeed, that while in His first decree God

[1] Even at Geneva the theology of Saumur found adherents in Louis Tronchet and Phil. Mestrezat. The latter was inclined to Arminianism.

[2] Comp. A. Schweizer, *Centraldogmen*, ii. 340, &c.

[3] F. Turretini *Instit. theologiæ elencticæ*, Genev. 1679, &c.

[4] Fr. Spanhemii *Disp. de gratia universali*, 1644, and the *Exercitationes de gratia univ.*, &c. 1646. He also wrote several works against Anabaptism.

promises salvation only to those who believe, by His second He grants faith and forgiveness only to some. Thus Amyraud's doctrine is distinguished from Arminianism, against which he also wrote, by the fact that the latter makes all participate in that pardoning grace upon which all depend, by bestowing upon them the means of believing, a point to which Lutheran doctrine also tends. The latter however is obliged, on account of its doctrine of original sin, to inculcate an irresistible general operation of grace creating the possibility of believing, while, according to Arminianism, every one is of himself capable of believing. The difference between Amyraud's and orthodox doctrine consists —since no one can really be saved by this universalism—only in the attempt to preserve the universality[1] of a purpose of grace so far as God's own nature is concerned, and thus to maintain that love is the very inmost power in God, lest it should teach the original existence in Him of a will which denies salvation together with a will which grants it. But he did not consider that the inmost nature of God can not be unaffected by this dualism, if the decree of efficient redemption is only particular. Amyraud only avoids the reproach cast upon supralapsarianism, of making God Himself guilty of that sin which He condemns, by being able to say with Augustine, whose infralapsarianism he really favours, that the original cause of the denial of saving grace is not an absence of loving purpose in God, and that the perdition of any is caused by his own voluntary fall into sin. Thus while a tendency to universalism was indeed manifested in Amyraud, he essentially adhered to the old system. Hence David Blondel, Daillé, and Benj. Basnage, president of the national synod at Alençon, 1637, men of minds akin to his own, were able to protect him, at least in France, from condemnation for heterodoxy.

The Amyraldian controversy was however followed by a second, relating to the consequences of the Adamic sin, and occasioned by Joshua La Place. If infralapsarianism said: The condemnation with which some are visited is no injustice, because it is owing to that fall of Adam in which we are all involved, it might be replied: This would certainly be the case

[1] The ethic tendency of Amyraud is shown in his copious treatise on morals: *La Morale chrétienne*, 6 vols. 1652, &c., as well as in his endeavour not to conceive of grace as merely sovereign.

if we had been personally present and active in this fall, or if it could be proved that Divine justice was, for any reason, acting rightly in treating Adam's posterity as guilty. On the part of the Calvinists, among whom the view that God should punish sin by sin met with little opposition, the attempt had been made to prove that this is the case, by the assertion that the general corruption of the race was decreed as a punishment for the fall, or as a judgment, and that this corruption makes them deserving of condemnation. Orthodoxy, on its part, sought to establish that direct participation in *Adam's guilt* which consisted in the transmission to all men of a penal state from the time of Adam's sin, by regarding Adam as the representative head of mankind, and also as the man with whom God had made a covenant in the name of the race, to the consequences of which the latter was subject. Now Placæus will neither admit that God inflicts, as a punishment, that sin which is itself worthy of punishment, nor agree to a direct imputation of Adam's guilt to his descendants.[1] On the contrary, he insists—and thus approximates to Lutheran doctrine—that God regards us as sinners, and as deserving of punishment, on account of that corruption which has become *our own;* and that it is only indirectly, and because of this *our own* corruption, that God can impute to us Adam's sin. There is no decree which so involves us in Adam's punishment, that we thereby become sinners. The transmission of Adam's sin to us is not effected by his being physically and morally our covenant head, it is simply a natural consequence of Adam's sin, and not a judgment upon his posterity. Thus, as far as sin and guilt are concerned, Adam only occupies the position of the first in a series, becoming indeed the propagating causality, as are we also to our descendants; but not the judicial cause of the infliction of sinfulness or condemnation upon us, his posterity. The Synod of Charenton decided against him in 1645. Amyraud attempted, though insufficiently, to defend Divine love with regard to salvation and perdition; but Placæus fell back more decidedly on the moral character of God in respect of justice also, and would not suffer sin to be conceived of as brought about by His agency, even under the form of a judgment against it. The same ethic feature also appears in the fact

[1] Placæus, *De Statu Hominis lapsi ante Gratiam*, 1640, and his *Disp. de primi peccati imputatione*. Comp. J. Müller, *Lehre von der Sünde*, ii. p. 453, &c.

that he insists upon treating the sin which has become *our own* through inheritance, and not the imputed sin and guilt of Adam as the direct cause of punishment. But as this obviously lays weight upon the personality of man, in opposition to his connection with his species, at least so far as the decision of his final destiny is concerned, it already involved a germ of opposition to the third salient point of the Calvinistic system, which became in Pajonism the object of the third chief controversy.

This related to the *irresistibility of the agency of the Divine Grace,* which was embraced not only by Calvin, but also, in opposition to semi-Pelagianism and Synergism, by Lutheran orthodoxy. If it be regarded as certain that not all are partakers of grace, and if this does not result from a sentence of God upon the sin of Adam, but from the sin of man himself, it is an obvious inconsequence to refer the continuance of unbelief and the perdition of the individual either, with Amyraud, to God's non-election or, with Placæus, to his own but irresistibly inherited sin, which must after all be connected with a Divine decree. The universal inheritance of sin, which abolished the power of believing, could only be reconciled if accompanied by an equally universal and irresistible agency of grace, in virtue of which the power of believing would be restored to all the descendants of Adam. But even ancient Lutheran theology had not ventured upon so wide a departure from the doctrine of particular election. Still less was such a departure contemplated by Claude Pajon,[1] who, on the contrary, weakened both the Calvinistic form of the doctrine of predestination, and the common Protestant doctrine of original sin, in order to escape the necessity of an irresistible agency of the Holy Spirit. Experience shows that all are not converted. If conversion depends upon an irresistible operation of grace, this must, to explain such a fact, be conceived of as particular, which is to be avoided. The reason then of the dissimilar results of the Gospel must lie with the world. In this case the alternatives which offer an explanation are human freedom and the joint influence of external circumstances, either of which may work with determining effect in the direction of conversion. Pajon decided for the latter. He

[1] His chief work is his *Examen du livre qui porte pour titre, Préjugez contre les Calvinistes* (by P. Nicole), 1673. He only orally delivered his heterodox views. Comp. Al. Schweizer, *Centraldogmen der reformirten Kirche*, ii. 564, &c., 576, &c., 600, and his treatise on Pajonism in Baur's *theol. Jahrb.* 1853.

rejects self-redemption, but thinks that original sin has no such power as to render irresistible grace necessary. Man needs but to be aroused by enlightenment, which he conceives of as having a determining effect upon the will, a notion to which his predecessors at Saumur were already inclined. *The agency of the Word* is all that is needed. In this, when favoured by external circumstances, a logically moral efficacy is inherent, apart from any agency of the Holy Spirit. The will, he thinks, is entirely dependent upon knowledge, nothing is required but the knowledge of the truth, and this is secured by the Word, without any direct reference to the Holy Spirit. Such operations of grace as he admits he transfers to Holy Scripture. The Holy Ghost has abdicated His agency to the Word. It is evident that an intellectualism was here taking the place of the ethico-religious spirit of the Reformers, and that God was thus, by a strange intermixture of deism and supernaturalism, put in the background by His Word being made the substitute for Himself. Pajonism forms a remarkable parallel to the intellectualistic degeneration—a degeneration leading even to deism—which Lutheran orthodoxy will at its climax exhibit to our view.[1]

Far more important than these modifications of the Reformed material principle was the relaxation which took place in Reformed theology, in respect of the *self-certitude of Faith*, and which manifested itself in an exaggeration of the formal principle. In this the two Buxtorffs of Basle, 1564-1629 and 1599-1664, played conspicuous parts.[2] The elder was the great rabbinical scholar of his age, the younger was more narrow-minded and scrupulous. The tendency of both was however to make everything depend upon the literal inspiration of Holy Scripture and the incorruptness of the text of the Old Testament. From their association with rabbis they imbibed so legal a kind of reverence for the Old Testament, that they considered it essential to prove that even the vowels of the Old Testament text, as

[1] With Pajon agreed Le Cène, Papin, L'Enfant, Alix, Du Vidal. His chief opponent was Jurieu of Sedan. After the cruel dispersion of the Church by Louis XIV., 1681, Jurieu and many others resided, as refugees, in Holland. He staunchly defended Reformed orthodoxy in his *Traité de la nature et de la grace, ou du concours général de la Providence et du concours particulier de la grace efficace*, &c., Utrecht, 1687. So also did Melch. Leydecker, † 1721, in his *Veritas evangelica triumphans*, and Fr. Spanheim, *Controversiarum Elenchus*, 1688, 4to. Comp. A. Schweizer, *id.* ii. 573.

[2] Hagenbach's *Jubelschrift der Universität Basel*, 1860.

handed down by the Jews, were inspired.[1] They were opposed by the above-named L. Cappellus.[2] The elder Buxtorff insisted upon the authorship of the sacred writers, in the case of the vowel points, as the safest view, but the younger gave a more decidedly doctrinal turn to the matter, by making this necessary to the inspiration of Holy Scripture,[3] and the *Form. Consens. Eccles. Helvet.* (1676) gave symbolical authority to the view, that the Hebrew codex, according to both its consonants and vowels or points, or, at all events, according to the signification of the points, was inspired by God,—a view which immediately found hearty acceptance in the Lutheran Church also.[4] The younger Buxtorff held that the punctuation had descended partly from Moses, partly from Ezra. The dispute grew violent, because Cappellus urged a revision of the text by a change of vocalization, and (after De Dieu's example) by a comparison of translations, and this seemed to the orthodox to imperil the certainty of the records of inspiration. How wide a departure from the standpoint of the Reformation was this notion, which made faith depend upon such questions, and denied to this extent the lawfulness of that very criticism which the Protestant principle so urgently demanded! Even Roman Catholic science, when contrasted with such a standpoint, took up a position of candid investigation, as is manifest by the labours of Rich. Simon[5] during the same century. It was forgotten that this standpoint again made Christian faith entirely dependent upon Church tradition, nay, so far as the Old Testament was concerned, upon the synagogue.

The *Consensus Helv.* remained in force for only some fifty years. About the year 1700, the so-called Triumvirate, Joh. Alphæus Turretin of Geneva, Werenfels of Basle, and Ostervald

[1] Bleek, *Einl. ins A. Test.* 1860, pp. 126, 732. Hupfeld, *krit. Belenchtung einiger dunkeln und nicht verstandenen Stellen der Alttestamentlichen Textgeschichte*, ii. *Vocalisation, Stud. und Kritik*, 1830, 3, 4.

[2] Lud. Cappelli *Arcanum punctuationis revelatum*, ed. Thomas Erpenius, Leyden, 1624.

[3] Buxtorfii *Tract. de punctorum vocalium et accentum in libris V. T. hebraicis origine, antiquitate et auctoritate c. Lud. Cap.*, Basle, 1648.

[4] As by Carpzovius, Pfeiffer, Ernst Val. Löscher; and also by the Reformed in other countries than Switzerland.

[5] Rich. Simon, *Histoire critique du Texte du N. T.*, 1689; *Histoire critique des Versions du N. T.*, 1690; *Hist. critique des principaux Commentaires du N. T.*, 1693.

of Neufchatel, gave to the Swiss Reformed Church another tendency of departure from strict Church doctrine, partly in the direction of pietism, and partly in that of unionism, while orthodoxy was beginning to be transformed into biblical supernaturalism.[1]

Contemporary with this but too brief period of prosperity for theology in France by means of the above-named scholars, to whom may be added, Phil. de Mornay, the apologist, and Chamier,[2] were the various forms of reaction which set in in Holland against the revival of scholasticism. The most important among these was the Coccejan, which was characterized by simple piety and an ardent attachment to Scripture. The founder of this school, which flourished during several decades, was a German named Cock (Coccejus),[3] born 1602, at Bremen, professor there in 1629, professor at Franecker from 1636 to 1650, and professor of divinity at Leyden at the time of his death in 1669. He had studied at Franecker, where Maccovius advocated strict orthodoxy, Amesius the Puritan insisted upon piety of heart and life, and Amama his friend specially enforced the study of the original text of Scripture. The two latter obtained great influence over the piously educated young student, who had grown up amidst

[1] The freer views of H. Grotius, Joh. Clericus (*Ars critica*, 3 vols. Amst. 1696, and *Diss. de optimo genere interpretum s. scripturæ*, 1693), and Joh. Jas. Wetstein (*Libelli ad crisin et interpretationem N. T.* ed. Semler, 1766), at first indeed met for the most part with nothing but opposition. Orthodox theology felt itself injured, both by the criticism of the canon, and by those principles of interpretation which released from the authority of symbolical doctrine as the binding *Analogia fidei*, and directed attention on the contrary to the meaning which its first readers must have found in Scripture. On the other hand, J. A. Turretin (*De s. scripturæ interpretandæ methodo tract. bipart.* 1728) and Werenfels, (*Lectiones hermeneut.* in his *Opusc.*) reject, with the above-named, the analogy of faith as hermeneutical legalism, and insist that the exegete should transpose himself into the historical circumstances and surroundings.

[2] *De veritate relig. Christ. a Ph. Mornæo, Plessiaco Domino*, 1587; Dan. Chamier, *Panstratiæ catholicæ, sive controverss. adv. Pontificios*, lib. iv. 1626.

[3] M. Göbel, *Gesch. d. christl. Lebens*, vol. ii. Tholuck, *d. akad. Leben d. 17 Jahr.* ii. 222-239. Ebrard in Herzog's *Realencycl.* ii. 762. On the Coccejan system, comp. the works of Schweizer (*Glaubenslehre d. ev. reform. K.* 1844, &c. Heppe, *Dogm. d. deutschen Protestantismus*, 1857, i. 142, &c. Gass, *Gesch. d. protest. Dogmatik*, Berl. 1857, ii. 253, &c. Diestel, *Studien z. Föderaltheologie Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1856, 2 vols. x. 209. His *Opera omnia theolog. exeget. didactica, polemica, philologica*, appeared at Frankfort on the Maine, 1702. Compare especially J. Cocceji *Summa doctrina de fœdere et testamento Dei* and his *Summa Theologiæ ex scripturis repetita*, Gen. 1665 (containing also the former work of 1653 in an appendix).

the Melancthonian leanings of his native Bremen. He early felt a special attraction to oriental and Old Testament studies, on which account he also endeavoured to acquire rabbinical knowledge from a Jew of Hamburg. These studies evidently influenced his entire labours. His whole theology was a scriptural theology, and in order to divert divinity from empty and unprofitable questions he desired to regard it as a statement of the vital relation between God and man. To understand the position of Coccejus, with whom a new element, proceeding from the Reformed Church of Germany, powerfully pervaded Reformed scholasticism, especially that of Holland, and to appreciate his influence upon the history of theology, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the state of Protestant theology and especially of the system of divinity in his day. Strict accuracy in the formation of notions and the firm establishment of their mutual connection were as urgently needed in the offensive and defensive warfare which the Evangelical Church of those days was waging for its very existence, as precision in the analysis of these notions. For it was these which formed, so to speak, the mental forces among which strict military discipline was to be preserved, that by firmly maintaining their rank and file they might leave no weak point to the attacks of the enemy, and be equally serviceable whether for attack or defence. Such a course of theology was rendered necessary even by the external history of Protestantism, unless the connection with the scientific traditions of the middle ages had pressed onwards to the Aristotelian scholastic method, before a new philosophy was generated by the Protestant mind. Though what has been said applies equally to both confessions, there is still an unmistakeable difference between them, even in the period of their mutual scholasticism. Little independent and productive power was indeed devoted by either side to the doctrine of the nature of God, *i.e.* to theology in its narrower sense. Lutheran divinity, however, more brought forward the benefits bestowed by Christ (*beneficia Christi*, according to Melancthon), and especially justification as the essence of Scripture teaching. To this it sought to make all dogma subservient, a purpose which subsequently resulted in the delineation, with special diligence, if not with a steady hand, of the succession of the different elements in the subjective process of salvation. The Reformed view, on the con-

trary, proceeded not, as we have remarked, from the nature of God, yet from the Divine decree, in which the whole affair is, as it were, regarded *sub specie æternitatis*, without the human side being able to appear as in any sense an independent factor.

Hence, in conformity with the prevailing doctrine of the unchangeableness of God, to whose nature His decree must be attributed, no room was left for a classification of history into great periods or ages, governed by different principles. Even the Fall forms no special section, and sin is, agreeably with the Divine decree, a factor acting nearly from the beginning, and referred by the strictest of the Reformed to God's ordinance, though in such wise that God does not act evilly (*non male facit*), though He may cause evil (*malum facit*) and insert it—though under this point of view it is still evil—as a salutary fermentation in the whole mass. God is ever harmonious with Himself, since He from eternity as equally ordained Christ as He did sin, though only indeed for the elect; because it is for the good of the world that it should be a monument of God's glory—of His justice in the lost, of His mercy in the elect. This downright supralapsarian view, chiefly advocated among the Reformed of French tongue and in Holland, never prevailed over infralapsarian opinions. Wherever it was dominant, however, it was able to carry out a reckless systematic consistency, in which man appears unselfed, and a system of unyielding Divine thoughts takes the place of a human history. These Divine thoughts naturally became Divine appointments, because, according to the prevailing doctrine of the simplicity of God, His thought and knowledge cannot be really distinguished from His agency.

Neither did Lutheran scholasticism attain to an actual *human history of salvation*, nor to a clear division thereof into periods, but only to a *history of the salvation of the individual soul.* This it so regards as to make, not indeed the Divine decree, but the revelation of correct doctrine, of Divine truth, the central point upon which salvation turns. Now, since agreeably to God's unchangeableness this truth is at all times the same, it holds that salvation was present to man before Christ, especially in the Old Testament, as well as subsequently present in the New; that God's grace never failed to reveal this truth; and that all generations possessed, in the knowledge of this truth, which was thus placed within their reach, the principle of regeneration.

This was a view which, on the one hand, already urges in a one-sided manner the subjective process of salvation into intellectualistic paths, while, on the other, it finds its support in the obscurity, with which even the Reformation age had expressed itself, concerning the difference and similarity of Old Testament and Christian times. For clear as is generally the view of Luther in this respect, and decidedly as the contrast between law and gospel is insisted on, yet this was not applied,—as is especially evident in Luther's commentaries on the Old Testament,—to bring out a settled distinction between the religions of the Old and New Testaments. Aptly as the Form of Concord brings forward the fact, that the Gospel is found under the Old Covenant, and the Law under the New, yet if justice is to be done to the division into periods hinted at by our Lord Himself (Matt. xi. 11, 12), the intermingling of the mutual relations of the two ought to have been expressed in a formula which did not too much encroach upon the newness of Christianity. It was natural that the identification of the two testaments should not be regarded by the Lutheran Church as taking place in the Roman Catholic fashion of a retrogression of the gospel to the law, but rather in the form of an anticipative exaltation of the Old Testament to the level of the New, a form which was however destructive to the idea of a progressive development. This kind of identification was favoured by the hypothesis that the Old Testament saints did already look to Christ and His redeeming work, that the whole course of the world's history was comprised in one single glance before that God who both in His nature and deeds is always equal to Himself, and that the future being already present and efficient with Him, the historical merits of Christ must naturally have a retrospective power. Increased support was also afforded to this view by the prevailing theory of inspiration, which regarded God as the exclusive author of Holy Scripture. For since the duty of interpretation must ever be to give the full sense of the author, this theology, in the interest of maintaining the constant self-equality of God and of His thoughts, gave to exposition an irresistible tendency to discover in the inspired writings of the Old Testament the truths of the New, as the alone suitable and exhaustive sense of their composer—a sense accessible at least to believers.

Thus, in spite of certain attempts in this direction, Lutheran

theology also no less failed to attain to a real, vivid and organic history of human salvation. Reformed theology shared more largely, if possible, in this identifying view of the Old and New Testaments. The utmost difference indeed between the two theologies, in this respect, was that the doctrine of absolute predestination, with its strong emphasis on the omnipotence and sovereignty of God, gave this identification a still more legal turn.

It is not till this state of things is considered, that we are in a position to estimate the eminent importance of Coccejus, in spite of the limits by which he too was restricted.

His opinions were always of the genuine Reformed type: he also imputed to the Old Testament too much that was essentially Christian. But he is distinguished from the scholasticism of his age in that it is his delight to live and move in the element of Scripture, and that he seeks in his exposition to furnish an explanation not less philosophically accurate than De Dieu and Drusius had required. His principle is not that the words—as was so often said—signify all that is grammatically possible, and that therefore manifold meanings are to be sought in Holy Scripture,[1] but only that God, the Author of Holy Scripture, was absolutely conscious of His whole counsel. He does not however seek to surpass what God intended, but only the sense which the sacred writers were conscious of, and limits the possible meaning by the context, the *integra oratio*, insisting that in any case that can alone be esteemed the genuine sense which is consistent with the evident meaning of the Word of God. This afforded to his scholarly acuteness and his rare gift of combination ample space for discovering, in this realm of the Divine Word and deeds, the utmost variety of reference between each and all, and observing how the thoughts expressed in different passages chime in, so to speak, with one another.[2] If then this method, formally regarded, was favourable to the deduction of a Scripture theology from the whole Bible, the important and decisive question was: What is

[1] He says, on the contrary, that the true meaning of vowels and phrases depends upon the whole connection (*compages*): *Id significant verba, quod possunt significare in integra oratione.*

[2] *Summa theol.* lib. vii. c. 6, sec. 51. It is according to the diversity of gifts that one man perceives in Holy Scripture aspects which escape another. Thus Scripture is susceptible of a variety of meanings, a fact which is not inconsistent with the principle of the oneness of the literal and verbal meaning: such multiplicity does but embrace the various *parts* of a higher whole.

that formative principle, that point in Holy Scripture, towards which the lines converge from all sides? And this brings us to the special matter of his biblical theology, which at the same time occupies in his view the position of divinity.

The all-governing principle is, he thinks, that of the *Covenant.* Instead of finding the central seat of salvation in the Divine counsel alone, and evaporating the history, or at least its saving significance, his fundamental notion, viz. that of the covenant, is an historical one, based upon the acts of God, and susceptible of various aspects during the course of the world's history. Salvation consisting, in his view, not in a summary of Divine decrees or eternal truths, but in the historical acts of God, the contents of Scripture, in all their variety, are far more accessible to him; and though, because he makes the human factor little else than a mere husk to the representation of the history of salvation, he also is, as yet, unable to discover with certainty any progressive development of religion and revelation, still the notion of the covenant does already decidedly break through the rigid and inflexible self-equality of the Divine decree. It leads him moreover, in virtue of his infralapsarian opinions, to the view of such a relation of God to men as is determined and conditioned by Him, with reference to the variety of their several needs.

Recent investigations have indeed shown that such men as Hyperius, Olevianus,[1] and Raphael Eglin, had, long before the time of Coccejus, adopted and diligently cultivated the idea of the covenant. With strict Calvinists, however, it could but remain a onesided one, and be confined to the relation of God to man (*μονόπλευρον*); and indeed the relation or act of God must be, in any case, that upon which all is based. The admission that there are two parties to a covenant, or even that there is a reciprocal relation between God and man, could hardly be conceded when freedom was denied. Even the Fall was not regarded as having changed or altered the relation of God to man, but merely as an expression of the unchangeable eternal decree to save some and not others, through faith and the gift of perseverance. Eglin, however, had already dealt more seriously with the idea

[1] Comp. (C. Olevianus) *Expositio symboli apostolici sive articulorum fidei, in qua Summa gratuiti fœderis æterni inter Deum et fideles breviter et perspicue tractatur*, Francof. 1570. Comp. p. 408, of which an extract is given in K. Sudhoff's Olevianus and Ursinus, 1857, p. 573, &c.

of the covenant, and sought to give it a more universalistic form. He allows that the *fœdus naturale* or *legale* was altered through the Fall, not indeed in respect of its final end, but of the means thereto, and represents it as not from the beginning particularistic. On the contrary, instead of introducing a dualism into the very beginnings of the covenant, he makes it refer to all men. The more exact elaboration, however, of the idea of the covenant must be referred to Coccejus, since it was he who first combined, under the point of view furnished by the covenant, all the words and acts of God related in the sacred history, down to the slightest detail, and thus sought to satisfy in a biblico-theological form the craving for a system. The system of divinity becomes in his view a history of the relation of God and man. Not believing Christian consciousness, but Scripture alone (the formal principle), is the immediate source of his system. It is to Scripture that the receptive intelligent mind must recur, in order to understand and reproduce the history in its internal connection and the mutual relation of its parts. This history begins to acquire, in his view of it, a progressive character, and the disturbance or alteration which he allows to have taken place at one point, viz. the Fall, in the Divine counsel begins to seek a position in other points of the history also. He, too, indeed—as has been remarked—is still unable to rise above an actual identification of the Old and New Testaments, all time subsequent to the Fall forming in his view, and in the entire theology of the covenant, one great period, called the covenant of grace. For the principle upon which is based the view that, because the future was present to God, it occupied a similar relation to those Old Testament believers who understood the words and acts of God according to their God-designed meaning, was not yet broken through. Thus everything in the Old Testament becomes typical or prophetic, and the special matter of the whole Old Testament history is only the New Testament or Christ. What the history of the Old Testament in its various epochs, especially the religion of the law, signifies in its own proper position, and with respect to the progressive development of religion in general, is not stated. It seems to him impossible that after the Fall had frustrated the acquirement of salvation by works, God should have contemplated in His dispensation, and even in that of the law, anything else than a direct communica-

tion of grace. Hence, to regard the law of the Sabbath,[1] the ceremonial ordinances, nay, the Decalogue itself, as Divine requirements, as duties to be performed, seems to him a Jewish misconception of that unchangeable covenant of grace which succeeded the covenant of works. The sharp contrast in Reformed theology between works and grace, law and gospel, may have co-operated at this point. He so represents this contrast as to make the chief significance of that covenant of grace, which was instituted immediately after the Fall, consist in the abolition of the covenant of works, which was indeed broken by man, without God having therefore ceased to require the fulfilment of His law. Thus the purport of the whole sacred history, down to Christ, is to introduce the legitimate abolition of the covenant of works, the legitimate deliverance of man from this covenant, to the requirements of which he was no longer equal, a deliverance consummated by the satisfaction of Christ and the eschatological completion of His work. Hence the obverse of this gradual abolition of the covenant of works was the gradual introduction of that fulfilment of the law, in other words, of that righteousness which, being effected by Christ, is apprehended by faith. And hence also the preliminary stages of Christianity were those types and prophecies of Christ which faith perceives to be such, and with which God has combined an actual Christian blessing, having, in virtue of the Trinitarian compact between the Father and the Son, so far suffered the pledge of the latter to hold good, even prior to His making satisfaction, as to allow the Old Testament saints to participate, if not in the complete pardon (ἄφεσις), yet in the remission and passing over of sin (πάρεσις) (Rom. iii. 25; Heb. x. 18). The Old Testament, including the law, is, he thinks, an actual type of Christian grace; the sacrifices were a bond given by the Israelites for the pre-reception of grace. By the death of Christ, which earned grace, this bond was cancelled.

But even this dawn of a distinction between the blessings enjoyed under the Old and New Testaments, a distinction which was in some respects still further carried out by Coccejus, agreed but ill with the orthodox theology of a Spanheim, a Maresius, a Hulsius.[2] Besides the attacks made upon his typical and alle-

[1] *Indagatio naturæ Sabbathi et quietis novi testamenti, Opera,* tom. vii.

[2] Comp. Gass, *Geschichte d. prot. Dogmatik,* p. 286, &c.

gorical mode of exposition, he was reproached with degrading the Old Testament, and with representing that which could only be called a difference in the administration of one and the same Divine counsel suitable to the diverse circumstances of the times, as though it were a difference in the degrees of salvation and in the ways of obtaining it. By such a representation, he introduced—it was said—an element of change into the unchangeableness of the Divine counsel. This must be indeed admitted also with regard to the fundamental distinction between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace, a matter in which he is to be commended when compared with his orthodox opponents. Such commendations cannot, however, be extended in every respect. For his system unmistakeably suffers from the appearance of exhibiting two ways of salvation; one without Christ, the other through Him, and both equally possible in themselves, and leading to the same end, and thus undoubtedly disturbs the unity of the divine idea of the world. Finding, as he rightly does, the covenant of works, which he regards as embracing the natural moral law and the primitive condition, in many respects imperfect, his system would have been in better proportion, if, departing still more widely from orthodoxy, he had regarded his *two covenants* under the point of view of a gradual revelation and development of religion; and if, after the example of the Apostle Paul, he had found even in the first Adam, and in the law of nature, an inward reference to the second Adam, through whom the law was fulfilled and realized.

The Coccejan school—in which Heidanus, Burmann, Momma of Hamburg, Van der Weyen, Braun, Gürtler, Campesius Vitringa, Hermann Witsius, Sal. van Til, form an important series, extending into the eighteenth century—on the one hand, further carried out the method of Coccejus in contending against its opponents Hulsius, Voetius, Maresius, Fred. Spanheim, and Peter van Maestricht, and, on the other, disencumbered it of much that was the mere play of a luxuriant imagination. Fran. Burmann, especially, stated the essentials of the Coccejan system in a simple and more finished form. He treats the two dispensations in such wise, that grace and faith were and are the basis of both; while the law and its ceremonies were first superadded by Moses, as a preparative for Christianity. The progress of the covenant of grace is denoted by the three stages which the

Church or the kingdom of God passed through up to Christ; the stage of the sacred family, the national or theocratic stage, and that in which the Church is being gathered in from all nations. In all these stages the Church had its appropriate revelation and sacraments. Thus the covenant of grace is divided into three periods, the patriarchal, the legally theocratic, and the Christian, each having a share in the promise. The legal stage being recognized chiefly in its historical significance, a more decided progress in the præ-Christian period subsequent to the Fall is the result, and Coccejus' distinction between the time in which Christ was the dispenser (*expromissor*), and that in which He was only the hostage (*fidejussor*) of salvation, receives thereby a more stable basis. The Gospel, however, still holds the place of only a subdivision in the *fœdus gratiæ*. Burmann at the same time so defines the first covenant, or the standpoint of nature and works, as to acknowledge the need of revelation, notwithstanding the innate knowledge of God.[1] He was also a Cartesian, and sought to combine the supralapsarian system with the theology of the covenant.

Many Coccejans, *e.g.* Heidanus, Burmann, Braun, Wittich, entered into closer relation with the Cartesian system by means of the first covenant, viz. that of works, which was also called the covenant of nature. For though it was at first conceived of as purely supernatural, as a miraculous endowment, with the knowledge of God and the capability of acting rightly, which sin subsequently weakened and obscured, yet the proper nature of man being obviously depicted in the description of his

[1] Fr. Burmanni *synopsis theologiæ et speciatim œconomiæ fœderum Dei. Ab initio seculorum usque ad consummationem*, 1651, 4to. 2 vols. 1681. Momma *de varia conditione et statu Ecclesiæ Dei sub triplici œconomia patriacharum ac Testamenti Veteris ac denique Novi*, 1673, 2 vols. Abrah. Heidani *corpus theologiæ christianæ in* 15 *locos distributum*, 2 vols. 1686. Hermann Witsius *de œconomia fœderum*, libri iv. 1677 ; his *Exercitationes sacræ in symbolum quod apostolorum dicitur*, 1681. *Miscellanea sacra*, 2 pts. 1695. Sal. van Til's *Isagoge ad scripta prophetica*, 1704, translated 1699, and Vitringa's *Typus doctrinæ propheticæ*, 1708 ; *Comment. in libr. proph. Jesajæ*, 2 pts. fol. 1714, elaborate a prophetical theology, as Gürtler had already done in his *Systema theologiæ propheticæ*, 1702. Witsius, Van der Weyen, and the three last named, endeavour to approximate more to orthodoxy, though not in its strictly scholastic form, while, on the part of orthodoxy, a more conciliatory attitude towards the federal theology was, after much conflict, assumed. Melch. Leydecker attempted to develop the three dispensations from the three Persons of the Trinity.

original state, the view taken of the latter could not but influence that held concerning the state of sin. For the primitive man must have preserved an identity with himself even after the Fall. All this naturally applied more to knowledge than to the power of acting rightly, and it was at this point that many Coccejan theologians embraced Cartesian notions. For they held that not only did that law of conscience which belonged to the original state remain also in the state of sin, while Mosaism did but transpose it into the form of positive statutes, but that a knowledge of God was also innate in the soul as such, a notion which harmonizes with Descartes *ideæ innatæ*. According to these, the soul, as the thinking principle (*res cogitans*), is created directly by God, and distinguished from extended substance—from matter, by actual union with God, so that the corruption propagated from the corporeal organism, cannot, properly speaking, penetrate into the nature of the soul. Heidanus indeed endeavours to veil that weakening of the effects of original sin involved in such a view, partly by referring to the personal union of the soul with the body, and partly by the expedient that the view that the soul of Adam was not from the beginning in real fellowship with God, in respect of knowledge and especially of will, leads to Pelagianism, to a development purely from man's own resources. But since this fellowship with God and knowledge of God must also be attributed to man in his sinful state, unless the nature of man (this *res cogitans*) is said to be abolished, natural theology must necessarily occupy a more important position with respect to revealed theology. This was held by Van Til, in such wise, that the subordination of the former to the latter was firmly maintained.[1] Others however went further. We shall subsequently have to consider more closely these Cartesian influences upon Reformed theology, when we treat of their effect upon the formal principle, of the relation of the *lumen naturæ* to Holy Scripture. For Cartesianism had but little influence in bringing about any alteration of reformed dogma in its material aspect.

Of far more importance was the inward undermining of predestinarianism by the Coccejan system. Not only because there was no position in Coccejan theology for a double original decree of election and reprobation; the original covenant with the human

[1] *Theologiæ compendium utriusque tum naturalis, tum revelatæ*, 1704.

race being, on the contrary, represented as bearing a character of universalism; but also, because if so copious a variety in the forms of the Divine covenant at different periods of the covenant of grace were regarded as consistent with the immutability of the Divine counsel, the infralapsarian standpoint must consequently be given up. For what else could have been the motive of such a variety of positions with regard to man on the part of God, but a regard to his condition and needs at different times? And if God, in His different dispensations, limits Himself in such various manners out of regard to man, with what consistency can His self-limitation out of regard to human freedom be excluded? For the supreme unchangeable sovereignty of God would be no more imperilled by this, than by such variety of form in His dispensation of salvation. This was in fact carried out by Peter Poiret in his "Dispensation of the Covenants," in which he, in an anti-Augustinian manner, embraces universalism even after the Fall, and attributes to the variety of the Divine covenants the meaning, that Divine grace has ever indefatigably sought by fresh means to gain and to save mankind. The Coccejan theology at first only broke through the absoluteness and unchangeableness of the Divine decree, and attempted still to embrace a particular election. But if this unchangeableness and the nature of God no longer stand in the way of universalism, and if a separate particularistic revelation of the righteousness and grace of God is in principle disclaimed, by embracing a covenant of works esteemed universal, it would be a far more insufferable thought, than in the rigid supralapsarian system, that God, without any intrinsic necessity of His own nature and notwithstanding the elasticity of His dispensations, should, out of pure arbitrariness, allow only one portion of the human race to profit by grace, and should, while including the other without personal guilt in the *pactum* of the common guilt of the race, by reason of the act of its first head, not also include it in the *pactum* of a share in the salvation of its second Head through faith. Samuel Puffendorff[1] makes this latter application, and shows that a covenant which utterly excludes the freedom of man, and lays no definite stress upon his conduct, but makes his final destiny depend solely upon the

[1] Samuel Puffendorff, *Jus feciale divinum sive de consensu et dissensu Protestantium*, 1695, p. 243, &c.

inevitable necessity of the decree of election, is an empty notion. Coccejus and his school did not indeed as yet admit this, though he no longer embraced a decree of individual reprobation. Without directly opposing the system of Dort, he touched upon the chief salient points of the predestinarian question; and upon the foundation of the greater vitality of sacred history, he sowed the seeds of opinions which of themselves involved the disuse of the predestinarian system, and necessarily smoothed down its austerity. So purifying a progress was a lasting gain.

Federalism broke the rule of Aristotelian scholasticism, and placed in its stead—nay, in that of dogmatics—investigation of the Scriptures, and the study of the Hebrew language. But though it thus rendered essential service to the knowledge of the Scriptures as a whole, it diminished, not to say neglected, the *subjective side* of the Reformation principle. In fact, the Coccejan system instituted no deeper research concerning the ultimate basis of faith in the Scripture than Reformed scholasticism had done. It stopped at an exhibition of the internal connection of the progressive and objective history of salvation, its harmonious arrangement and concatenation. These are said to be the guarantee of its internal truth. But if the point of contact between this objective historical world and the subjective mind, with its need of salvation, is not discovered, there is a declension from the standpoint of the Reformation to the stage of a merely historical faith, and the principle of an external though trustworthy authority, again becomes the ultimate basis of faith. To this must be added that the absence of systematic accuracy, and distinct definitions concealed the above-named want of consistency, and that the constant repetition of the federalistic scheme, naturally led, like scholasticism, to a lifeless uniformity.[1] Hence its orthodox adversaries, G. Voetius, Maresius, Spanheim, Hoornbeck, Ant. Hulsius, were right in opposing the over estimation of the Coccejan method and system. They brought about a persecution of the Coccejans, who from 1650 to 1670 were in great and increasing estimation. A second and greater schism seemed to threaten the Dutch Church. It was not however in vain that the Rhenish Synod exhorted them to peace, and a reconciliation was brought about. This was the

[1] Comp. Gass, *Gesch. der protest. Dogmatik*, ii. 319.

more practicable, inasmuch as the tendencies of the rising generation opened the way to an accommodation between the Coccejan and Voetian types of doctrine. It even became customary in Dutch universities to have a Coccejan professor for exegesis and a Voetian for divinity; to these were soon added a theologian of the Lampian school for practical theology,[1] an arrangement which lasted till about 1820.[2] And finally, the new factor which, after the Ramistic philosophy had fallen into discredit, began in Cartesianism to exert an influence, contributed in no slight degree to the willingness of the Coccejans and the orthodox divines to come to an understanding. This new philosophy was indeed anti-scholastic, and yet in one aspect favourable to the orthodox system, inasmuch as it laid great stress upon accuracy of notions. It was allied to Coccejanism by its efforts to cast off the fetters of traditionary authority, and to make the old system more pliable, not however in the way of objective contemplation, but by a vigorous appropriation of the religious matter in the way of philosophical reasoning.

So early as the middle of the seventeenth century, Cartesius had acquired influence in Holland. The free republic had become the adopted country and auditory for the philosopher born in the bosom of the Catholic Church. He first acquired a school at Leyden in Heidanus, then at orthodox Utrecht in his son-in-Law Fr. Burmann, in Wittich, Braun, Allinga and others. The stricter Reformed orthodoxy however carried out prohibitory edicts not only in Holland, but also in Berne, Marburg, and Herborn.[3] The reason of this was chiefly Cartesius' doctrine of the *necessity of doubt* for arriving at the knowledge of truth. Cartesius insisted upon doubt, not as an end, but as an impulse to more thorough investigation. This was certainly making stricter demands on science than scholasticism could acknowledge. Besides, if doubt were unrestricted or indeed regarded as the ultimate attainment of science, unbelief or even atheism might be the result. Doubt might moreover be made use of as

[1] Lampe, a disciple of Campegius Vitringa, and of a mind akin to Pietism, flourished in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. He was born at Detmold.

[2] Göbel, *Gesch. des christlichen Lebens*, ii. 160.

[3] It was only at the university of Duisberg, founded by Brandenburg, that greater freedom with respect to embracing the Cartesian philosophy was enjoyed. Clanberg, a Cartesian highly esteemed by Leibnitz, taught there.

a substructure for proving that we must turn to external authority alone for support, a use which was indeed less congenial to Protestant than to Catholic theology. Cartesius did not himself inculcate a doubt of all external authorities for the purpose of recurring to the authority of the Church. He desired, on the contrary, to lead doubt to the knowledge of reason, by means especially of innate ideas. Hence it is not surprising that he gave a new impulse to a natural theology in the Evangelical Church. The doctrine of innate ideas, advancing as it did beyond the merely formal or "organic" use of the reason, might be applied as a proof of the superfluousness, or at least as a criticism, of historical revelation.

To this must be added, that men of this school differed somewhat from each other in doctrine. When, *e.g.*, Wittich, Burmann, Braun, found the nature of spirit to consist in thought, the result with respect to Christology was, that since the nature of God also is said to consist in thought, the union of God and man is only possible through thought; otherwise their very natures would remain disunited. Their uniting then takes place so that the two substances become in action and endurance one compound quantity or Person, and form as it were the higher unity.[1] Union itself is effected by the Divine and the human substance mutually revealing their respective thoughts, and together determining and agreeing to constitute one single whole. Maresius and Peter von Maestricht wrote against these notions. The application of the Cartesian dualism between mental substances and bodies had a greater effect upon demonology. For if mind has by its very essence nothing to do with nature, a mutual influence of one upon the other is impossible. This was capable of affecting the doctrine of original sin (see above, p. 41), and was moreover extended, especially by Balthazar Bekker,[2] to a denial of the influence of spirits and demons upon bodies. Demoniacs he considers, on the contrary, to be merely persons affected with a certain form of disease. Holy Scripture, he says, lays down no revealed doctrine concerning the Devil, but accommodates itself to that which previously existed; in fact, it is not its purpose to teach us what natural things are in themselves, but

[1] Comp. my *Geschichte der Christologie*, ii, 899-901.

[2] Born in West Friesland, 1634, † 1692; comp. his *Mundus fascinatus*, in 3 vols. translated by Schwager, with notes by Semler, 1781-82.

to view them in reference to the glory of God and our salvation. Other suspicious features of Cartesianism, which form a transition to Spinozism, had less effect, as *e.g.* its view of God as being, properly speaking, the sole substance, because all beside Him is accidental or transitory, or its recurrence not to final but efficient causes; or finally, its thesis, leaving scarcely any room for miracles, that all nature is one vast unalterable machine which God does but assist, that the world having been once formed by God, is ever afterwards self-maintained, like an automaton.

Of more importance to theology than all this, was the position in which an external revelation and all objective authority might be placed by the Cartesian system. For since, by reason of the dualism between mind and the corporeal world, that which was perceptible by the senses could have no influence upon the mind—a notion consistently carried out by Geulinx into occasionalism—all external agency, whether of Holy Scripture, of the Person of Christ, or of the sacraments is denied, and a direct agency of the Spirit of God upon the spirit of man can only take place on the occasion of an external agency upon the senses. In this aspect occasionalism does but furnish the philosophical formula of the dualism to which Reformed theologians were in many respects inclined. And it was in this dualism that Cartesianism sought to gain a hold of the Reformed system by making eternal truths, and even logical and mathematical truths, dependent upon the sovereignty of God; a notion which, *e.g.*, even Burmann,[1] without incurring any reproof on the part of the orthodox, embraced, and stated in such a form as to say that God's free will could, without any detriment to His nature, have caused twice three not to make six.[2] If, in this respect, the influence of Cartesianism resulted, not in a departure from Reformed orthodox doctrine, but rather in bestowing upon it philo-

[1] Comp. Gass, *id.* p. 317, &c.

[2] Limborch, the Arminian, contradicts him, so far as logical and mathematical truths are concerned; these he regards as unalterable, while with respect to moral truths Arminians think with Burmann. This doctrine of the dependence of eternal truths upon God's free sovereignty, shows how closely even Cartesius, in spite of his anticatholic theses, still coincides with the mediæval conceptions of God. We shall not, moreover, err in assuming, in the predestinarian system also, an after effect of mediæval notions of God, when we see it arrive at the same result as Cartesius, by the stress which it lays upon the freedom (*i.e.* the power) of God. On the other hand, the apparently close affinity of the predestinarian system with Spinoza's determinism is not a real one. For

sophical strength, the case was otherwise with respect to the position of reason to revelation held by many theologians as the result of the Cartesian system. The consciousness of reason, which had been aroused in Holland by Cartesianism and Spinozism, resisted the notion of submitting to the authority of the external word, whether of Holy Scripture or the Church. And the more so, since no definite and rightful position had been assigned to the reason in theology. Faith was no longer to theologians of different tendencies, nor even to orthodoxy, as it had partially been at the Reformation, the Christian form and determination of the reason itself. Hence they did not regard it as a duty to conquer by Christian reason and science their non-Christian degenerations. Reason was left outside the domain of faith as an alien power either to be nothing or to lay claim to everything. Alexander Roëll already awarded the supremacy to reason. Reason, he said, is *in itself* as infallible as God; it is even the born word of God, with which Holy Scripture must coincide. The latter is susceptible of various meanings, and its dicta are incapable of directly producing certainty, while reason includes in itself a certainty of what is known. Hence it is the part of reason not only to explain Scripture, but also to prove the truth of the word of God therein contained.[1] Ludwig Meyer, extending this still farther,[2] says: Reason is that *analogia fidei* according to which Scripture must be interpreted, even if for this purpose recourse is had to allegory. Hen. Hulsius of Duisberg, 1684-1723 (son of Anton. Hulsius of Leyden, the opponent of

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necessity is not dwelt upon by the Reformed system for the purpose of subjecting God thereto, but solely for that of placing man under the absolute freedom of God. Hence the Arminian accusation of Spinozism is repelled with a good conscience by the orthodox.

[1] In saying this he certainly demands that care should be taken, lest any alien element should be mingled with the reason. Hence though he, as well as Cartesius, insists upon conceiving of the reason as something more than a mere faculty of cognition, he yet returns to the view of a latency of the reason in reality, or to a restriction thereof, a notion which must have rendered the dicta of the empirical reason doubtful. Comp. Scholten, *De Leer d. hervomde Kerk in hare Grondbeginselen*, 2 pts. 1850, i. 267, &c.

[2] *Philosophia scripturæ interpres*, 1666; Wolzogen, *De scripturarum interprete*, 1668. Wolzogen assumes both the divine authorship and truth of Scripture, and the possibility of perceiving these. But he adds that what is obvious to the reason is truth, and cannot be at variance with Scripture. If a contradiction is apparent in *natural* things, it is the interpretation of Scripture which must

Cartesius), even advances beyond this. He rationalizes the doctrine of the Divine covenants, and in his *Principiis Credendi*, 1688, puts the evidence of reason in the place of the *testimonium Spir. S.* as the ultimate ground of faith.[1] Here then natural reason is absolutely identified with reason, and in virtue of the doctrine of perfect innate ideas exception is taken to their obscuration by sin. At most he does but admit that the consciousness of this treasure of innate ideas requires to be developed, thus admitting a natural non-knowledge as the beginning. Roëll also denied the imputation of original sin. Hence it was a misapplication, based upon self-delusion, when Tucker attempted to prove to the reason the authority of Scripture by means of reason. Finally Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-politicus* had an extensive influence in the same direction.[2]

Reformation truth was not, however, without its advocates. Huber, the jurist, rejected alike the authority of the Church, and the basing of the truth of Scripture upon reason, because nothing but the light kindled in the heart by the Holy Spirit can bring real certainty.[3] Joh. Melchioris of Herborn, 1676, expressed himself still better. The Reformed Church, he says, did not set faith in the divine origin of Scripture, but faith in its truths, in the first place, and it is from faith in these that we advance to faith in the Scriptures in general. For the conscience easily unites itself to Christ, who is the central point of Scripture, while the other contents of Scripture are in close connection with Him. Faith is based upon the *sensus conscientia.* It is this which furnishes to faith the basis which it needs for a rational theology. In the affair of our eternal salvation we must be determined by the truth contained in the matter itself; the Holy Ghost creates no new faculty of apperception, but He

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be at fault. On the other hand, with respect to the mysteries of the Trinity, Christology, &c., he can only recur to the authority of Holy Scripture: submission thereto being facilitated by the demonstration of probability. Thus a mixture of proofs to the understanding, and faith in authority, took the place of the self-evidence of truth (or the *testimon. Sp. S.*).

[1] Com. Tholuck, *Das akad. Leben*, ii. 249.

[2] Comp. Tholuck, *Das kirchl. Leben d. 17 Jahrh.* ii. 31.

[3] The faculty of Basle (Joh. Buxtorf, J. J. Wetstein, and Gernler), in their *Syllabus controversiarum*, &c., 1662, also say: There is in faith an *actus directus* which is the means of the *certitudo objectiva;* but there is also a *radius reflexus in se ipsum, importans* SUBJECTIVAM CERTITUDINEM *in ipso credente.*

purifies the mind that it may be able to form a right judgment, in virtue not merely of an instinctive conviction, but of a conscious perception of the conscience. He also seeks to distinguish between this certainty of faith and the inner light of fanatics. It is truth alone which can give inward satisfaction and repose (*satiatio, acquiescentia*); it arouses the true sensibility of the reason, and then agrees, by its own nature and without argument, with the conscience, which is predestined for truth and its reception. The fundamental truth, that salvation is by Christ alone, is sufficient for faith, though more is required for church fellowship.[1]

Insular Britain presents an aspect wholly unlike that of the Reformed continent. Its active intercourse with the Protestant continental churches was followed, during the seventeenth century, by a period of isolation, and occupation with its private affairs. In the eighteenth, however, it acquired only the more influence in Germany.

It is common to the whole of this branch of the Evangelical Church, that it cannot be said to have produced any successive scientific development of theology. Neither in England, Scotland, nor Ireland, was a scholastic theology and a scientifically-framed orthodoxy able to strike root. On the contrary, after the common fundamental doctrines of the Reformation had been received from the continent, and naturalized in the country—and that not without the differences between Calvin and Melancthon being reproduced in Scotland and England—the development here took place in the sphere of the will, in Church government and organization, in political, social and moral life, and, especially in England, in worship. The consequence of this preponderance of the productions of the will over those of the intellect was, that heterodoxy here easily assumed the form of schism; and this both because opposites are wont to come into far more violent collision in the world of practice than in the world of thought, and also because there was a lack of inclination to follow out the different tendencies to their principles, and thereby to arrive at that understanding or accommodation which might have resulted in a combined historical development. This practical turn of mind, which rather furnishes material for Church history than for a history of theology, necessarily suffered the relation between Church and State to attain to a supreme

[1] See above, pp. 16, 17.

importance, which was the cause of many disturbances in the history of the Church. And yet it may be said that the same active principles which developed themselves in a more theoretical manner on the continent, were in operation here also. For here too the history is, on the whole, the history of the relation between authority and freedom, which, now combining with, and now opposing one another, were incessantly striving to attain to a satisfactory union. Here, however, the different schools of the continent became different Church parties or sects, and carried out their differences more in practice than in doctrine. The chief contrast, which sprung up in the soil of a tolerably uniform doctrinal confession, was that of *Episcopacy* and *Presbyterianism;* the former established in England under Elizabeth, by means of Richard Hooker and Archbishop Whitgift, the latter implanted in Scotland by John Knox and Melville. The first of these forms of Church government makes the Church as unity its starting-point, the second starting from the congregation makes unity result from the ascending organisms. Both asserted themselves to be *doctrinally* necessary, and each sought to make itself supreme. Hence arose, especially after the union of the Scotch and English crowns (1603), the most violent ecclesiastico-political conflicts, particularly from 1638 to 1689. These, after the alternate triumph and defeat of both parties, resulted not in the mutual purification and interpenetration of these opposites, but in general enervation, and finally in the sway of Episcopacy with hierarchical features in England, and of Presbyterianism with theocratic tendencies in Scotland. The consequence of this disturbance of the national life in the seventeenth century, when the minds of men were shaken in their inmost recesses, was Deism, which lasted, without intermission, till about 1750.

These opposite systems may be historically accounted for, by the fact that in Scotland it was the people who, in opposition to the civil power, violently carried out the Reformation, while in England the state itself supported it, but at the same time kept it under tutelage, the crown deporting itself, under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, as the inheritor of the papal power, and the bishops becoming its powerful dependant vassals. At first, in Scotland as well as England, the tendency was towards Lutheran doctrine. The martyrs Hamilton, Alesius, and other Scotchmen, studied at Wittenberg. It was not till after 1544 that, through

the influence of Wishart, close connections with the Swiss were entered into, while in 1557 John Knox, a faithful Genevese disciple, instituted, in combination with the nobles, the first covenant, "to fight to the death for the Lord's cause and against idolatry." The first General Assembly, the *Confessio Scotica* and the *Book of Discipline*, all date from the year 1560. The earlier English Reformers also were either educated in Germany or by means of Lutheran works. Subsequently, however, Martin Bucer and Peter Martyr were summoned to England, and through their influence a moderate form of evangelical doctrine prevailed.

The fundamental importance of the conflict between the two systems lay in the fact that it was a strife between the purism of the Reformation and a reverence for ecclesiastical tradition with respect to worship and Church government. Episcopacy was desirous of breaking with this as little as possible, and regarded the continuity of the Church as consisting chiefly in the apostolical succession of its bishops. Not venturing to view ordination as a sacrament, it yet considered the clergy the constant and God-ordained depositaries of all ecclesiastical ministration. Presbyterianism, on the other hand, broke with ecclesiastical tradition, for the sake of recurring to Scripture alone, which it treated, however, in a legal manner, as a codex for a theocracy, of which the Israelitish nation was said to be the type. Both abridged the material principle. The Scotch, by finding in Scripture a divine *law*, prescribing the only correct form of Church government, instead of leaving to the mind of the Church, and its own perception of what would in each age be most beneficial, freedom to fashion its government according to existing necessity: the Anglicans, not only by finding their form of Church government prescribed in Scripture, but also by referring the interpretation of the Bible and the right to decide upon the orthodoxy of doctrines, to the clergy, and especially the bishops, by showing extreme mistrust of the private judgment of the laity, and finally, by requiring from clergymen such obedience to their bishops as is rendered to the secular authority in its department, or as is based by the Church of Rome upon her doctrine of ordination. Thus Church government, which both regard as essential to the true and procreative Church, may become, with both Presbyterians and Anglicans, a new condition of salvation, and come into collision with *sola fides*.

The Anglican Church is in her Thirty-nine Articles—so far as their doctrinal statements are concerned—purely evangelical, and an advocate of the common truths of the Reformation in a mild and moderate form. In the doctrine of the sacraments she inclines rather to the Reformed, than to the Lutheran type.[1] But with this common evangelical doctrine is combined a form of worship and church government which follows as closely as possible that handed down from pre-Reformation times, and originating in part from a different principle. This discrepancy has, at different times, acted as an effectual spur to attempts, in one mode or another, at a more harmonious arrangement. The Anglican form of worship and government has ever involved the temptation to a catholicizing and hierarchical tendency; and three times since the Reformation has the latter endeavoured to ignore or tamper with the Thirty-nine Articles. First, from Elizabeth, and Bishops Jewell, Hooker, Whitgift and Bancroft, down to the Stuarts, James I. and Charles I., in whose time Archbishop Laud was the harsh and tyrannical advocate of hierarchism. Secondly, after the restoration under Bishops Hicks and Dodwell, born 1641, died 1711. The latter was of opinion that the reception of the sacraments makes the soul of man immortal; that the power of valid baptism, of the right administration of the sacraments, and of teaching, is restricted to the episcopally ordained; and that the laying on of the hands of the bishop communicates the Holy Ghost, irrespective of the spiritual receptivity of the ordained. Also, that those baptized by ministers not episcopally ordained, *i.e.* by dissenters, are not Christians at all. The third attempt of this kind was the Puseyite or Tractarian movement of the present century.

These Episcopalian attempts to reduce the religious spirit of Great Britain to uniformity were opposed in England, not to mention Scotland, by several counter-attempts to give prevalence to elements opposed to Episcopacy, and to carry out with greater strictness the now slumbering Reformation. If on the one hand tradition and authority preponderated, Protestant liberty was asserted on the other, nay, the principle of liberty made the foundation of every form of national life.

[1] She refers indeed also to the homilies which advocate the peculiarities of Anglican Church government, but in her doctrinal theses she coincides, on the whole, with German confessions, especially with the *Conf. Wuertemb.*

It was during the reign of Elizabeth, when all who rejected Episcopacy and the Liturgy were threatened by the Act of Uniformity with deprivation and imprisonment, that a large number of English Nonconformists, who found a moral support in Scotch Presbyterianism, first opposed this act. Till the time of Cromwell, indeed, it was a question whether the episcopal or presbyterian form of Church government would predominate. The intermingling of the political and ecclesiastical elements in both parties embittered the strife, and complicated the issue. The reason of this intermingling was that the evangelical principle of faith not being grasped in its full independence, and consequently failing to attain a sufficiently free development and productivity, assumed, on the contrary, either a hierarchical or theocratic form; the *authority* whether of the Church and tradition, or of the Scriptures, and especially the Old Testament, being pressed in a legal manner. The question whether certain ceremonies—matters which for the most part had long been connected with superstition—might be regarded as *adiaphora*, and be made binding upon the conscience of the clergy by the secular power, was brought before the Swiss, especially Bullinger, and answered by them in a moderate and conciliatory manner (1564-74), in which however the leaders of the malcontents did not acquiesce. Persecutions directed against their party determined them to found a communion of their own, after the model of the Swiss Church. Conventicles were accordingly formed, which were soon presbyterially organized (after 1568), and a puritanical separation was opposed to the episcopal system. Its leader was Thomas Cartwright of Cambridge. It demanded the full autonomy of the Church, the equality of ministers, the abolition of a compulsory liturgy, the application of the Mosaic law even to Christian princes, presbyteries for the congregations, but no combination of presbyteries into synods,—a feature which already showed the independent tendency of English Presbyterianism. It regarded the Scriptures as the codex whence the only lawful form of Church government was to be derived.

Archbishop Whitgift (1583-1604) opposed the notion of establishing a presbyterian, instead of an episcopal national Church, and persecuted the Puritans as nonconformists, while his predecessor Grindall had regarded and defended them as a pious private society within the Church. The Baptists and Brownists

were also treated with extreme harshness. Doctrinally, Whitgift advocated the strictest predestinarianism and the particularism of grace for the sake of extirpating Arminianism. He was however compelled to withdraw his Nine Lambeth Articles, and *controversial sermons on predestination were forbidden by the Queen.* After 1620 these very Lambeth Articles were adopted by the Puritans as their confession of faith, while the High Church party began to favour Arminianism. The demand for a stricter sanctification of the Sabbath expressed in Bound's Book on the Sabbath was also inscribed upon the banner of Puritanism, while, on the other side, Bancroft attributed to Episcopacy the character of a Divine institution.[1]

James I., 1603, King of England, had inspired the English Puritans with confidence, by recognizing in his Scotch kingdom, 1592 (as James VI.), the claims of Presbyterianism. He soon however, let fall the mask, and combined with the assertion that the Episcopal Church, as being catholic and apostolic, was the true medium between Popery and Puritanism, efforts to make it supreme, and desires for absolute political power. Bancroft, nominated Archbishop of Canterbury, laid upon the Puritans the iron yoke of his Ecclesiastical Constitutions, which resulted in numerous deprivations. The King hated Puritanism as a popular power, and thus it happened that on either side parties were at the same time both ecclesiastical and political. The King showing himself favourable even to popery, and endeavouring to enforce the episcopal system upon the Scotch Presbyterians, the Brownist, John Robinson of Leyden, conceived the notion of preserving religious, and through it civil liberty by emigration to New England. The first band of Pilgrim Fathers sailed in 1620, and by the year 1635 they had been followed by above 20,000, who founded a church after the apostolic model, free from the oppressions of the state and hierarchy, and maintaining a strict observance of the Sabbath.

Charles I. (1625) being averse to austerity, and seeking to legalize, so to speak, the desecration of the Sabbath, by the "Book of Sports" which all clergymen were ordered to read from their pulpits, the Puritans, who were derided by the frivolous court and populace, now assumed a more morose and obstinate

[1] E. Schöll, art. *Puritans* in Herzog's *Realencycl.* and Macaulay's *Hist. of England.*

character. Many of them quarrelled with all ecclesiastical and political order, and formed those *democratic Puritans*, who were the precursors of a second more violent anti-episcopal movement in England.

Charles I. (1625) believing Puritanism to be suppressed, attacked the political liberties of the country, and gradually advanced so far as to introduce certain Roman Catholic ceremonies. Flatterers preached the doctrine of passive obedience, according to which subjects were bound, under pain of eternal condemnation, to submit in all things to the will of their rulers. Archbishop Laud endeavoured, by the most violent means, to extirpate the Puritans, and the King treated his ancestral country of Scotland almost like a conquered province. All this brought the movement to a crisis. The attempt to introduce the Liturgy into Scotland produced a rebellion, and the Covenant for the defence of purity of doctrine (1638). While the ecclesiastical dignitaries were examining in convocation the seventeen canons, by which the royal supremacy and the Laudian hierarchy were to be legally recognized as Divine institutions, and the doctrine of passive obedience established as the divine right of kings, the opposition had already become powerful in England also. The "Long Parliament," 1640, was the introduction to the great English revolution. The so-called Committee of Religion was to do away with the Laudian systems, and to relieve the Puritans; but the bishops, determining to stand or fall with absolute sovereignty, the episcopate was abolished, and the Westminster Assembly (1st July 1643) devised a form of Church government for the whole nation.[1] Usher proposed a combination of the presbyterial with the episcopal system, but the bishops and the King opposing the scheme, the Scotch insisted upon introducing their Presbyterianism unaltered into England also. Such independence of the State on the part of the Church was not however desired by Parliament. The parties there represented (dissenters being excluded and the bishops having retired) agreed indeed to an alliance with the Scotch, but the King and the majority of the Upper House were opposed to it. When then the war against the King broke out, the parliamentary army was powerfully supported by the Scots. Oliver Cromwell, with his Iron-

[1] Comp. Niemeyer, *Puritanorum Libri Symbolici*, Lips. 1840 (especially the *Conf. Fidei Westmonaster*).

sides, however soon raised himself to the head of affairs, and with him—who till now had espoused the cause of Puritanism, which was akin to Presbyterianism—a new principle, viz. that of *Independency,* began to make its way and to branch off from Presbyterianism.

Cromwell was adverse not merely to prelatic but also to Presbyterian uniformity. Instead of making one or the other of the parties which had failed to come to an agreement supreme, he sought a *third* standpoint raised above both, suggested to him both by political and religious motives, and which, though he was unable to carry it out with Episcopalians and Catholics, anticipated much which was in subsequent times current. He required inward piety, but not identity of outward form nor even of doctrine, and desired to grant full liberty of conscience even to Anabaptists, &c., and equal political rights to those of different religious views. Parliament was obliged to concede full political privileges to the Independents; though it instituted in 1646 a modified presbyterial system for England. This however never took root in English soil, but remained a mere castle in the air, being opposed not only by Episcopalians and Catholics, but also by the jealousy of Parliament, and especially by Independency, which was adverse to every kind of uniformity. Power now passed into the hands of the army, which formed a military parliament, consisting for the most part of Independents. The imprisonment and decapitation of the King, the Protectorate of Cromwell, and the greatest religious confusion in the midst of general tumults followed. Externally the spirit of Independency prevailed. Catholicism was however still cherished in secret, and the Episcopal Church had its numerous though oppressed friends. In Scotland, the presbyterial system, there supreme and independent of the State, hated Independency almost more than Romanism; while in England, the new Parliament seized upon the royal supremacy, and so exercised it, that the Church seemed, after the suppression of Episcopacy, about to become more than ever dependent upon the State.

Besides, *Independency* itself was soon the subject of an *internal process of dissolution.* The moderates desired that the Church should be independent of the State, but also that each separate congregation should be independent of others. They adhered to the formal principle, but did so, like the Scotch, in a

legal manner, in respect of Church government, retaining however the evangelical doctrine of salvation. Their aspirations after liberty were satisfied with independence of ecclesiastical tradition, and subjectivity was as yet appeased by the contents of Scripture, as the material principle required. But among the more radical spirits there began to appear an alteration of the material principle, which, under the semblance of more fully carrying this out, violated, in one way or another, the formal principle, and misconceived the necessity for the union of subjectivity with the objective and historical contents of Scripture. To these belonged the Anabaptists, who set up the principle that different religions must be brought before each individual for his choice, in order that his decision may be a free one—a maxim which attributed less importance to truth of matter than to freedom of decision, *i.e.* to the use of formal freedom. With others the predestinarian doctrine of the indefectibility of grace resulted in Antinomianism. They viewed the doctrine of the grace of which faith participates in an unethical manner, and made it the nourishment of a eudæmonistic subjectivity, which, fleeing from the strictness of objective moral requirements, cradled itself with dreams of an already attained sanctity. The widely spread millenarian notions, especially of those who reckoned themselves among the "saints," added greatly to the ferment which everywhere prevailed. By the byway of millenarianism, an intermingling of the ecclesiastical and the political was—as by the Anabaptists of the Reformation period—again arrived at. "The fifth monarchy of Daniel, the thousand years' reign of the saints, was at hand, and they, the Millenarian Independents, were called to establish this kingdom."[1] To these were added the *Levellers.* When that great statesman Cromwell did not enter into these fanatical notions of his former friends, nay, opposed the opinions of the Independentistic Parliament, which insisted upon treating merely political questions, such as alliances, war, peace, &c., solely according to the religious principle, and dissolved the discordant assembly, he was regarded by them as an apostate and Antichrist, and the tide of fanaticism rose higher and higher. The Levellers demanded unlimited political equality and religious liberty: a man's own conscience and the illumination of the Spirit of God were in their eyes the

[1] G. Fox, 1649; Robt. Barclay, 1667; William Penn, 1644-1718.

sole authority. With some, especially where political motives preponderated, religious indifferentism was the goal arrived at. Hence, as subsequently by the Quakers, no essential and necessary position was left for either the external historical revelation or the means of grace. In the midst of such an elimination of the formal principle, an inward revelation with which the mind might more easily and more closely combine than with the external being still insisted on, the character of faith, now set free from the historical contents of Scripture, was thus necessarily altered, and the mystic "inner light" of the Holy Spirit was but too easily transformed into the light of reason, or the voice of the subjective conscience.

Cromwell himself at last occupied a tolerably isolated position. Hated by many, but now free from party combinations, he was only the more diligent in laying the foundations of religious toleration in England. He constrained none to conformity, but granted to all who confessed God and Christ, with the exception of Papists and Prelatists, religious freedom and civil equality.

But the mental anarchy which had set in was not thus to be restrained. The restoration of Episcopacy and absolutism under Charles II. and James II., the latter of whom, at first secretly, afterwards openly a Roman Catholic, attempted to undermine Protestantism, served, after a short interval of tranquillity, to increase the excitement and confusion, until the second revolution resulted in the final overthrow of the Stuarts, and also put an end to the struggle for either a Presbyterian or Episcopal uniformity of Church government or worship.

The result of these violent convulsions was, that on the whole Presbyterianism predominated in Scotland, and Episcopacy in England. Besides these, the firmer formations of the English *Baptists* and *Independents* (or *Congregationalists*) settled down as the more peaceful deposit of the various parties. To these must be added the *Quakers*, who, by an appeal to the inward leading of the still small voice of the Holy Spirit alone, carried to the last extreme the opposition to the clerical office, to external authority in religious matters, and to ceremonies. Their starting-point was opposition to the onesidedness, resulting in formalism and a mechanical legality, with which the Scotch and English Churches took their positions upon a formal principle of authority alone; the former upon that of the Bible,

the latter upon that of the Church. To this was added the desire to flee from the storms of external life and from the national disasters to the peace of rest in God, and in this way to obtain an inward independence. But in an equally onesided and mystical manner did they themselves insist upon those elements of the material principle—inward experience and the assurance of faith. *The reaction of the material principle* which was exhibited in their case was insufficient, because they sought by pure inwardness to separate themselves from all external objectiveness, a proceeding accompanied by distortions of Christology, and of the doctrines of justification and the atonement. This alteration of the matter, by combination wherewith faith receives its evangelical form, involved a change in the nature of faith itself. Quakerism left no firm position to the word and sacraments, those means of grace upon which faith must lay hold, to say nothing of a rule of doctrine and an ecclesiastical organization. The inner light to which it trusted was by no means conceived of in a rationalistic sense, but regarded as an objective emanation from the glorified and light-imparting Saviour (in the souls both of Christians and non-Christians). But their aversion to all that was objectively historical, could not but have a Docetic effect upon their Christology. Christ is to them the eternal light, endowed with a body of light, and enlightening all men without the external word. His birth of the Virgin is not denied, but is made a theophany without real importance. The mystical union with the eternal Christ, by which the latent light of the soul is aroused, and the image of Christ impressed upon it, takes the place of justification. According to Barclay,[1] it is possible for the regenerate man to be sinless.

But a further result of the conflicts and disorders in the regions of politics, morals and religion, was the appearance of *Deism* after the second half of the seventeenth century, and its

[1] Robert Barclay died 1690. *Theologiæ vere Christianæ Apologia*, 1676, and the *Catechismus et Fidei Confessio*, composed by him, 1673 and 1676. Comp. also the recent works of Joseph Gurney, and Thos. Clarkson's *Portraiture of Quakerism*, 3 parts, London, 1806. The party of Hicks has, during the present century, carried out in America the spiritualistic and rationalistic consequences. The result however has been, that the Quakers, those reformed Schwenckfeldians, have drawn nearer to the Scriptures. See Schneckenburger's *Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren prot. Kirchenparteien*, 1863, pp. 69-102.

unchecked and triumphant progress till about 1750. By its means England exercised extensive influence upon the churches of the Continent, and especially of Germany, until the reaction of practical Christianity in Methodism, and its consequences —the formation on the one hand of the Evangelical or Low Church party, and on the other the victorious reaction against the moderates in Scotland, changed the scene. Before, however, entering upon this subject, we must first take a glance at the state of theology in Great Britain in the seventeenth century.

During the sixteenth, and especially the seventeenth century, England can certainly boast of many names of note among her theologians, especially in the departments of exegesis, patristic literature, and the history of doctrines. Among these are J. Pearson, 1612-1686;[1] George Bull, 1634-1710;[2] Archbishop Usher, the famous chronologer, 1581-1656; Jos. Bingham, the great archæologist, 1688-1723;[3] J. Selden, 1584-1654; Beveridge, 1636-1708; the learned patrologist Cave, 1637-1713; and the Anglicanized German, Grabe, 1666-1712; Jewell, the apologist of Episcopacy and the English Church,

[1] *Exposition of the Creed*, 1659. This work, which is held in high estimation in England, endeavours to rear up systematic theology upon the simple foundations of the œcumenical creeds. It develops from Christianity those general principles of religion by which atheism is to be refuted. His *Lectiones de Deo et Attributis Ejus* rather adhere to the method of Thos. Aquinas, and he has hence been called the father of a scholasticism. Comp. the article *Pearson* in Herzog's *Realencyclop.* He endeavours, however, to assert the biblical and historically critical character of theology, and insists upon the necessity of a settled text of the New Testament. See the great exegetical work *Critici Sacri*, 9 vols., which he edited in conjunction with others. Among his numerous patristic labours may be mentioned his *Vindiciæ Epistolarum Sancti Ignatii*, 1672, against Daillé. He unites with Petavius in favour of the seven Epistles edited by Vossius, 1646. In this question he was especially interested for the antiquity of Episcopacy, the rise of which he also traces in other works, in which he gives the evidence for the apostolical succession in the Anglican Church. Comp. Dodwell's edition of his *Opera posthuma*, 1688, and Churton, *The Minor Works of John Pearson*, 1844, 2 vols.

[2] *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ* in his *Opp.* ed. E. Grabe, 1703. In his *Harmonia Apostolica*, he seeks to prove the identity of ante-Nicene with Nicene doctrine, and with that of the Apostles Paul and James.

[3] *Origines Ecclesiasticæ, or the Antiquities of the Christian Church*, 8 vols., 1708-22, carried down to Gregory the Great. He maintains that the Apostles instituted episcopacy. Bingham, Pearson, and Bull were highly esteemed in the Romish Church also, as well as in Germany.

1522-1571; Richard Hooker,[1] 1554-1600; Potter,[2] 1674-1747. Among the Scotch, the most important Church historian was J. Forbes, 1593-1648, who proved,[3] with much scholarship, that the different popes contradicted one another, and showed the uncertainty of Romish doctrine, if its authority is to be estimated according to its own claims—*e.g.* its demand that the sentence of the Pope *è cathedra* should be decisive. With regard to *exegesis* the London Polyglot of Brian Walton (undertaken by him in conjunction with many fellow-labourers, and completed 1657) was an eminently meritorious work. With respect more particularly to the Old Testament, may be mentioned Edw. Pococke, died 1691, the Arabic scholar, one of the co-operators in the Polyglot, and an interpreter of the minor prophets; Edw. Castell, the lexicologist of the Polyglot; Th. Hyde, S. Clarke; Lightfoot, the great Talmudist, 1602-1675; Outram, † 1689;[4] J. Spencer, † 1695,[5] who embraced the notion that the motive of certain portions of the Mosaic law was that they might furnish a defence against heathenism, while he considered that in other portions many heathen elements had been incorporated from a spirit of accommodation, a view opposed by H. Witsius and others. To still more recent times belongs Lowth, Bishop of London, a man of refined poetical taste, died 1787.[6] Among New Testament exegetes are: W. Whitaker, 1547-1595;[7] Hammond, 1605-1660,[8] a zealous admirer of Hugo Grotius; and D. Whitby, 1638-1726.[9] The first famous critic of the New Testament in England was J. Mill, 1645-1707.[10] *Systematic Theology* and especially *Divinity* were less cultivated,

[1] Author of the *Ecclesiastical Polity.*

[2] Author of *Church Government in the Apostolic Age.* Episcopacy is uniformly regarded as of apostolic ordinance.

[3] In the 2d vol. of his *Works*, 1708.

[4] *De Sacrificiis*, lib. ii.

[5] *De Legibus Hebræorum Ritualibus eorumque Rationibus*, lib. iii. 1685.

[6] *De Sacra Poësi Hebræorum*, 1753. *Translations of Isaiah*, 1778-79.

[7] *Works*, ii. fol., Genev. 1610. He is an esteemed defender of the authority of Holy Scripture.

[8] *A Paraphrase of, and Annotations upon, the New Testament*, 1675. *Psalms and Proverbs*, 1684.

[9] *Paraphrase and Commentary on the New Testament*, 2 vols. fol., 1718, ed. 4. At first an Arminian, he subsequently embraced Arian tenets. Comp. his *Disquisitiones Modestæ in Bulli Defension. Fidei Nicænæ.*

[10] *Novum Testamentum Græcum cum Lectionibus Variantibus* (from MSS.), Oxford, 1707.

except by the Puritans, Independents, and Dissenters in general, among whom the Calvinistic John Owen, 1610-1683, takes the first rank, and John Howe, 1630-1705, together with Goodwin, 1600-1679, are highly esteemed.[1] To these may be added Archbishop Leighton of the Anglican Church of Scotland.[2] Divinity was chiefly treated on by Anglicans, as *e.g.* by Pearson and Beveridge, under the form of expositions of the Apostles' Creed, the Athanasian Creed, the Church Catechism, and the Thirty-nine Articles. Treatises on separate doctrines, especially Baptism, the Lord's Supper, the Church, Holy Scripture, are not infrequent; nor in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are discussions on the Trinity, the Incarnation and work of Christ, and, after the pattern of the Reformation age, on Justification. It was not till after the Deistic period that the doctrines of the Divine government and the Trinity were much discussed.[3] Among Anglican theologians of a freer doctrinal tendency, during the seventeenth century, were Chillingworth, 1602-1699;[4] Stillingfleet, 1635-1699;[5]

[1] *John Owen's Works*, by W. Goold, D.D., ed. in 24 vols. Edinb. 1854. Through fear of disturbing the received text by a critical use of translations, he declared himself opposed to the preface and appendix of Walton's *Polyglot*, and maintained the genuineness and purity of the Hebrew and Greek text of Scripture against Walton, who successfully defended his cause. He also advocated the original authority, the self-evidencing light and power of Scripture against "the fanatics," attacked "the idol of free will," and defended the indefectibility of grace against the Arminians. Sherlock maintained the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, Satisfaction, and Justification, and especially the doctrine of the Holy Ghost and His work against the Socinians. John Howe, *Whole Works*, 8 vols., ed. John Hunt, 1822; see especially vol. i., *The Living Temple.*

[2] Leighton, *Theol. Lectures*, translated under the title of *Prælectiones Theologicæ. Works*, 1830, vol. iv.

[3] Sam. Parker, *De Deo.* The doctrine of the Trinity was treated on by Waterland, 1683-1740; the dissenter Isaac Watts, 1674-1748; and Edw. Stillingfleet (see below); the doctrine of the Atonement by the last named, Goodwin the Independent (*Discourse on Christ the Mediator, Opp.*, vol. iii. 1692), and Thomas Taylor the Puritan, 1576-1632; Christology by Isaac Watts (*The Glory of Christ as God-Man*), 1728, and Owen (see above); the Sacraments by Hopkins, 1633-1690; Justification by Richard Hooker, Forbes, Gataker, 1574-1654, Owen and Howe; the Church by almost every learned bishop; Eschatology by Thom. Burnet, a millenarian, 1635-1715, author of *Telluris Theoria Sacra*, in 4 vols., 1681 and 1689; *De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium Tractatus cum app. de Futura Judæorum-Restaur.*, ed. nov. 1723; *De Fide et Officiis Christ.*, ed. nov. 1729.

[4] *The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation*, 1638.

[5] *Works*, 6 vols. fol. Lond. 1710. Specially worthy of notice is his *Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion*, ed. 2, 1681; *Origines Sacræ, or Rational Account of the Grounds of Natural and Revealed Religion*, 1701.

Edw. Fowler, 1632-1714;[1] and Bishops Tillotson and Burnet, 1643-1715, famed for their pulpit eloquence, the latter also a Church historian. Rich. Baxter, † 1691, and John Bunyan, † 1688, were chiefly concerned for the revival of practical godliness.

The character of English theology, during its most flourishing period, is, however, pre-eminently historical and comparatively indifferent to scientific accuracy. As a scholastic age, properly so called, cannot be here, as elsewhere, spoken of, so neither do we find productivity even in freer forms. The English mind of the seventeenth century had not yet sufficiently mastered the Reformation principle, to possess therein sufficient power and impulse for an independent reproduction of dogma, and especially of the doctrine of salvation.[2] Anthropology and soteriology were still discussed with far less interest than the doctrine of the Trinity, which was defended on the authority of tradition, and without attempts at its further cultivation.[3] In the seventeenth century far more importance was attached, in the Anglican Church, to submission to Church order than to doctrinal orthodoxy. This was especially the case with the Romanizing Archbishop Laud, who endeavoured to transfer the authority of the Church of Rome to the Church of England and to restrict its reformation. At the same time he declared peaceable dissent in certain non-fundamental articles allowable, while Potter required only the substance of the Christian religion for the existence of the Church, nay, called the apostolic symbol a sufficient catalogue of fundamental articles.[4] It was the dogma of predestination which gave the greatest offence to English theologians, although among the earlier there were many non-presbyterians of Calvinistic opinions. *The resolutions of Dort were not sanctioned,*

[1] *The Principles and Practices of certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England, abusively called Latitudinarians, truly Represented and Defended* (anonym.), ed. 2, 1671. *The Design of Christianity*, 1676 (that it is, "inward real righteousness"); *Libertas Evangelica*, 1680.

[2] There was always among Anglicans, though not among Puritans, an inclination to Arminian opinions, the zealous advocacy of free grace or of assurance of salvation being rather regarded as antinomian or enthusiastic. So Gataker with respect to J. Eaton, Tobias Crisp, and John Saltmark. Comp. Hoornbeck, *Summa Controversiarum Relig.* 1658, p. 812.

[3] G. Bull and others return to a subordination of the Son, together with his Homoousion.

[4] Comp. Tholuck, *das kirchl. Leben*, ii. 22-24.

*nay, in* 1620, *the preaching of predestinarian doctrine was prohibited*, a fact which served to favour Arminianism. Strict Calvinism was, in the seventeenth century, advocated by scarcely any except Presbyterians, and especially Puritans, whose breaking up into numberless sects we have described above. A middle position between the Episcopalians and the fanatic Puritans was taken up by the so-called Latitudinarian party, now beginning to appear, of which Archbishop Abbot († 1633) may be regarded as the first representative. This tendency was both politically and ecclesiastically liberal, and inclined to a union with the Presbyterians, nay, with the Greek Church under Cyrillus Lukaris. If some of this way of thinking still adhered to the Thirty-nine Articles, others already went farther, as *e.g.* John Hales of Eton (born 1584, died 1656), who accompanied D. Carlton, the English deputy, to Dort. He there inclined towards Episcopius, and was alienated from Calvinism. Chillingworth, who was of a kindred spirit, also embraced Arminian opinions. In this view love is the main point. Soul-destroying error need not be feared where this is found, and other errors do not justify intolerance or schism. They desire to leave even those articles which are required as fundamental, in that breadth and generality in which Holy Scripture states them. It was no marvel that this anti-dogmatic tendency, which laid the chief stress upon the practical, in other words, upon the moral element, should have increasingly evaporated all that was specifically Christian. Already there were not wanting those who rejected every other evidence of Christian truth than that furnished by its reasonableness, because the appeal to the inward testimony of the Holy Ghost involved the circle, that this witness to the truth of Scripture is only known to us from Scripture, while the historical proof furnished by miracles was (according to Grotius) wanting in validity, even Scripture itself admitting that there are such things as lying miracles.[1]

This latitudinarian tendency obtained, moreover, fresh accessions by means of the philosophical systems which, in the course of the seventeenth century, appeared in England in its turn.

[1] So Bishop Fowler, in his work (mentioned p. 63), *The Principles and Practices of certain Moderate Divines*, &c. Comp. Tholuck, *Das kirchl. Leben*, ii. p. 23. To these belongs also Hammond, *Opp.* vol. i., *The Reasonableness of the Christian Religion; of Fundamentals, of Schism*, &c.

These were divided into two main branches, one of a more idealistic kind, at the head of which was Ralph Cudworth; the other realistic and empiric, whose leaders were Lord Bacon and John Locke. The relation of both to the Church type of doctrine was a free one. The Cambridge school of Cudworth still manifested a reverent spirit, while Locke, on the contrary, retreated to the one proposition, "Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah," (see below,) and Arthur Bury[1] regarded repentance and faith as alone essential, and the gospel as intended to render legible the eternal law of nature, written in the heart.[2]

At this point, however, we are already brought in contact with Deism.

[1] *The Naked Gospel Discovered*, 1690, and the *Vindiciæ Libertatis in Fide Christiana Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ et Arthuri Bury contra calumnias et ineptias Petri Jurieu Theologiæ et Malignitatis Professoris*, an appendix to the work *Latitudinarius Orthodoxus*, London, 1697.

[2] Tholuck, *id.* p. 24.

## SECTION II.

### THE DEISTIC ERA.[1]

## CHAPTER I.

### SUBJECTIVITY AWAKENING IN BRITAIN.

IT was not till the philosophic movement, caused by the overthrow of the Aristotelian philosophy by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), had removed obstructions from its course, that the flow of theological science in England became more rapid, while even then its current was, for want of a settled method, more intermittent than in Germany.

The great chancellor bestowed both speech and consciousness upon the genius of the English nation by those works which, on the one hand, vindicated the claims of ordinary experience, especially with respect to natural phenomena and politics, and on the other gave it an impulse whose after effects were far-reaching and not wholly salutary.[2] England under Elizabeth had taken her place among the great powers of Europe, her patriotism was fully aroused, while her views were at the same time enlarged by her commerce and colonies. All this, together with numerous inventions, continual discoveries in the heavens, in the seas, on the earth, the great advances made in mathematics, mechanics, and physics, promoted as they were by the labours also of Cartesius and Spinoza, developed more and more the realistic feature of the national mind, and threatened traditionary beliefs with serious collisions, wherever they came in contact with modern notions. Bacon gave to this tendency both scientific method and a good conscience; the former by directing to common experience as the only possible means of advancing science, the latter by

[1] J. Leland, *View of the Principal Deistic Writers*, 1754. Thorschmid, *Versuch einer vollst. engelländ. Freidenker-Bibliothek*, 1765-67, and especially G. B. Lechler's excellent work, *Gesch. des engl. Deismus*, 1841, and Pattison's essay in the Oxford *Essays and Reviews*.

[2] Best edition of Francis Bacon's works, by Basil Montagu, 16 vols. 1825-34. Especially with regard to our subject the last book of *De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum*, lib. ix. 1605; *Novum Organum*, 1620.

keeping on tolerably good terms with the world of faith. He is willing to leave to theology its independent province, but he does this for reasons which show that he takes too low a view of the problems of philosophy, which he limits chiefly to natural science,[1] and that he sees in theology nothing more than the revealed and moreover arbitrary law of God. To his mind a knowledge of nature is, next to the Word of God, the best nourishment of faith. Nature reveals the power of God, Scripture His will. The Word of God, and not the *human nature*, is the sole source of theology. It is our duty to believe God's Word, even where it is opposed to our reason; for we owe to God self-renunciation with respect to our reason, as well as obedience with respect to our will. To say this is to assume, in unprejudiced faith, that the Scriptures are the Word of God. This principle may furnish a hint as to the reason why he ascribes a far greater dignity to faith than to our present knowledge, viz., that in knowledge the mind is affected by the impressions of the senses, in faith the mind is affected by mind, by a worthier agent.[2] He here seems to fall back upon a sense of the Divine nature of Holy Scripture, as he indeed expresses it, when he says, that it is written upon the heart by God. Yet little weight can be laid upon this, since, on the other hand, he again returns to the maxim, that the principles of religion being of a positive kind, and ordained of God's free omnipotence, are entirely removed as to their corroboration from any investigation. Nor must the purport of Holy Scripture be ascertained by means of such an exposition as human compositions are subjected to, for the revelations of God being designed to meet the necessities and answer the inquiries of every age, their meaning cannot be exhausted by the sense first given by the context. He thus opens a door to various meanings, in other words, to a subjective interpretation of Scripture, while, on the other hand, he requires the absolute submission of faith even to that which is apparently incredible and unreasonable; greater honour being in such cases done to God, and the victory of faith being proportionately nobler. Hence he does not recognize an enlightening of the understanding by means of Christian

[1] Compare H. Ritter, *Gesch. der chr. Philos.* vol. vi. pp. 369, &c. He contemplates a reform, or restoration of the sciences in general, by means of their return to their proper office, the "interpretation of nature," in the place of the flights of imagination they have hitherto been taking through *anticipationes mentis.*

[2] *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, ix. cap. c. i. ed. Francof. 1665, pp. 258, 259.

truth. In his view faith is, in the first place, a blind submission to mysteries, and it is as foreign to his notion of theology that faith should itself beget knowledge, as that the gospel should be the means of bestowing an assurance of salvation. He by no means regards faith as the source of a Christian knowledge, and almost entirely sacrifices the material principle to the formal. On the other hand, he insists that to attribute to Scripture a completeness of such a nature, that all philosophy, unless it is to be esteemed profane, must be derived from it, is an exaggeration, an *intemperies* of a Rabbinical and Paracelsian kind. This, he thinks, would be to seek the dead among the living, an error quite as blameworthy as seeking the living among the dead, *i.e.* theology in philosophy. It is by sharply defined severance between the two that Bacon would maintain their respective claims and provinces.

His very view of nature displays a sensualistic and material feature, though of a more refined kind, since he allows that all matter has life in itself. In natural science he will have nothing to do with designing causes, but directs his attention chiefly to efficient causes, though a mechanical explanation of nature does not content him. He is also averse to Atomism, because he is incapable of comprising multiplicity in unity. Being, however, unable wholly to exclude ethics and natural theology from philosophy, he is obliged again to bring philosophy and Christianity into contact, even as the heart to which the gospel appeals is connected with the reason. In fact, he concedes to the natural intelligence, which is a spark and remnant of primitive purity,[1] an inward instinct, in conformity with the law of conscience, though such a concession is certainly at variance with his opposition to innate ideas. But this natural intelligence is almost entirely of a negative kind, and more capable of condemning errors than of instructing in duties. So too in the case of natural theology. In his view it also is rather a merely negative source of knowledge, capable of refuting atheism, but not called upon to lay the foundations of religion, for all the principles of religion rest upon themselves (*sunt authypostatæ, per se subsistentes*), because they are positive, and depend more upon authority than upon reasoning.[2] On the other side, he allows to reason at least a secondary position in

[1] *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, p. 259. [2] *Ibid.* p. 260.

theology; it is her part to explain mysteries according to their purport, and to draw inferences, only guarding in the former case against presumption, and in the latter comparing results with principles.

Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1684), though a personal friend of Bacon, opposed his views.[1] In contrast to Bacon's empiricism, he embraced the belief in innate ideas, which however needed to be aroused by experience, and in common notions corresponding to the world; for man is a microcosm in correspondence with the macrocosm. He views morality as such a common notion, or rather as a compound of such common notions. Such too is religion, and it is to this latter that he chiefly directs his attention. He endeavours to retreat from *the mysteries* which, according to the dominant theology, must be believed,—although their real importance to the moral and religious life cannot be made evident—to those vital principles of religion which he finds in all modes of belief. In doing this he is so little opposed to a belief in revelation, that it is by means of an inward revelation that he would learn what are the essential doctrines in all religions. These he makes to be the five following: there is a Supreme Being; He is to be the object of worship; piety and virtue are the chief elements of worship; sin is to be expiated by sorrow and amendment; and there are divine rewards and punishments both in this life and the next. These truths are self-existent in the reason, after the manner of innate ideas; they may also, if necesssry (if they have been choked or obscured) become matters of revelation, which may after careful criticism be recognised as such. He lays great stress upon repentance of evil as the crisis of the malady, and calls it the sacrament of nature. These chief pillars of religion he regards as having been overlaid and hidden by priestcraft, till Christianity appeared to restore primitive religion, which however was soon to experience a fresh degeneration from which it is now to be delivered.

Thus the notion of innate ideas, far from forming a bridge to historical Christianity, was rather to serve as a handle for the criticism of Christian doctrine, by denying that it was possible

[1] *De Veritate prout distinguitur a Revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili et a falso*, 1624. *De Religione Gentilium Errorumque apud eos causis*, 1645, and more completely, 1663.

for Christianity to introduce anything essentially new. It was however with Hobbes that an antagonistic, a purely empiric, nay, a materialistic system, which was to have a far more destructive effect upon Christianity, appeared in all its harshness.

Thomas Hobbes (1558-1679), like Cartesius and Bacon, insisted on keeping apart the provinces of philosophy and religion; but the mathematical system which Cartesius required was formed in his hands into an entirely mechanical and materialistic view of the universe.[1] The object of his exertions differs from that of Bacon, inasmuch as it was not a reform of natural science, but of ethics and politics, which he contemplated. These he desires to see treated mathematically as hitherto neglected branches of natural science, and moreover of a mechanical kind of natural science. The perplexity and misery caused during his time in England by religious contentions, aroused such disgust in his mind, with its conservative principles and lively interest in the good of the community, that he did not hesitate to adopt even those most radical means which he thought alone promised a remedy. This remedy he found in reducing society to a mere mechanism, by a theory which placed everything, without exception, in absolute subjection to one supreme earthly power, namely, that of the State, whether its will were democratically or monarchically represented, and whether it dealt with things secular or with things religious and moral.[2]

According to Hobbes, by nature there are no innate ideas, and consequently no conscience. He is a sceptical sensualistic nominalist. In his view there is no knowledge but that which is derived from the impressions of the senses, and our ideas are but perpetually oscillating sensations which we denote by words, *i.e.* names,—the counters of our logical computations or sequences. Reactions against the influence of the senses arise within us; to these we give the name of will, and even our moral ideas have a sensuous origin. We also are nothing else than bodies, and God Himself is a corporeal spirit, who can only reveal Himself to us as such (*i.e.* to the senses). The matter of the will is self-assertion; this we call happiness: and what we *desire* that we call good. Thus he arrives at a morality of

[1] The complete edition of Hobbes' works is that of Sir William Molesworth in eleven English, 1839, and five Latin vols., 1839-1845.

[2] Compare H. Ritter, *Gesch. der chr. Philos.*, vol. vi. pp. 453-542.

absolute egotism, which is only restrained, through regard to common interests and fear of anarchy, by means of public order. Power especially is desired by all, and everything is in itself common property. This being so, it is might which gives right, and hence would arise a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, a universal chaos. A compromise however by which all renounce their power in favour of one absolute sovereign, viz. the government, is expedient. Thus chaotic democracy is made, as it is also by Mariana and other Roman Catholic teachers of this period, the basis of government and even of monarchy. This does not arise from the higher idea of justice or of the State, but from prudence, which upon utilitarian principles seeks a remedy against the chaos of arbitrariness, but without any alteration of the selfish principle. According to this renunciation, the government or monarch becomes the general will, the soul of the gigantic ζῶον, of the Leviathan, whose members are all without a will of their own. This monstrous being is the mortal God, the God upon earth. This only, and not the Church, has power on earth. It was not possible for Christ to found a kingdom of redeemed beings, before He had paid the price of their redemption. But neither did He found this kingdom after His death; this event is not to take place till His return. All this shows us how suspiciously near a relation there is, between the Stuart theories of passive obedience founded on the Divine right of kings, and a system of absolute materialism which denies all moral freedom and despises personality.[1] The state, *i.e.* the ruler—continues Hobbes—cannot indeed control the inward faith, but the whole outer man, even the tongue, belongs to it. If the sovereign commands a man to blaspheme God or Christ, he must do it upon the sovereign's responsibility. It is his to prescribe religion, worship, doctrine, his decree makes Holy Scripture canonical, he is the supreme pastor and ordains bishops;

[1] Other English writers of the seventeenth century advocate the doctrine of passive obedience from other standpoints. Thus Sir Robert Filmer († 1647), in his work, *The Freeholders' Grand Inquest touching our Sovereign Lord the King and his Parliament*, 1679; *Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings*, 1680. Such was also the doctrine of the Nonjurors, 1688. Comp. Macaulay's *Hist. of Eng.*, Samuel Parker, and others. A like position was occupied in Denmark by Archbishop Swaning (*Idea boni Principis*, 1648) and John Wandalin (*Juris Regii ἀνυπευθύνου solutissimi*, 4 books, 1664), who materially contributed to the establishment of the Danish royal law; and in Sweden by Arsenius and Lundius. Comp. Tholuck, *Das akad. Leben*, ii. 159, 179.

that is heretical which opposes his commands, and he can never be a heretic. This audacious system, full of the materialistic spirit, and arising, as it did, in a period of superabundant subjectivity, and bloody conflicts waged in the name of religion, was a desperate attempt to cast out the Beelzebub of arbitrary subjectivism by the most ultra-despotism, which however was itself no less arbitrary, nay whose throne was based only upon egotism, upon the desire for peace at any price, even at that of the sacrifice of all that was most sacred. It is despair of all truth, and of its power to restore health to human life, which thus leads the last instinct which yet survives—that of bodily self-preservation—to mental suicide. This same dialectic necessity, which certainly is ever urging the arbitrariness of pure subjectivity to seek its point of rest in the absolute despotism of merely external authority, that fear may begin to operate where higher motives have ceased to work, by a contrary process drives men again from this to a fresh supremacy of arbitrariness, as certainly as such an authority can itself be regarded only as a product of arbitrariness. For the idolizing of self-constituted authorities does not make them divine. The same vicious circle must be ever and again traversed between subjective arbitrariness and authority, till each is interpenetrated by the other, till authority aims at freedom, and freedom has found its true condition and just support in lawful authorities. Of the union of these two principles in the sphere of religion, by the Reformation, Hobbes understood nothing, and in the seventeenth century they were severed in every possible way.

At this period many signs showed that atheism and infidelity were widely spread in England.[1] And yet the nation at large was not accessible to materialistic opinions, not to speak of the coarser theories of Hobbes. Nor had the spirit of empiricism as yet taken sufficiently deep and general root in the land of a Scotus Erigena, an Anselm and a Duns Scotus, for a contempt for speculation, and a neglect of the deeper intellectual problems, to have become universal. On the contrary, it was after the overthrow of the Aristotelian system that the school of Ralph Cudworth, 1617-1688, who, without obstructing the progress of

[1] *The True Intellectual System of the Universe, wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is confuted and its impossibility demonstrated*, 1678 (trans. into Latin, with notes by Mosheim, ed. 2, vol. ii. 1773).

natural science, opposed a Platonic philosophy to empiricism, materialism, and atheism, became more widely spread. To this Platonic school belong John Norris, 1657-1711,[1] Samuel Parker, Bishop of Oxford, 1640-1687,[2] and especially Henry More, 1614-1687.[3] To maintain a harmony between the natural sciences and the interests of spiritualism, Cudworth decided on the acceptance of a plastic power in nature, nay, of the vitality of every individual atom. This was in accordance with the doctrine of John Baptista of Helmont, who taught that nature fashions all things not from without, like art, but from within.[4] So little is Cudworth opposed to the atomic theory, that he endeavours to employ it as the substructure of his theological views; but that which he strongly embraces is the notion of design. The movements of atoms cannot be conceived of as the work of chance. A spiritual being controls them: since however he is of opinion that it would be unworthy of God to operate directly upon things so trifling, he interposes as it were an intermediate being between God and the atoms, in the shape of his plastic power of nature. This is, on the one hand, the motive force inherent in matter, and so connected therewith that a law of nature may be spoken of, and all that takes place in nature need not be attributed to miracle. On the other hand, it is not independent of God, but obeys His supreme behest. A motive similar to that which induced the interposition of the Alexandrian Logos here prevails, the only difference being that Cudworth considers the plastic power of nature both finite and fallible, and hence is obliged to have recourse to a theodicy. If this limitation of the Divine co-operation (*concursus*) already betrays a deistical feature, this is yet in many ways checked in his writings, and his friend Henry More, when speaking of his labours, declares their aim to have been to oppose the Cartesianism which would exclude God from the world, by again

[1] *An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*, London, 1701-4, allied with Malebranche.

[2] Ritter's already cited work, vii. 432. Also Wilkins, Bishop of Chester, 1614-72, who seeks to check the prevalence of the mechanical view of the universe by directing attention to other possibly inhabited worlds, and to the marvels of mechanism.

[3] *Theological Works*, fol. 1708; *Opera Theologica*, 1675; *Philosophica*, 1679, together 3 vols. fol.

[4] Ritter, *ibid.* p. 439.

introducing Him into the world. This he attempts to do—in contrast to the Cartesians, whom he calls Nullibists, because they deny that Spirit or God is anywhere—by attributing to Him an actual existence in space. At the same time, however, he ascribes to space itself a kind of spirituality, and herein reminds us of Newton's doctrine that the living and Divine Omnipresence has its general sensorium—by means of which God is in perceptible and active relation with the world—in the subtlest medium, whether called ether or space.[1]

Far more important, however, to Cudworth, H. More, and Norris, than a rectification of the view of nature, was the laying of a genuine theological foundation for the ethical principle. To Cudworth especially are we indebted for having so boldly contended against the principle of deism and materialism, in its first movements, that he sought to liberate theology also from those errors which offered dangerous points of contact to the opponents of Christianity. For instance he opposes, besides atomistic atheism, both immoral theism, *i.e.* the doctrine that the difference between good and evil depends upon the sovereignty of God, and that moral but fatalistic theism which, though it admits that good and evil are such of their own nature, yet leaves everything to God's exclusive agency, and, by denying moral freedom, abolishes morality. In Cudworth's opinion, good is inherent in the nature of God, and—according to Norris, who carries out this subject still further—independent of the Divine sovereignty.[2]

The Platonism of this school, however, required a transposition into a world of thought to which the age in general was already alien. This was seen in men who, though opposed to Hobbes, were yet unable to accept the doctrine of innate ideas. Thus Richard Cumberland[3] insists that it is only by experience that we can know that the law of our nature does not urge us, as Hobbes declares, to mere self-love; but has, as Hugo Grotius teaches, its counterpoise in the social instinct. Joseph Glan-

[1] A view repudiated, as is well known, even by Oettinger, and most nearly approximated among modern philosophers by Lotze and Weisse.

[2] *A Treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality*, 1673. *On Freewill*, with notes, by J. Allen, London, 1838. More, *Enchiridion Ethicum*, Amstelod. 1695. Norris, *ibid.* cap. vi. pp. 303-407.

[3] *De Legibus Naturæ disquisitio philosophica*, 1672. Compare Ritter's above-cited work.

ville, too, 1636-1680,[1] goes so far as already to question the applicability of the law of causality.

But such scepticism, which could not fail to introduce confusion even into the duties of life, was little in accordance with the English mind. This, after the extravagances of Independency during the Cromwellian period had exposed an appeal to the Divine Spirit, with respect to things divine and Christian, to a general suspicion of enthusiasm, sought for itself another way.[2] The English mind could not again be brought into subjection to ecclesiastical authority, whether Romish or Anglican, not even in the form that, while faith is based upon Holy Scripture, Scripture is based upon the authority of the Church. Nor was the assertion that Holy Scripture is self-evidencing, and furnishes assurance of its own divine nature, borne out;[3] for though the saving truth it contains has indeed the power of accrediting itself to the heart, yet this truth being neither restricted to the form of Scripture, nor identical with it, but being, on the contrary, capable of existing in various forms, its divine nature is no guarantee of the divine nature of its form, nor, consequently, of the inspiration of Scripture. This distinction—so natural to the Lutheran Reformation, though subsequently forgotten by Lutheran theology—was one wholly alien to English theology, as was also the perception of the relative independence of the material principle in general. Hence, English theology, on the whole, has laboured under this misfortune: that while the advocates of Holy Scripture have dwarfed the principle of faith, and therefore shown so little independent power of free dogmatical production, the advocates of free believing personality have, on the contrary, failed to discover its consistency with Scripture, and degenerated, as above related, into the

[1] *Skepsis Scientifica, or Confessed Ignorance the Way to Science*, 4to, 1665.

[2] Compare the Oxford *Essays and Reviews*, 1861, 5th edit., pp. 254-329: *Tendencies of Religious Thought in England*, 1688-1750, by Mark Pattison, Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. His conclusion, with the question it contains (p. 329), finds an answer in the history of German theology.

[3] Cudworth, in the preface to his *Intellectual System*, had already said, with Calvin, that a belief in Scripture is not a merely historical faith, resting upon artificial proofs and evidences; but a certain higher and diviner power in the soul which is, properly speaking, in correspondence with Deity. Compare H. More, *Discourse on the True Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in points of Religion, Theol. Works*, i. 765.

fanaticism of the inner light, or into a self-emptying latitudinarianism.[1]

When, then, the integrity of faith in Scripture or the Church was shaken by the religious movements and the beginnings of Deism, the English mind, after the Revolution of 1688, sought the support which it was in need of, in the reason, and there being then no system of philosophy whose influence was at all extensive, this was done by making common sense the judge as to what truths were requisite for the community. To this circumstance it was that John Locke, the herald of common sense, was indebted for his permanent authority in England. In this respect rationalists and supernaturalists are agreed, that both in the last instance appeal to common sense; with this difference, however, that while the latter would prove to it, that the fact of its own existence obliges it to admit that of other supernatural but historically corroborated sources of truth besides everyday experience, the former think themselves obliged to refuse any such admission. We have thus described the nature of the two parties, which, for the space of sixty years, were found in conflict with each other, and also shown what was the basis common to them both.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE CONFLICT AND TRIUMPH OF DEISM.

A NEW era dawned on Britain with the Revolution of 1688. To the change thus inaugurated, the two last-mentioned factors, together with latitudinarianism and the prevailing indifference with which religious distinctions were regarded, mainly contributed. The breach between the English mind and its episcopal or presbyterian traditions became wider and wider. It retreated from positive truths and definite forms to indefinite generalities, and sought to exchange its antiquated garments for robes of a more elegant and modish kind. Solid and steady study at the universities, with its requisitions of accuracy of idea and copious knowledge, laid aside its scholastic garb, and

[1] According to Pattison, the doctrine of an inner light (even when regarded as kindled by Scripture) was, about 1688, rejected by all parties as enthusiastic, without the claims of the material principle being otherwise secured.

at the same time its thoroughness; and the classics and versification now occupied the chief places in the universities.[1] The clergy no longer regarded themselves as the ambassadors of Christ, commissioned, in His name, to offer salvation to the world; but as orators whose office it was eloquently to recommend to their flocks Christian, or for the most part merely moral, truths, as the surest means of happiness both in this world and the next. Pattison, the intelligent and clear-sighted historian of this period, describes it as one of decay of religion, licentiousness of morals, public corruption, and profaneness of language;[2] and makes the just remark, that those ages in which morality *alone* has been most spoken of, have ever been those in which it has been least practised. In saying this we would not deny our obligations even to the period terminating 1750; which, by clearing away much dead matter, prepared the way for a reconstruction of theology from the very depths of the heart's beliefs, and also subjected man's moral nature to stricter observation. From the very nature of things, however, it can only be regarded as a period of transition, as an elementary step towards the genuine inward freedom of personality.

We must, however, take a somewhat nearer view of this period, the influence of which was abundantly felt in Germany.

John Locke (1632-1704)[3] coincided with Hobbes in his denial of innate ideas, but knew how to touch the right string for moving the English mind, by combining empiricism with a love of liberty, as well as with a certain amount of reverence, more of a moral than of a mystic or religious kind, for the Divine and for the the law of God.

Locke proclaimed the doctrine of the religious toleration of the State, and went even so far as an absolute separation of Church and State. Faith, he says, is not a matter of the will; but depends, and must depend, upon evident reasons. He endeavours to unite Divine revelation and reason, by treating the latter, with its formal laws, as a kind of revelation. Reason is the eye, revelation the telescope; fanaticism alone desires a revelation

[1] See Pattison, *ibid.*

*Essays and Reviews*, p. 256.

[2] *Works*, 3 vols. fol., 1689, especially vol. i. *An Essay on the Human Understanding, and the Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures, with two Vindications*, vol. ii., 1695.

with that omission of reason which would abolish both. While the former is not the production of reason, it is by means of reason that we must be convinced that it is revelation. Who would pluck out an eye to be better able to see through a telescope? Reason is able to perceive why she must use the telescope. If once the form by which revelation is introduced is proved divine, its contents must consequently be believed. These contents then are, that Jesus is the Messiah, and that faith in Him makes up for the deficiency of our works. To embrace and hold fast fundamental doctrines, and to be willing to believe all that comes from God, is all that is necessary to salvation. Locke's maxims on toleration made him the favourite of dissenters; his propositions on the possibility of proving that a reception of Christianity is agreeable to reason, which resembled those of Hugo Grotius, exerted an influence upon English works on the Evidences which has endured until the present day. In these compositions Christianity is regarded, in a onesided manner, as a summary of doctrines, at which reason, left to itself, either never could, or could not till a later period, arrive; and the evidences adduced for these truths or doctrines, leaving their matter entirely out of the question, stop at proving the divinity of their origin, or of the form in which they were introduced, as that wherein their authority consists.

When once a feeling for the independent nature of religion is lost, the world of will and thought will soon be substituted for it; and where confidence in the power of the understanding and the dictates of the reason is aroused—an event which occurs most speedily in the realm of morals—opposition to Christianity, or religion in general, is sure to follow.

Arthur, Earl of Shaftesbury, 1671-1713,[1] was a man of an estimable spirit. In contrast to Hobbes and Locke,[2] the latter of whom eudæmonistically calls that good whereby anything is

[1] Shaftesbury's *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times*, 3 vols. 1749.

[2] He, as well as William Wollaston (1659-1724), author of *The Religion of Nature Delineated*, 1726, and Samuel Clarke (1673-1729), author of *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in answer to Hobbes, Spinoza*, &c., 1705, is an admirer of Plato. He is also a special opponent of the mechanical doctrine of nature. He acknowledges the value of mathematics, but declares that they have nothing to do with the soul. The mechanical explanation of the soul's life is folly in his eyes. See Ritter's above-named work, vii. 549, and Lechler's *Geschichte des englischen Deismus*, 1841, pp. 246-65.

brought about which, according to the laws of our nature, is a benefit to us, Shaftesbury is of opinion, that moral goodness has a real existence, and that its principles are innate in us as ideas, or at least, as moral instincts. As music and beauty of form are not merely subjective, nor the results of certain conventional arrangements, but things objective, so also are the natural moral feelings, such as shame, remorse, everywhere and at all times the same, and therefore reasonable.[1] He admits that the mere immediate feeling is not, as yet, in the stricter sense, a moral one, but that reflection and conscious will are needed to constitute it such. For in morals all depends upon the motives of actions. This motive he finds in the beauty and loveliness inherent in good; these beget a delight, which becomes the motive of right action. He takes offence at Christianity because it promises rewards to virtue, and thereby denies its intrinsic value, its position as its own object, and the happiness which it involves. Hellenistic by nature, and an enthusiast for beauty, he misconceives both the power of sin and the claims of justice, views good in an idealistic manner, and desires not salvation in another world, but harmony in this—that union of the good and the beautiful which enables us to dispense with the hope of Heaven. But he is unable to state whence this virtue originates; he is of opinion that a persuasion of the goodness, the order and the beauty of the universe can animate and encourage virtue; that man, entertaining such views, will act rightly, because he is in harmony with himself and the world. He allows that this faith in the goodness of the world, and therefore the attainment of perfection in virtue, depends upon faith in God, *i.e.* upon theism. But in an optimist spirit, he overlooks sin, and the disorder it has introduced into the world. The theism of Christianity seeks neither to deny these, nor to regard them as subjective conceptions, but to reconcile them. Shaftesbury, on the contrary, in his idealism, rather flees from the contemplation of reality than gains the victory over it. If we find disorder within us, he says, we find it also without—we find an angry and a threatening God. But he is not able to inform us how to escape the disorder that is in us, and instead of recognizing that it is precisely to the

[1] Compare his work, *Sensus Communis, an essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour; An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit; The Moralist, a philosophical rhapsody on the Deity and Providence.*

pure that the sin which is in the world must be the heaviest sorrow, he solaces himself, in an easy and æsthetic manner, by his view of the unalloyed perfection and goodness of nature, while God is in his eyes mere harmonious goodness; holiness and righteousness being left in the background. He acknowledges that Love, the principle of Christianity, is the supreme principle, and that hence solicitude on its account is out of place. With regard to scoffers he considers that it stands the test which of all others shows it to be proof against them, namely, the test of ridicule. It is unjust to apply ridicule, that practical scepticism, even to that which is most ridiculous; when applied however it does not injure, but strengthens that which it seems to injure. Christianity is "a witty and good humoured religion," and needs no other evidence in its favour than that furnished by its contents,[1] by which he means its morality, although he finds this deficient, inasmuch as it omits all commendation of patriotism and friendship. In Shaftesbury we see a reaction against that legal spirit, which so loves to separate the good from the beautiful, and to place it in a onesided manner in the light of duty only, but overlooks the ideal pleasure and the freedom found in goodness. By placing their reconciliation however only in humanism and in a refined æsthetical cultivation of the intellect, he makes this to be the power of morality, which he therefore views not in its deeper meaning, but rather as merely a beautiful form of the intellectual life. Even that which he views as the source of knowledge in the province of morals, viz. the feeling, he regards as a feeling merely for form.

Hence Samuel Clarke, an otherwise tolerably yielding opponent of the Deists, sought to give a more objective expression to matters ethical. He regards neither the State nor the Church, with its revelation, nor the mere feeling for the beautiful, but the reason of things, as the criterion or source of our knowledge of goodness. That is good which is in conformity therewith, which is therefore suitable to circumstances, and which would also make itself heard if a pure idea of the world were already established. Reason would then be the object as well as the law of the

[1] Ordinary theology has the defect of laying more stress upon the power of God, by its appeal to miracles, than upon His goodness, while in fact the order of the world is the best proof of God's power and wisdom, and a being acting in a merely arbitrary manner would not be God but a dæmon. *The Moralist*, ii. 5. Ritter, *ibid.* p. 544.

normal movement of the empiric world, in which the law may certainly be in some manner innate. But the formula assumes that empiric things are of themselves reasonable, that things exist not to be determined by the moral, but that the moral has to find its standard in things.

Tindal (1657-1733)[1] follows Shaftesbury, inasmuch as he regards beauty as a motive to virtue, but he adds to this a second motive, viz. its utility, and passes entirely into eudæmonism. He considers the desire for true happiness to be the all-impelling lever, the ultimate object, while virtue, because it makes perfect, is the means thereto. In such eudæmonistic morality, religion is abolished; for though action according to the reason of things, which leads to happiness, may be religious so far as this reason of things is regarded as the will of God, yet it is only a possible relation to God, as the primary originator of this world which is therein supposed. A further relation between God and man in history, such as positive religion insists on, is denied by Tindal. For he thinks that a positive religion, if it is to be anything more than natural religion, must be distinguished from this only by basing its precepts, not upon the reason of things, which forms a whole complete within itself, but upon the Divine pleasure, and this he considers would be unworthy of God. Hence Christianity can be nothing more than the restoration of the one natural religion, *i.e.* of morality, which impels to the pursuit of true happiness, in a manner conformable to that reason of things which originates from God. It was from the moral consciousness, as though this were a complete and always uniform possession of the reason, that Deism carried on its operations against revelation and Christianity, because freedom and a conscious knowledge of good, and not belief upon mere authority, are essential to morality. Nothing was to be received except on reasonable grounds, and hence faith was based upon knowledge.

While faith was thus made entirely theoretical, the theological *opponents of Deism* by no means maintained its moral and religious importance. There is indeed a difference among them. Some declared natural religion to be chimerical, others, who

[1] *Christianity as old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature*, 1720. Certain replies to this work are given in Darling's *Cyclopædia Bibliographica*.

did not view it in this light, either deduced it from a primary and positive revelation (as Campbell and Stebbing), or—as was the case with the majority—asserted its need of completion by the perfect revelation contained in Scripture (so Conybeare, 1697-1755).[1] Both the advocates and opponents of Deism are however agreed that faith is an acquiescence in doctrines, which being above the reason are mysteries, and that evidences for the truth of Scripture furnished to the understanding must produce a reasonable persuasion that even mysteries are to be believed, because they are contained in Scripture. But that operation of the understanding, which was in this case relied on for the defence of Christian doctrines, led Deism to the opposite goal, and it now displayed the "Freethinking" banner.[2] Thus there can, according to Toland (1669-1722), be nothing above the reason, because anything can only be believed according to the dictates of reason, which must appeal to the contents themselves of that which is to be believed. Collins rightly thinks that that which has evidence in its favour must be allowed to be valid, that freethinking means seeking evidence, and that Holy Scripture even requires this. The prophets and apostles were freethinkers, no conversion of the heathen was possible without a desertion of the superstition of their forefathers through freethinking. But this evidence is regarded as purely theoretical, and as equally adapted to all, of whatever degree of moral and intellectual power. Besides this freethinking does not advance beyond self-justification and self-praise; instead of coming to the point, it is satisfied with laying down the principle or maxims of free thought, but attains to no process of reasoning productive of positive results. On the contrary, the energy of this free thought seems only able to exhaust itself in a negative manner, viz. by attacks upon the Christian religion, which it regards as in the main the work of priestcraft.[3] The emptiness and capriciousness of such free thought, and the contrast between its ridiculous self-assertion and its performances, was wittily, but bitterly, exposed by the great philologist *Richard*

[1] Conybeare, *A Defence of revealed Religion against the exceptions of* (Tindal's) *Christianity as old as Creation*, 1732.

[2] Anth. Collins (1676-1726), *A Discourse of Freethinking occasioned by the rise and growth of a sect called Freethinkers*, 1713. This was answered by Whiston.

[3] Anth. Collins, *Priestcraft in perfection*, &c. 1710.

*Bentley.* It was possible, he said, to think freely, and yet to accept Christianity, but that freethinking had been a bad calling for Collins, who advocated the most slavish of all systems, which left nothing but pure matter and an endless chain of causes. "That the soul is material, Christianity a cheat, scripture a falsehood, hell a fable, heaven a dream, our life without providence and our death without hope, such are the items of the glorious gospel of these truly uncultivated evangelists. As a fly delights in a sore, so does this freethinking seek everywhere thorns instead of roses, blemishes instead of beauty. The deists lay claim to no other thoughts than those of the fools who say in their hearts, There is no God." But theologians, alas! contented themselves with the task of demonstrating Christianity, and treating faith as the result of historical evidence.

This fault of method, however,—which considered it as the chief business of theology to establish the truth of Christianity without regard to its specific matter, and especially to the fact that it is the religion of atonement and regeneration, and therefore in an entirely formal manner,—had its deeper roots in that increasing indifference to the truths from which the Church derives her life, in that progressive dilution, nay, entire dissipation of such verities, which had prevailed since Latitudinarianism had been the order of the day. The vitality of religion depends on the atonement furnished by Christianity in the person and work of Christ. But the Latitudinarians had, after the Arminian fashion, actually transformed the evangelical doctrine of justification by free grace for Christ's sake, into justification through sanctification and good works, and severed it from the merits of Christ. Not Christ, but faith, *i.e.* faith acting by love, was said to have justifying power; while the merit that was lacking through human frailty, God—who was not bound by any law of retributive justice—was to supply, in prospect of amendment of life according to the injunctions of Christ, whose office thus became chiefly that of a teacher of morality. It is true that those peculiar expressions concerning the relation of God to Christ, and concerning His Divine dignity, the so-called "mysteries," still formed part of those Holy Scriptures whose contents were to be believed for the sake of the evidences adduced. But these expressions had become uncomprehended mysteries, chiefly through the fact that the doctrine of Christ's work had been so pared down as to

form a contrast to the doctrine embraced concerning His person, and that His miraculous dignity had become a superfluous apparatus if only such results as were ascribed to it were to be produced. Hence it may easily be conceived that when apologists did enter somewhat more closely into the contents of the Gospel, for the sake of rendering them more plausible to the reason, the transition to giving to the Son a subordinate position would soon be made. Already did the Platonists, and even Bull, entertain a lowered view of His equality with the Father, while later writers on evidences, such as Whitby and Clarke, under the influence of a deistic view of the universe, embraced Arian and Socinian notions.

We will return however to a detailed view of the history of English formal apologetics.

The chief concern of these was, after the manner of Grotius, to establish the formal principle, which on the one hand was generally esteemed the sole and independent principle of theology, while on the other it was, through the loss of unbiassed faith, regarded as itself standing in need of confirmation. This was to be attained by the help of two kinds of historical proof, that of *prophecy* and that of *miracles*.

The former was worked out especially by *William Whiston* in a book abounding in hypotheses.[1] The quotations in the New Testament often making verbal departures from the original text of the Old Testament, and sometimes altering its sense, this strange man hit upon, and carried out, the notion, that the Old Testament as it existed in Christ's days might have been adulterated by the Jews, for the sake of depriving Christians of the most palpable evidence against them. Collins[2] thankfully accepted the proposition that the evidence furnished by prophecy was alone conclusive, since then every new revelation must be based upon former revelations, and declared that God's consistency with Himself required this. If, however, the prophecies of the Old Testament are unfulfilled, this proves—he said—that Christianity

[1] W. Whiston, *The Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecies* (*Boyle Lectures* for 1708). Its author, who succeeded Sir Isaac Newton at Cambridge, turned Arian, and forfeited his post. In other works he endeavoured to show that the Apostolic Constitutions, and most of the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, form parts of the canon of Scripture, having been orally delivered by Christ Himself to His disciples after His resurrection.

[2] *A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, &c., London, 1724. Compare his *Scheme of Literal Prophecy considered*, 1727.

is not true. And if the New Testament presents us with a Messiah totally different from that of the Old, we cannot therefore—with Whiston—fall back upon the typical and allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament, otherwise we destroy the foundations of Christianity. If the Old Testament may not be allegorically explained, there is no foundation for Christianity, for we cannot appeal directly to inspiration. All agree that this depends upon the authenticity of the apostolic writings, as the latter again does upon their credibility, all which makes this kind of evidence too complicated. If then we would not give up Christianity altogether, there is nothing left but to allow it to be a mystical and allegorical Judaism. The position occupied in England by the Old Testament was such that the appearance of this work produced a sensation similar to that felt when an explosion takes place. No less than thirty-five answers appeared. These however presented the spectacle of a scattered army deprived of its leader, and notably contradicted each other. Some thought all depended on the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies, and that it was possible to adduce proof that they had been strictly fulfilled. Others acknowledged that the Old Testament representations of the Messiah, if literally viewed, did not harmonize with the New Testament. Hence they either admitted erroneous applications[1] in the New Testament, or had recourse like Chandler[2] to typical, or like Woolston, 1669-1733,[3] to allegorical explanations, by which indeed, as Collins desired, the stringency of the evidence was weakened, and a door opened to arbitrary views. Sherlock, 1678-1761,[4] went still farther, and viewed the Jewish religion as itself a prophecy. He sought to strengthen the evidence of prophecy by making the whole of the Old Testament, and even the law, prophetic. But he thought that Christianity itself was potentially involved in Judaism, in which idea he went beyond Collins. Finally, Bullock[5] said that Christianity did not at all depend on pro-

[1] Jeffrey, *A Review of the Controversies between the author* (Collins) *and his Adversaries*, 1726.

[2] *A Defence of Christianity from the Prophecies of the Old Testament*, 1725-28, 3 vols.

[3] *The Moderator between an Infidel and the Apostate*, 1725; and previously, *The Old Apology for the Christian Religion*, 1705.

[4] Six discourses on the *Use and Intent of Prophecy in the several ages of the World* (2 Pet. i. 19), vol. iv. 1725, *Works*, ed. Hughes, 5 vols. London, 1830.

[5] *The Reasoning of Christ and His Apostles in their Defence of Christianity*

phecy, but was a new law given by the interposition of Omnipotence.

This leads to the evidence of *miracles*. The unfortunate results of the mode of treatment adopted with regard to the evidence of prophecy were far from leading to an abandonment of the entire method. On the contrary, it was hoped that better success would ensue from combining Christian doctrine with the evidence of miracles. Woolston, the allegorical interpreter at whose hands the miracles experienced the same kind of treatment as the prophecies had done, marks the transition. They were not to be taken historically, but rather regarded as the allegorical garb of doctrines;[1] and, as in the case of prophetic evidence, all must at last centre in the Messianic prophecies, so here too all depended on that supreme miracle of Christ's person, His resurrection, which must necessarily be more historically cognizable than His origin. Woolston's attack upon the miracles called forth about sixty controversial works, the chief of which were those of Lardner, Gibson, Ditton, and especially *Sherlock* (*The Tryal of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus*, 3rd ed. 1729). This celebrated work was answered by Peter Annet († 1768), the chief opponent of the evidence of miracles, who endeavoured to prove both the impossibility of miracles in general, and the incredibility of the narratives of the resurrection and of the miracles of the Apostle Paul. Sherlock's *Trial of the Witnesses* was conducted after the manner of English courts of judicature, and sought, in conformity with English taste, to adduce strict legal evidence for the fact of the resurrection. But here too it was apparent, that such merely historical proofs of single historical facts as would compel belief, are not possible, or at least are not capable of becoming the foundation of *such* a faith as Christianity demands. Annet, assailing the possibility of miracles on *à priori* grounds, thought them inconsistent with the wisdom of God; because a good government would be all of one kind. A system which, by demanding faith in miracles, expressed a disapprobation in God of a world without miracles, had but little of God in it. Instead however of entering upon a

*considered, with a preface against Collins' grounds and reasons*, 3rd ed. 1730. Also his defence of this work against the scheme of Collins, in which also he appeals to the evidence of miracles, London, 1728.

[1] Compare his six discourses on *The Miracles of our Saviour*, London, 1727-29, and defence of these, 1729, 1730.

more thorough investigation as to what the unity of the world was to be sought in, and what was required thereby, the path of historical evidences was still persevered in. These were met by David Hume, 1711-1766,[1] with the assertions that, allowing miracles to be possible, they could not be *recognized* as miracles, and consequently were wrought in vain; that they were only the effects of mysterious causes, and that it is not yet apparent whether they proceeded from good or evil powers, whether they are attributable to accident or deception, whether they were the effects of divine or (as Woolston supposes) only magical forces and means. It was for the sake of establishing the possibility of recognizing miracles, that resort was had to combining them with the holy character of Christ, especially since miracles alone could, as in the case of the prophets, at most prove the Divine mission of Christ, but not His Divine nature, for which it was necessary to have recourse to His own statements. This indeed increased the necessity of establishing the credibility of the New Testament writings, which had not been unassailed, and though *Lardner's* comprehensive work was in this respect a highly meritorious performance, yet the complicated nature of the process of proof could not but arouse the uncomfortable feeling that Christian faith was thus made dependent upon the proficiency of the learned. This feeling—apart from the practical religious reaction of Methodism against the staleness and unprofitableness of merely evidential preaching and writing and against Deism—was powerfully expressed by *Henry Dodwell* the younger.[2] He arrived at the conclusion that there is a great gulf between revelation and reason, and that not only are evidences powerless to fill it, but that to employ the method of demonstration is to betray Christianity. It is folly to attempt to found faith upon free thought. Thought remains thought, and will never become religion. Faith worthy of the name is the operation of the Holy Ghost, and none can believe unless he is a subject of such operation. He was opposed however by both the Deists and the apologists (Leland, Doddridge, &c.), for both saw that if he were in the right, their exertions had been in vain. For the rest, his views also were

[1] *Essays on Miracles, an Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, and his *Natural History of Religion* in his *Essays and Treatises*, 1764, vol. ii.

[2] *Christianity not founded on argument, and the true principle of Gospel Evidence assigned* (Anonym.), London, 1743.

still far removed from the standpoint of the Reformers. He did not perceive that in faith, too, a principle of objective knowledge is granted, and contributing nothing to this, he was incapable either of stemming the torrent, or of turning it into another channel. On the contrary, he is so indifferent to objective truth, that he thinks faith cannot be one and the same in all, and that the obligation to believe cannot apply to all, because faith does not depend upon a man's own will. He thus, in a predestinarian manner, approximates to the Quaker standpoint.

Theologians of the leading school, however, preferred to fall back upon the moral excellence of Christ's teaching, and to avoid those questions concerning His person and work which had become too difficult for them. Hence, in the fourth decade of this century, Deism appeared increasingly triumphant. Tindal († 1733), Morgan († 1743),[1] at first a dissenting preacher, then an Arian and Socinian, and Chubb († 1747),[2] agreed in a denial of all positive religion. According to Morgan the Old Testament was a system of priestcraft, the God of Israel a national God, and it was through the Old Testament that the original purity of Christianity had been corrupted.[3] Paul, the great freethinker, exercised due criticism against Mosaism, and as a Deistic Christian opposed Judaizing Christians. Morgan however forgets that the atonement, which he stigmatizes as a Jewish error, forms the central point of Pauline doctrine. Chubb finds the Scriptures intricate, and denies their inspiration, nay, even their credibility. To the historical reasons upon which the supposed positive revelation may be opposed, he adds also *à priori* grounds. Morality, for the sake of which alone religion has any claim upon man, can tolerate nothing arbitrary. But there must always be an arbitrary element, uncongenial to the mind in positive religion, while natural religion, which primitive Christianity was intended to restore, has this evidence in itself.

[1] *The Moral Philosopher*, 1737.

[2] *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ asserted*, 1739. *Discourse on Miracles*, 1741.

[3] These propositions gave rise to the Warburtonian controversy. Warburton, convinced of the intimate connection between the divine authority of the New Testament and that of the Old, and aware that apologists had felt great difficulty in the fact, that the doctrine of retribution in another world is not taught in the books of Moses, attempted in his work, *The Divine Legation of Moses*, 1738, to prove from the very absence of this doctrine the Divine nature of the Old Testament theocracy, which would have been out of all keeping unless this deficiency had been compensated by direct Divine government.

Natural religion knows nothing of an arbitrary God, giving positive laws at variance with His own nature. Theology may indeed say, that what God wills is therefore good, but truth says that God wills what He wills because it is good for man; for it is the glory of God to will what is best for man, and the knowledge of God is nothing else than the knowledge of this Divine will which is in conformity with the well-being of the world it governs—in other words, the knowledge of God is the knowledge of the laws of the universe. Thus the living God being banished, a way was made for pantheistic opinions, which were also advocated by Morgan. The universal Spirit reveals itself to the general reason, and makes evident the intrinsic reasonableness of truth. The criterion of truth is, that it be consistent with the happiness of man, as the ultimate object of Deity. This truth was revealed from God to Christ, who possessed the pure light of nature, which His apostles indeed again obscured. If Tindal and Morgan rejected positive religion, because reason was sufficient, and her dictates of superior authority to any outward revelation, Chubb denied the latter, because everything in the world follows its settled undeviating course; hence he acknowledges neither a special Providence nor answers to prayer. If there were a revelation it could not be perceived to be such, because uncongenial to the mind. Christ may indeed be allowed to be a heaven-sent teacher, inasmuch as He taught, that the virtuous are pleasing to God, that repentance atones for sin, and that there is a retribution. But these three propositions, which were laid down as primary by Herbert of Cherbury, are held also by the reason. The course here followed is most worthy of remark, for while the starting-point was the endeavour to assign the narratives of Scripture to design and fraud, the impossibility of establishing this position drove its would-be advocates to the mythic or allegorical view. For Chubb esteems the Apostles to have been enthusiasts, and unconscious inventors; the story of the resurrection, *e.g.*, being in his opinion the result of dreams and visions. The subsequent repetition of this process, on a larger scale, in Germany, points to a law of history.

Meanwhile the defenders of revelation perseveringly continued their labours. Among these were G. Benson,[1] 1699-1763, Stack-

[1] *A Summary View of the Evidences of Christ's Resurrection*, 1754. *The History of the Life of Jesus Christ*, 1764. *The Reasonableness of the Christian Religion as delivered in the Scriptures*, 1759.

house, Leland, and Lardner, but these all followed only in the beaten track, devoting themselves rather to the defence of the formal authority of Scripture, than of the subject-matter of Christianity. But since their chief interest also lay in the moral teaching of Jesus, which did not need the evidence of miracle and prophecy, their position became one of increasing difficulty. They reverentially guarded indeed one portion after another of their old doctrinal inheritance, which from their standpoint it was troublesome enough to defend. But they altogether failed to perceive how intimate was the connection between these doctrines and the cause of religion itself, *e.g.* that of Christ's person. It is, therefore, no matter of surprise that their own doctrinal stores grew more and more scanty. *Conybeare* and *Foster* were rational supernaturalists. Daniel Whitby and others belonged to categories whose very existence announces the extinction of religious life. Christianity was looked upon as a beneficent and useful institution. To maintain that it was necessary seemed too bold a step. In 1750 many who desired that the excellence of Christian morality should be admitted, owned their obligations to Deism for having delivered them from superstition and dogmatism.

Thus was Deism dreaming of its victory over Christianity, and the witty and frivolous *Lord Bolingbroke*[1] (1678-1751) making Deistic inferences the common property of the educated, and a matter of taste and fashion. Not contented with claiming toleration or equality for freethinkers, he directed all his energies to bring about the triumph of Deistic opinions. As a statesman he was tyrannical in matters of religion, which he despised. He agreed with Romanists, that Scripture is not the sole source of our knowledge of truth, for to him it was nothing but a collection of falsehoods. He agreed with Protestants, that tradition was untrustworthy; to both he declared that revelation was impossible, and without a specific object. It was no good sign for Christianity that its decline was contemporary with the advance of science. This looked as if it were but ill able to endure the light of reason. He too distinguished between the traditional element in Christianity, which originated with deceitful or deluded men, and genuine Christianity, *i.e.* natural religion. The former he called a melancholy religion, requiring only prayer and penitence, and demanding no activity for the general good. It was a vain attempt to justify Scripture to the philosophic

[1] *Philosophical Works*, in 5 vols. ed. Melet, 1754.

mind, indeed the irreconcilability of Christianity and reason had become an axiom, the latter looking down on the former from its superior elevation.

But it was just now, when, in the public opinion of the educated world, the victory of Deism seemed in a scientific aspect decided, and when being unobstructed by opponents, it was to begin to develop the supposed fulness and self-assurance of Deistic reason, in the place of that Christianity which it rejected, that its emptiness became apparent, and it incurred the fate of all merely negative criticism. It had unconsciously been living upon its adversary, theological science; and when this succumbed it fell with it. It was not Christianity that was overthrown, as the Deists supposed, for this still existed in another form than that of the feeble theology which had fallen. Deism, on the contrary, had no existence as religion, but only as an aggregate of critical notions, and it was under the delusion that Christianity too was but a system of opinions. Criticism, however, having disposed of its theological adversaries, did not stop here, but made the reason itself, and its assumed copious knowledge, the object of its next attack.

David Hume was "the stronger man" who came upon Deism, and resolved its supposed knowledge into a searching investigation of the reason itself, by disputing the objective truth even of the necessary categories of thought, those of causality, &c. No Deistic work made any general impression after 1750, except perhaps those of Priestley, who propagated Socinian opinions in America also, and of the still more radical Paine. Its ardour was self-extinguished; for an orthodox opposition could scarcely be said to exist. Orthodoxy in fact contented itself, for the most part, with a defence of the outworks, while, as far as the contents of Christianity were concerned, it was itself only too nearly assimilated to a moderate kind of Deism; morality and not religion having become the centre on which it turned.

But while the learned were thus engaged either in fruitless contentions or injurious compromises, and while the very defenders of revelation were losing sight of the vital points of religion, a practical religious movement originated in the midst of the English nation. We speak of *Methodism*, which not only attained great importance in England, but also in North America, and on the continent of Europe, where it exercised considerable

influence upon the different Reformed Churches, and also upon some Lutherans. Its leaders were John Wesley, born 1703, † 1791, George Whitfield, born 1714, † 1770, and subsequently Cole, Asbury, and especially Fletcher, † 1785. At first they were desirous only to restore the saving truths taught by the Reformers, and to apply them to the religious revival of the nation, but not to effect a separation from the national Church. Hence the ideas of faith and regeneration were those to which they gave especial prominence, while in the genuine spirit of the Reformers, they could not be satisfied with that merely historical faith, which, in the most favourable case, would be the result of the English system of evidences. Faith was to them that personal reliance on, and confidence in Christ, with which the assurance of salvation is combined. Hence it was the material principle, the subjective side of Christian piety, which was so vigorously revived in Methodism, and which was here more intimately and decidedly united than in Quakerism, with the object of religion and with Holy Scripture. In this respect Methodism rather follows Baxter and Bunyan, although, with the exception of Whitfield's smaller party, it was opposed to the Calvinistic dogma of predestination, and inclined rather to Arminian doctrines; indeed Wesley was himself for some time editor of an Arminian magazine (after 1777). And yet Methodism was, on the whole, far more removed, as far as saving doctrines were concerned, from Arminianism, than from the old Reformed system. It was the protest of national piety against the languor of Latitudinarianism. Its animating principle was "the subjectivity of direct feeling and of inward experience, while that of Arminianism and Socinianism was the subjectivity of the practical intellect."[1]

But those saving doctrines of the Reformers, to which the attention of Methodism was almost exclusively directed, acquired a peculiar tinge in its hands. On the one side great stress was laid upon the misery and natural corruption of man, and especially on the corruption arising from original sin. With this was combined—as the subjective tendency of Methodism might lead us to expect—the requirement, in every case, that a special and formal conflict of repentance should be undergone, for the promo-

[1] Schneckenburger, *Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien*, 1863, p. 104.

tion of which special institutions, as is well known, were invented, as *e.g.* the inquirer's bench.[1] On the other side, it was held that sinless perfection of the inner life was attainable even on earth subsequently to this conflict; while in opposition to Calvinistic tenets the possibility of the falling away of true believers was nevertheless admitted.[2] The combination of these tenets was brought about by the fact that Methodism did not regard the power of original sin as consisting so much in its tenacity and enduring influence, as in that feeling of unhappiness and ruin which is present in the sinner, through the agency of sin as an inimical power, while grace was viewed as a sudden deliverance from this alien power. Certainly redemption was not regarded by Methodists as a purely objective occurrence —as a mere deliverance from the power of the devil. Their attention was, on the contrary, rather turned to personal assurance of conversion and justification. The period of anxiety which they required, was to be followed by a corresponding and contrasted state of delight, which, where it is found, consists in the pleasure now taken in things divine, instead of the pleasure once found in sin. In this feeling of delight, however, the continued existence of sinfulness was lost sight of, to a degree which made perfect holiness appear a present possibility. Justly has a moral shallowness been found here, a shallowness of which the antinomian movements in the party were the fitting retribution. There is, however, another equally suspicious feature. Justification being the Divine act of pardon and adoption, forms the independent objective basis of the whole process of salvation,

[1] With this was [by some] combined the demand of being able to name the day and hour of the new birth, of which a man must of necessity have been conscious. The grace bestowed in, and from the time of, baptism was consequently held in but slight estimation.

[2] When, about 1770, an antinomian superiority to law began to evidence itself among the Methodists, John Wesley preached against Calvinism, and found the reason of such antinomian tendencies in the assurance of eternal election (the *donum perseverantiæ*). This was followed by a severance of the Methodists into the followers of Wesley and Whitfield, the believers in universal or in particular redemption. The Thirty-nine Articles, which Methodists embraced, had made no decision. The more lenient system of doctrine was successfully advocated by Fletcher, the theologian of Methodism (*Checks to Antinomianism; Christian Perfection*), and by Rowland Hill. Since, however, an antinomian element might easily be connected with Wesley's doctrine of Christian perfection, Wesleyanism endeavoured to render this harmless, by teaching the possibility of losing the gift of perfection.

and remains unshaken even amidst the subsequent workings of sin, so long as faith endures. This, however, Methodism does not allow to be a self-existing, independent power, but to a certain degree identifies it with sanctification, by making the Divine act of justification consist in the bestowal of a feeling of ecstasy, whose other side is said to be an abhorrence of sin. Thus, what with the inconstancy of human feeling and the still existing power of evil inclination, the very foundation of justification is shaken, if growth in sanctification ceases. When the feeling of delight is lost, temptations reappear which shake the edifice of the spiritual life to its very foundations. Efforts are made to avert such a catastrophe, either by an antinomian disregard of convictions of sin, or by seeking a palliative in a revival or augmentation of that feeling of delight, which, from its very nature, cannot be equable. But there is one thing which cannot thus be attained, and which can alone be possessed in the genuine doctrine of the Reformers, and that is the simultaneous presence of grace and of consciousness of sin; in other words, the comforting assurance that by virtue of our union with Christ, we, who have not merely been sinners, but to whom sin still cleaves, are nevertheless justified for the sake of our union with Christ,—an assurance which makes us partakers indeed of the peace of God, but with respect to which, that rising or falling measure of ecstatic feeling, which varies according to the varying temperaments of individuals, is to be regarded as accidental. Methodism soon leads to forming a judgment of Christian excellence not from independent considerations of moral worth, but according to the existence or amount of this feeling; though this, in itself, can be but æsthetic, or—though in a refined sense—eudæmonistic and egotistic. Methodism may also lead, by a life of constant reflection upon one's self, to such absorption in the question, Am I accepted of God? or, Am I a true believer? that the acts of faith and the acceptance of grace are meanwhile delayed, or—to speak more correctly—the appearance of both faith and grace is waited for in a wholly passive manner. The effects of Methodism were, nevertheless, as salutary as they were widespread. It powerfully contributed to the revival of Christian feeling, by even that partial purification of doctrine which it effected, and if it did not directly bring about a regeneration of English theology, it yet produced

a healthy agitation in the English Church, and furnished a factor which is indispensable to such a regeneration, by insisting upon personal experience of justification, and regeneration of life.

When this factor assumes—as in a large ecclesiastical community it may easily do—such a form as to exclude all that is incidental, forced, and arbitrary, in the pious subjective tendencies of Methodism, the time is come for the Church to show her gratitude for the blessing she has received, by a gift which is peculiarly her own. At first, however, Methodism furnished but little in a direct manner towards the regeneration of theology, its efforts being chiefly limited to the sphere of practice. It largely contributed to the fall which Deism underwent in the estimation of the English nation after 1750, though the inward poverty of that system was the chief cause of its ruin. Theology was unproductive in England till the Tractarian or Puseyite movement in the fourth decade of the present century, and whilst practical Christian activity was vigorously and variously developed both in the Church and among Dissenters, theological science kept to its traditional paths, and busied itself, according to its custom, with *Evidences.* Among these *Butler's Analogy*, a convincing, refined, and judicious work—still in high estimation —may be regarded as a model; while Leland,[1] 1691-1766, and Nath. Lardner,[2] 1684-1768, manifest extensive apologetic scholarship, though their doctrine is in other respects of a subordination or Socinian tendency. Paley (1743-1805), moreover, produced, besides his *Horæ Paulinæ*, a work on *Evidences*, which is to the present day instilled into English youth at the universities, and regarded as a complete apologetic panoply.[3]

A similar state of things prevailed in Scotland as in England. After its long and fierce struggle for existence,[4] the Church applied itself with special delight to completing and perfecting

[1] See above, p. 66. *A View of the principal Deistical Writers*, &c., *and some account of the answers that have been published against them*, 1754. He wrote against Tindal, Morgan, and H. Dodwell.

[2] Lardner's principal work is *The Credibility of the Gospel History*, which first appeared, London, 1727-1757, in 17 vols. He is a Socinian supernaturalist.

[3] *Natural Theology*, 16th ed. 1819. *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* and *Horæ Paulinæ*, 3d ed. 1803. *Works*, London, 1825. Comp. Pattison in *Essays and Reviews.*

[4] Compare J. Köstlin, *Die schottische Kirche, ihr inneres Leben und ihr Verhältniss zum Staat*, 1852, and *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, 1850, Nos. 23, *seq.* *Das Dogma und die rel. theologische Entwicklung der schottischen Kirche.*

the constitution it had now secured. While devoting itself, however, to this work, it was betrayed into a spirit of dead formalism. Its connection with the State and with the educated classes became a more intimate one, and this, while on the one hand it mitigated the ruggedness of old Presbyterianism by the influences of classical learning and philosophy, on the other, suffered Church discipline to grow lax, and Arminianism, nay, even Socinianism, to creep in, and conceded to the State and to patrons great power over the congregations. This tendency towards lifeless externalism which characterized the previous century, now designated by the name of the "dark age," did not indeed remain entirely without opposition, which, however, vented itself only in the form of two secessions, in 1732 (Erskine) and 1761 (Gillespie), on account of the laxity of Church discipline and the privileges of patronage. The tendency reached its height under the leadership of Robertson, the historian, A.D. 1758-1788. Estranged from the people, who still clung to Calvinism, and had received an impulse from Methodism, the Assembly, relying upon the support of the State, governed the Church despotically, and the party which exhibited most signs of vitality, and was designated by its opponents as that of "the Wild men," was crushed by the Moderates. The latter were afraid that a revival of the old Reformed doctrines of grace would lead to Antinomianism. Even the awakening which appeared after the French Revolution, and in consequence of which the evangelical party again preponderated after the first quarter of the present century, chiefly through the exertions of the renowned Dr. Chalmers, did not immediately bring about a regeneration of theology, and succumbed to the temptation of looking upon the State as the headquarters of that worldliness with which it had to contend.

For the rest, more solid philosophical studies, in which it excels England even to the present day, flourished in Scotland from about 1750.[1] The scepticism, nay, atheism, of his countryman Hume, was opposed by Thomas Reid (1704-1796),[2] founder of the so-called Scotch school, to which belong James Beattie[3] († 1803),

[1] Compare Dav. Masson's *Recent British Philosophy.* London and Cambridge, 1865.

[2] *The works of Thos. Reid,* now fully collected by Sir W. Hamilton, 1852, especially, *Essays on the power of the Human Mind,* 3 vols. 1803.

[3] *An Essay on the Nature of the Immutability of Truth, in opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism,* 1770. *Elements of Moral Science,* 3d ed. 1818.

Ferguson[1] († 1816), and Dugald Stewart[2] († 1798), and with which Thomas Brown[3] (1778-1828), and the French philosophers Jouffroy and Royer-Collard are closely allied. Like Fries, they endeavour, by observation of, or reflection upon psychological occurrences, to build up a science, and thus to oppose to Locke's sensualistic, a mental empiricism, and to lay down the laws of mind in a so-called mental philosophy. There exists, according to their views, an abstract infinite something most intimately connected with our being, and which is at the same time the principle both of conscience and of religion. There is also a direct inward apprehension of this (common sense), which neither needs nor is capable of proof. This they also call faith, in the sense of the most certain persuasion of irrefutable mental facts. They base their ethics upon the principles of benevolence and sympathy. What these command is good. With the exception of Beattie[4] they have not entered into nearer relation to Christianity, while their successor, Sir W. Hamilton, rather inclined to criticism.[5] Hence philosophy, though flourishing more in Scotland than in England, had no influence in effecting a revival of theology. The revival of the Scotch Church during the present century was confined chiefly to practical matters.

[1] *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, 1792.

[2] *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 2 vols. 1792 and 1814. *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, 7th ed. 1844 ; *Philosophical Essays*, 3d ed. 1818.

[3] *Inquiry into the relation of Cause and Effect*, 4th ed. London, 1835. *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, ed. Welsh, 1838.

[4] *Evidences of the Christian Religion briefly and plainly stated*, 4th ed. 1795.

[5] *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, and especially his treatise *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, 1852, pp. 1-37. Compare my treatise in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1861, No. 2: *die Mansel-Mauricesche Controverse.*

# SECOND DIVISION.

## The Lutheran Church from 1580 to 1800.

### INTRODUCTION.

THE period of the Reformation was succeeded, in the Lutheran Church also, by an epoch dedicated to the scholastic fortification of the system of doctrine contained in its symbols. This epoch lasted still longer in this than in the Reformed Church, viz. till about the year 1700.[1] A reaction on grounds of feeling, science, and practice, then set in; hence after the authority of the established Lutheran Church and of the clergy had fallen, the emancipation of the Church advanced in such wise, that philosophy placed itself at the head of the movement.

Compared with the Reformed, the Lutheran Church was the subject of a slower, but also of a more united and more consecutive development. This development was moreover less disturbed by schisms. The dissensions which arose remained within the same ecclesiastical community, hence they were of necessity more thoroughly investigated and understood, a fact which in many instances resulted in the combination of the lawful elements found in opposing parties.

The character of the earlier part of this period was not creative; neither was its attention directed so much to the elaboration and utilization of those treasures which were the legacy of the Reformation, as to their preservation and maintenance (see above

[1] Comp. Gass, *Gesch. der protestant. Dogm.* 3 vols. 1854; Schmidt, *Dogmatik der evang. luther. Kirche*, 3d edit. 1853; Franck, *Geschichte der protestant. Theologie*, 1862, i.; *Von Luther bis Gerhard*, 1865, ii.; *Von G. Calixt bis Wolff.* And see especially Tholuck's instructive and excellent works *Das akadem. Leben des* 17 *Jahrhunderts*, i. ii. 1853, 1854; *Der Geist der lutherischen Theologie Wittenbergs*, 1852; *Lebenszeugen der lutherischen Kirche aus allen Ständen vor und während der Zeit des dreissigjährigen Kriegs*, 1859; *das kirchliche Leben des* 17 *Jahrhunderts*, 2 pts. 1861-62; *Geschichte des Rationalismus*, pt. i. 1865; Heppe, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im* 16 *Jahrhundert*, 3 vols. 1857.

p. 1). This interest too was specially subserved by theological science, which consisted almost exclusively in dogmatics, while religious life consisted for the most part in the act of assimilating traditional beliefs. The faithful maintenance of doctrine was indeed no slight matter in the serious and inevitable contest with the Church of Rome, especially with the Order of Jesuits,[1] and in the voluntary contest with the Reformed Church. More especially too was this rendered difficult by the fact, that the very existence of the Lutheran Church was threatened till the year 1648. The Thirty Years' war, moreover, gave rise to irregularities, which seemed to make a strict maintenance of church unity indispensable, and bestowed upon the elements of discipline and ecclesiastical law an importance not originally involved in the spirit of the Lutheran Reformation. The constructive intelligence of the seventeenth century possessed itself of the materials accumulated in the mind of the German people during the Reformation era, to fashion them into means of offence and defence. A well-armed method, equipped with a system of logic, sought to make Protestant truth theoretically defensible at all points. The unwearying diligence and acuteness of the great dogmatic writers of the seventeenth century surrounded it on all sides with defences, and endeavoured to render it an impregnable citadel. Within this citadel a vigorous spiritual life, which gave evidence of its existence chiefly in sacred song and music, was not lacking. But the notion of winning the world to the Gospel, and of the moral expansion of the Protestant principle according to its different aspects, had almost disappeared. Nay more, amidst such onesided efforts to preserve what was already possessed, without any attempt at vivid reproduction, criticism, and progress, the very subject itself deteriorated, according to an inward

[1] These endeavoured, when violence was unavailing, to bring back the minds of men to the Romish Church, by discussions of terms of peace, by attempts at union, and by the conversion of ruling princes. In these discussions of terms of peace they invented many so-called methods. (Comp. Walch, *Rel. Str. ausserh. der luther. Kirche*, ii. 195; Henke, *G. Calixt*, i. 357, &c. 425, &c. 532; II. i. 157.) The appeal to Scripture was opposed by the demand for literal proof that Protestant doctrine was contained therein. Others proposed making Augustine umpire; others tried to shew by the *methodus præscriptionum* that the Catholic Church was in possession of primitive Christian doctrine, which must be esteemed genuine until her declension from purity of doctrine was proved from history, while Protestant doctrine being a novelty was self-condemned by this very fact.

law while passing through the hand. Luther's principle of faith in its union with Holy Scripture (see Vol. I.), instead of being the centre which supported and the vital power which fertilized the whole system, became a mere single article of doctrine along with others, and the scholastic treatment to which even the scriptural doctrine of justification through faith was subjected, betrays but too surely a secret uncertainty touching sundry important elements of the principle as well as its position in the system. Nor could aught else be looked for if vital religious experience was to retire to the background instead of continuing to take the lead. It cannot be denied that a certain amount of formal productivity belongs to the period. The mind showed itself fruitful in the invention of various methods; a vast amount of matter was also collected from the Old and New Testaments, and the writings of the Fathers, and utilized for divinity. But throughout the whole of these various methods, a breach with the heartiness and assurance of personal faith is apparent. In place of these we find either an orthodox belief, which unfortunately esteemed itself a scriptural faith, or an objective churchmanship. A Protestant tradition opposed itself to Romish tradition, and sought to compensate by external authority for an inward persuasion of truth. Hence, in spite of doctrinal productions, noble and admirable of their kind, complaints of the gravest nature began to arise on the part of men of vital piety, *e.g.* of such as John Arndt, Lütkemann, Valentine Andreä, Grossgebauer, Heinrich Müller, Tarnovius Quistorp, Mayfahrt, Schuppius, and others, who were the forerunners of the movement inaugurated by Spener. Scholastic orthodoxy was already opposed by that *mystic element* which, though repulsed, was now again asserting itself. With this was connected the opposition made from the scientific standpoint, by Calixtus, and at last these elements combined in Spener and his school, and in Zinzendorf, in efforts to obtain either an internal reform of the Church, or to set up a model community beside her. Since however each of these oppositions represented only such elements of truth as had been lost sight of, under the aspects of either knowledge, will, or feeling, orthodox Lutheran theology was still superior to each of these manifestations, though shaken by them to its very depths. And thus it came to pass that when reason awoke to consciousness, and began to raise its head, one stone after another was carried off from the old

Lutheran divinity. This section too of the history of theology, to which that of the Reformed Church is anticipatively analogous, maintains, in spite of the apparent chaos, a uniform course, governed by perceptible laws. The only difference is that in the last-named church the continuity is less closely linked, and the successive stages less completely passed through.

*Philosophy*—whose entrance into the movement was now indispensable, if faith, rejoicing in redemption, was to expand into an objective knowledge of God, of the world, and above all of itself—after exercising a criticism upon the ecclesiastical system of doctrine by means of a formal logic, and achieving the independence of the movement, commenced operations by attempting to win for itself, first within the sphere of the subjective will, then in those of the subjective feeling and the subjective reason, an independent kingdom of truth. Thus that which was already announced under these three aspects, in a theological or religious garb, by the opposition which was but in its germ in the seventeenth century, appeared under a philosophic form in the eighteenth; and the factors whose union is essential to the soundness of church life and of theology, were still more decidedly separated, and unanimous only in opposing the Christianity of the Church. But the effort to make each of these factors, taken singly, the whole, did but serve to bring out with greater distinctness their intrinsic organic connection. To this must be added, that theology, which was itself deeply stirred by the movement in the sphere of philosophy, was making ever fresh attempts to maintain the bond between reason and faith, and to set up a theology in harmony with the prevailing philosophy. All these efforts at union, embracing as they do the various phases of rationalism and supernaturalism, were indeed soon extinguished, not only on account of their own unsatisfactory relation to faith, but also by reason of that incessant progress which was continually superseding each of the great philosophical systems by a later one. We may even say of each, that the latest was ever urging on the mind which was seeking to carry it out more completely towards its successor, until—all the philosophical attempts of onesided subjectivity to constitute itself a whole, to the exclusion of objectivity, having been successively exhausted and overthrown—the time for a higher stage of philosophy had arrived, even that whose fundamental tendency may be called the combination of the subjective and objective elements.

Although a whole series of experiments was needed, even upon this new soil, before a more satisfactory standpoint was obtained, yet there was given in the fundamental tendency of this stage of philosophy a prototype for the due and conscious combination of the objective or formal principle, and of personal faith or the material principle, and thus for the restoration of the evangelical principle to its reformation purity and glory. And not to this only, but to the higher and more certain position of being no longer a mere matter of formal inheritance, or indeed of tradition, but a common possession, scientifically secured, capable of restoring its independence to theology, and of effecting its fruitful organization.

During the whole course of this great history—a course progressing in conformity to law—the great matter was to liberate from the chrysalis state into which it had again fallen, that evangelical principle of faith in which a new world was enclosed; and to deduce therefrom, or obtain from its point of view, a new knowledge of the human and the divine, nay, of the world in general. But for this more conscious possession of the treasures of faith, the first thing needed was such an investigation of the general relations of the divine and human as might form its substructure. This task, which had remained unaccomplished since the Reformation, necessarily and naturally devolved upon philosophical research. Not only during the middle ages, but again, in respect of the doctrine of predestination in the Reformation era, and in the seventeenth century, theology had for the most part kept more strictly to the divine side, *i.e.* since the doctrine of God was but little discussed, to the investigation of divine grace and its laws; while the creature, the human side of Christology, together with the doctrines of inspiration, of the operations of grace, and of the sacraments, had been almost lost sight of in the divine. Hence, after 1750, philosophy, placing itself on the *human* side, began to make this question its own. It advocated the misconceived claims of subjectivity, nay, at first it far exceeded these claims, by seeking to set up subjectivity as the absolute principle. But all these attempts at rendering this principle absolute, whether in the form of will, thought, or feeling, terminated in a reaction towards objectivity, and hence a position more friendly to Christianity characterizes the commencement of the present century.

## SECTION I.

### ONESIDED OBJECTIVITY.

## CHAPTER I.

### LITERATURE AND THEOLOGICAL METHOD.

THE universities were pre-eminently the homes of Lutheran doctrine, though the great cities—such as Hamburg, Lübeck, Magdeburg,[1] Dantzic, Stettin, Gotha, Nuremberg and Stutgardt—also boast the possession of theological celebrities.[2]

I. After the separation of the Melanchthonians, *Wittenberg* was the school of the strictest orthodoxy, in the sense of the Form of Concord. Tübingen, Strasburg, and Greifswald, and for a short period Giessen also, rank next, during the seventeenth century. After these may be mentioned certain towns, such as Dantzic, Lubeck, and Hamburg. Immediately after the promulgation of the Form of Concord, in which the Wurtembergers had taken so prominent a part, Wittenberg was greatly reinforced from Swabia. Hence were Polyk, Leyser the elder (1552-1610), the continuer of the *Harmonia quatuor Evangeliorum*, begun by Chemnitz and completed by John Gerhard; George Mylius; Ægid. Hunnius, † 1603, formerly of Marburg from 1576 to 1592, and father of Nicolas Hunnius of Lübeck, who exercised such abundant influence upon the Lutheran form of the doctrine of predestination (see Vol. I.), and a partial influence upon its Christology also;[3] and Leonhard Hütter (1563-1616), (see below, p. 109). Wittenberg also claims the following names of note: Balth. Meisner (1587-1626),[4] John Hülsemann,[5] from 1629

[1] Magdeburg was the birthplace of Protestant ecclesiastical history, by means of the Magdeburg centuries of Von Flaccius, John Wigand, Matth. Judex, Basilius Faber, Andr. Corvinus, Thom. Holzhuter. An abridgment was made by Luc. Osiander, with a continuation from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.

[2] With respect to what follows, compare especially the detailed information in Tholuck's *Das akadem. Leben*, &c., ii. pp. 15-202; Gass, *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, 3 vols.; Stäudlin, *Geschichte der theol. Wissenschaft*, ii. 1811.

[3] Ægid. Hunnii *libelli iv. de persona Christi*, 1585. *Articulus de providentia Dei et æterna prædestinatione sive electione*, 1605, in opposition to Tossanus and G. Huber, *Epitome biblica*, 1603.

[4] B. Meisner, *Philosophia sobria*, 1611.

[5] *Breviarium Theologiæ exhib. præcip. fid. controversias*, 1640.

to 1646 of Wittenberg, and subsequently of Leipsic, a violent polemic,[1] but a man of profound intellect, † 1661; Abr. Calovius, formerly of Königsberg, Rostock, and Dantzic, but of Wittenberg from 1650 to 1686;[2] Quenstedt, his father-in-law, 1617-1688, and Deutschmann, his son-in-law; and lastly Baldwin, with whom may be named Weller, chaplain to the Saxon court.

Next in estimation to these are the theologians of Tübingen: Jacob Andreä (Schmidlin), 1562-1590, Heerbrand[3] († 1600), Hafenreffer[4] (1592-1619), Steph. Gerlach († 1612), John George Sigwart[5] (1587-1618), Andr. Osiander (1607-1627), the Cryptic Theod. Thumm (1618-1630), and M. Nicolai (1618-1650), Luc Osiander, the scourge of John Arndt, one of those theologians to whom "the Holy Ghost seems to have appeared in the form rather of a raven than a dove."[6] And in the second half of the century: John Adam Osiander (1660-1697), author of the *Harmonia Evangelica*, not to mention that theologian of doubtful character Tobias Wagner († 1680). Förtsch (1695-1705), Christoph Pfaff the elder (1685-1700), and Jäger (1702-1720), terminate the strictly orthodox series. With Christoph Reuchlin († 1707), Hochstetter († 1720), and the Church historian Weismann—who were more akin to the genius of Spener's school,—and with Christoph Matth. Pfaff the younger, a man of elegant and extensive scholarship, a new era began.

At Strasburg, where Calvin, Bucer, Capito, Hedio, Peter Martyr, and Zanchius taught in the sixteenth century, but which after the controversy of the latter with Marburg became decidedly Lutheran, theology at the beginning of the seventeenth century still maintained a milder tendency, which was advocated chiefly by John Schmidt (1623-1658), to whom Spener was largely indebted. Dorsche (1626-1658) and Dannhauer (1635-1666), however, soon became the ruling spirits. Bebel, too, the historian, who was highly esteemed by Spener for his moderation, also subsequently adhered to the Wittenberg school. Zentgraf (1695-1707) was like-minded with these. The pious and scriptural theologian Seb. Schmidt (1654-1696) was the only exception to the prevailing tone.

[1] Comp. his *Calvinismus irreconciliabilis; Callixtinischer Gewissenswurm*, 1854.

[2] Calovius, *Biblia illustrata*, iv. fol. is specially directed against the *Annotat. in V. T. und in libros Evv.* &c. of H. Grotius. On his doctrinal writings, see below.

[3] Jac. Heerbrand, *Comp. Theologiæ methodi quæstionibus tract.* 1575.

[4] Matthias Hafenreffer, *Loci Theologici*, lib. iii. 1600.

[5] Author of a theological compendium which, according to Hafenreffer, was introduced into Wurtemberg.

[6] Tholuck, in his above-cited work, ii. 133.

In Giessen (compare above, p. 15, *Marburg*) Justus Feuerborn, († 1656), and Balth. Mentzer, 1627 the Kenotics,[1] whose Christology was of a more moderate kind than that of the Tübingen theologians and their colleague Gesenius (of Strasburg, 1619, of Rinteln, 1621), who inclined to the Tübingen school, were, together with Winckelmann († 1626), driven from that university. Nevertheless they, as well as Menno Hannecken, 1626-1646, and Haberkorn, 1650-1676, belong to the strictly Lutheran party. Not before the times of H. May, the worthy representative of the Spenerian tendency, 1688, Gottfr. Arnold (for less than a year professor of history, 1697), John Ernst Gerhard, 1697, Hedinger, 1694, and John Jas. Rambach, did another spirit enter into Giessen and bring to it fresh renown.

In Greifswald, towards the end of the sixteenth century, Jacob and Frederic Runge were still inculcating the tenets of Melanchthon, and contributing to the rejection of the *Form. Conc.* in Pomerania. In the seventeenth, however, the doctrines of the *Form. Conc.*, concerning the Lord's Supper, the Person of Christ, and predestination, were adopted at the instigation of the harsh Balth. v. Krakiewitz, and the *Form. Conc.* itself made binding upon the faculty. Balth. Rhaw († 1638), Battus, and others, laboured in a like spirit until about 1693. In Mayer, the enemy of Spener, this tendency reached its climax.

Thus it was, for the most part, the strictest orthodoxy which prevailed in the above-named cities, and in their universities, and this evidenced itself more particularly in animosity to the Reformed Church. In Hamburg, Lutheranism was advocated by Jas. Reineccius, 1613, Edzard, Erdm. Neumeister; in Dantzic, after a short prevalence of Reformed doctrines (from 1606 to 1616), by Botsack, Calovius, 1643, the bully *Æg.* Strauch, 1670 to 1682, and the immortal Schelwig (see below).

For a considerable period Rostock, where a milder and more mystical tendency prevailed,[2] presented a marked contrast to

[1] *Kenotik* (κενοτική), doctrine of the real humiliation of Christ, *i.e.* of His so emptying Himself of the Divine attributes of omnipresence and government of the world that in His human nature He was not omnipresent, but limited to a particular place. The older Tübingen school, on the other hand, maintained such a union of the two natures as gave to the human all the attributes of the divine. Hence, instead of a real *emptying*, there was only a *concealment*, an abstinence from the use of attributes really possessed. Theologians who held the former doctrine were called *Cryptics*; those who held the latter, *Kenotics*. Both words have failed to obtain currency out of Germany.—*Tr.*

[2] Practical theology was here specially favoured and cherished.

these cities. According to Chyträus, Lutkemann laboured there as professor of philosophy (1643), also Grossgebauer, Paul, and John Tarnovius (1604-1637), (1614-1629), J. Quistorp the elder, 1615-1640, and J. Quistorp the younger, 1647-1661, Heinr. Müller, the excellent ascetic author (1653-1675), Schomer, the admirable writer on ethics (1680-1693), while Affelmann (1609-1624), John Kothmann (1626-1650), Dorsche (1654-1659), and John König (1663-1664), author of the *Theologia positiva*, 1664, belong to the scholastic series which terminated with that staunch anti-pietist Fecht. Eihhard Lubinus (1596-1621), there sought to strike out an independent philosophical path. He declared evil to be necessary, but viewed it as a mere negation.[1]

II. The strictly orthodox universities were opposed chiefly by the Calixtine school, which was represented not merely at Helmstädt (founded 1576), but also at the universities of Altdorf, Rinteln, and Königsberg, and which found adherents in many other places besides Schleswig-Holstein, the native land of Calixtus, where Terserus, Matthias, and Strigelius were Calixtines, and which continued to be its chief seat till Sweden accepted the *Formula concordiæ*, and became the home of Lutheran orthodoxy.

Helmstädt was the scene of the labours not only of George Calixtus, but of his friends and pupils Hornejus, 1619-1641, Titius, 1649-1681, the advocate of the necessity of good works for salvation, and also of his contentious and worldly-minded son Ulrich Calixtus, 1657-1701. The classics, and a feeling for history, flourished still longer in Helmstädt. Mosheim, who subsequently removed to Göttingen, was their last representative. But indifference to all confessions spread on all sides, as is shown especially by Fabricius, that mischievous ecclesiastical counsellor of protestant princes who were willing to make their daughters change their religion for the sake of a crown. Unionism in the Calixtine school went so far as to form plans for uniting with Romanists. This was the case with the Abbot Molanus of Loccum, a pupil of Calixtus. He had been professor at Rinteln, together with two other pupils of Calixtus, Mart. Eccard (1650), and Henichen (1651), author of a theological compendium. John Meisner of Wittenberg, Ernst Gerhard of Jena (1659-1688), a son of John Gerhard, were likewise favourers of Calixtus. Besides these may be also mentioned the strange, and subsequently

[1] E. Lubinus, *Phosphorus de prima causa et natura mali*, 1596.

rationalistic, Hermann von der Hardt (1690-1713), who was at first much moved by Spener's teaching.

Among the teachers of Königsberg were numbered, besides Myslenta (1619-1653), "a volcano constantly vomiting fire and mud," and Alex. Calovius (1640-1643), John Behm (1613-1640), who was at first zealous against the Reformed, and became afterwards, together with his son, Mich. Behm (1640-1650), a syncretist; also Latermann (1647-1652) and Christ. Dreier (1644-1688). Mich. Behm, Dreier, and Lev. Pouchon were deputies of the Elector to the Conference of Thorn (1645). The syncretism of Königsberg became to John Ernst Grabe (1697) a bridge to Anglican episcopacy, and to the theologian John Phil. Pfeiffer (1694) and many laymen a bridge to Roman Catholicism. Towards the close of this century, Königsberg rejected pietism. In Lysius (1709), a pupil of the Halle school was first numbered among its faculty, and Mich. Lilienthal (1713) was afterwards associated with him.

Finally, the æsthetic and humanistic inclinations of Nuremberg gave the tone to its university of Altdorf. At first, Altdorf was decidedly Philippistic—nay, many of its teachers went as far as Calvinism, *e.g.* Dürnhofer († 1594) and Moritz Helling († 1595). The *Form. Conc.* was perseveringly rejected by the council of Nuremberg; and the *Corpus Philippicum* made a textbook. Only Schopper (1598-1616), John Schröder (1611-1621), professor at Altdorf, and Saubert of Nuremberg advocated Lutheran orthodoxy—the latter in a zealous, but at the same time a dignified and pious, manner. Thereupon, König (1614-1626) more decidedly represented the orthodox system, but not sincerely, since he was at the same time dallying with the Socinians, who had secretly collected in Altdorf. After this, in the third decade of the century, the influence of Helmstädt, of Cornel. Martini, and of Calixtus commenced. In 1636 appeared the celebrated Old Testament exegete Hackspan, whose views harmonized with those of Ludw. Cappellus. Fabricius, Dürr (1651-1677), and John Saubert (professor at Altdorf 1660, at Helmstädt 1673) shared in this tendency.

The theological ambiguity which had set up its seat chiefly at Nuremberg and Altdorf was principally represented by Dilherr, called in 1642 from Jena to Altdorf. The pietistic school subsequently obtained a footing here.

III. The middle-ground between strict orthodoxy and the

school of Calixtus was occupied by Leipsic, but especially by Jena, which, by means of a series of excellent teachers, entered with wisdom and moderation, but at the same time with decision, into the various theological phases of the seventeenth century, and whose circle of youthful theologians amounted to several thousands. But it was chiefly through the instrumentality of the great John Gerhard, in the beginning of the century, that a new and better era dawned upon Jena. John Himmel and John Major formed with him the famed "Johannean Triad." For a short time (1638 to 1640), Sal. Glassius, author of the *Philologia sacra*, 1623, was the ornament of Jena. Christ. Chemnitz (1652-1666), a man as pious as he was orthodox, kept up its fame from its greatest period till that of John Musæus, 1643-1681, an acute philosopher, and, together with Calixtus and Gerhard, one of the greatest theologians of the century, with whom even Spener was on terms of understanding. Wilh. Baier also, author of the famed *Compendium*, after reading Arndt's *True Christianity*, adhered, though cautiously, to Spener. Sagittarius, the renowned historian (1674-1694), agreed with H. A. Francke; and Fr. Buddæus transmitted this spirit to the eighteenth century.

On the whole, a comparatively milder tone prevailed also in Leipsic, as is evidenced by Höpfner, celebrated for his work *On Justification*, one of the Leipsic collocutors in 1631, Martin Geyer (1639-1683), court-chaplain before Lucius and Spener; also by the pious Olearius (1664) and Rechenberg, the friend of Spener (1680-1721). Nay, even John Bened. Carpzovius the elder (1646-1657) does not exhibit the acerbity of the strictly orthodox. These were represented in Leipsic by the names of Hülsemann (1646-1661), Scherzer (1667-1683), Pfeiffer (1648), Alberti (1671), who were, however, unable to make any decided impression upon the university.

In Copenhagen, Brochmann (1633) was a worthy representative of the Jena school; while Masius, the Calovian, exhibited the hateful combination of a defence of despotic secular power and orthodoxy, and found kindred spirits in Arsenius and Lundius.

The chief works of the above-named are of a doctrinal nature. But divinity, besides mere controversy, embraced also ethics, practical theology, exegesis, and the history of doctrines. All these subjects however were ruled by divinity, that depositary of the self-conscious Protestant principle. Progress is exhibited

in method. The doctrinal works of John Spangenberg (1540, *Margarita theologica*); Erasm. Sarcerius, Chyträus, 1555, Nicol Hemming (*Enchiridion theologica*), 1537, and *Syntagma institutionum christ.*, 1574). Nicolas Solnecker (*Institut. chr. rel.*, 1563), Victorin Strigel (edited by Pezel, 1582-1585), Martin Chemnitz ed. Polyk, Leyser, 1591, and especially John Gerhard,[1] the great divine of the Lutheran Church, all follow the *local method* of which Melanchthon set the example, and which prevailed from his time to that of Calixtus. Gerhard's works are distinguished by the devout spirit, the extensive patristic and scholastic learning, the fulness of thought, and finally by the precision of ideas, and the skill in doctrinal criticism and apologetics which they exhibit. He exercised a lasting influence upon the consolidation of Lutheran views, was greatly followed by even Quenstedt, "the book-keeper of Lutheran orthodoxy," and remains to this day a mine of doctrinal knowledge. His mildness and moderation gained him the esteem both of Catholics and Reformed, and his principal doctrinal work was re-edited by the latter (at Geneva). Leonhard Hütter of Nellingen, near Ulm, wrote a theological compendium in strictest accordance with the symbols.[2] It gives the Lutheran system of doctrine, without many explanations, in the form of question and answer, as being most convenient for committing to memory, and is accompanied with extracts from Luther and Melanchthon, Chemnitz and Ægid. Hunnius. He is thus the most decided representative of merely traditional Lutheranism. In his larger work, published after his

[1] Jo. Gerhardi *Loci Theologici cum pro adstruenda veritate, tum pro destruenda quorumvis contradicentum falsitate per theses nervose, solide, et copiose explicati; novem tomis comprehensum*, 1609-22. Enlarged by excellent articles, ed. Cotta, in 20 quarto vols. 1762-1781. Lic. Preuss has commenced a new edition, pt. iv. 1867. Also *Confessionis Catholicæ in qua doctrina cathol. et evang. quam ecclesiæ Aug. Conf. addictæ profitentur, Epitome*, ed. Joh. Ernst Gerhard, lib. i. ii. in 2 vols. 4to, 1661.

[2] Frequently edited in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a staunch controversialist against the Jesuits, Melanchthon and the Reformed, he inaugurated the era of symbolical traditionalism in the Lutheran Church. He replied to the *Irenicum* of Dav. Pareus (1614) in his *Irenicum vere christianum* (as opposed to a *unio fucata*), 1616; and to the *Concordia discors* of R. Hospinian, 1607, in the *Concordia concors, de origine et progressu Form. Conc. eccles. Aug. Conf.* 1614. Of like nature are also his *Calvinista Aulico, Politicus*, and several works occasioned by the secession of John Sigismund to the Reformed Confession. He was also a specially zealous and productive commentator on the symbolical books, particularly the *Augustana* and *Form. Conc.*

death, he treats doctrinal matters more thoroughly, but with little feeling for system or sound exegesis. His chief aim is to carry out, for learned and acute controversialists, the opposition to Melanchthon and the Reformed. To the same series belongs also the doctrinal work[1] of Brockmann the Dane.

The local method, by separating the doctrinal matter into fragments, prevented the organic connection and progress of the system from being perceptible. Hence George Calixtus,[2] who entered upon his labours in the sphere of divinity in 1613, introduced the *analytical* method, which soon found acceptance even with his opponents, *e.g.* Calovius,[3] Dannhauer (*Hodosophia*), and Hülsemann. It seeks to deduce from one supreme truth, which is the best possession of mortals, the several doctrinal propositions as component parts of that same truth, and as means towards the attainment of the highest end. This highest end is the happiness of man in the fruition of God. With this Calovius already connected the so-called definitional and causal methods in the several doctrines. Scherzer reduced the whole system of theology to twenty-nine definitions to be learned by heart.[4] König,[5] Quenstedt,[6] and Baier,[7] employed a method similar to that of Calovius.

When the time arrived for giving the stability of a systematic form to the truths attained to at the Reformation, and laying down connected and self-consistent tenets,—for which process the agency of the reasoning powers was indispensable,—the chief concern was to bring evangelical truth into its true and positive relation to general human reason. It was in this respect that the controversy of Daniel Hoffman was important.[8] Strongly as Luther had expressed himself against philosophy and reason, so far as their intervention in *spiritualia* was concerned, he had yet as decidedly acknowledged reason as God's gift to man, and as queen in her proper province. His chief solicitude had been to maintain the independence of the province of faith with

[1] C. E. Brochmanni *Universæ theolog. systema*, 2 vols. Lips. 1838.

[2] G. Calixti *Epitome theologiæ*, Gosl. 1619, with a *disput. de principio theologico.*

[3] Abr. Calovii *Syst. loc. theol.* 1675-77, 12 vols. in 4to.

[4] Jo. Ad. Scherzeri *Systema Theologiæ, xxix. definitionibus absolutum*, 1679, ed. 2, 1685.

[5] *Theolog. posit. acroam.* 1664.

[6] *Theolog. didacticopolem, sive syst. theol.* 1685, 1702.

[7] Joh. Guel. Baier, *Comp. theol. posit.* 1693, following the footsteps of Joh. Musæus.

[8] Comp. Gass, *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, i. 1854; Henke, *Calixt*, i. 33, ff. p. 67-70; Thomasius, *de controv. Hoffmanniana*, 1844.

respect to that of reason. In so doing he was far from denying to faith a susceptibility of scientific treatment; on the contrary, in his own opinion, that which seems foolishness to the natural reason is nevertheless divine wisdom, and also capable of being perceived to be such. But the provinces of nature and of faith cannot be two separate worlds; they are, on the contrary, found together in one and the same man, nay, there is no other faculty of thought at the service of faith, than that which the natural man also possesses. Hence, if there is to be a science of faith, the first matter is to define more exactly the relation between *reason and faith*, and on this point Luther has laid down no connected doctrine, though he has not omitted dropping hints, which betray a feeling that the Aristotelian philosophy and its categories do not meet the requirements of the science of faith, but that we must learn to speak "with a new tongue in another language." Now Daniel Hoffmann,[1] an opponent of Ægid. Hunnius, and a camp-follower of the Gnesio-Lutheran band, himself formerly a professor of philosophy, who had in 1593 been reproached with holding the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination,[2] irritated at the enthusiasm which Caselius and Corn. Martini had rekindled in Helmstädt for humanities and the Aristotelian philosophy, maintained in the interest—as he supposed—of pure Lutheran doctrine, that, reason being naturally an enemy of God, is to be regarded as essentially opposed to revelation, and that consequently her opposition to revelation is a sign of its truth. That which is against reason is for God.[3] In such terms did he reject all and every use of reason in theology. Philosophy is a work of the flesh, and of all impurity, idolatry and witchcraft; the ancient Church called philosophers the patriarchs of heresy, a saying which his philosophical colleagues, Caselius, Martini, &c., took amiss; all that is true in philosophy is false in theology. Philosophers are unregenerate

[1] Hoffmanni *proposito de Deo et Christi tum persona tum officio*, 1593.

[2] Bayle asserts of him that he made God the author of sin *per accidens*, *Diction. hist. et crit.* ii. 489. Hoffmann specially reproaches Hunnius with declension from the doctrine of election of the *Form. Conc.* He puts the *prævisa fides* in the place of election which finds no reason in us. Hoffmann, on his part, felt himself in a condition to point out a hundred gross errors to the Wittenbergers. He was also a stout polemic against the Reformed.

[3] It is an *abominabilis sententia* of the Sorbonne: *idem esse verum in philosophia et theologia*; compare Hoffmann, *pro duplici veritate Lutheri*. 1600. His opponents maintained that double truth is blasphemy, since God is truth.

men; what they say of God is untrue. No unregenerate man can know that God is, and the more the reason is cultivated, the more highly does she estimate herself, and the more dangerous does she become to faith. To practise philosophy is to incur damnation. Bötscher, an opponent of Calixtus, subsequently expressed himself in a similar manner. All knowledge beside that of Holy Scripture leads from God to the world and to idolatry. It is the devil who has implanted their law in nature and in reason, viz. the delusion, "Ye shall be as gods." It is not difficult to blame the narrowness of this standpoint, yet we have here but the theoretical correlative of that antinomianism which is also so penetrated by the power and fulness of the principle of faith as to regard a transition to other spheres, whether to the ethical on the one hand or to the intellectual on the other, as an impeachment of the all-sufficiency of faith. In this case, Hoffmann proceeds upon the assumption that philosophy will not confine itself to that which is merely formal, but will hold certain notions with regard to things moral and divine, which, by reason of natural corruption, must necessarily be erroneous, and lead to either Pelagianism or Atheism. His Aristotelian opponents[1] insisted on ascribing to philosophy, not indeed another truth besides theological truth, but another mode of becoming acquainted with at least a certain portion of theological truth, which, as such, is only historically corroborated by Scripture and deducible therefrom. In so doing they evidently overlook evangelical *fides* and its assurance, and fall back upon the form of historical faith. Hence the controversy could not but lead to the question, whether philosophy possesses a special second source of knowledge of the same truths or a portion of them, which theology teaches from Scripture? If this question were answered in the affirmative, theology, which had thus been referred to merely historical sources of knowledge, was evidently placed in an unfavourable position with respect to philosophy, which ascribed to itself the lion's share, as far as certainty was concerned. It was said that it was possible to know, by means of the reason, that God was not only just, but also compassionate, and placable. Hoffmann, without bringing into the field the power of true Protestant *fides* (though he says that we must learn *novis linguis loqui*), had yet a feeling that if philosophy is an

[1] Jacob Martini, *Vernunftspiegel*, 1618.

independent source of knowledge, while theological knowledge bears a merely historical character, and if reason has no need of revelation, a self-sufficiency, nay, a worldly and ungodly tendency is introduced in philosophy. The contest however was not as yet to be decided on its own merits.[1] His philosophical colleagues brought the matter before the secular power, which obliged him to recant, and deprived him of his office (1601). He died in 1611.

After the influence of Calixtus had made itself felt, the formerly inimical relation of the theological faculty, of a Hesshus, a Hoffmann, a Strube, to the humanities and philosophy became a friendly one, and the study of philosophy flourished at Helmstädt. The attempts of Pfaffrads and others to introduce the philosophy of Peter Ramus were defeated by the decided Aristotelianism of Corn. Martini (1568-1621). Generally speaking, the study of formal philosophy, of course after the mediæval fashion, was soon much cultivated in the Lutheran Church. This was done chiefly on dialectic grounds, for purposes both of defence and attack. The most general and popular means of exercising or displaying intellectual power was by means of disputations. The *Methodologia* (see above, p. 18) for the study of theology arranged that, in a five years' course, the study of philosophy should play an important part. Many, indeed, were afraid of any other than a formal use (*usus organicus*) of philosophy, though the Aristotelian seemed, according to its usual custom, capable of being applied indifferently to the analysis of any material, whatever might be its purport, and of conducing to systematic instruction therein. Moreover, not only was the Aristotelian logic embraced, but also the Aristotelian ontology and metaphysics—of course exclusive of the denial of a creation,—together with the improvements and additions of the Schoolmen. No scruples were felt in transferring the categories of being or essence and existence, substance and accidence, potency and art, causality, the modal categories of the possible, the actual, the necessary, the ideas of genus, kind, and individual, of the finite and infinite, to the sphere of doctrine,

[1] Henke, in his before-named work, p. 69, thinks he sees in this controversy the real beginning of the history of Rationalism, because the names *Rationistæ*, *Ratiocinistæ*, already occur in it. I should think that in saying this he fixes it either too early or too late.

and applying them to its subject-matter. Nay, since the *Socinians* built their system upon the natural ignorance of the reason, and thence inferred that all, even eternal, truths have only an empiric and positive significance, an inference evidently more favourable to the positivism of the Romish view, Lutheran divinity, undeterred by its doctrine of original sin, gradually took up the position of an advocate of the rights of reason and philosophy, and that not with reference to their merely formal employment. Gerhard first opposed this Socinian axiom, and asserted that the reason is capable of a certain knowledge of God, though by no means of such a knowledge as to make revelation superfluous. Perhaps the remembrance that the Reformation had sought to do justice to whatever was truly human, and to recognize its compatibility with Christianity, also contributed to bring about this result. But be this as it may, the relation of theology to philosophy, in the Lutheran Church of the seventeenth century, was far more than in the Reformed Church, one of maintaining " a high estimation yet subordination of philosophy."

And this lays down the conditions for that distinction between the *articuli puri et mixti* of Lutheran divinity, which most decidedly shows what was esteemed to be the relation of the reason to external revelation; whether these were to be regarded as two sources of the knowledge of the same truth, or as separate gradations in a source essentially one.[1] The *articuli puri* are known only by the word of God, are merely matters of faith in Holy Scripture; they contain the mysteries of salvation, especially the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The *articuli mixti* are such doctrines as are partially known to the reason; but the reason being fallible and obscured, we cannot be assured of the truth of what it teaches; hence even those articles which reason knows from its own resources, are only believed in so far as they are confirmed by Divine revelation in Holy Scripture. We know that there is a God from evident proofs, but we believe it only because it is revealed by God. So Calovius, Quenstedt,

[1] The investigations into the relation of the universal moral law to the Christian law are of like import in ethics, as the *articuli puri et mixti* in divinity. Hugo Grotius had already thoroughly discussed this subject. He was followed by G. Pufendorff, who laid it down as an axiom, that the universal moral law receives only a positive form in Christianity. This was to make Christianity nothing more than a means of promulgating or establishing the universal human.

Hollatius, and Baier. The revelation of God is contained only in the Word of God. Faith is thus treated as a higher kind of certainty than the knowledge arrived at by the reason through its own inferences. And this of itself involves an unquestionable truth, if by faith we understand not merely historical faith. But then, it may be asked, whether a certain amount of faith may not, in this sense, be ascribed even to reason antecedently to its inferences, nay, whether the notion of revelation is to be limited to the external revelation in Scripture? It is, moreover, perfectly correct to say that if the inferences of reason are not confirmed by the Christian faith, but, on the contrary, opposed thereby, it is impossible that the confidence and certainty of Christian consciousness can be bestowed on such inferences. In this case, it holds good that the beginning should await its corroboration and establishment from the completion. But this does not prove that, in another respect, the beginning, *i.e.* the knowledge attained by reason, may not contribute, as a point of contact, to the corroboration of revelation, and especially of the Christian revelation, since there may be various degrees of certainty. Now though it is unanimously allowed that even theology must conform to the laws of formal logic, it was not generally admitted by the Lutheran systematizers of the seventeenth century, that the actual dictates even of the *ratio recta* were necessary points of contact for Christianity and theology. The reason, in consequence of that admixture of error to which she is exposed, is incapable of judging what are the dictates of the *ratio recta*—this is a matter which revelation alone can decide. But even those dictates of the *ratio recta* which are admitted by revelation to be such, are not brought into inward relation to faith, still less is a kind of revelation recognized in reason, in so far as she participates in divine truth. "Revelation" is found solely in the positive, the historical; nay, by degrees the secondary, *i.e.* the records of historical revelation, the Holy Scriptures, are taken for "revelation;" and thus Holy Scripture with its doctrines is put in the place of the vital facts of revelation. *Fides*, moreover, was not regarded as the Christianized form and self-certainty of the mind, *i.e.* of truly enlightened reason, but only as the reception into the mind of the contents of scriptural and church teaching; and theology was far more occupied with the establishment of correct doctrine, than with

the question, how and by what means a vital appropriation of Christianity was to be effected. Hence it may be said that the distinction of *articuli puri et mixti* was by no means sufficient to determine the relation between Christianity and reason, between faith and knowledge. On the contrary, it attributed both *too much* and *too little* to the human mind. For the reason, apart from God and His continual revelation of Himself, which does not take place in Scripture alone, cannot have that knowledge of God which is assumed in the *articulis mixtis*. We may perceive also the influence of the old non-Christian metaphysics upon theology itself, in the fact that the nature of God is chiefly found in the metaphysical attributes, and that His moral nature, historically revealed in Christ as Love, is cast into the background, and by no means attains as yet its central position. On the contrary, the co-ordination of all the Divine attributes, nay, even the denial of any actual distinction between them, is embraced; and thus the idea of God is reduced to a simplicity void of vitality, and dangerous to the history of revelation.[1] But *too little* is also ascribed to the human mind. For there is such a thing as reason enlightened by Christianity, and revelation would have been given in vain, if it were not possible to know both that it is true, and why it is true. According to the view in question the two sources of knowledge, reason and revelation, are said to have the same contents with respect to the *articuli mixti*, and therefore to be but different modes of knowing the same thing. Now to avoid an arbitrary choice of either the one or the other, it was necessary that both should be subjected to a rule which should assign to each its right position. This then was erroneously placed in one of the two members of the contrast: true certainty even of the existence of God, it was said, could be attained only by the revelation in Holy Scripture, and consequently faith in God was based upon Holy Scripture, its inspiration, miracles, &c.; as though it were possible for an unbeliever to believe in Scripture, without in some way or other previously believing in God.[2]

It was John Musæus who had already opposed the beginnings of English Deism, and written against Herbert of Cherbury and

[1] Compare my treatise on the unchangeableness of God, in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1857.

[2] Comp. the prize essay of Harries, *De articulis puris et mixtis*.

Spinoza, who most nearly approached the truth in this matter, and elaborated a system of natural theology.[1] He did not deny the possibility that reason might discover Herbert's five propositions; but knowing is one thing and doing another. For the latter, a divine and vital energy was needed; and this Christianity offers. Sin needs expiation and a mediator; and these are given in Christ. Spinoza, in his theologico-political tracts, insists upon absolute freedom of thought, and the exclusion of nothing but what is contrary to *Pietas*. Musæus replies that the very condition of piety is the knowledge of God, that a *vacuum* of knowledge is not sufficient for piety, which consists not in mere obedience to God and knowledge of the Divine will, but also in knowledge of the Divine nature. True piety is not possible without an atonement; and this presupposes a definite truth which must be known if it is to be of use to piety. Consequently, natural theology differs from that which is revealed; because man cannot obtain salvation from his reason, which can announce to him only law and punishment. Finally, in opposition to Herbert, he regards the connection existing between natural reason and positive revelation, with all their diversity, to be similar to that between a vital need and its supply, and finds a reasonable assurance of the truth of Christianity in the path of ethical knowledge. Man's conscience finds, he says, in Christianity the satisfaction of its wants, and nature and grace enter into a fruitful alliance in the reason that is enlightened by the truths of Christianity. In thus speaking, however, he stands almost alone; while the more stress the Lutheran Church laid upon purity of doctrine, and the more theology found in Christianity nothing beyond a mere compound of doctrines—nay, of secret doctrines, *i.e.* such as appeal only to faith, and are incapable of being matters of knowledge—the more were the *articuli puri* threatened with an irruption of intellectualism in a traditional form, while the *articuli mixti* exhibited an intermingling of the philosophical and theological elements. If the distinction between reason and revelation is chiefly that they are but different sources of the same knowledge, theology would have placed itself in a difficult position by conceding to reason an independent

[1] J. Musæus, *De luminis naturæ et ei innixæ theologiæ naturalis insufficientia ad salutem contra Herbertum de Cherbury Baron Angl.* 1667. *Tractatus theologico-politicus—ad veritatis lancem examinatus, Præside J. Musæo*, 1674.

knowledge, and yet attributing only to revelation the power of self-authentication. For if Holy Scripture were not blindly received upon the authority of the Church, and therefore of tradition, it could be only for the sake of proofs of some kind or other offered to the reason that this validity and supremacy over reason were claimed for it; unless recourse were had to some other confirmation of revelation than one of a merely intellectual kind. This leads, however, to the position which the divinity of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries occupied towards the principle of the Reformation, especially to its material side and to the assurance of salvation.

## CHAPTER II.

### HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION PRINCIPLE DURING THE PREVALENCE OF LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY, DOWN TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

We have seen (Vol. I.) that with Luther the word and faith were indissolubly united, while each, nevertheless, had its relative independent existence; that he regarded assurance of the truth of Christianity as being in the first place assurance of salvation, and not a mere product of the authority of Holy Scripture; and, finally, that to his mind that divine assurance, which is inherent in evangelical faith, is an assurance of the *truth* of the promises contained in the word of God, and, above all, of the justification of the sinner before God through faith, and not chiefly the product of divine testimony to the authority of the canon. The article of justification is regarded by him not merely as a single article among others, but also as that very truth whose generative power produces from itself the entire organism of Christian doctrine and Christian practice. Hence, all doctrines were not, in his view, of equal importance, but their relative value was determined by the closeness of their connection with the vital principle of the whole. Not that he laid down scientifically the distinction between faith and doctrinal formula —nevertheless, justification through faith was not a mere dogma of his theology, but the experimental fact upon which it was founded. This relative independence of faith not merely secured a free interpretation of Scripture by faith, in opposition to ecclesiastical tradition, but also left a lawful position to believing criticism.

That aiming after absolute certitude in religious matters, so ineffaceably impressed upon the German mind by the Reformation era, was, in the seventeenth century, still powerfully operative, and seeking for satisfaction in a theological manner also, by continuing its labours until it should find repose in that which was supreme, even in the Divine. On this ground it was that there was such constant opposition to Socinianism and Arminianism, which would probably have been contented to esteem truth unattainable, partly because what is good, and what is true to us depend upon the will of God, which is only to be known in a positive way. Equally was this the reason for opposing Roman Catholic theology, which, by furnishing only human testimony to superhuman truth, stops at the stage of a merely historical faith. In the place of the Church's testimony, to which its legitimate and subordinate position was allowed, was placed the testimony of Holy Scripture, and even this not in such wise that faith in Scripture should now be a mere faith in external authority as faith in the Church had been. On the contrary, it was unanimously acknowledged, as at the Reformation, that a firm, a God-produced, certainty concerning the contents of Christianity and their truth, is both possible and necessary. Gerhard, Hülsemann, König, Calovius, Dannhauer, Dorsche, Quenstedt, and Hollatius, all agree in this respect with Luther and Chemnitz. Neither will these teachers allow Christian truth to be regarded as a merely theoretical matter, nor permit the assurance thereof to be separated from the assurance of salvation. They call theology a *habitus practicus*, whose object is eternal salvation, and in so doing express a principle, to which indeed some were less faithful than others. Hence, it cannot be said that that union of the formal and material principles which forms the central point of the Reformation, was entirely neglected or lost in the seventeenth century. Even though subsequently to Gerhard, Holy Scripture was, according to the prefatory work of Hunnius,[1] made the starting-point of systems of divinity, and the sole principle and foundation of theology, yet this was only done on the assumption that the theologian or divine had experienced in his own case the *power* of Scripture, and that, while laying down in his system the contents of Holy Scripture, he possessed also an assured *certainty* of its truth, even as

[1] Æg. Hunnius, *De perfect. Majest. autorit. fide ac certit. Script. sacr.*, 1594.

Scripture is meant both to create faith and to be understood by faith.

And yet how different is the spirit exhibited by this century from that of the Reformation era! Let us see in what this difference consists and how it may be explained. We shall not err if we say that the theology of this period no longer treated the material principle of the Reformation, viewed in the aspect of personal assurance, and that which is the matter of this assurance, viz. justification by faith, as a principle co-ordinate with the Scripture principle, but made its authority depend *solely* upon the Scripture principle, nay, regarded it as exclusively the result and product of the latter, and was therein unfaithful to the standpoint of the Reformation, and especially to that of Luther. We shall soon see what abundant results followed from this imperceptible alteration.

It crept in unperceived, and was no conscious declension from the Reformation. On the contrary, it is easy to point out the factors by means of which the extinction of the material principle was gradually effected. On the one side, the divine self-certainty of faith, a certainty which, where it really exists, is relatively independent of all men, even of apostles (Gal. i. 8), was something alien, and therefore fantastical to catholic piety and theology, which regarded it as "private fancy," and appealed from "private judgment" to the supposed surer judgment of the Church. The mere appeal to personal assurance of truth (even though it were divine truth) or of salvation, seemed of little avail in that important function of polemics, which, instead of defending itself with evidences, or taking refuge in the citadel of personal faith, was seeking to give universal authority to evangelical truth, and consequently to maintain an aggressive character. Such an appeal could only have been efficient if the formal pherophory of faith had developed its treasures, and made an important objective impression, by a statement of its contents, and of their indissoluble connection; and for such a work the age was not yet ripe.[1] Since then a dispute cannot be carried on against one *negantem contra principia*, and Catholic theology moreover, while rejecting the material principle, equally

[1] Chemnitz, in his *Loci*, proves that the doctrine of the Trinity may be developed from that of justification by faith; the notion is however nowhere else further carried out.

with its opponents, acknowledged the Divine authority of Holy Scripture, this was the principle which was fallen back upon. To this circumstance was added another. The fanatical tendencies (*fanatici enthusiastæ*) sought for support from the material principle, while they either diminished or lightly esteemed the formal. Hence both zeal for the defence of the latter, and the effort to deprive such opponents of all support from the former, led to a disregard of the co-ordination of the material with the formal principle,[1] though, as before remarked, this was not carried so far as not still to leave to the former, as being at least the effect of the formal, a secondary position in the introduction to the system, or among the fundamental doctrines.

On the other hand, however, that impulse of the Reformation which required infallible truth and assurance thereof, and which would not rest content within the province of the creature, still survived. Hence it was necessary to exalt Holy Scripture to a superhuman position, that thus connection therewith might maintain somewhat of that direct fellowship with God which protestants from the very first demanded.

In what has been advanced, we have stated the data out of which the theological principles or fundamental doctrines of the period were constructed.

The edifice was reared with much care, and with a conscientiousness which was thorough of its kind, the divinity of the age not shrinking from encountering the most cogent objections. It was one of the dogmatic achievements of the seventeenth century to carry out the *locus* of Scripture with an exactness which had not been even approximated either in the sixteenth or in any previous century.

We must, it is said, if our faith is to rest upon an absolutely secure and infallible foundation, recur to its ultimate, its absolutely supreme principle. This very notion of an ultimate principle forbids us to derive our assurance of it from aught extraneous to itself; it is worthy of belief on its own account (αὐτόπιστον); it is not subject to be judged by aught inferior to itself (ἀνυπεύθυνον), being, on the contrary, itself the supreme rule of judgment. Finally, it is not even susceptible of proof,

[1] In this respect the controversy between Rathmann and Movius marks the point of transition. See below.

or as Hollatius more moderately expresses it, at least not *à priori* demonstrable, but must be left to prove itself. The supreme principle of theology is God as revealing Himself, or His revelation, and a doctrine is fully proved when it is shown to be really the word or revelation of God. Now the revelation of God is given in Holy Scripture, or as was subsequently said, Holy Scripture is the revelation of God. That it is this, and nothing less than this, is its own assertion, and the truth of this self-assertion commends itself to our belief *by the external and internal criteria of its divinity, i.e.* of its Divine origin. The external criteria are its antiquity, the superior illumination and love of truth which distinguish its authors,[1] the miracles which attest it, the consent of all Christendom, the wonderful spread of the Gospel, the martyrs who died for their faith in Scripture, and the judgments which have fallen upon its despisers and persecutors. The internal criteria are the majesty of God's witness to Himself in Holy Scripture, the simplicity and dignity of its style, the sublimity of the divine mysteries which it contains, the truth of its statements, the holiness of its precepts, and finally its sufficiency for salvation. But it was possible to acknowledge all this, and still to stand on the ground of an historical faith, a faith in mere authority (*fides humana*). Hence the *inward witness of the Spirit*, which seals and certifies to the heart, the inspiration of Holy Scripture, was declared to be the ultimate and chief means by which its divine origin is to be certified and sealed to the heart.[2] To make this clear, and to avoid the appearance of arguing in a circle, it was needful to connect the doctrine of the authority of Scripture with that of its efficacy. Holy Scripture does not accredit itself in so far as it places before us a certain matter of thought, but in so far as it evidences (certainly by means of this matter) its power to affect us, to open and to enlighten our hearts. This enlightenment, being the effect of Scripture, compels our inference of the nature of its cause. Through this enlightenment we recognize the truth of the *doctrina scripturæ sacræ*, and its divinity, and are therefore conscious that God is its author.[3] Hollatius also brings forward the converting saving power of Holy Scripture, and since the

[1] So Hollatius, bk. i. p. 124.
[2] Hollatii *Examen*, pp. 136-140.
[3] So especially Calovius and also Hollatius, p. 138.

effect, the changed heart, is conscious of its own state, and knows that the effect of Scripture is good and salutary, nay, has an assurance which it must perceive to be infallible and divine, the inference of the divine nature of the cause, *i.e.* of the divine origin or inspiration of Scripture, is a just one. It must here be noted *that neither in Calovius, nor Quenstedt, nor even in Hollatius, is the adoption of the individual, nor the assurance of justification, made to be the proper matter of the Holy Spirit's testimony, on the contrary, the whole stress is laid upon the production of an assurance that the* DOCTRINES *of Holy Scripture are true*, and it is by means of this, or even by means of an experience of the converting effects of these doctrines, that a transition is made to the assurance of the divine origin of Holy Scripture, which last is reached by an inference of the cause from the effect. He who has evangelical faith (*fiducialiter credit*) knows also that he believes, and in this his faith and assurance, which are both conscious, he possesses the divine datum which points to the divinity of its cause,[1] which gives him assurance of the Divine origin of Holy Scripture.

Thus was Holy Scripture—accompanied of course by the Holy Spirit who was its author—made the *sole principle of theology*,[2] and then that it might be duly and adequately endowed for this position, the doctrine of its properties (*affectiones*) was made proportionate thereto.

It was only step by step that the departure from the Reformation doctrine was accomplished. Æg. Hunnius was still so far from laying down faith in the Holy Scripture as the first thing, and then building personal assurance of salvation upon the assurance of its Divine origin, that he says, on the contrary: The most efficacious and surest evidence on which to found faith in Holy Scripture is this, that believers (*i.e.* they who believe in Christ) are sensible of the truth of the Divine promises in Scripture, and therefore experience their saving power. The Holy

[1] Comp. Hollatius, *id.* p. 137.

[2] The era of the local method showed itself more faithful to the position of the Reformation in the fact that the older doctrinal terms, *e.g.* even in Chemnitz, nay, at first, even in John Gerhard, do not yet put the *locus* of Holy Scripture in the first place as the all-supporting foundation. In them the doctrine of Holy Scripture falls within the doctrine of faith, either in the section *de lege et Evangelio*, which, from Melanchthon onwards, was never lacking, or in the doctrine of the means of grace (as in Calixtus).

Spirit thereby seals to the heart the truth of Holy Scripture (of its contents). Nevertheless it is certain that Hunnius proceeds directly from the experience of the saving power of the contents of Scripture to that of the Divine authority and origin of the canon. The assurance of the saving power of that Christian truth which is contained in Scripture, is at once changed into assurance of the Divine origin and form of the canon, and it is this exchange of assurance of the Divine nature of the contents, for assurance of the Divine nature of the form of the canon, which is, almost without exception, the turn taken and maintained during the seventeenth century.

Gerhard too, though he does not yet exclude personal experience of salvation from the means of being assured that the contents of Scripture are the truth of God, already applies the testimony of the Spirit in a onesided manner to doctrine.[1] He, as well as those who follow him, understands the words, "The Spirit beareth witness to our spirit that the Spirit is truth," to mean the Holy Ghost witnesses in the heart that the doctrine which has proceeded from Him, *i.e.* Holy Scripture, is truth. Personal salvation and the experience thereof—and therefore justification—are no longer made, as by Luther, the means of attaining assurance of the Divine nature of Christianity, and the basis of all religious certainty.

In the writings of Gerhard's successors, of Calovius, Hülsemann, Dorsche, Quenstedt, and even Hollatius, it is the confirmation of the objective doctrine which alone occupies the foreground. The necessity of experience of salvation to the evangelical recognition of the Divine authority of Holy Scripture, is detracted from, the connection of the former with the latter lost sight of, while the matter of the *Testimonii Spiritus S.* is no longer made to be the personal adoption of the justified believer, but Holy Scripture, the Divine nature of its doctrines and form, its Divine authorship or αὐθεντία, whoever its earthly author may have been. For the question of human authorship becomes indifferent, and may be decided by the historical testimony of the Church, if the Divine authenticity is established. The assurance of personal salvation, which was the chief concern of the Reformers, maintains but a very precarious position, beside that assurance of the truth of *doctrine*, which had become the main

[1] J. Gerh. *Loci*, pt. ii.; *De natura theolog.* § 20, &c.; *de auctor. scr.* § 36, 44, &c.

point, and which was conceived of as bestowed by the *Illuminatio*. The temptation to deduce assurance of salvation from the possession of correct doctrine was now imminent. Calovius, in spite of his doctrine of the *Unio mystica*, here cuts off all direct connection between the believer and the Holy Spirit, referring him solely to Holy Scripture, in which nevertheless the name of the believer longing for personal assurance of salvation is not written, and thus leaves no room for any other assurance than that which is caused by an inference from the possession of pure doctrine, and the experience of its ameliorating effects. And G. Calixtus, his antipodes, is not so far removed from him in this respect. For, while ancient Protestant doctrine unanimously demands in evangelical faith that *notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia*, with which the assurance of salvation is connected, Calixtus, on the contrary, is satisfied with the *assensus*, and says nothing of the *fides specialis*, nor of the *certitudo salutis*. This being the case, it is evident that the chief interest was, in theory, placed, not as formerly, in the saving contents of Scripture, but in the *truth of its doctrine*.[1]

What wonder was it then, that finally Wernsdorf,[2] the "Epigone of Lutheran theology," should dwindle the *Testimonium Spr. S.* into a recalling to the memory of all those texts of the Bible which prove, that our judgment concerning our adoption is according to truth, which judgment itself must again be based upon the fact that we have embraced pure doctrine.

The altered position given by even a Hollatius to the *Testimonium Spr. S.*, when compared with that which it occupies in the writings of the Reformers, is especially apparent in his discussion of the questions, how conversion and the new birth are related thereto. The Reformation doctrine was that the believer, the man born again, has this witness in himself (1 John v. 10). That he has it, and that in a fuller degree than one who does not yet believe can have it, is still admitted, but the fact that he

[1] Quenstedt, pt. i. p. 97, iii. 566, &c., especially 569, &c. Hollatius, i. p. 136, &c. Baier, *Compend. theol. posit.* 1750, pt. iii. c. 5, § 14, p. 553. Compare, on the other hand, Chemnitz, *Loc. th. de justif.* p. 254, &c. In Calovius the *testim. sp. s.* falls far behind the authority of the ecclesiastical institution, with its word and sacraments. Also in Calixtus the *specialis fides* is merged in the *assensus*, *Epitome Theol.* 1619, p. 171, &c.

[2] Wernsdorf, *Disput. Acad.* i. 1164, *De gustu spiritus s.*, in opposition to the mystics and pietists.

believes is significantly ascribed to the *Testimonium.* For the witness of the Holy Spirit (which is heard in the written or preached word) must stir, open, and enlighten the heart of him who is on the way to the new birth, and kindle faith in him.[1] But while an increased importance is thus given to the Spirit's witness, even in the case of one about to believe, the matter of this testimony is not merely diluted but altered; the testifying Spirit has become something merely objective, pure doctrine, the contents of Scripture, nay Scripture itself. An assurance of the truth and divine nature of Scripture is consequently esteemed possible, nay necessary, even before the existence of that *fides specialis* or *fiducia,* which individually appropriates salvation. Such assurance is possible through the illumination proceeding from the Holy Spirit; and it is but a consequence of this notion that there must be also a *Theologia irregenitorum.* It is also necessary, because personal saving faith must evidently have a correct view of the object to be apprehended, in order to be able to apprehend it as that which it is, and therefore to originate itself, and perceive the act of faith to be a duty, in which result the above-named criteria also co-operate. But here the distinction is lost sight of, that while there is in Christian truth an aspect which commends itself to the better mind of one about to believe, a persuasive aspect calculated to gain his full concurrence, the saving power of Christianity, that central point of the contents of the Gospel, is neither experienced nor guaranteed thereby, but only the right, nay the duty, established of making this experience by the act of faith, and thereby obtaining divine assurance concerning the main point.[2]

The position thus assigned to assurance of salvation, a posi-

[1] The above-cited work, pp. 140, 141.

[2] I must not here omit to own, that Chemnitz, in his *Loci theol. de justif.* p. 250, occasionally expresses himself in a manner which is involuntarily favourable to later writers. This is a further proof that the task of forming doctrine into a science, which was left unfinished at the Reformation era, was a difficult work, and encompassed with many obstacles. He says, evangelical faith requires *notitia assensus* and *fiducia specialis,* these form three grades of which each successively assumes the preceding. The second, by means of which the third becomes possible, already contains, in his view, the firm persuasion that all which is revealed in the Word of God is undoubted truth. *Quando hoc generale fundamentum vacillet, tunc non potest concipi vel in lucta retineri firma fiducia promissionis Evangelicæ.* If in this passage we are to understand by the word of God the Holy Scripture, Chemnitz requires faith in the whole of Scripture as undoubted truth, before the existence of faith in Christ.

tion inferior to that occupied by assurance of the purity of scriptural doctrine, and of the Divine nature of Holy Scripture, naturally deprived the doctrine of justification by faith, and the knowledge of such justification of fundamental importance to assurance of the Divine character of Christianity. For assurance of salvation is identical with assurance of justification. Another way of being assured of the truth of Christianity was struck out, viz. the self-corroboration of Holy Scripture with respect to the truth of its contents and the Divine nature of its form, by means of indwelling of the Holy Spirit therein. The material principle of the Reformation being thus deprived of its rank as a principle, it could now find a position only within the system itself, and only as *an article of faith beside others* in opposition to *art. Sm.* 305. On the other hand, the undisputed proposition that *Holy Scripture is the sole principle of theology,* now found general acceptance. This then had now to be endowed in a manner which should correspond to its high position, and fit it to bear alone the weight of the whole body of divinity. It could now no longer be only the trustworthy record of Christian revelation, the source of genuine Christian knowlege, and therefore the rule and test of all that was supposed to be Christian; it must also become the source of all assurance that Christianity is *truth,* and—together with the formal use of the reason—the sole and sufficient means of proof in matters doctrinal and moral. All that was taken from the material principle—which answers for the Divine nature of Christianity, and thus for the certainty of Christian truth by means of the consciousness of adoption—was attributed to Holy Scripture, nay, the latter was so endowed, that, compared with Luther's standpoint, the confirmation, sense and importance of the inspiration of Holy Scripture were essentially altered, and it was represented as fully self-sufficing, self-supporting and self-evidencing.

Even Joh. Gerhard[1] starts with setting up Holy Scripture as the sole principle of knowledge, as though this, apart from *fides,* embraced the whole doctrine of the principles. Calovius and

[1] Compare Gerhard, *Loci theolog.*, pt. i. § 1, and the whole of the first *locus,* also pt. ii. especially cap. 2, 3. That Gerhard marks in this matter a point of transition is shown by the fact that, after having in vol. i. advanced to the *locus* of the work of Christ, in vol. ii. he begins again with the *locus* of Holy Scripture, and continues it in detail, going so far as to maintain the doctrine of verbal inspiration.

others imitate him. The old orthodox theory of inspiration, according to Calovius, is as follows.[1]

The holy men chosen for the writing of the Scriptures are *Dei amanuenses, Christi manus et Spr. S. tabelliones et notarii.* It is as though Christ had written all, even the historical parts, with His own hand. "The holy men were living and writing pens," to call them instrumental authors would be to say almost too much. Inspiration has regard to the words as well as matter, a view to which the contemporary theory of Buxtorf, which has already been discussed, was necessary.[2] Thus Holy Scripture became itself revelation, and not merely the record of a revelation previously given. So much was that fundamental idea of Christianity, the union of the human and the Divine, forgotten, that even the apostles, the first depositaries of Christianity, were treated as though nothing of this union had been manifested in them. The fear lest human error should enter, caused all human co-operation save of an external kind to be excluded and suppressed, as though Christianity had as yet effected nothing in the minds of the apostles, or as if the propagation and transmission of Christianity could be conceived as a fresh miracle, quite isolated and separated from its fundamental facts, and therefore one which might just as well have taken place, and with as beneficial results, outside the sphere of Christ's historical agency. Such a view involved the admission that Christianity neither possessed nor exercised a force which might enable it to maintain itself as a power which had entered into history, but that on the contrary an absolutely new beginning, a second and ideal creation was, as it were, necessary in order that the first and real one might—as though it had effected nothing—be secured to the world. For what effect could it be said to have produced in the world, if a union of the human and the Divine had not been attained even in the apostles? If the Holy Spirit worked in them to the destruction of their individuality, and continued to be extraneous to their persons, nay, if Christianity cannot become the possession of man, without suffering an obscuration, this must apply to succeeding generations in their relation to Scripture, and thus finally, this whole theory of

[1] Calovii *Syst. loc. theol.*, tom. i. cap. 4, pp. 448-758, tom. ii. cap. 1, quæst. ix. p. 101, &c.

[2] Hollatius, *idem*, p. 161.

inspiration appears in the light of an ineffective and idle expenditure of miraculous intervention. Is it said, however, that there was such a connection of the apostles' own consciousness and experience, with both the fundamental fact and what they knew by inspiration, that they, comparing the two, were able, either wholly or partly, to perceive their identity and to answer for it? It then follows, in the first case, that they were capable of correctly transmitting the facts of Christianity without this abrupt miracle; and even in the second, that, with reference to that which as the pure Gospel must have become their mental property—and this would contain the saving doctrines,—historical Christianity had so sufficiently worked in them, that its rudimental doctrines at least were sure to be faithfully handed down by them, even without this miraculous re-foundation. Christianity is however a complete whole, and as surely as it is this, so surely is it capable, wherever it is found, though only in a rudimentary state, of rearing up out of itself its concrete contents.

From this doctrine of the *inspiration of Holy Scripture* were now deduced, as its chief properties, its authority,—which objectively is rooted in its inspiration, and subjectively is proved by the above-mentioned criteria, especially by the *Testimonium Spir. S.*,—perspicuity, sufficiency, and *efficacy*. We pause upon the latter, as specially characteristic of the age, and again make Calovius the speaker for that orthodox Lutheran doctrine, in which he essentially coincides.

Rathmann (born at Lubeck, deacon in Dantzic 1612-1628), had been particularly zealous in his opposition of the above-described tendency of orthodox theology. To restrict all real communion between God and His believing people, to the means of grace, and especially to the Holy Scriptures, to confine the agency of the Spirit exclusively to these, and to endow them with all those divine powers which are due to Christ and to the Holy Ghost, seemed to him to do dishonour to Christ and the Holy Spirit, and to put fellowship with the impersonal Scriptures in the place of fellowship with the living God. He was a follower of Arndt, and the manner in which he extolled the books of the New Testament Scriptures seemed to his colleague Corvinus to be fanatical, and tending to hypocrisy, while, at the same time, he was reproached with contempt of the exter-

nal or preached word, in comparison with the inner word, or the power of the Holy Spirit. Rathmann maintained[1] that Christ, with His grace, ever remains the true light, that the Holy Ghost is the true foundation of the Church, that He must Himself kindle the light in each heart, and lead to the discovery of the hidden treasure in the field of the external word. This is in itself a dead letter, in which there is no inherent power of conversion; for this power is in the Holy Ghost in combination with the external word. Scripture, though it does indeed bear testimony to the truth, is yet, if viewed alone, but a picture, or as a finger-post, which shows the way without leading therein. In his view the external word is not the Holy Spirit's self-acting instrument for salvation (*instrumentum passivum, lumen objecti, instrumentale, historicum*), not the efficient cause of illumination. The power of enlightening grace voluntarily combines with the external word, or even precedes the agency of Holy Scripture, in the case of those who have a predisposition for it, in virtue of gracious predestination from eternity. "The axe does not hew, unless the woodsman throws his strength into it." On the other hand, the influence of the Holy Spirit has operated, even apart from Scripture, and as truly as He unites Himself therewith, that we may be made partakers of salvation, so surely must it be held that we are saved not by words but by real things, by things not earthly but heavenly. Every one must come for himself to Christ, the fountain of grace.

His opponents ascribed to the external word, as the vehicle of salvation, an inherent efficacy like that attributed to God Himself. As the power of propagation dwells in the natural seed, and the power of sight in the eye, so does the power of conversion dwell, by means of a miraculous and divine appointment, in the Word of God. It was thought necessary to oppose mysti-

[1] Rathmann, *Jesu Christi Gnadenreich*, Dantzic, 1621. *Bedenken über D. Dieterici Schwarmfragen*, Luneb. 1624 (with Andr. Osiander's *Consilium Noricum. Der Vater beständige Lehr.* (see Calov. i. 699). With him agrees the Lithuanian Casp. Movius, *Discursus Theolog.* Comp. Gust. Franck's *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie von Luther bis Joh. Gerhard*, i. 365. Tholuck's *Lebenszeugen*, p. 169, &c. *Censures and Doubts of the Theological Faculty, &c., concerning Herm. Rathmann's Works*, Jena, 1626. Engelhardt's *Rathmann Controversy* in Niedner's *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, 1854. The theological convention too which was summoned yearly from 1621-28, for discussing and deciding on the theological questions of the day, in as official a manner as was possible, by Matth. Hoë of Hoënegg, entered into the Rathmann controversy.

cism by limiting the agency of the Holy Spirit more and more to that which He exercises by means of the external word, whether written or preached. The four faculties of Wittenberg, Königsberg, Helmstädt (without the agreement of Calixtus), and Jena, being consulted by the council of Dantzic, gave their judgment against Rathmann, and designated him a Calvinist, and a despiser of the external word. Among these the Jena theologians were those who most decidedly pronounced against him. His distinction, they said, between the external and internal word savoured of Schwenckfeld and of mystic fanaticism. Even Joh. Gerhard, urged by Matthias Hoë of Hoënegg, court chaplain at Dresden, allowed himself to accede to a harsh condemnation of Rathmann.[1] Not a few purposed, in this contest with Rathmann, to pass sentence upon Arndt also. This was, however, opposed by J. Gerhard. The theological convention at Leipzig also decided against Rathmann,[2] after Rostock, then (1626) at the height of its theological fame, had contested the judgment promulgated by these four faculties, and defended Rathmann's orthodoxy.[3]

We will now see how Calovius laid down Lutheran doctrine in 1655, after the controversy.[4]

Holy Scripture is the word of God, inspired by God; the word of God is of its own nature *spiritus et vita*, the power of God unto salvation. For though the power of God dwells essentially in God, it is also present by impartation in the human nature of Christ, in the sacraments, and in the word of God; and Holy Scripture being the word of God, that divine power which is in the word of God never leaves it. Divine power is indeed present in the sacraments only during their use, for it is given them only for the act of participation. But the power of God is perennially present in Holy Scripture, for the word of God is living and incorruptible, and the Holy Ghost is insepar-

[1] Compare Gerh. *Loci th.* ii. 284.

[2] *Der reinen Theologen richtige Lehre von der h. Schrift*, Leipzig, 1629 (by Matth. Hoë of Hoënegg).

[3] The Rostock divines, especially Paul Tarnovius († 1633), declared moreover that they did not acknowledge the Saxons as their judges. Tarnovius, and his nephew John Tarnovius († 1629), an able exegete, still advocated the Reformation doctrine. Hoë sent to the latter the censure of his theological convention, which even J. Gerhard, in opposition to his former declarations, was induced to sign. Tholuck, *Lebenszeugen*, p. 167, &c.

[4] Calovius' above-cited work, i. 692-718.

able from His word. Otherwise it would no longer be the word of the Spirit, but the word of man. Although it is a thing instrumental, and therefore designed for use, yet it may not be called lifeless or inoperative in itself. In that aspect according to which it both is, and has inwardly, the power of the Holy Spirit, it is as little an instrument as the presence of the Triune God in Holy Baptism is an instrument. There is indeed no binding (*alligatio*) of the Holy Spirit to the word, but the power of the Holy Ghost is communicated to the word by means of a mystical *unio* of the Holy Spirit therewith. Formally regarded, (*i.e.* according to its proper nature), it does not belong to the rank of the creature, for it is Divine thought, the mind of God. And who would assign the thoughts, mind, and counsel of God to the creature? Hence some say, the word of God is somewhat of God (*verbum Dei esse aliquid Dei*), a divine effluence (ἀπόῤῥοια). In no case is the power of God imparted to the word, a creature.[1] Hence too Holy Scripture does not first need the illumination of the Holy Ghost. Holy Scripture is not an *instrumentum inanimatum*, ἄεργον; the removal of the obstacles to faith is not effected directly by the Holy Spirit, but solely through the Word, by means of which all that is necessary to conversion is effected. The Holy Spirit does not operate directly and apart from means, not even at the beginning of conversion; all is effected by the Word of God alone, by the power which it possesses, nay, which it is.[2]

So far did Calovius close his eyes to that desire for direct fellowship with God which characterized the Reformers. But both himself and the Wittenbergians of his days, unlike the generation which preceded them, went so far as even to change the saving, religious importance of the *Testimonium Spir. S.* into a merely intellectual process of becoming acquainted with truth. Though Rathmann may, in his opposition to the literalism of the Scriptuarians, have here and there gone too far, and made the internal relation between letter and spirit, form and contents, too accidental a matter, he is undoubtedly, on the whole, nearer to the standpoint of the Reformation and to the Augustana, Art. V., than his opponents are. They, however, overpowered him, as Calovius shows.

The communication of the Divine attributes (*Communic.*

[1] Calovius, *id.* i. 717. [2] *Id.* p. 705.

*idiom.*) was now transferred from Christology to Holy Scripture. The more the latter was withdrawn from the sphere of means leading to the Triune God, and the agency of God Himself attributed to it, the more did it stand in the place of God, and the more were direct communion with God, and all such agency of the Holy Ghost as was not at the same time its immediate agency, excluded. But the obverse side of this deification of Holy Scripture, like the deification of the Church by Romanism, was a lifeless and deistic notion. God—so to speak—abdicated His saving agency to Scripture. With such an identification of the matter or contents and its expression, in which that element of symbolism which cleaves to language was—as gradually in the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper—more and more left out of the question, it was no wonder that magical notions of the agency of Holy Scripture should be entertained. From this point of view, even the serious inquiry of the otherwise admirable Nitzsche, general superintendent of Gotha—whether Holy Scripture may be called a creature?—need seem neither strange nor new. The negative answer at which he arrived was, about 1750, still farther carried out, and developed to gross errors, by the Swedenborgian doctrine.

With regard to *canonicity*, Luther's freer views left for a while an open field to scientific investigations. At first, a distinction was still made between proto-canonical and deutero-canonical books.[1] A subordinate position was still given in German editions of the New Testament to the Antilegomena; but Luther's principles of criticism soon came to be regarded as something which must be pardoned in so great a man. If historical testimony were here and there wanting to their apostolical authorship, the Church had, notwithstanding, always received these books as canonical. In that identification of the contents and the form of Holy Scripture, of which we have spoken, the *Testimonium Spiritus S.* was indeed to be treated simply, as if it testified also to the Divine authenticity of the form. According to Quenstedt, the canonicity of a book is not determined by its being the composition of the author whose name it bears, nor is

[1] Compare Bleek's *Einleitung ins A. T.* 1860, p. 8, &c.; *Einleitung ins N. T.* 1862, pp. 12, &c., 665, &c.; *Einleitung in Hebräerbrief*, pp. 449-460. Even Chemnitz in his *Examen. Conc. Trid.* calls seven books of the New Testament *apocryphos* to denote the uncertainty of their authorship.

it said that this depends upon "whether it treats of Christ"—and therefore upon the material principle,—but a book is canonical for the Church if it has received therefrom the mark of Theopneustia. Hence, that which decides the question is the judgment of the Church.[1] And the mark thus affixed by the judgment, whether of the individual believer or of the Church, testifies to authenticity and the fact of inspiration, in the sense in which Quenstedt understands it, and not rather to the Divine nature of the contents, which may be found also in other Christian writings. Calovius regards the questions of genuineness and integrity as irrelevant, after the Church has decided. To correct even acknowledged errors in Luther's translation of the Bible was regarded as dangerous; nay, the very typographical errors of his editions were to be left intact[2]—a sure sign what kind of faith was being set up. Thus the self-dependence of the canon—which was exactly what had to be proved by the free agitation of this question apart from Church authority—was more and more transferred to the *Church*, which was to give canonical importance to a book, and to fill up the gaps which historical investigation and regard to the intrinsic value might have left.[3] In like manner, the universal reception of a certain text, the *Recepta*, by theologians, took the place of further critical research, and caused various readings to be forgotten. The inspiration of the very words seemed, moreover, to involve the *utmost purity of style*. Hence, when Musæus declared the assured inspiration of the matter to be possible without that of the words, the majority of contemporary theologians who were seeking to prove the classical correctness of the New Testament idiom[4]

[1] It is no matter to *fides salvefica* whether Matthew is, or is not, the author of the gospel; yet it may be and it is canonical on this account. It belongs to *fides salvefica* to regard it as canonical, not on account of historical testimony to its origin, but because the *testim. sp. s.* witnesses internally thereto, Quenst. i. 94. He maintains, in opposition to the Calixtine triad, that there is no need of the historical testimony of the Church to the apostolic origin of a book to prove it canonical. This is an approach to Romanism. Scripture is self-sufficient, and itself testifies to its Divine origin. But he fails to perceive that this would lead back by a byway, as shown in the text, to the dogmatic authority of the Church, and, indeed, in a far graver form than that of historical tradition, which protestants have never rejected. This *testimonium* is said to be *publicum* (see above, p. 120).

[2] Comp. Tholuck, *das kirchl. Leben*, i. 65.

[3] And yet it was at the same time still declared that we were not to believe on account of the Church.

[4] So especially the decision of the Wittenberg faculty, in 1638. To admit

handled him roughly enough. The controversy concerning the purity of the New Testament Greek in Lutheran theology, which was a pendant to that of Buxtorf, was first occasioned by Pfochen,[1] and transferred to Germany by Jungius, rector of Hamburg, who denied that the language of the New Testament was classical Greek, which neither Erasmus, Beza, Stephanus, Grotius, nor Salmasius had found it to be. The opponents of Jungius and Musæus, especially the faculty of Wittenberg, conceded at most the presence of Hebraisms in the New Testament. One advantage, however, accrued from this controversy, in the compromise pointed out, especially by Scaliger and Heinsius, who, on the one side, conceded the non-classical character of the New Testament language, without, on the other, admitting that it was arbitrary, uncouth, and awkward. The New Testament idiom was Hellenistic; and the Hellenistic language was neither solely Hellenistic nor Hebraistic, but a composite tongue having its own laws. This compromise found favour, *e.g.* even with Quenstedt, without, however, being so far developed as to give rise to a grammar and lexicology of the New Testament idiom—a task which it was reserved for Winer to accomplish in the present century.[2]

The *historical discrepancies* of Holy Scripture were subjected to the artificial harmonizing of Osiander and Calovius, who chiefly sought to reconcile them by making two separate occurrences out of two different accounts of one fact, a method which was not found to answer in every case. Thus the aim still was to give certainty to the form and the formal authority of Holy Scripture. It was here that a palpable pledge, as it were, of the truth of Holy Scripture and the true strength of the Church were sought, as is ever the case where a dead conservatism is inclined to. It is however questionable whether these high views of inspiration really increased the estimation or were profitable to the exposition of the Scriptures.

Exegetic theology was indeed diligently prosecuted in numerous literary works, though little practised at the universities.

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*Labem barbarismorum et solescismorum* would be *blasphemia* against the writers of Holy Scripture and against the Holy Ghost. So Quenstedt, Hollatius, and Calovius.

[1] *Diatribe de linguæ græci N. T. puritate*, Amstel. 1629.

[2] Compare Guhrauer, *Joach. Jungius und sein Zeitalter*, 1850; Tholuck, *das kirchl. Leben*, i. p. 77, &c.

Flacius had already done good service to hermeneutics in his *Clavis*. Joh. Gerhard, Glassius (*Philologia sacra*, Jena, 1623), Wolfg. Franz, Dannhauer, Pfeifer and Michael Walther,[1] continued to labour in this department. With the help of dialectics certain doctrinally important words were carefully investigated, and besides the already-mentioned works of Gerhard and Osiander, Calovius' *Biblia illustrata* is the result of much diligence. But, compared with the discoveries made by the enlightened views of the Reformers, the utmost that was now attempted was to remove certain apparent contradictions, by explaining them according to the law of the *Analogia fidei* (as Flacius already required), and thus to give certainty to the matter of Scripture in general. Holy Scripture was chiefly applied to the confirmation of single dogmatic *loci* and propositions, as though the congruity of Scripture with the ecclesiastical system were already perfect, and the former had nothing more to impart to the latter. A free and consistent development of itself, and of the organism of its contents, was not permitted to Scripture, but was always obstructed by doctrinal exigencies and scruples. Thus the divine did in reality only occupy too independent a position with respect to Holy Scripture, and the body of ecclesiastical doctrine already put itself in the place of the material principle instead of existing in virtue of it. The interest too felt in the contents of Scripture was more and more confined to the *dicta probantia*, as though Scripture existed only for the sake of furnishing them. Calovius sought, in his theory of inspiration, to exercise a special care for these *dicta probantia*, it being his belief that at least one passage of Holy Scripture was specially inspired to serve as a proof of each doctrine of theology. But this very theory of inspiration, by changing the human side of Scripture into a mere appearance; had an actual influence upon its contents. If everything in Scripture were directly and only Divine, it was no longer possible to recognize that rich abundance in Divine revelation which is unveiled to the human race in proportion to the growth of its receptive power. If, *e.g.*, the Psalmist, prophets, and apostles, were but the speaking-trumpets of God, the conflict, the labour, in short, the individual state of mind which Divine revelation presupposes and uses as the means by which its progress is accomplished, are lost sight of.

[1] *Officina biblica*, 1636. J. Olearii *Theologia exegetica*, 1674.

On the contrary, the speaker is always and equally God, who is unchangeable, and since what He says can be nothing else but absolutely perfect and complete, all difference between the Old and New Testament revelation in doctrinal matters is abolished. Accordingly, we find Calovius imputing it as a sin to Calixtus, that the latter will not acknowledge the Old Testament to be the *sedes* of the doctrine of the Trinity. In general, however, the province of exegesis does not appear as at all an independent one beside that of doctrine. Full justice could not be done to the *grammatical* element while the notion of classical purity of style was embraced. At best, recourse was had to Hebraisms, while the Hellenistic tongue, which, since the age of Alexander, had been composed of an intermixture of Oriental, and especially Semitic, with Greek expressions, was not yet investigated as a separate department of language under its own special laws. Neither was justice done to the *historical* element of exegesis so long as the sacred writers were regarded as the merely passive instruments of a Divine agency, by which they were withdrawn from the influence of actual occurrences. And finally, the *theological* element, instead of being represented by the principle of living faith dwelling in the exegete, was replaced by the *Analogia Scripturæ sacræ*, which, being derived from Scripture, was to become the guiding-star of its interpretation. But, it may be asked, who was to fashion this analogy of faith, and according to what principles? The *Church's* rule of faith was substituted unawares for the analogy of Scripture;[1] an interpretation departing from that which was traditionary was censured; and this rule of faith by which exegesis was to be guided was gradually extended to all subjects. From all that has been said, it is evident what must have become of the still much talked-of principle of the *Perspicuitas* and the *semet ipsam interpretandi facultas* of Holy Scripture. In fact, the symbolical books, instead of being compared with those scriptures which were intelligible to faith, had themselves become the supreme rule of theology. This was however an actual denial of the sufficient intelligibility of Holy Scripture. They who in a spirit of candour agree with the symbolical books, like J. Gerhard, will readily admit that they cannot have an *autoritatem judicis*. But later writers, like Calovius, and

[1] Gerhard still very decidedly insists that the true rule of faith must be the *Analogia scrip. s.* and be derived therefrom.

especially Schelwig, Neumeister, and Wernsdorf, the opponents of the Pietists, talk of the normative power and inspiration of the symbolical books.[1] They are compositions which are more divine than human, and are therefore a standard of doctrine. This they are, of course, on account of their accordance with Scripture. But instead of arriving at this accordance again and anew in a theological manner, by means of a believing interpretation of Scripture, it was taken for granted and made the pole-star of exposition. Not merely innovations but even *inusitatis loquendi formulæ* were looked upon as dangerous.

This mode of treating Holy Scripture could not fail to exercise an influence upon the estimation of individual doctrines, inasmuch as they were all contained in Scripture, and all subjects of that *Testimonium Spiritus S. internum* which proceeds therefrom. If the material principle were no longer treated as a principle, and the centre no longer acted as the centre or pulse of the whole, it was impossible to distinguish between central and peripheristic, and the consequence was that the supposed conservative and polemic feeling which had swallowed camels strained at gnats. The consciousness that there was still a difference between the theological formula of doctrine, with its subtle distinctions and intricate ramifications, and the saving and essential truths of Christianity, could never indeed wholly vanish from the Lutheran Church.[2] It was necessary, even in regard of the Old Testament saints, if they were not to be excluded from saving faith, and the unlearned masses for whom the truths of the Catechism were deemed sufficient, to admit a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles. But, on the other side, the interests of controversy were so seductive, that the greatest possible number was included among the fundamental. In this respect Nicolaus Hunnius occupies an influential position.[3] A distinction was made between that which constitutes faith, and that which either results from faith or con-

[1] They had an *inspiratio mediata*, were not written *sine singulari numinis directione*.

[2] Tholuck, *Das kirchl. Leben*, i. 79, &c., 81, &c., 93, &c.

[3] Διάσκεψις *theologica, de fundamentali dissensu doctrinæ evangel. Lutheran. et Calvinian*, Viteb. 1626. Hülsemann, *Calvinismus irreconciliab.* Viteb. 1646. Calovius, *Syst.* i. 767, and his work *Syncretismus Calixtinus*, 1655. *Examen doctrinæ publ. eccles. ref. et syncret. cum orthod. in art. de persona Christi*, 1663. Quenstedt, i. 241, &c. Joh. Meisner, *De articulis fidei* in his *Examen catechismi Palatini*, Wittenberg, 1669.

tributes to its preservation (*consequentia, conservativa*). Others, as Hülsemann, Calovius, and Quenstedt, also distinguish therefrom the presuppositions (*antecedentia*) of faith. The creation in time, the fall and eternal reprobation of some of the angels, the propagation of souls, the unpardonableness of the sin against the Holy Ghost, the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church, and, for the most part, the dogmatic explanation of the sacraments, the doctrine of Antichrist, &c., were allowed to be non-fundamental.[1] But, upon the whole, there was a very evident inclination to be continually narrowing their sphere and increasing that of the fundamental, to be ever tracing fresh lines of demarcation against Calvinism and Syncretism, and thereby more and more approaching the Romish manner of treating doctrines. There was a gradual drifting from the *multum* of the principle to the *multa*, which were no longer guided by a pole-star, but kept together by the authority of Church doctrine.

All this shows that, as far as the doctrine of principles is concerned, the seventeenth century furnishes occasion for speaking, not of a scientific fertilization or cultivation of "justifying faith," but almost exclusively of a pathology thereof, such as we have endeavoured to describe. It was not that it was banished from evangelical consciousness, or even neglected in practice, but it was scarcely touched upon in the doctrine of theological principles, its place here being occupied by the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, and the article of faith and justification being found within the system as one article among many, and even losing its position there through the doctrine of Holy Baptism.

During the first epoch of Lutheran scholasticism, down to Calixtus, a candid agreement with Church doctrine still prevailed, though even then a relaxation of the spirit of the Reformation was traceable. This was still more the case during the second epoch, viz. from 1630 to 1670, which was occupied with the Syncretistic controversy. The third epoch, however, from 1680 to E. Valentin Löscher, exhibits in such men as J. B. Carpzovius, Schwelwig, Mayer, Edzard, and E. Neumeister, fresh and vigorous efforts in favour of purely Lutheran doctrines, in opposition to Pietism.[2] But here too, the his-

[1] Comp. Gass's above-named work, i. 244.

[2] Comp. Engelhardt, *Ernst Val. Löscher*, 1856.

torical law held good, that an orthodoxy which insists upon being only conservative, and repressing all new germs, is imperceptibly converted into heterodoxy. In opposition to the allegation of Spener, that no one can be a genuine Christian theologian without personal experience of salvation, his so-called orthodox opponents—whose tendency was to a relaxation of morality and an externalization of religion—were of opinion that there is a truly spiritual and divine theology even of the unregenerate; that *pietas* is no essential requirement in a theologian, for the apodeictic mark of a true teacher is simply correctness of doctrine; as though it were a matter of indifference to the right understanding of Christian doctrine whether personal participation in that which is its subject takes place or not. But things had gone so far that saving power was, in Hellenic fashion, transferred to knowledge, or to correctness of notions, inward experience of salvation inferred only from purity of doctrine, and theology regarded as proprietress of those theological notions which are ordained of God to be of saving efficacy. It was taught that the true sense of Scripture does, in virtue of its inherent power, reveal itself to the understanding even of the ungodly, if he be orthodox, as often as he contemplates it; and that the word becomes to him the means of salvation through the true and divine knowledge (*illuminatio*) obtained therefrom. Spiritual feeling and experience are not the foundation nor the means of salvation, neither are they the principle of knowledge in things divine. On the contrary, experience is but a fruit of the knowledge, produced by the light of the word in the understanding, in the case of those who do not wickedly reject grace. The office of an orthodox teacher, even if he be ungodly, is self-efficacious. With this were connected hierarchical notions of the office of the Church, and of so-called official grace. Every regular minister of the word does, in the work of conversion, truly, though after the manner of a servant, kindle faith, and beget the soul anew. Thus the continued agency of the Holy Ghost was, in a deistic fashion, abolished by the ministry, by the Church and its means of grace, and the power belonging to the Spirit alone represented as abdicated to these second causes. These were no longer regarded as mere *media* for His operations, but as exercising an independent agency, wherever access was allowed them. A regenerating power being

thus attributed, not only to the sacraments, but to correct doctrine and to notions, in the case of those who did not wickedly oppose them, the *opus operatum* of Romish doctrine, which works in all who *non ponunt obicem*, was again reached, and an intellectual Pelagianism combined with a magical effect of grace. The only difference was that the good works of the mediæval Church were exchanged for the works of the understanding, while the Reformation synthesis of the intellectual with the ethic and the religious was dissolved. A rationalizing Pajonism had been reached by a Lutheran byway also, and this had been done under the self-pleasing delusion that a transcendently high position had been preserved to supernatural grace, by conceiving of it as operating magically. This intellectualism of the *theologia irregenitorum* did more damage to so-called orthodoxy than any external attack, and deprived it of the confidence of Christian people. It was forsaken by the nation in the eighteenth century, but not before it had forsaken itself, *i.e.* the Reformation principle. On the one hand, it confounded nature and grace, by teaching that the unregenerate are capable of spiritual knowledge as well as the regenerate; on the other hand, it exceeded, if possible, the Romish dogma of the magical efficacy of the sacraments, in favour of the word and the clerical office, by making the *impius orthodoxus* receive illumination from the word as often as he contemplates it, and regarded Holy Scripture in the light of some natural production, which cannot help giving out its power of propagating true theology and genuine illumination.

## CHAPTER III.

### INDIVIDUAL DOCTRINES DURING THE PERIOD OF LUTHERAN SCHOLASTICISM.

It will be easily perceived from what we have found to be the case with respect to the spirit and principle of Lutheran orthodoxy, that it was but little concerned to extend the sway of the Reformation principle, and to make it fruitful in fresh aspects. In such departments of thought, indeed, as the Reformation had not yet touched, dependence was placed upon the Schoolmen, especially Aquinas. It was not yet perceived that their doctrine of God, as well as that of Augustine, was still combined with

pre-Christian elements, and ill-accorded with the evangelical principle of faith. An identification of the counsel and nature of God, the acceptance of the objective undistinguishableness of His knowledge and will, and of His attributes in general, in short the doctrine of a simplicity in the Divine nature which excluded distinctions, and ill-agreed with the doctrine of the Trinity, prevails even in Gerhard, Musæus and Quenstedt. All this was but little in accordance with the conviction entertained by the Lutheran Church of God's historical presence in the world.[1] Yet a mystical element was so deeply rooted in Lutheran doctrine, that the absolute transcendentalism of God never unanimously prevailed. Hence it was just the most strictly orthodox divines, a Calovius and a Quenstedt, who were not satisfied with the teaching of Helmstädt and Jena. A presence of the Divine Being equally near to all creatures, together with various degrees and kinds of agency (*operatio*) on His part, did not content them. They required also a difference in the nearness of the Divine nature to different creatures. They explain the words of the *Form. Conc.:* that the Holy Ghost dwells in believers, not merely by His gifts, but by His nature, as signifying a special nearness (*peculiaris approximatio*) of

[1] From the unity of God are inferred His simplicity and unchangeableness. Calov. ii. 278-320, *Attributa ab essentia Dei realiter non distinguuntur*, p. 221. They are formally distinguished, and that not merely subjectively for us (*ratione ratiocinante*), but we are necessarily obliged (*ratione ratiocinata*) to distinguish, *e.g.*, between justice and mercy. But *realiter* they are not distinct *sive ab essentia, sive inter se*, or else there would not be *summa simplicitas* in God. It is thus that he would reconcile Scotus and Aquinas, pp. 243, 244. The absolute simplicity of God excludes even a distinction between *actus* and *potentia*. He is *summa actualitas;* there is room for no *accidens* in Him, p. 283 (therefore not even in His knowledge and will with respect to what is free). *Decreta Dei, quæ actus Dei sunt immanentes, non sunt realiter ab essentia Dei distincta, nedum per morem accidentium.* Else would there be *mutatio* in God, even though He were Himself the cause of His *mutatio*, p. 286. Neither is there a *realis distinctio* between the *essentia* and *voluntas libera* of God, between *essentia* and *persona;* all distinctions and changes are solely on the part of the world, p. 286. So also Quenstedt. He goes on, indeed, to say, i. 284-293, that these, though *conceptus inadequati* on our part, are *realiter* in God. But his meaning is that they are God's nature (even the *decreta*, so far as they are *actus Dei immanens et æternus*, p. 299), and that this being absolutely simple, the *Attributa ex natura rei* or *realiter* are not distinct therefrom. The Divine actions are, so far as God is concerned, ever the same. *Mutatio fit in creatura, non in creatore*, p. 300. Comp. in *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1857, my *Gesch. der Lehre. v. d. Unveränderlichkeit Gottes*, p. 469, &c.

Himself to the believer,[1] and they make the nearness of Christ —which becomes to believers a *unio mystica*—to be a still more intimate one. Quenstedt also delights in describing how all *things* live and move and have their being in God, which is indeed easier to conceive, than to think of *God* in a living, historical and varying relation to mankind.[2] If the mystical element were even suffered to recede in the origin of faith, and transferred to the *unio mystica* of the Holy Ghost with Scripture, still the *unio mystica* of the Christian with God was esteemed a higher grade of Christian life. The *doctrine of the Trinity*, indeed, was only analyzed according to logical dis-

[1] Calovius, 1635, ii. 612-650, especially pp. 615, 638. He insists upon a *veritas inhabitationis mysticæ naturæ ipsius divinæ, non abstractæ solum alicujus virtutis*, x. 506; the *unio mystica* is *intrinsica, non per nudam assistentiam, sed per intimam immanentiam, non solum gratiæ operationem, sed simul substantiæ divinæ ad fideles approximationem inferens, cum mystica περιχωρήσει, citra tamen commixtionem vel essentiæ humanæ transformationem.* Meisner, *Orat. de Christiano: Ut divina et humana natura in Christo capite uniuntur personaliter, ita in Christianis membris uniuntur spiritualiter* (s. Calov. ii. 637).

[2] The Calixtine school, Fr. Ul. Calixtus, Hornejus and Henichius, find such a notion to savour of the doctrine of Schwenckfeld and Weigel. J. Musæus however says (*Disp. de Convers.* vi. *de Renov.* n. xxvi., *Der Jenischen Theolog. ausführl. Erklärung*, 1676, pp. 600, &c., 540, &c.), God is in His essence always and everywhere equally present, *i.e.* He is secretly near to all. To deny this would be to deny in Socinian fashion His immeasurableness. Neither is it fitting to embrace a diversity in His omnipresence, according to His several attributes, as *e.g.* that He is not goodness in all: for God is everywhere wholly and indivisibly one, everywhere present in His whole simple being; hence there remains only a distinction in His mode of operation, which however is not exercised without His substantial presence. Since, moreover, it is said, at the same time, that man does not draw forth *actus* from God, but that the will of God is also His simple essence, it follows that God ever wills the same, and thus even this distinction is but apparent, and falls back solely upon the part of the world. Calovius, on his side, x. 513-515, insists that the human nature of believers becomes a partaker of the Divine nature, and also, in Christ, of personal *unio* with God. Musæus, *Ausf. Erkl.* p. 540, &c., says, on the other hand, God is—so far as His substance is concerned—as present everywhere as in Jesus; but in Jesus the person also of the Logos is united with the human nature; moreover, in His case, an entirely unique operation upon the human nature takes place. But the person of the Logos being conceived as, according to its nature, not only in the human nature of Jesus, but as omnipresent in all men, even the *unio personalis* seems to lead not to another mode of being, but only to another mode of operation of the Logos in Jesus, and this again, under the prevailing notion of the simplicity and unchangeableness of God, to transfer all that is distinctive in Christ to His human nature. This would be to say that the latter was so peculiarly constituted that it received in a peculiar and unique manner the one undivided and ever self-equal agency of God.

tinctions, and remained but loosely connected with history and with the interests of piety. Calovius, however, in the interest of the unity of God also extended the old doctrine of the hypostatical union to the divine agency in the world (*opera ad extra sunt communia*).

The *original state of man* is so described by Lutheran divines, as to leave but very limited space for moral self-cultivation, and to render the fall from such a state almost inexplicable. According to Quenstedt, superior wisdom and knowledge of God were bestowed upon man; while others, going more into detail, describe also the nature and matter of such knowledge.[1] To this were added not only instinctive purity and harmony, but also perfect holiness, and the entire accordance of his whole nature with the Triune God, who had made His abode in man. This universal perfection (*perfectio, justitia originalis*) was natural (*naturalis*), not accessory. It dwelt habitually in man (*habitualiter*), and but for the fall he would have transmitted it to his posterity; nevertheless he possessed it only in an accidental manner, *i.e.* he was capable of losing it.

By the fall, which brought in guilt and punishment, the whole corporeal and mental condition of man was altered. Having lost original righteousness he could not bequeath it to his descendants; on the contrary, being himself corrupt, he could only transmit a corrupt nature.[2] The view, that souls also originate by generation, was usually adopted as an auxiliary tenet to this theory of Lutheran divinity, though it found no favour with such men as Melanchthon and Brenz, and even the Jena school did not regard it as an incontestable axiom. Since, then, it was

[1] According to Quenstedt, ii. 6, Adam's knowledge was so excellent and perfect, that none, since the fall, have been able, whether by means of the book of nature or of Holy Scripture, to attain to it. The apostles alone had a clearer insight into the mysteries of faith; but Adam surpassed even them with respect to his extensive and intensive knowledge of the world, which he arrived at, not in a discursive and uncertain manner, by inferences, but by seeing, so to speak, into the heart of things.

[2] In the interest of the Theodicy, Eilh. Lubinus (*Phosphorus de prima causa et natura mali*, 1596) sought, in an age as yet favourable to the doctrine of predestination, to smooth, by a negative view of evil, those difficulties concerning the relation of God thereto, which even the *F. C.* had not obviated. Evil was a nullity. A nullity could arise only from a nullity. From God only good can proceed. His chief opponent, Grawer, maintained on the contrary an aggravated notion of evil, and made man responsible for sin. Comp. Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, *s. v. Eilh. Lub.* See above, p. 106.

taught, the wrath of God lay upon the first human beings, and their ruined state descending to their successors, the wrath of God also was transmitted to them. But the wrath of God presupposes the guilt of man; hence the task was to convict the progeny of Adam of a share in his guilt. This was attempted by endeavouring to prove, both *directly* and *indirectly*, the imputability of Adam's sin to his descendants. *Indirectly*, because original sin, according to the Reformation axiom, consisting not merely in a *debitum* through another's fault, but also cleaving to us as our own sinful nature, the guilt of Adam and his descendants is equal, and his corruption is ours. The question, however: how God can impute to us that Adamic corruption which was transmitted to us without our consent? still remaining unanswered, it was sought to implicate Adam's descendants *directly* in this state of ruin, by the view that Adam's sins may be directly imputed to us, because he, as head and progenitor, was also the representative of the whole race, and acted in their name. So Quenstedt and Hollatius, in agreement with Gerhard. According to Quenstedt, all the wills of his descendants were contained (*locatæ*) in Adam's will. There was, as it were, a *pactum*, according to which our first parents, if they preserved their purity, would bequeath their perfection, if they fell their corruption, to their posterity. This thought was afterwards further carried out by the federal theology admitted into Lutheran divinity in the eighteenth century.[1]

At this point, the post-Reformation era advanced beyond the Confessions, which had been satisfied with admitting the indirect imputation of Adam's sin; and, in so doing, it took a step which did no service in proving the doctrine. On the other hand, divines firmly adhered to the Confessions in admitting original sin to be the source and reason of all actual sin, whether of heart or life. In proportion, however, as the doctrine of absolute predestination was gradually expunged, did that of the freedom of the will necessarily involve a modification in this respect; the

[1] Baier, *Compend. theol. pos.* ed. Preuss, 1864, p. 308, is however somewhat more cautious, from the feeling, that in saying this, either the pre-existence of all men is admitted, and Adam made only a symbolical figure of mankind in general, or that nothing is contributed towards proving the personal participation of all his progeny in Adam's sin. He insists that it is not for us to enter into subtle investigations of the *manner* in which the imputation of Adam's sin and guilt is possible, but firmly to embrace the revealed *fact* that it is so.

province of civil justice especially having already been, at least for the most part, left by the Reformation to free will. But the desire of making the need of redemption full and absolute forbade a limitation of the power of original sin; and, impelled by this, no such allusion to free will was suffered in the doctrine of original sin as might allow, *e.g.*, that aught but the latter should be regarded as the source of that contempt of God's word which was not supposed to be in itself necessary to sinful man. Original sin was indeed generally treated as a power everywhere present and always equal. Actual sin, on the other hand, was the more carefully distinguished, and classified according to its various kinds and degrees. In doing this, however, great stress was necessarily, but inconsistently, laid upon the amount of evil inclination—deliberate sins against the conscience, or even the sin against the Holy Ghost, being naturally regarded as heavier. The latter was, however, only viewed as unpardonable in case of final impenitence. A deeper degree of sinfulness, not involved in original sin as such, was found in the state of obduracy (*induratio et excoecatio*). Of this God was not to be regarded as the ordaining or active cause; though, of course, it was held to arise permissively and judicially from Him, and to result from abandonment by His Spirit. This was an indirect admission that original sin is not a sufficient explanation of all actual sin:[1] if it were so, indeed, the choice would no longer be between the truly good (*spiritualia*) and the evil, but between greater or less degrees of evil (*liberum arbitrium*[2] *in malis spiritualibus*).

Hence arose, moreover, a difficulty with respect to the doctrine of conversion, unless this were to be effected in a magical manner. For if man can meet the grace of the Gospel only with evil actions, and thus offer it no point of contact, it would seem that nothing but a sovereign act of Divine power, whose obverse would be the absolute passivity of man, will avail. A careful elaboration, however, of the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation led to the discovery of a way of escape from this position. Calling, illumination, regeneration and con-

[1] The *contumax repugnantia* is *ex malitiâ sponte contractâ*. Musæus, in the important *Disputt. De conversione hominis peccatoris ad Deum*, 1647, *Disp.* ii. § lxiii.

[2] Quenstedt, ii. 176. Gerhard, v. 99.

version, justification, mystical union, and renewal are its chief points. Calling ever lays hold on that spark of knowledge of God on the conscience, and on the vague longings for salvation still found in the natural man.[1] These, though powerless as a counterpoise to the outbreaking of original sin into actually sinful acts, form a handle upon which the influences of Divine grace may operate, through the means of grace. Then, if the man (though at first presenting nothing more than a possibility of conversion, *aptitudo passiva*) gives himself up to these influences, his enslaved will, gradually delivered from bondage, becomes an *arbitrium liberatum*,[2] which is capable, in spite of original sin, of deciding upon an acceptance of salvation. The chief weight is here certainly laid upon the increasing illumination, and its power of becoming a fresh impulse to the will. Quenstedt and Hollatius find, even in these natural drawings towards amendment, a call to salvation in a wider and more general sense. But effectual calling lies only in that call which conveys the glad tidings of redemption (*vocatio specialis*). This, according to its intrinsic and Divine tenor, is universal and addressed to all men; but the particular carrying into execution, which experience points to, together with the general acceptance of the view that the day of grace is limited to the present life, caused great difficulties, and it was only by the help of unsatisfactory and artificial expedients that Lutheran divinity was able to carry out an opposition to a doctrine of absolute double predestination.

*Christology*, the work of Christ, and the doctrine of the sacraments were very zealously discussed after 1600. They were, however, treated chiefly in a traditional manner, though, as far as these matters were concerned, the tradition was that of the Reformation, while the inherited objective doctrines of God and of the Trinity were not yet determined by the principle of faith, nor cultivated in their intrinsic connection with anthropological and soteriological tenets. Thus the system which was by Luther so decidedly founded upon a unity, obtained, as it were, two centres, a purely objective one as well as the principle of faith —a state of things which, in a logical point of view, could only be made more tolerable by gradually losing sight of the independence of the latter.

[1] For example, Musæus, *Disp.* ii. § lxiv.

[2] Comp. Franck, *die Conc. Form.* i. 150, &c. 164, &c.

Those who adhere more strictly to the fundamental notion of Lutheran Christology, teach not merely a communication of *idiomata* (in which are included actions and sufferings as well as attributes), but also a communication of *natures* (a *realis communio naturarum*), nay, even a communication of the Person of the Logos to the human nature, that the latter may not remain impersonal. It is insisted that the *unio* is not a mere appearance of the Person of the Son of God in human nature, nor a special influence thereon,[1] but that He also brought the Divine nature into humanity, nay, effected a communication of the Divine nature thereto. Of this real communion, the threefold *Communicatio idiomatum* which is laid down—chiefly after Chemnitz—is but the result. In the first place, *idiomata*, which chiefly appertain to one nature, are declared to belong to the whole Person, in virtue of the *Communio naturarum* (ἰδιοποίησις), John vi. 62, iii. 16. Secondly, in virtue of the same *Communio*, the acts of the one Person are at the same time the acts of the two natures, co-operating in the work of redemption (*genus apotelesmaticum*) —the one Person acting through its two natures. Thirdly, there is, on the same grounds, a transference of the *idiomata* of the one nature to the other. Since, however, it is not possible for the Divine nature to be limited by the human, this transference, it is said, is not reciprocal. On the contrary, only an elevation of the human by means of the Divine nature can be thereby effected (*genus αὐχηματικόν, majestaticum*). In the seventeenth century, indeed, Christology was no longer based, as formerly, upon the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, but fully developed without this reference, and that chiefly in an anti-Reformed and anti-Jesuitical interest. Hence, the question concerning the omnipresence of the body of Christ was no longer the only one discussed, but that also concerning the relation of the manhood of Christ to omniscience and omnipotence. No important advance can, however, be perceived in this dogma. Its ethic predicates remained as good as uncultivated till the time of Hollatius; while, on the other hand, a departure from, and a yielding up of the consequences of the idea, began to show itself after the exaggerations of the Tübingen Cryptics.[2] Not only was

[1] Calovius, *Systema*, 636.

[2] The Tübingen school taught from the first the omnipresence of the manhood of Jesus, in virtue of the *Unio*; the Giessen school merely inferred from the *unio*

it admitted now, as also in the sixteenth century, that the so-called passive attributes of Deity, such as *infinitas, immensitas, æternitas*, were not imparted to the human nature, and the communication limited to the active attributes, but the participation of Christ's human nature in the Divine attributes, and therefore the bond of *unio*, was more and more loosely and externally conceived of.[1] They did not actually belong, it was said, to the human nature of Christ, but the Godhead of the Son exercised them in and through the manhood.[2]

In order to maintain the reality of Christ's manhood, and especially of His sufferings, the dogma of the *twofold state* of Christ was carefully elaborated. The state of humiliation was, however, to be not otherwise distinguished from the state of exaltation than by the consideration that, since the Divine Logos must maintain His eternal unchangeableness, the participation in His attributes by the human nature on earth must be in some way limited. The incarnation could not, however, be regarded as *per se* a state of humiliation, because the manhood of Christ continues to exist in the state of exaltation. Was, then, that humiliation of which the Logos could not be the object to be regarded as a suffering on the part of the humanity only, as a physical necessity imposed thereupon by the laws of human life, or as the voluntary assumption of a state of humiliation? Theology, eager to preserve the notion of self-humiliation, and not merely that of humiliation, endeavoured to represent the humble beginnings of Christ's humanity as the voluntary act, not merely of the Logos,—who, being incapable of either humbling Himself or being humbled,—

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the possibility of His being wherever He would during His state of humiliation, and from His exaltation the actual *omniprœsentia*, so far as this belongs to His government, or is united with an agency (*omniprœsentia modificata*), a view essentially coinciding with the Saxon *Decisio*. Thus Musæus asserts: The human nature of Jesus had, in its state of humiliation, no *indistans propinquitas ad omnes creaturas*, and even, in its state of exaltation, no *absoluta omniprœsentia in omnibus creaturis*, though it is indeed present wherever He has promised, in His word, in His holy Supper, in the Church. *Aufs. Erklärung*, p. 544. Musæus adheres to the maxim: The Logos is *non extra carnem;* but apparently in the sense that He is never and nowhere disunited from the manhood.

[1] In contrast to Schwenckfeld and the Mystics, all *commixtio* and *transformatio* of the human into the Divine nature and *vice versa* were avoided. See above, remarks upon the *unio mystica* by Calovius and Musæus, p. 143.

[2] Comp. my *Entw. Gesch. d. Lehre v. d. Person. Christi*, p. 831, &c. [translated in Clark's *Foreign Theological Library*]. The *unio* takes place *per συνδύασιν*.

can at most withhold His active communication, but, on the contrary, as the act of the manhood which was united with the Logos. But an irreconcilable contradiction thus arose. For, in order to abase itself, the manhood must first exist. Now, it had no existence prior to its conception, yet the first moment of its being was an abasement, unless we accept the notion of a prior glorious existence of the human nature of Christ. Hence, Latin theologians (such as Reinhard) explain the self-abasement of Christ's manhood by the statement, that Jesus was subsequently willing to bear that humiliation to which, at first, He passively submitted, and that thus, by supplementary acquiescence, that freedom of choice was perfected which could not at first take place for lack of self-consciousness. This leads, in all essential particulars, to the explanation given by others of Phil. ii. 8, viz. that self-abasement is to be referred to the human nature as both its subject and object, and not to the Logos—indeed, the Reformed themselves insisted that it can be referred to the Logos only figuratively and in the moral sense of Divine condescension. Thus, self-humiliation was held to signify that *status servilis* in Christ's earthly life which, in virtue of His intrinsic majesty, He could easily have renounced without ceasing to be true man. But the more strictly orthodox kept to the former circle of ideas. They embraced the view that the Incarnation first took place in the eternal and illocal sphere, and that, the manhood of Christ, having thus come into existence at the same time that the act of *unio* took place, then took part in the process by which its entrance into this world was effected. For this purpose it humbled itself—a view which leads to a pre-existence of the manhood of Jesus in a conscious form. The pre-existence of Jesus was also arrived at, in a corporeal point of view, through the dogma of the *Præservatio massæ Adamicæ.*

With regard to the doctrine of the *Work of Christ,* Melanchthon had already alluded to the threefold division, adopted by Strigelius, and specially carried out by John Gerhard. Yet it was chiefly the priestly office alone which was brought to bear upon the rest of the system, especially upon the doctrine of *Justificatio,* or forgiveness of sins. The royal office was extended by Lutheran theology to the whole world, and not only to the kingdom of grace.

With respect to the *appropriation of salvation,* and especially

the relation of Divine grace to human freedom, the question for Lutheran theology was, to maintain man's absolute need of redemption and inability to redeem himself, in such wise as to avoid a double decree of predestination, and to lay upon the lost the blame of their own perdition. Now it might indeed be said that none would come into condemnation without personal unbelief. But none can be guilty of unbelief except the possibility of believing is given both externally and internally. This possibility it was attempted to prove in two ways. It might be said, after the manner of Synergism, that original sin not only leaves man capable of executing civil justice and of hearing the word of God, but that its effects must also be limited by the admission that it does not necessarily entail upon the unregenerate, as such, the rejection of grace. On the contrary, man still naturally possesses the power of turning towards redemption, and therefore a real recipiency of a spiritual kind. Such was the tendency of the Calixtine school; but such notions were, upon the whole, rejected by Lutheran divinity. Secondly, the causation of the condemnation of some might be removed from God by embracing the view that to those who—as they are certainly able to do—hear His word, and inquire after true religion, or to those in general whom His Gospel reaches, while they are, in a spiritual respect, as yet entirely passive and incapable of activity, and hence, to all who are externally called, He so far restores freedom that they are capable of deciding either for or against Christ. Thus, the point of the resistibility of conversion —as distinguished from the *possibility* of conversion—was still maintained (in opposition to the Reformed). Comp. Musæus, *de Conversione*, in his before-named work *de lib. arb.* § xlix.; *Conversionis gratiam non esse irresistibilem*; and Disp. v. *de conversionis termino ad quem* (*i.e. fide salvifica*), § lv. &c. If man will not hear the word, which he certainly might, nor inquire after true religion, he brings upon himself the guilt of his own ruin. If he hears it, he receives illumination and the excitement of good desires through the Holy Spirit, *more passive;* in short, the possibility of believing. Lic. Reinhard, however, the opponent of Musæus, does not omit to reproach him for thus teaching that there are *bonis motus, pia desideria*, even in the unregenerate. This accusation Musæus attempts to answer (*Ausf. Erkl.* p. 420, &c.) as though he had spoken of a *pium desiderium* only in the

case of one already included among the regenerate. The opponents, indeed, speak even of an inpouring of fresh passive powers (*id.* 459) for the reception of salvation by faith. There was no need to conceive of the latter as of a magical nature. The gracious influence in question might be supposed to be caused through the divine operation of the word and sacraments upon that human constitution which was still capable of conversion, upon the reason first, which still possesses some dim remains of divine knowledge, and, through the reason, upon the will. But if grace first of all restores freedom of choice, and if this is not determined through absolute election, and if, on the contrary, the good decision of man is made the condition of election (as, *e.g.*, even Quenstedt insists), this is an evident departure from the doctrine of the *F. C.;* for *fides perseverans,* inasmuch as it is foreseen by God, is now made a cause of election. Thus, the Divine foreknowledge of persevering faith is the condition of election—in other words, persevering faith is this condition; and this the *F. C.* had denied. Calovius still declined to call faith a *causa impulsiva, movens* of election; but both König and Quenstedt taught, after Gerhard, that faith is the cause, though not the meritorious cause, of election.[1] So much having been conceded concerning a free decision for faith, and the Melanchthonian type being thus victorious,[2] a modification of the doctrine of assurance immediately followed. According to Musæus, there is no *absoluta certitudo* of final salvation, because no one knows whether he shall believe to the end (*finaliter*); and Quenstedt

[1] Quenstedt, *Syst.* iii. 36; *Fides et quidem perseverans et finalis etiam ingreditur circulum Electionis æternæ. Ex divinitus enim prævisa fides meritum Christi finaliter apprehendente ad vitam æternam electi sumus.* Comp. p. 31. Musæus, *Ausf. Erkl.* pp. 482-518, replying to Lic. Reinhard's attack upon the faculty of Jena (*Theologorum Jenensium errores,* p. 706, &c.), says: Since all that is in God (His decrees as well as His attributes) partakes of His own independent and unchangeable nature, nothing can properly be to Him a *causa impulsiva decreti,* otherwise His decisions would be determined, and His acts induced, by something created (p. 487). We can only speak of a *ratio à priori quæ se per modum causæ impulsivæ habet,* and which suffices for an explanation why some are elected and others are not. That is to say: It is not the faith of believers that is the cause of their election, but the will of God, who imputes this to faith, that he who has it is elected. Thus, however, the predestination of individuals is exchanged for the predestination of the conditions of salvation, viz. repentance and faith; these are, however, so much the more the causes of actual salvation, though according to God's *ordo salutis.*

[2] How wide a departure this is from the *F. C.* is shown *F. C.* 809, 810.

says it is not so much faith as established faith that has a *certitudo salutis*. We may, indeed, and we ought to, have a Divine assurance of our present state of grace, but only an assurance conditional upon our fidelity of our future state.[1] The use of the words *Electio* and *Prædestinatio* was, indeed, still continued; but the absoluteness of the decree, instead of being referred to certain persons, was referred to the *principle* that God had resolved to save those who believed to the end. With respect to individuals, the doctrine of Calixtus of a *decretum salutis conditionatæ* was general.

Thus, at all events, the necessity of seeking in God the cause of the condemnation of any who were called through the word was dispensed with. But now the further difficulty remained—How, without inequality of treatment, can those be condemned who do not experience that irresistible influence of the Holy Ghost which is connected with the means of grace, the external word having been either not at all or not powerfully proclaimed to them? A remnant of Particularism still lurked here; and even missionary zeal was long repressed by the silent assumption that the Gospel was not designed for all. It was held that those nations who are still suffered to depart without having the Gospel brought to them, incurred this lot through the sins of their forefathers; as though the Gospel could anywhere find itself in presence of men already incapable of being redeemed. If, in order to justify their condemnation, it was said that the heathen are to be judged according to their works, while others are to be judged by their relation to Christ, this was to set up another standard of judgment, which, unless it were in some way combined with the former, must result in a contrary destination of different men, and consequently in a severance of the one human race into different species. And what are we to think of the children of the heathen? Quenstedt's opinion is that God foreknew that they would not have believed; as though punishment, nay, damnation, could be inflicted, not for anything done, but only for the *scientia futuribilium*. Evidently this would only be possible if the essential equality of all sin committed before the birth of Christ were denied, and the sin of the heathen regarded as of a nature

[1] Quenstedt, *Systema*, iii. pp. 566-578. A new point of controversy against the Reformed arose from this, as well as from the received doctrine of the falling away of believers.

excluding *à priori* the possibility of faith, which, again, would impeach the universal capability of redemption through Christ.[1]

It was no wonder then that, about 1700, Petersen preferred to advance to the notion of a universal *apokatastasis*, for the sake of doing justice to the universality of grace. His doctrine met, however, with almost universal rejection, because it obliged him to embrace a physical process of redemption, or at least one which was not brought about by the word of Christ. Dippel and Edelmann soon joined him, though not so much on religious grounds. A train of thought which was the germ of the Terministic controversy of 1698-1710 might well lead further. It had been usual so to identify the day of grace with the duration of earthly life, as to allow no hope beyond it, and also to regard the term of grace as unexpired while life lasted. Though the original foundation of this opinion was a serious view of the importance of earthly life, it was yet capable of being made the basis of that levity which would delay repentance till the approach of death. To put a stop to this notion, Böse, with whom Rechenberg agreed, upheld the tenet[2] that there is, even in this life, a peremptory termination of grace. This cannot depend upon so external a matter as time, but upon the inward maturity of the decision for or against Christ. Grace is taken from those who have repeatedly refused it, and the justification formerly pronounced is withdrawn. On the other hand, this shortening of the day of grace even during the earthly life was opposed especially by Ittig. The position was, however, one very unfavourable to him, although it is evident that Rechenberg's argument, if it is to have any force at all, proves too much. For if everything depends mainly upon inward maturity and decision, and not on time and place, it follows not only that in some this ripe-

[1] Some also thought that the promise of God to all nations was fulfilled by some specimens, as it were, of each being gained for the Gospel or called, while the guilt of the unbelieving remnant was caused by the fact that, though they could not be ignorant of the existence and spread of Christianity, they neglected coming to Christian nations and thence fetching the Gospel—mere evasions, with which the missionary instinct, if it had been in a vigorous condition, as in the [Roman] Catholic Church, could not have been satisfied. Evangelical Christendom was, however, still but too much engrossed by itself, and, unfortunately, by its own internal disputes, especially those between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches: for differences in doctrine were at last detected by controversial acuteness in almost every article of faith.

[2] Rechenberg, *De gratiæ revocatricis termino peremptorio*, 1700.

ness for judgment is found even before the close of their earthly life, but also that in others it has not yet been reached when life is over, and then that judgment cannot be passed till they attain such ripeness in another world. This inference, however, was not drawn, but the eternity of punishment was doubted by many, in the case of the unbaptized, or its nature viewed negatively, as an absence of happiness.

To enter more minutely into the separate elements of the appropriation of salvation, it is obvious, that from the combination of the doctrine of man's absolutely impotent yet salvable condition by nature with the above considered doctrine, that there is present in the word of God a divine power enabling man to lay hold of salvation, the condensed and mature results of Lutheran orthodoxy may be stated as follows. Through the means of grace, especially the word of God, man, who is naturally dead, receives new and divine powers, the illumination of his understanding, the excitement of good affections in his will. This endowment with supernatural powers is the restoration of the *liberum arbitrium*, and is called *the new birth.* Man having now a liberated will (*arb. liberatum*) possesses the *possibility* or power of believing. If he uses these powers of regeneration, as he can, but is not constrained to do, in cultivating repentance and faith (in *conversio*), justification and sanctification, mystical union with God, and glorification, are imparted to him. Justification must, however, be regarded as an *Actus Dei forensis*, independent of man's merits, though not of his faith. So Hollatius.

Thus there may be regenerate men not yet justified by God, and not yet believers, and man may experience this great act of endowment with the powers of regeneration in a purely passive manner. Since, moreover, it was evident that the notion of regeneration would be much weakened, if only the *possibility* of faith, and therefore of justification, were implied thereby, others made faith also to be bestowed among the powers of regeneration, whereby this grace also was involved in mere passivity. On the other side, however, this doctrine of the impartation of the supernatural powers of regeneration, with or without faith, encroached upon justification, nay, the latter was emptied, and deprived of that fundamental importance in the new life which it had possessed in the Reformation system, in favour of regeneration. Justification was no longer the foundation of

the new life, being itself a mere effect of regeneration. Neither could it any longer claim the independent merit of abolishing the Divine displeasure and substituting the Divine grace in its place. For from what else than already present and preventing grace was the impartation of the grace of regeneration to flow? It is evident that God must Himself already have been secretly favourable and gracious to a man, and must already have pardoned him in the *forum divinum*, for the sake of Christ and His relation to human nature, to be able to bestow upon him the grace of regeneration.

It may easily be perceived why doctrinal teaching should have taken a form which placed regeneration before faith. The reason will be found in *infant baptism*,[1] in connection with the doctrine of natural corruption, and the power of the means of grace. It could not but be granted that children cannot, properly speaking, have faith, as required by the gospel. But so much the more was it insisted that regeneration took place through the act of baptism, not indeed without respect to faith, but in order that it might be produced.[2] This relation then became typical also of the doctrine of the conversion of adults. The only difference was, that in the latter regeneration had gradually to overcome actual opposition, while children, being incapable of interposing any rebellious resistance to grace,[3] the work of regeneration could in them proceed without obstacle.[4] If adults fell from the grace of Baptism, *i.e.* from regeneration, they needed, in the first place, since in their cases will and consciousness were developed, that effectual calling should again touch their hearts, and spiritual illumination be again bestowed. The course of things was, however, entirely analogous to that which takes place in Infant Baptism, in this respect that the grace of regeneration (*liberatum*

[1] Many efforts were made to fashion the doctrine of baptism in a manner analogous to that of the Lord's Supper. Hence a *materia cœlestis* was sought, which should sacramentally combine with the water (the *mat. terres.*). This was found, *e.g.*, in the words of consecration, in the Holy Trinity, in the Holy Ghost, or in the blood of Christ. This was however opposed by Musæus, *Ausf. Erkl.*, pp. 677-690, who appealed in this matter to both Chemnitz and Gerhard.

[2] Luther, on the contrary, required it for Baptism, and did not teach a regeneration previous to faith.

[3] Hollat. *Exam.* iii. *quæst.* 14, p. 334.

[4] According to Hollatius faith is assumed in their regeneration. It is not however to be regarded as an act, but only as the repose of the reasonable soul of the child in Christ, as the cause of salvation. Luther thought otherwise: see vol. i. 170.

*arbitrium*, must first be bestowed, to make repentance and faith (*conversio*) possible, and that then faith receives justification.

In all this there was undoubtedly a restoration of a logical proportion between the appropriation of salvation by means of Infant Baptism, and its appropriation by adults; while, in embracing the notion of regenerate persons who as yet neither believed nor were justified, there was a sensible departure from apostolic and Reformation teaching. According to New Testament diction the term new birth should have been reserved for the time of living faith.

More important however to us is the dislocation entailed, by such doctrinal statements, upon that stronghold of the Reformation, justification. The abridgment of its rights as the fundamental doctrine has been already considered (p. 119, f.). Let us now observe the position which it gradually occupied as part of the superstructure itself.[1] It might have been expected that justification, though no longer, as at first, the foundation of the whole system, would still have played a distinguished part within it. For it is undoubtedly the leading characteristic of the Reformation, that the justification of the sinner forms the point of transition between the old life and the new, and that hereby is that free grace of God which depends on no human performances glorified, and a new beginning made. It is to the Divine act of justification that the new life is to owe its origin, to make the former in any way dependent on the latter is to invert the Divine order. Moreover, it was solely in the interest of avoiding a dependence of divine grace upon man's own moral worth, even if this were referred to God, that the definition of justification as an *actus Dei judicialis, forensis* arose.[2] And yet a glance at the Lutheran system shows, that such an expectation was far indeed from being realized. It is true that the older theologians, such as Chemnitz and Hütter, still make everything hinge upon giving a decided prominence to justification as the turning-point. In their writings, the doctrines of God and of creation are usually followed by those of sin, of the *liberum arbitrium*, and of the law, to which the Gospel stands in con-

[1] Comp. Henr. Hopfneri Lips. *Theol. De Justificatione hominis peccatoris coram Deo Disputatt.* xii. *Lips.* 1653. Jo. Musæi *Tract. theol. de Conversione hominis peccatoris ad Deum*, 1691. 9 *Disputatt.* distinct from the above-cited *Disp. de Convers. v. J.* 1647-1649, and chiefly occupied with the Jesuits Erbermann and Walenburgh.

[2] Comp. Chemnitz, *Loci theol. de Justif.* pp. 202-249.

trast; and the central point of the Gospel is, in their view, justification, which is *followed* by the doctrines of good works, of repentance, and of faith.

Hafenreffer indeed inserts *fides* immediately after the doctrine of the work of Christ, but he does this because he had made predestination, *i.e.* election—which advances through the three elements of the mercy of God, the merits of Christ and faith—follow the doctrine of sin. For faith, which is regarded as a divine operation subsequent to the proffer of justification, is needed for the accomplishment of the Divine counsel. Thus the precedence is here actually given to justification, while the law, the Gospel with repentance and faith, follow as human acts. Chemnitz does not treat of predestination, and Hütter deals with it after justification, passing on thence to the subjective aspect, viz. repentance, faith, and obedience. Joh. Gerhard takes another course. According to Scripture, he first discusses the doctrine of God and of Christ, as "the foundation of theology;" he then proceeds to creation and providence, with which he connects the doctrine of election. Then follow the Divine likeness, sin and free-will. After these, the law and the Gospel, then *pœnitentia*, including repentance and faith, and not till after these *justificatio*, with which *bona opera* are connected. Later writers, such as Calovius, give an even inferior place to justification, by placing the doctrines of the Church, the *magistratus politicus*, and the means of grace, before it. Not till his tenth volume does he discuss the acts of God for the application of redemption and the conversion of man. He there first speaks of *Vocatio*, *Illuminatio*, *Regeneratio*, *Conversio*, afterwards of *Justificatio*, in connection with *fides justificans* and with *contritio* and *fides*, as parts of *pœnitentia*, and then of the *unio mystica*, *Sanctificatio*, *Glorificatio*, and *Prædestinatio*. Scherzer, in his *Systema*, essentially follows Calovius. Here justification follows the law, the Gospel, conversion, the power of the keys and the sacraments, and is followed by *renovatio*. And if others do not go quite so far, it is still customary to place *Vocatio*, *Regeneratio*, and *Conversio* before *justificatio* (so König, Baier, and essentially also Calixtus). Musæus understands *regeneratio* as *conversio*.[1] So

[1] *De Convers.* 1647, Disp. i. In its wider sense *regeneratio* includes also *justificatio* and *renovatio* (sanctification); in its narrower, it is identical with *Conversio*. *Regeneratio*, as well as *Justificatio*, is *actio solius Dei*, but the former

too does Dav. Hollatius,[1] † 1713, since he first discusses, in a Trinitarian manner, God's mercy and predestination, Christ's redeeming work, and the Holy Spirit's appropriating grace, as principles of redemption, and designates *vocatio, illuminatio, conversio, regeneratio, justificatio, unio mystica, renovatio, conservatio fidei* and *glorificatio*, as the operations of the Spirit.[2] He then proceeds to the *means* of salvation, the objective, viz. the word and sacraments; the subjective, viz. *Pœnitentia*, with *Contritio* and *fides salvifica*. Not that there was any intention to injure the before named fundamental idea of the Reformation by the position thus assigned to justification; yet not only did it thus lose its due prominence, but it was also necessarily, even though involuntarily, obscured by the precedence thus given to other matters. It was certainly an advance to determine with greater exactness the psychological gradations in the process of salvation; but in doing this a sphere was entered upon, in which from the very nature of the matter, the Divine willingness to save, and man, combine in ever new aspects—in which the former more actively takes in hand and moulds the various qualities of man, and the latter willingly yields himself to this plastic power, and becomes a new and free personality in God. If then, in detailing the successive stages in the process of salvation, justification were inserted—as was customary—*after regeneratio, conversio, (pœnitentia=contritio et fides salvifica), justificatio*—so far as it was to be regarded as the principle of the new life—was necessarily placed in an embarrassing position, as being by the order of the doctrines preceded by this life. A further difficulty arose from the cir-

effects a change in the subject, producing illumination and spiritual desires; its aim (*terminus ad quem*) is saving faith. *Justificatio* produces no change in man himself, it is external to him, *forensis*. It is the non-imputation of sin, the imputation of Christ's merits. He subsequently changes this usual mode of representation for the following (*Ausführl. Erklär.* p. 591): The merits of Christ apprehended by faith are the *causa impulsiva* of *Justificatio;* hence the *imputatio justitiæ Christi* (*fide apprehensi*) *ordine prior remissione peccatorum.* Moreover, guilt (*reatus*) is not taken from man *after* regeneration. *Disp. de Convers.* 1647, ii. § xiii.

[1] *Examen theologicum acroamaticum univers. theolog. thet. polem. complectens*, 1707.

[2] He views *Regeneratio* as *donatio fidei*, or at least as the result of the supernatural powers by which it is accompanied, together with the destruction of sinful opposition, vol. iii. p. 342.

cumstance that it was placed here as an *actus Dei forensis*. For while all other divine acts (*vocatio, illuminatio, regeneratio, conversio*) express at the same time an effect produced, a change of some kind evoked, *in* man, this was not the case with *Justificatio* as *forensis*, although it was reckoned a member of the same series.[1] There was now but one step needed to make justification homogeneous with its fellow members. This was to understand this divine act, as consisting in *a consciousness of justification before God*, wrought in the heart by a divine operation. And this was actually the way in which it was viewed by many. Such a view was however insufficient, nor could the relegation of justification as an *actus Dei forensis* to an inferior position be thereby justified. For thus, according to what has been stated above, that which was most excellent had taken place *before* it, and this act was no longer in a condition to act as a principle. Hence, it is taught—and very justly—that the consciousness of redemption or justification is by no means an immediate consequence of faith, and that hence justification before God may exist without such consciousness. In fact, viewed as an *actus Dei forensis*, there is a necessity that it should be regarded as existing prior to man's consciousness thereof, nay, prior to faith. For faith is nothing else than the commencement of such consciousness, and could not arise at all unless preceded objectively by justification before God—in other words by a Divine and gracious purpose, special with regard to the individual sinner, existing on God's part as an accomplished act of pardon, and then applying to man by the exhibition and offer of the benefits of redemption. The vocation of the individual to salvation could not result unless God had already, in preventing love, previously pardoned the sinner for Christ's sake, *i.e. for the sake of that fellowship of Christ with the sinner*, which the latter had not yet rejected.

It is only when *Justificatio forensis* maintains its Reformation position, at the head of the process of salvation, that it has any firm or secure standing at all.[2] If removed from this, it is

[1] And that without a more secure position either for this act, or the knowledge thereof.

[2] For evangelical doctrine was not concerned that God's favourable judgment should not be announced, "not be insinuated" to man, but only that this judgment should be passed on account of our union with Christ (not on account of our own right disposition), God accepting Him as our surety.

gradually driven to a greater and greater distance, till at last, as in Storr's divinity, it takes its place at the end. We have already seen that the formula by which the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation, especially as far as regeneration and faith are concerned, was expressed, was analogous with that of Infant Baptism. But, in another aspect, this postponement of justification to *regeneratio, conversio, pœnitentia, fides*, was also at variance with the Lutheran doctrine of baptism. For this did not suppose that the *justificatio* of the child was delayed on the part of God, until the existence of that faith which, according to orthodox divinity, was regarded as an effect of baptism. On the contrary, Holy Baptism—which does not become valid baptism by means of and after faith—is undoubtedly said to include remission of guilt for Christ's sake, the non-imputation of original sin, and the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and therefore the Divine adjudication of justification in virtue of a secret divine award, which is however manifested in the sacrament. Nay, the covenant concluded with the baptized infant is said to be permanent on God's part, until positive unbelief renders it void. And it is just to this preventing love of God that the Reformers rightly ascribed the power of breaking and shaming the sinner's heart, of bringing man, in proportion to the development of his consciousness, to that repentance, conversion, and assurance, by which the gift, which it is God's serious purpose to bestow, becomes in fact man's own possession. But in the above described succession of stages in the process by which salvation is appropriated, this prevenient character of pardoning grace (*justitia forensis*) is much obscured, because *justificatio* is so long retarded. As to the question, at what stage of the process the secret and divine act of *justificatio forensis* comes into operation, nothing more could be said than that it is *not* at the point where the consciousness of being justified before God takes place. On the contrary, according to the prevailing doctrinal scheme, not only calling and illumination, but also regeneration, repentance, and faith (or conversion), were to precede, at least in the case of adults, not only perhaps the *consciousness* of Divine forgiveness, but the *act* of Divine *justification* itself, and therefore the secret divine forgiveness; in other words, this was not to come into operation till after a series of stages had been gone through, involving also subjective changes to which God, in His

*actus forensis*, is said to have no regard. By such a scheme not only is the permanence of the baptismal covenant, on the part of God, forgotten, but this post-Reformation doctrine of the so-called orthodox divines approximates in a very suspicious manner to the Roman Catholic system, according to which the justifying (and sanctifying) love of God is indeed said to be preveniently manifested in baptism, but declared unattainable for sin after baptism, before *pœnitentia* and its works.[1] The reason of this change is certainly very evident. The intention was to do away with the frivolous trust in a magical efficacy of the merits of Christ, by teaching that the process by which salvation is bestowed upon man, is not completed by the eternal compassion of God and the objective merits of Christ, but needs also the subjective process of faith, from which also amendment and a change of mind cannot be excluded. But this danger could hardly be in this manner averted, without the free and prevenient grace located in *Justificatio forensis* being obscured. The Reformation doctrine was so laid down that the possession and happy enjoyment of grace could in none otherwise be obtained than through repentance and faith, which formed the soil in which the new birth was implanted. But at the same time it stated with

[1] Faith, which on its part presupposes repentance and amendment, thus becomes, in fact, a causality of salvation, and that not merely of an instrumental and mediate kind, nor as a psychologically necessary result of a personal possession and enjoyment of salvation, but also a *causa impulsiva* to the Divine act of *Justificatio* itself;—as though even the very offer of pardon, and therefore faith, were possible, unless God anticipatively announced the existence of His favourable disposition, His pardon for the sake of Christ's union with us—not on account of our union with Him through faith, or of the change wrought in us by faith. Musæus (*Ausf. Erkl.*, pp. 587-599), on the contrary, makes earnest repentance and true faith the conditions, generally speaking, on which God's forgiveness of sin takes place. But how can this be even offered unless it has already taken place on the part of God for the sake of Christ? And how many uncertainties ensue (sec. 18) as to whether repentance be earnest enough, and faith true enough, to result in the act of Divine Justification! Again, this act is indeed, according to Musæus, no more to be conceived of as an *Actus realiter in Deo productus* than election is (*idem*, p. 585). "It is, on the contrary, *ipsa Dei essentia*, or else we must deny, with Conr. Vorstius and the Socinians, the unchangeableness and simplicity of God." *Justificatio* is but the nature of God Himself, regarded according to our imperfect notions as will, with respect to believers as its object. In such opinions a deistic feature is unmistakeable, and is necessarily involved in the prevailing idea of God, *Comp. de Convers.* 1647, disp. v. § lix. Thus the impossibility of a repetition of justification need not be inferred—as by the Calvinists—from God's unchangeableness.

equal clearness that Justification (*justificatio forensis*) formed the pre-temporal foundation, on God's part, for the *whole* process, and that God can only impart its blessings step by step, on the ground that He *has already* forgiven a man objectively before His secret forum, for Christ's sake, and chooses, on His side, to treat him as one who has found favour with Him. This pre-temporal justification is then manifested ("insinuated") objectively in the call in the sacrament, and in the pronunciation of pardon (*e.g.* in confession), and subjectively by the witness of the Spirit in them that believe. A notion of this shows itself even in the remark made by some, that all the several stages of the process exist simultaneously—a remark however, which, when applied to the subjective process in man, calls in question the whole order laid down, and might be connected with a perfectly abstract view of the relation of God to time.[1]

It is of the first importance to hold that the prevenient grace of God is wholly independent of human merit, with respect both to the commencement and the continuance of the work of salvation; and this is what is meant by Luther's saying that in the work of salvation the condition of man is *mere passive*. This is most especially true with regard to justification, because it is not the change in the sinner which first inclines God to pardon him; but, on the contrary, the gift of pardon which produces a moral change in man. Thus the justification of the sinner must be conceived of as, first of all, a transaction taking place in God, and manifested in that preaching which produces faith (*Vocatio*). But if justification is to take its place with faith after regeneration and conversion, this relative state of things is not merely obscured, but there arises the further difficulty, that while, in the case of justification, the *mera passivitas*, which is here in place, disappears behind the *causæ impulsivæ*, it is maintained in that of regeneration, through fear of Pelagian or Synergistic views. If, however, its Reformation position at the head of the whole process of salvation, as its governing principle and lasting foundation, were preserved to justification, its independence of sanc-

[1] Quenstedt, iii. 621, says: *Regeneratio, justificatio, unio mystica, et renovatio tempore simul sunt et quovis puncto mathematico arctiores adeo ut divelli et sequestrari nequeant, cohærent.* It was also a principle recognized by Gerhard (vii. 321), and still more distinctly by Musæus, that *bona opera* are present in faith.

tification, and the subjective part of the process in general, would also be secured in the manner in which alone this can adequately be done. The advantage would also be reaped, that all the jealousy with which sanctification and human agency in the work of salvation are regarded from the standpoint of justification would be dispensed with. Effectual calling, which proclaims that God *has* forgiven for Christ's sake, and now requires faith in this fact, involves the possibility of faith, through which the gift of pardon is possessed and enjoyed, nay, through which regeneration into vital communion with Christ is effected; while unbelief not only deprives man of the present possession and enjoyment of reconciliation, but, if persevered in, entails condemnation. On the other hand, the precedence given to regeneration, instead of justification, was an obstacle to the free development of the Protestant principle in its ethical aspect; and hence it was against this precedence that the Pietistic movement was chiefly directed.

Faith is more decidedly necessary for the profitable reception of the Lord's Supper than for baptism and regeneration. It is indeed insisted that unbelievers do receive the body and blood of Christ, and that these are not merely offered to them. According to Gerhard, however, they have only a *manducatio oralis*, not *spiritualis*. Hollatius limits this assertion by the further statement that, on the one hand, the elements, on the other, the body and blood of Christ, are received, but not in the same manner. For since Christ's body and blood, being glorified, are accessible to the *naturalis concoctio*, but not as the elements are, the *manducatio oralis* is directly a mere partaking of bread and wine, and only indirectly, and for the sake of the *Unio sacramentalis*, to be referred to the body and blood of Christ. Since, then, the latter neither bring a blessing to unbelievers, nor have any detrimental effect attributed to them, the doctrine of Hollatius could not but lead to the view that, in the case of unbelievers, who exclude themselves from the reception of Christ's glorified body, a dissolution of the *Unio sacramentalis* must be accepted; and no reason can be shown for making this dissolution take place *after*, instead of *by*, unbelieving participation, except an obvious inclination to admit a miraculous change in the elements, by means of consecration. By consecration Quenstedt understands not the mere setting apart from profane use and blessing of the elements,

but also that sacramental union which thus takes place, not in their dispensation or reception, but through the priestly utterance of the words of Christ Himself. In his view the *Unio sacramentalis* also is referred, not to the whole Christ, but only to His body and blood, though the whole Christ is present, and is spiritually received. If the consecration which is performed by men is said to effect the sacramental union, this approximates to the magical notion that it is not so much Christ who brings to pass the act of union, as the priest who has it in his power. A barrier against such a view was, however, furnished by that article of the *F. C.*, according to which the *Unio sacramentalis* is not objectively and independently secured by consecration, but only involved in the whole transaction, including the distribution and participation. Incorporation into Christ, and spiritual nourishment to eternal life, are increasingly dwelt on as being, together with the sealing of pardon, the *benefits* received in the Lord's Supper. Hollatius, who in this particular approximates, with easy unconcern, to the Calvinistic Churches, attributes to the Lord's Supper a reference also to immortality, the symbol or pledge of which is given in Christ's body and blood. This train of thought, however, keeps within the limits of viewing the sacrament as a pledge and promise, and does not go so far as to regard it as the causative principle of the glorification of corporeity.

With respect to *the Church*, the fundamental definition—that it is *Primarie societas fidei et Spir. S.*—was adhered to; and according to Musæus and Hollatius, its members are not only morally united to Christ, but are also in physical connection with him, especially by means of the sacraments. All (Hütter, Gerhard, Baier, Hollatius, &c.) insist upon its invisibility, because its members, *ratione fidei et electionis*, are known to God alone. At the same time, however, they embrace also its visibility, and deny that from this distinction a twofold church arises; for the visible would be no church at all without its invisible side, while, on the other hand, believers are visible men. Though the faith of each visible man cannot indeed be with certainty known and perceived, still the Church itself is perceptible, by means of the word and sacraments, whose use is never absent where there are believers; as, on the other hand, believers are never utterly wanting where the word and the sacraments are still in use. With

all their attachment to the Lutheran Church, the general Church of Christ (*catholica universalis*), which surpasses all particular churches, has ever the highest place assigned to it in the writings of theologians. In Calovius, indeed, we can detect the effort to identify the Lutheran Church with the Church of Christ, and, emulating Romish teaching, to deny that other confessions are portions of the universal Church.

In Apologetics the *idea* of the Church was already distinguished from the wider sense in which the *word* Church was used (*Ecclesia large dicta*). The Church in this more extended meaning is a community of those who hold the same confession and use the sacraments. Comparing this definition with *Conf. Aug.* vii., where *verbum* and *sacramenta* are required as the signs by which the Church may be recognized, we perceive that, with respect to the Church in the wider sense of the word, the confession was, in the seventeenth century, substituted for the word. A true or a false church is now to be distinguished by its confession. Yet even the Lutheran Church is not reckoned absolutely true, nor others absolutely false. Perfect purity of doctrine does not secure the perfection of the Church, and even churches whose doctrine is impure have still the word and sacraments. Only a few place the Church of Rome on a level with Antichrist, and the Reformed with the Romish Church, or even with Mohammedanism. The assumption of Calovius that the Lutheran is the only true Church, from which it would follow that all others—which he calls, notwithstanding, particular churches—are no churches at all, because not parts of the true Church, was not accepted on the part of Lutherans even in the seventeenth century. More important is the doctrine of *official grace* and *official gifts*, which is closely connected with the above described dilution of the Reformation principle. The *Conf. Aug.* had connected the right of *public* teaching only with a regular vocation to the ministry. C. V. Löscher, however, maintained that the ministry of the word in general is, in accordance with Divine appointment, properly confined to a certain order of men regularly called and appointed thereto. To this order alone it appertains to speak as the word of God, and to perform the work of the διακονία. According to Quenstedt and Hollatius, the teachers of the Church form the *Ecclesia representiva*, for the maintenance of purity of faith (*i.e.* doctrine) and discipline.

The totality of members, including both teachers and hearers, is called the *Ecclesia synthetica*, which, after Luther's precedent, is divided into the three *Status hierarchici*, the *ecclesiasticus, politicus*, and *œconomicus*. Thus, while the priesthood in general was acknowledged, laymen were not, in principle, excluded from councils. This privilege of the laity, however, never came into *exercise*, and the two first were distinguished as the teaching and ruling orders from the obeying order. An attempt was made to give independence and standing to the clerical order, which, inefficiently supported as it was in the infancy of this Church, was exposed almost defenceless to the violence of the State. This theory, which was derived from the Divine appointment of a separate order of teachers, and which was to form, as it were, a compensation for the sacrament of Holy Orders rejected at the Reformation, could but have led to a restoration of Romish views, and did not fail to produce a powerful reaction on the part of the hitherto silent Church, which found a speaker and leader in Spener.

Greatly as the dogmatic interest preponderated in the Lutheran Church, the Reformation could not be so inoperative as not to awaken in extensive circles an interest in vital religion and personal faith. The vigour of that evangelical and practical faith which prevailed in the heart of the German nation, was manifested especially in the richness and abundance of its sacred song. This was not only cultivated in different ways by many—and some of them highly-gifted poets, among whom Paul Gerhard figures as an intellectual magnate—but found the greatest acceptance with the people, and watered the thirsty ground like a refreshing spring. A copious literature of ascetic and practical theology also testifies to an abundant store of spiritual life in the Church.[1] But this life was in part either a hidden and personal nature, or confined almost entirely to religious worship and domestic life.

[1] Under which head must be specially mentioned the writings of Joh. Arndt, Heinr. Müller, Scriver, Val. Andreä, Joh. Gerhard, Valer. Herberger, Lütkemann; in practical theology, those of the two Tarnovs, Grossgebauer, and Joh. Gerhard. In the universities, however, and in literature, by far the greater share of attention was devoted to giving an *artistic form to preaching*. The rhetoric of Melanchthon and the classic models of eloquence became the standard of preaching, so far as its outward form and fashion were concerned; while its spirituality was repressed by the various schemes which ingenuity was constantly multiplying. A regard to

The aim of the Reformation had been to bring about present personal salvation and the inner life of faith; and it was entirely consistent with this aim that what was morally produced by man —nay, what was yet to be expected from God—for the *perfecting*

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these was often productive of an absence of all elegance of language, and controversy occupied a space destructive of edification. Among writers on methods of preaching may be mentioned, after A. Pancratius, 1571 (from whom the Pancratian, *i.e.* the synthetic, method takes its name), Luc. Osiander, 1582, and Æg. Hunnius, 1595; in the seventeenth century, Baldwin, 1632, J. Hülsemann, 1633, J. B. Carpzov, 1656, Christ. Chemnitz, 1658. Spener, Breithaupt, and Weismann effected a deliverance from the numerous restrictions of a mass of artificial rules by a recurrence to a careful consideration of Scripture, which was very favourable to analytical preaching (the homily). They opposed especially the so-called dogmatic, Jorismatic, Hopfnerian, Zetetic, and Ursinian methods. Comp. Palmer, *Ev. Homiletik*, and his article upon it in Herzog's *Real Encycl.* vol. vi. In the matter of the *catechism*, and gradually in that of catechizing, the seventeenth century exhibits no small amount of productiveness, in which the spirit of the various epochs is, as it were, reflected, and indeed so much so that each separate epoch furnishes its separate contribution. Luther's Little Catechism—"the fruit, not an abridgment, of the large,"—together with the catechism of J. Brenz, is the standard of the catechisms of the several Lutheran national churches. In its plastic and childlike simplicity of language, the objective matter of the Confession is wondrously blended with the expression of personal faith. In it we find a typical union of those elements which were subsequently severed, the *simplex et certa professio* of the Church's common faith, and the vigorous, joyful, personal profession and conviction. But the brevity and simplicity of the Shorter Catechism required that this, even if it remained the foundation, should be supplemented by more copious explanations, that the young might be able to give an account of their faith. The numerous works designed to supply this want adopted *the existing type of Church doctrine*, and stated the *summa doctrinæ*, the *Locos communes*, sometimes for higher schools and universities (see above, p. 109), at others in a more popular form; yet still, accompanied by definitions and axioms, sought to impress upon the understanding with the utmost accuracy and distinctness the traditional dogmas of the Church. This was an important complementary act of self-constitution on the part of the Evangelical Church; and the irregularities prevailing after the Thirty Years' war made it the more necessary that the young should be again brought under the discipline of Church teaching. On the other hand, however, intellectualism, which had begun to transform the Church in general into the school, exerted its influence here also. The catechetical instruction of the people was not arranged according to the normal stages of growth in religious life and its needs, but at most according to the different grades of school proficiency. In the seventeenth century, confirmation was disused in many countries. To obviate even the appearance of any deficiency after regenerating Baptism, the act by which the blessing of Baptism is developed was omitted. Spener is the first who marks a point of transition to ancient practice in this respect. His aim is to lead Christian doctrine "from the head to the heart." He takes up the important element of personal faith so much let slip of late, though made of such vital importance by Luther, and seeks either to inculcate or to strengthen

*of this salvation* and of His kingdom, should have been but little elaborated. The chief thing is known by faith to be already present, and therefore the soul is saved, is happy, even in this world—nay, inwardly as if already in heaven. Hence, its gaze was but very seldom directed to that external and manifest triumph of the kingdom of Christ, which was still lacking. Protestantism, by the stress which it laid upon the internal, had assured, if not the freedom and vigour, yet certainly the moral purity of its principle. And it was just by virtue of this purity that it could despise both the external ecclesiastical glory of Romanism and the coarse chiliasm of the Reformation era. The servile state of the good and of the Church was a matter to which a Christian must willingly accommodate himself, and must even learn to love, as furnishing the condition under which faith may be exercised and proved to be true faith, without sensible perception, sensuous desires, or selfishness, a faith in that which is heavenly, for its own sake, and irrespective of its coming glory. Hence, in *Eschatology*, that aspect was brought forward which represents the future world as but a higher degree of that blessedness to which faith has access even in this, and the dying believer as immediately introduced into the full enjoyment of salvation in Christ. This, indeed, would almost deprive the final judgment of its importance, and could be only conceivable on the supposition that joy in the triumph of the kingdom of God, and consciousness of the perfection of the whole

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it, for general edification—a work in which he had been preceded by Ernest the Pious. Spener's catechism, 1677, and still more the works of Gesenius, already give the preponderance to that which tends to edification, rather than to the accurate definition of traditional dogmas (as given *e.g.* by Mich. Walther and the Herford catechism). Nevertheless, it is still in the main from objective Church doctrine that they endeavour to obtain practical fruits, partly with special reference to the rite of confirmation, now reintroduced particularly by Spener. And yet this objective Church doctrine was cast into the background by Pietism. The Wurtemburg Church alone had the good fortune, while retaining the catechisms of Luther and Brenz, to secure unimpaired the acquisitions of the new era in the Confirmation manual of Hiemer, 1723, which brought into Church order the above-mentioned religious, and not merely didactic gradation. Compare the excellent work of Ehrenfeuchter, *Zur Gesch. des Katechismus*, Gött. 1857. Among older writers on catechizing are: Trotzendorf (*Methodus doctrinæ catecheticæ*, 1570), Lossius; among those of the seventeenth century, Lütkemann, Kortholt, J. G. Baier, Hartmann, Tarnov, *de SS. ministerio*, lib. ii. c. 3, Val Andreä, *christlich-evangelische Kinderlehre*, 1648. Comp. Langemack, *Histor. catechetica*, pt. i.-iii. 1729, &c., and v. Zezschwitz's not yet completed *Geschichte der Katechetik*.

race, were no part of the blessedness of the individual. Selnecker had already taught an intermediate state before the final judgment, even for the righteous;[1] but the notion of progress and improvement in another world soon fell to the ground. The emphasis laid upon the inward state, and the consequent preoccupation of the believer solely with his personal relation to Christ, resulted moreover in a *spiritualistic view of the world*, a certain contempt for nature and its earthly theatre. This was shown even, *e.g.*, in the treatment which the notion of miracles met with, a miracle being unhesitatingly regarded as a suspension, or even an infraction, of the laws of nature. It was scarcely a decided reality, but rather a fluctuating kind of existence which was conceded to nature; she was, as it were, only the material which, in a state of absolute plasticity, was at every moment being fashioned by God. Notwithstanding the importance attached to this earthly life, its aim was so exclusively faith, that when this was once obtained, the prolongation of his life could scarcely have been of any importance to the individual; nay, rather, since the possibility of falling away was admitted, it must have seemed desirable that the moment when saving faith originated should be also the moment of death. It is true that the testing and proving of faith were to take place in this life; but this could be effected whatever might happen in the outer world. The surroundings are actually indifferent if the sole matter of importance is that faith should be maintained. There is not, indeed, an utter absence of the notion of such a moral fashioning of life as should make it a vital portion of the whole kingdom of God and an efficient means of promoting it. Such a notion could not but partially result from the nature of things, but it formed no prominent feature of the consciousness. The earthly work of the Gospel upon mankind, as a connected history of the kingdom of God upon earth, was lost sight of. In fact, the *ethical* feeling for such a work was not yet developed; and it is in this latter circumstance that we find the secret reason of the absence of missionary efforts. The clear light of faith having been again set up by the Reformation, and the possibility of salvation extended to all, the proper work of the world's history was regarded as accomplished, and the speedy end of the world confidently expected; Antichrist, according to Luther, already

[1] Heppe, iii. 420.

existing in the Romish Church. It was allowed that the Church, in that state of bondage which constitutes her mark upon earth, will yet have many sore trials to bear; but the fact that it is not her only duty to be a sufferer, but also to contribute by self-sacrificing service to the renovation and revival of mankind in every sphere of life, lay so far beyond the horizon, that many thought, with Quenstedt, that this present world would, at the second coming of Christ, be not merely changed as to its form, but even utterly destroyed as to its substance. The world-wide mission of Christianity and the Reformation with respect to governments and nations, to art, science, and the whole realm of culture, could scarcely enter into the consciousness of an age whose utmost efforts barely sufficed to maintain, among the storms of the seventeenth century, the pure preaching of the Gospel for the salvation of the individual soul. All the moral edifices of mankind were, together with the world on which they were reared, represented as transitory and without lasting importance; though, on the other hand, an endurance even of the corporeal substance in glorified perfection was, in opposition to this general destruction of the world, embraced in the doctrine of the Resurrection. The thousand years' reign—a notion whose importance consisted, among other things, in making the earthly theatre of the Church of great consequence, and in regarding her duty to the world as one to be accomplished thereon—was regarded as already past; because so much had been already attained by faith that only sight, *i.e.* the future state, could be a higher stage or furnish higher tasks.

That faith, or believing consciousness, should not freely enter into the realm of moral tasks is, as may easily be perceived, a defect in faith itself. It is not, so far only as its own verification and growth are concerned, that faith is a moral work, whose natural fruit is true sanctification in the calling which God appoints. Faith, when it feels a lively interest in its object, cannot but be animated by a love which will long for the true victory of grace in the kingdom of Christ, and for the extension of this kingdom. Faith has not proved how infinitely productive a principle it is, until it lovingly embraces the whole world, and is not occupied solely in caring for the salvation of the individual soul. For this it needs the ideas of design, an acquaintance with the world's destiny according to the counsel of God,

which must be accomplished; and therefore eschatological knowledge, as is evident by the Apostle's insertion of *hope* between faith and active love, as the cause of the latter (1 Cor. xiii.). Hence it was but in accordance with the normal relation of things that Spener—the very man who so greatly contributed to the re-animation of the evangelical principle of faith, and exhorted men with such peculiar earnestness to care for the salvation of their own souls—should, when the time was come, burst in an unexpected manner the bonds of a spurious subjectiveness, which, whether emotionally or intellectually, would not advance beyond first principles, and should direct the hope of believers to the grand historical development of *a future* kingdom. It may seem strange, or look like an indirect way to such an end, that on the whole the ethic interest of the Lutheran Church should at first be directed, not to the present state, but to the future hopes of Christ's kingdom. In this case, however, we have but another instance of the repetition of that vital law which we find prevailing also in the primitive Church; and the fact alluded to will suffice to prove that the first thing needed,—if we are to be ethically at home in the present, if we are to view our immediate duties in their connection with the whole, and consciously to fulfil them in a truly ethical spirit, *i.e.* as parts of the great moral task of the whole race,—is that we should bring before our minds the ideal form of that kingdom of God which shall be. With this must also be combined the realistic side, *i.e.* a lively and faithful appreciation of the *history* of the Church, inasmuch as the present, upon which our consciousness of the ideal has to operate, can only be understood from the history of the past. In this respect the theologian of the seventeenth century to whom we are most indebted is Calixtus, whose historical survey of the actual state of mankind, and of the real necessities and essential functions of the Church, impressed upon him the conviction—in which he coincided with Spener—that it was the duty of the modern Church, instead of occupying itself in fruitless internal disputes, to devote its energies to the extension of the kingdom of Christ.

Looking back from this point, how great was the difference between this period and the sixteenth century! Attention was then directed almost exclusively to the New Testament and the apostolic age. Far from expecting a new series of developments,

both externally and internally, in human life in general and the kingdom of Christ in particular, or regarding the promotion of such developments as the duty of the modern Church, it was thought enough if the existing Church were purified and inwardly led back in its faith to the type of the apostolic age. Now, on the contrary, the image of a glorious future for the Church, not only in another world, but in this also, was depicted by the energy of faith for the encouragement of hope; and this having to be realized by human instrumentality, could not fail to kindle that *love* which sets vigorously about its daily labour, and does not suffer him whom it influences to rest satisfied with a life of mere contemplation, or of joy in his own salvation.

Having thus reviewed the scholastic period of the Lutheran Church, we have arrived at a brighter phase of its life,—a phase full of fertile germs, rich in promise for the future—at tendencies which existed indeed even in the seventeenth century, as *ecclesia pressa*, nay, which provoked by their opposition a still more rigid manifestation of orthodoxy, but which finally showed themselves not only superior to all that was morbid therein, but also shook and destroyed the power of the Church so far as it was identified with these morbid elements, and thus in due time opened a wider and freer path to the genuine spirit of the Reformation.

## SECTION II.

### THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE OLD CHURCH ORTHODOXY.

THE tendency which, for the sake of brevity, we have designated as that of Protestant scholasticism, was never quite sure of its tenure nor happy in it. The contests with the Romish and Reformed Churches, as well as with Socinians, still continued, the former especially being powerfully supported, not only by the material assistance of Jesuitical policy, but also by considerable intellectual ability. For while, during the sixteenth century, the advocates of the Romish Church betrayed, generally speaking, a want both of genius and intellectual power, it possessed after its close the advantage of numbering such men as Bellarmine, the equally able opponent of Chemnitz, Dionysius Petavius, Thomassinus, and such divines as Gregory v. Valentia, Francis Suarez, Sanchez, Tanner, Forer, and many others, among its defenders. These were the less bound to reply to Protestant theologians, inasmuch as the latter omitted to bring into the field their own peculiar resources, viz. the powers inseparable from their principle, and only too nearly approximated in their method to the standpoint of their adversaries. They opposed the reception of tradition beside the Holy Scriptures, while in point of fact they vindicated the authority of their own system of doctrine to its smallest and slightest details, as though it were an inviolably sacred tradition, and enforced it with the utmost zeal, and even by means of discipline. They referred, indeed, for its support to Holy Scripture, yet notwithstanding their appeal to the perspicuity of the latter, they did not leave its explanation free. On the other side, the Romanists denied even the limited intelligibility of Scripture, *i.e.* its clearness concerning what was necessary to salvation, and strengthened this denial by referring to the variety of ways in which Scripture had, from the earliest ages, been understood. And since at the period of the Thirty Years' war the schism in the Western Church was not regarded as irretrievable, methods were invented—especially by the Jesuits

Peron, Neuhaus (Nihusius), Erbermann, and after 1650 by the brothers Walenburgh—for bringing the Lutherans, with their appeal to Scripture alone, into straits, and proving that subjection to a visible living authority in matters of doctrine was the only reasonable course. These methods, which bore various names,[1] all coincided in taking the Lutherans, and their self-restriction to Scripture, at their own word, and in striving, as it were, to starve out both their theology and divinity. They declared themselves prepared to own their opponents in the right, if they should be really able to prove that their dogmas were literally contained in Holy Scripture, and that they embraced nothing more than could be verbally pointed out therein. To this demand of Veron and Neuhaus it was replied that: Holy Scripture being written for men endowed with the gift of reason, obvious inferences from the words of Scripture must be held equally valid; and also, adds Calixtus, that which is evident to reason, since reason proceeds from the same God as revelation. To this the brothers Walenburgh answered, that inferences were not possible without the exercise of reason, and that this would therefore be to leave each individual to decide concerning mysteries by means of philosophy and reason. But that upon which happiness depends, the doctrines necessary to salvation, must be purely divine, for the intermixture of aught human would render everything uncertain. Hence the Church must be endowed with divine authority, if she is to pronounce infallibly on matters of doctrine. This work she effects by the help of the Holy Ghost. Musæus, who treats these questions with penetrating acuteness, points out, on the other hand, the contradictions existing between Catholic theologians, some of whom insist that saving faith must be founded upon direct revelation—at least, upon one imparted directly to the Church—while others, on the contrary, prefer recurring to an assistance of the Holy Ghost, by means of which the Church develops what is virtually given in revelation,—an operation which Protestants likewise may lay claim to, only that they, in

[1] For example, the Veronian, Augustinian, &c. By a *petitio principii* the prescriptive rights of the Romish Church were inferred from its antiquity, while from its state of possession it was deduced that the *onus probandi* lay with the Protestants. They who sought by such methods the conversion of Protestants were called Methodists.

exercising it, strictly adhere to the word of Scripture.[1] Protestants especially have a right to decline any external tribunal in matters of faith as an institution which they can entirely dispense with, because they profess, through the inward witness of the Spirit, to rejoice in an assurance of scriptural truth and an accurate knowledge thereof, for which no external authority could compensate, and which enables them to deal with truth as their own property.[2] If, on the other hand, the formal principle is relied on, and only that position given to Holy Scripture which is accorded in the Catholic system to the Church, then the circumstance that the formation of the canon, so soon as it is regarded as unalterably concluded, does but lead back to the authority of the Church, is undoubtedly the weak point.

And yet attacks from without were less dangerous to the old orthodox system, and met with more unanimous opposition,[3] than

[1] An inconsistency, however, is discernible here. If a pure and infallible reception of Christian truth is possible to us, although human functions are concerned in such reception, why should these be excluded in the case of the apostles in the generally-received theory of inspiration? The question, If Holy Scripture were not understood in a Protestant sense by all Christian antiquity, what becomes of its perspicuity? necessitated that historical proof of the *novelty* of Roman Catholic explanations of Scripture which was now also undertaken. This controversy, if the prepossession of the constant identity of orthodox doctrine had not stood in the way, might even have led to the conviction that there must be a development of doctrine, because revelation, whose record Holy Scripture is, can only become more and more to the mind through the action and the forms of the human intellect. And finally, with this might have been combined the perception that doctrine, in virtue of that human side which by its very nature it possesses, not only must be susceptible of variation, but is also only an *image* of its matter; that matter may itself remain invariable, even though alterations should take place in the doctrine. But such a perception still lay in the far distance.

[2] Calixtus (*Append.* to *Epist. theol.*, 1619) and Musæus particularly point this out. This assertion does not indeed appear here as holding the rank of a second, and, in its way, an independent aspect of the evangelical principle by the side of Scripture, although faith in Holy Scripture is itself made to *depend* upon Divine assurance of the truth of its contents; consequently, in this material aspect of the evangelical principle, justice is done in a higher, and in the only satisfactory manner, to so much of the Romish demand as is justifiable.

[3] Besides M. Chemniti *Examen Concil. Trid.*, of which several new and complete editions appeared, may be mentioned in this connection Joh. Gerhard's *Confessio Catholica*, vols. i.-iii. 1634-1637, in which this well-read divine has collected testimony in favour of Protestant doctrine from Catholic authors, and opposed Romish doctrines as innovations. His work resembles the *Catalogus estium veritatis*, 1557 gathered from all centuries, compiled by Matth. Flaccius, and further carried on by the Magdeburg centurists. And since Bellarmine was the most formidable opponent of Chemnitz and J. Andreä (Schmidlin), Gerhard

those powerful tendencies which appeared one after another within it. These, while they were of one accord with the orthodox, in contending with external foes, and especially with Romanism, opposed the system of old evangelical orthodoxy from various standpoints.

Protestant mysticism, Calixtus, Spener, and their respective schools, Zinzendorf and the Moravian Brotherhood, successively developed the Protestant principle under different phases, already contained in its germ, viz. the phases of feeling, knowledge, and will. They all however came in collision with the dominant system, and were exclusive toward each other. Hence, though exhibiting progress, when viewed in their individual aspects, they manifest on the whole a dissolution of the unity and characteristics of the Protestant ecclesiastical system. In none of these new forms does the Protestant principle work in all its fulness and entirety, but is separated into contending tendencies, which do not seek a mutual agreement till after the second decade of the eighteenth century.

## CHAPTER I.

### PROTESTANT MYSTICISM.

Our attention must, in the first place, be directed to the tendency which is, on the one hand, inwardly related to Pietism, and may, on the other, be regarded as the prelude, within the sphere of religion, to the philosophical movement inaugurated by Leibnitz. It came into direct contact with theology, by reason of the freer

wrote also *Bellarminus ὀρθοδοξίας testis*, Jena, 1631-1633, in which he endeavoured to corroborate evangelical Catholic truth from the writings of Bellarmine himself, and to show these to be opposed in many important particulars to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. Other controversial writers of the period are Conr. Schlüsselburg, *Catalogus hæreticorum* (*i.e.* all opponents of Lutheran doctrine since the Reformation), 1597; Abr. Calovii *Synopsis controversiarum potiorum*, 3d ed. Viteb. 1652; *Scripta Antisocina*, 1674; Lucas Osiander, *Enchiridion controversiarum*, Viteb. 1612. J. B. Carpzovius, H. May, and Eisenmenger, wrote against the Jews; Hinkelmann and Prideaux against Mahommedans; and Joh. Musæus against Deists and Naturalists. Controversial literature against the Reformed Church was also very abundant. Among those who contributed thereto were Calovius and Hülsemann. We limit our mention of the older Protestant Church history to C. Calixtus' *Darstellung*.

position which it maintained with respect to the Church. We speak of Protestant *mysticism*, with which the first and more religious or theological course of opposition to the orthodox scholastic system commences. The second and philosophic course was to follow in the eighteenth century.

We have seen that when Protestant doctrine clothed itself in the form of scholasticism, the fulness of the Reformation spirit, which still lived in the nation, by no means consented thereto. Side by side with Lutheran scholasticism, which was ever increasingly anxious to rid itself of Luther's mystic element, and was immersed in a course of reflexion unfavourable to all originality and direct conviction, flowed on a copious stream of mysticism, which in some instances maintained and cultivated genuine evangelical tenets, as the names of Valentin Weigel, Jacob Böhme, and especially John Arndt, may suffice to show. But this mysticism, alienated in spirit from the torpidity of objective orthodoxy, betook itself, in many instances, to a practical or theoretical kind of inwardness which was quite as one-sided. In the seventeenth century the Protestant mysticism, generally speaking, still preserved its church character. Towards its close however a separation, which already advanced to the formation of new churches, gained the upper hand. Hence while subjectivity, in the zeal of its self-assertion against external church authority, more and more emancipated itself from the restraints of tradition, the material principle of Protestantism was exchanged, in various forms, for the inner light, which was but loosely, or not at all, connected with historical Christianity. In Chr. Dippel and Edelmann, mysticism had already degenerated into naturalism.

The older Protestant mysticism, in which the after effects of the Reformation impulse may be detected, now took possession chiefly of those points of doctrine which had been least cultivated by the Reformers, viz. the doctrine of God, including the Trinity, those of the creation, of the relation of the nature of man to the nature of God, and the doctrine of the principles of knowledge. The ancient mysticism of the Greek Church had fixed its attention only upon God, in whose sacred light, which is darkness to man, it sought to be immersed: mediæval mysticism, including that of Germany, was of a more subjective character. Its aim was no longer the mystic enjoyment of God,

the being lost in God, but, with an all but total forgetfulness of sin, the glorification or deification of the mystic individual (see Vol. I. pp. 51, 56). Both the Greek and mediæval mysticism however, whether aiming at the enjoyment of God or the glorification of man, had an element of idealism, and coincided in disregarding corporeity and nature in general, or, though never actually surpassing the foundation of reality, in treating them after the fashion of catholic asceticism, in a dualistic manner, as being but limitations to the spirit. Now the Reformation, whose first object was certainly the salvation of the soul, dealt seriously with *reality*, with respect to sin, that phenomenon of universal experience, and proclaimed to its subject pardon for this reality, even in this world. Thus however mysticism also assumed a new form, namely, a tendency towards the world of reality. Even *nature*, which had till now been treated as though it were merely a deception, or as inimical to spirituality, was now placed in the light of the Divine idea, and brought into inward relation with the soul. Such mysticism is *theosophy*. This now embraced the whole realm of existence, with the single exception of the *history* of the human race, which was not as yet reckoned a part of the Divine idea, nor perceived to be the history of the Divine kingdom. This indeed was a step first taken by mysticism in consequence of Spener's movement, and by the instrumentality of Bengel and Oetinger.

Whatever may be the imperfections of mysticism in a scientific point of view, it was the precursor of a great process, which was to be accomplished in due order in objective thought. It conceived the idea of a knowledge comprising the Divine and human spirit and nature into a unity, and set this before the mind as its goal. It was through this, its leading idea, far superior to the philosophy of the age, not only to the Aristotelian, but also to the Cartesian, which is reared upon an irreconcilable dualism. The unity which it aimed at is adapted to form a substructure, not only for the doctrine of faith, but also for Christology, and for the doctrine of the means of grace, *i.e.* the word and sacraments. The first theosophist was Theophrastus Paracelsus, a contemporary of Luther, and already half a Protestant. He regarded Christ as the light of nature as well as of man, and sought to show the inward relation between the revelation given in Christianity and that manifested in nature.

He also held that there was an inward relation between nature and man. Everything is contained in each individual man: he is a microcosm, he has within him even all the spirits of the stars, the only question is how to arouse them. He admits no astrological fate over man, nor any objective magic; magic is to be found in man himself, it is the power of a man united to God by faith. Faith is omnipotent, it effects what it conceives, what it chooses. In his view, magical power, properly so called, is the imagination of faith, for God also created all things by means of imagination. He has but little to say of sin and justification, but much of the sickness of the body and the reason, which is however healed by the imaginative power of the spirit, which has placed itself in relation to Christ, and received His Spirit. As our souls were poured into our bodies by God Himself in unfathomable love, so do we also receive from Christ, through the Holy Spirit and by means of the imagination of faith, the seed of a heavenly and spiritual body. This takes place especially in the Lord's Supper, so that Christ has His incarnations in all believers through the Spirit. A tendency towards forming spirit and corporeity into a unity is here unmistakeable, but this mysticism does not see its way to such a unity except in the case of Christ's glorified body and our resurrection body. Here it finds that union of spirit and nature, which it does not extend to the earthly body. This it regards as rejected and a prey to death by reason of its material nature, in which notion a still unsurmounted remnant of dualism is apparent.

Closely connected with Theophrastus and Lautensack of Nuremberg, who desired to treat the letter of Holy Scripture as its mere husk, is Valentin Weigel[1] († 1588). He will be dependent on Christ alone; Christ is his book. Holy Scripture is to him the mere witness of this inner revelation. The natural man has no knowledge; we must be taught by God, but we must, through the Holy Spirit, see with our own eyes, and not thrust them out. Knowledge must flow forth from within, that it may

[1] Comp. J. O. Opel, *Val. Weigel, ein Beitrag zur Lit- und Cult-Gesch. Deutschlands im 17 Jahrh.*, 1864, p. 121, &c. Weigel's opponents were especially Joh. Schellhamer, Luc. Osiander (who was also the opponent of Theophrastus), and Mich. Walther. On Weigel's writings comp. Pertz, *zur Gesch. der myst. und ascet. Lit.*, Niedner's *Zeitschrift für Hist. Theol.*, 1857, and especially Opel, pp. 53-70.

recoil towards us (*i.e.* objective knowledge, which, with such an origin, is at the same time subjective). It is by passivity that we attain in the quiet sabbath of the soul to the perception of truth, which already exists in our very nature and cannot first be brought to us from without. It is, however, through the Spirit and His testimony that that which is from the beginning secretly within us becomes the matter of our consciousness. Not till the inner sight beholds in its sabbath repose the heavenly treasures which are in Christ is the child found in the manger and in the swaddling clothes—*i.e.* in Holy Scripture; and at last Christ is also known in the human nature which He assumed. For all things come out of the invisible into the visible, out of the spiritual into the corporeal. There is in Weigel a strong inclination to make room in his system for corporeity. We need, he thinks, a substantial regeneration, which is not merely spiritual, but chiefly corporeal, and accomplished by means of Christ's spiritual and heavenly body; for through the fall we have lost our heavenly nature. He opposes this actual union with Christ to a *justificatio forensis*, without substantial sanctification. He knows, moreover, of no reason for Christ's earthly corporeity, except that it might serve as a covering to His heavenly glory. If the sun were on earth, no one could dwell near it.

Weigel places the perfection of man not in perfect and loving fellowship with God in Christ, but in the identification of man with God, and in the actualization of that Divine nature which was already latent in man, though it had not become his personal possession.[1]

Lautensack had already embraced the view of a progressive incarnation of God in history, which left to the historic Christ only a very limited position, together with others, and laid the chief stress upon the eternal Divine Spirit, who was also called Christ.[2] Esaias Stiefel, 1605, advanced to the proposition, "I am Christ," and so did Ezekiel Meth, his nephew. This is censured, however, by Jacob Böhme, who says: "The believer is, on the contrary, Christ's instrument—a small, humble, but fruitful

[1] Concerning other mystics of this period, compare Arnold, *Kirchen und Ketzerhistorien*, ii. 326, 329, 340-350; (Esaias Stiefel, Ezekiel Meth), 370-377; (Paul Nagel and Paul Felgenhauer), 650-741.

[2] So also Hiel (properly H. Janson), in his *Ackerschatz*, 1580.

sprout." In such words concerning a continuous incarnation of God we may indeed find traces of rejoicing, that through Christianity the wall of partition between God and man has been broken down, that the union between God and humanity has not been limited to Christ, but continued by His Spirit, and that the opposition between the divine and human natures, which the Schoolmen had regarded as infinite, had been overcome. But since it was not an ethical conception of the Divine nature which was entertained, an actual union between God and man could only take place in a physical manner; in other words, could only lead to actual Pantheism. This physical idea of God, unsuspected as it is at the first glance, betrays itself especially in the fact, that regeneration and redemption, so far as these enter into the question, are, by theosophists, transferred chiefly to the corporeal side of the matter. Compared with that Romish mysticism which despised nature, an advance is discernible in the fact that true life is made to consist in the full concrete reality of personality. At the same time, however, this doctrine of a Divine nature, in which the moral element was greatly lost sight of, afforded a handle to a refined materialism; nor were there wanting instances of magical and theurgic applications of faith to alchemy, elixirs of life, and other finite purposes. Neither can we fail to perceive a remnant of dualism in these doctrines. For they will not allow that the heavenly body, whether in the case of Christ or ourselves, becomes such in an ethic manner, by the spiritualization of the earthly. On the contrary, they make two bodies exist in one another, and doom the earthly to annihilation, always manifesting an antagonistic relation to the external and material world as the root of evil. Hence they are also alien to external means of grace, and to the Church.

German theosophy reached the climax of its development in Jacob Böhme, the shoemaker of Gorlitz (1575-1624).[1] He sought to trace the principle of creation, and combined the origin of the world with the Trinitarian problem. In the beginning primordial knowledge, the first *principium*, was like a dark valley. Therein is harshness, bitterness, fierceness, wrath; this is not God, and yet it is the intrinsic and first source, which is in God

[1] Compare my *Gesch. der Christol.*, ii. p. 855; Wullen, *Böhme und seine Lehre*, 1838.

the Father, and after which He calls Himself an angry God. But there is in Him also that eternal feeling [*Gemüth*], which longs, which is anxious, which conceives a desire to become manifest to itself, and which becomes a will to beget. Hence God is not to him, as often to the elder mystics, mere indiscriminate existence or nullity, as though the "waste" of infinity were the highest and the ultimate. He does not conceive of God as only a dark valley, as unity without divisibility or affectability, nor as the mere ardour of selfism. According to his view, there is in God will, emotion, and an indefinite longing to make something out of nothing. Thus the First *Principium*, by the force of emotion, begets the Son, the eternally beloved of God, the gentle light produced from eternity, from the dark fire; and from the power which is in this light proceeds the Holy Ghost. Böhme conceives of God as ever active, and, as it were, agitating, to bring forth a world of innumerable centres, and to develop all the fulness of that primal will which is ever tending towards revelation. His Trinity is said to render creation possible through the principle of the love of the Father, the eternal indestructible nature in God, which he also calls the sensitiveness of love or the Son, and the Spirit, who propagates the splendour of majesty. The way in which the world was actually created was that God, beholding in the mirror of wisdom, in His eternal nature, the prototypes of creation, was moved, and spoke. At first, however, these were but ideal creations, and these not out of nothing, but out of God, in three different circles, representing the Trinity. This, our material, world arose only in consequence of an apostasy in these circles of spirits, through the fall of Lucifer. Böhme regards evil not as a mere deficiency, but as the Titanic attempt to overthrow the order of principles. The principle of egotism or selfism, which he calls wrath or anger, and which is ever repressed in God, was seized by Lucifer; and set free, it thus became the spirit of fire, brought love and wrath into mutual strife in the creature, and kindled therein a fire, by means of which the divine unity of its powers was dissolved. He thinks that we must go to the very depths of Deity in our search after evil; for though God had not even an anticipation of evil—since this would have been an obscuration of light—yet the evil which is in the creature has its roots in the first principle, when operating, so to speak, independently; and it was through its libe-

ration from all restraint that the Divine order was overthrown. After the fall of Lucifer and his circle, man was put in his place,[1] and appointed to unite the three circles of the ideal creation which represented the Trinity. The three principles in him were still, however, present in him in a "separable," not in a united state; hence he could and did fall. Then the Divine wrath was excited against increasing sin. Yet wrath was never wholly separated in God from the gentle light of love. And when the fulness of the time was come, the fall of man moved the Divine love to reveal itself. It came forth from the womb of the woman; having become man, it was exposed to every human condition—to development, to conflict, to temptation. To quench that fire of wrath, which was kindled in the world by sin, Christ plunged therein, died, and vanquished the darkness, thus becoming the Redeemer of nature and of mankind, and the founder of a new and fairer paradise, of which we become partakers, not by mere retirement and passivity, but by the union of our creature *will* with that of the Creator. This is the faith which is born of retirement and repentance, and through which the soul is clothed in the heavenly body.

In Böhme's laboured statement the invention of the imagination and its visionary notions are still in the ascendant, the latter have rather the mastery of him than he of them, and he is unable to winnow and arrange them so as to form them into a connected and intelligible delineation. On the other hand, however, in the doctrine of God, of the creation, of the fall, and of the restoration, we discern, amidst wondrous beauty and plasticity of language, a realism from which idealistic philosophy, with its more methodical treatment, has often, to the no small injury of its matter, but too far departed. It was reserved for a later period, for Oetinger, Fr. v. Baader, and Schelling, to seek out and utilize many a noble germ in the fermenting chaos of Böhme's notions.

Böhme's chief disciple was Gichtel (1638-1710) the founder of the Angelic Brothers, a mystic sect whose leaders favoured the strictest abstinence, and inclined towards an Apokatastasis, at least with respect to the souls of all men. They also attributed to themselves the office of redeeming others. Gichtel teaches that God is only love and not wrath, and while Böhme,

[1] So Milton, in *Paradise Lost*, according to ancient precedent.

in spite of being violently attacked by Richter and others as an enthusiast, desired to remain a faithful son of the Church, the Gichtelians, as well as many others, *e.g.* Petersen († 1727), Poiret († 1719), and after a time even G. Arnold, became Separatists.

Lutheran scholasticism in the days of its supremacy uttered nothing but condemnation against all these mystics. The reason of this lay partly in the coldness and reserve manifested by the mystics with respect to the means of grace, and the whole external machinery of the Church, nay, even in their inclination to a spiritualistic view of historical Christianity in general. But not less is it to be found in the literalism and unchanical stiffness of this so-called orthodoxy, to which even the heartfelt piety of an Arndt was an offence.[1]

## CHAPTER II.

### CALIXTUS AND THE SYNCRETISTIC CONTROVERSIES.

George Calixtus,[2] born December 14, 1586, in Meddelbye in the duchy of Sleswick, pursued his studies chiefly in Helmstadt, where Cornelius Martini, the Aristotelian and Polyhistor, exercised a most important influence upon him. Having proved the correctness of Martini's saying: that modern philosophy was of no great value, and that it would be far more profitable to be better acquainted with the ancient, he began to inquire whether, in the whirl of opinions and controversies, this were not the case with theology also, and whether the neutral ground for a friendly understanding might not be furnished by Church history.

[1] Not only did Corvinus take the field against Arndt in the first year of the great war, but in 1624 the *Theolog Bedenken* of Luc. Osiander of Tübingen discovered Popery, Monkery, Enthusiasm, Pelagianism, Calvinism, Schwenckfeldianism, Flacianism, and Weigelianism in his writings. Comp. Scherff, *Supplementum historiæ liturgicæ Arndtianæ*, 1727. The *Wahres Christenthum* of Arndt however did not lack defenders, among whom were J. Gerhard, and even Wittenbergians, especially Val. Andreæ, Glassius, Spener, and Buddæus. Comp. Buddæus, *Apologetica Arndtiana*, 1625, and Thomasius in Herzog's *Realencycl.* on Arndt. Pertz, *de Joanne Arndtio ejusque libris qui inscribuntur de vero christianismo*, Hannov. 1852.

[2] Comp. Henke's *Georg Calixt und seine Zeit*, 2 vols. 1853, 1856, a work of exemplary and thorough research.

To this department he applied himself with the utmost zeal, and became therein "the ruler of his age."[1] After a journey in Lutheran countries, according to the frequent and praiseworthy custom of the times, he also visited many Reformed Churches and Roman Catholic lands during many years of travel. He passed a winter (1612) at Cologne, "the Trojan horse of the papacy in Germany." Thence he went to Holland, which was then at the height of its prosperity, and seemed to him a compendium of the whole earthly sphere. He next visited England, where he became acquainted with Casaubon, and through him with Thuanus. Soon after his return he became a professor of Helmstädt, where he laboured for forty-two years (dying March 19, 1656). The enlarged horizon which he had gained, both by his philosophical and historical studies, and by means of his journeys, opened his eyes to the fact that faith and love are not the exclusive possession of any one religious party; but that other confessions also are possessed of these advantages. This conviction disposed him to desire peace. Such a desire was moreover greatly increased by the revelation made by the fury of the Thirty Years' war,—the whole of which happened during his public life—of the mischief caused by divisions and religious intolerance. Willingly did he echo the saying of Jerome: Christ is not so poor as to have a church only in Sardinia, all Christendom belongs to Him. He specially delighted to dwell on all that is truly Christian even in Romanism, and used his utmost efforts to do away with, or at least to blunt, the sharp points of those distinctions by which Lutherans were separated from Reformed, and both from the Romish Church. He hoped that thus a spirit of true Catholicity might arise upon the ground of that common and primitive possession, which had never been surrendered, though it might have been partially buried beneath other matters.[2] He longed to see the civil war which was raging within the Church of Christ extinguished, and to behold the combatants combine in turning their attention without, that thus the heathen might be converted to Christ,

[1] Titius, *oratio funebris*, 1656.

[2] See the introduction to *Augustinus de doctrina christiana* and to the *Commonitorium* of Vincentius Lerin, 1629, the Reflections *de tolerantia Reformatorum*, and the treatise *Desiderium concordiæ eccles. sarciendæ*, 1650. Digression addressed to the academies subject to the Pope concerning Barthold Neuhaus's new art. (an appendix to *Theol. mor.*) 1634. *De auctoritate antiquitatis ecclesiasticæ*, 1639.

by the efforts of a united Christendom. This striving for union formed the central point of his whole public activity, and was also an important factor in his theology. He was in communication with the Reformed Ireniker, Pareus of Heidelberg, and with the Scotchman Duræus[1] [John Dury], who travelled from country to country with his unceasing projects of union. He also exerted his utmost energy, though in vain, to bring about the discussion at Thorn between the Catholics and the two Protestant confessions—a work to which he was summoned by the Great Elector.[2]

Calixtus was undoubtedly, after J. Gerhard, the first theologian of his age in Germany. His eminent talents were acknowledged not only by friend and foe, but by great princes, such as Duke Augustus of Wolfenbüttel, Ernest the Pious of Saxony, and the Great Elector. He was a man of more than ordinary attainments, a theological statesman and a zealous German patriot, but, for this very reason, of anti-Italian and anti-Jesuitic tendencies. His personal appearance was imposing and superior, yet at the same time attractive in its tranquil firmness and conscious gentleness. He devoted his many-sided cultivation and extraordinary scholarship to the object of his life, an object pursued with persevering and undeviating constancy. By this unswerving pursuit he makes, as few others do, an impression of being a consistent, self-assured, resolute character. In many respects he may be regarded as the reviver of a tendency similar to that of Melanchthon; but we may well imagine that the Abbot of Königslütter would, with his turn of mind, feel himself most at home in the Anglican Church. This feeling for catholicity, this largeness of view and heart, were not, however, shared and scarcely understood by his contemporaries, but were, during the whole course of his life, the cause of numberless attacks. These arose first from the Society of Jesuits, that modernized Romanism transformed into sectarianism. A verbal controversy with Romish theologians in Hämelschenburg concerning Holy Scripture, in which his erudition and dialectic skill were conspicuous, was the first occasion on which he obtained laurels. He had subsequently much disputation with Erbermann and other Jesuits of Mayence, and even previously with his former fellow-student and friend B. Neuhaus, who had

[1] Henke, *id.* i. 124, 501, &c.

[2] *Id.* ii. 2, p. 71, &c.

apostatized at Cologne, and who was never weary of provoking and annoying the great theologian in numberless treatises.[1] After 1640, however, when more than half his official career was over, he came also into violent collision with the heads of Lutheran orthodoxy, with Matth. Hoë of Hoënegg, Hülsemann, Calovius, Weller, Dannhauer, Dorsche, Scharf, Myslenta of Königsberg, and even Höpfner of Leipsic, after preliminary skirmishes with Staats Büscher of Hanover. The three first-named especially regarded his principles as treachery to Lutheran orthodoxy, and bestowed upon his widespread school the name of Syncretists, because, after the manner of the Cretans, they entered into alliances against their common adversaries, without scruple or selection; nay, they even joined with the Jesuits in accusing him of preparing the way for atheism by his "neutralism." They succeeded in causing the shipwreck of his hopes of union, and, indeed, contributed not a little, by the strife which they stirred up, to that repression of Protestantism in many countries during the course of the seventeenth century, to which no successful opposition was offered. But they failed in their plan of declaring that a theology which did not submit to the *F. C.* forfeited the name of Lutheran, and of defending the Lutheran Church against heterodoxy by means of a new symbol.

The services rendered to theology by Calixtus were very extensive. Helmstädt had been, during many years prior to Calixtus, distinguished for humanistic and philosophic studies, Caselius having successfully advocated philology, and Cornelius Martini the Aristotelian philosophy. Calixtus greatly contributed during the first half of the century to maintain these intellectual pursuits in full vigour at this university. His large and liberal spirit sought to use every means for bringing theology into close relation with the whole world of culture, nay, for making it fill the position of the most mature development of human consciousness. Not that he would have set reason above revelation, but that he lived in the persuasion that God, being the author of both, they could not possibly contradict each other, and made it his constant endeavour to show the harmony of

[1] He was ever in the lists against the Jesuits, as the chief defenders of that dogma which he regarded as most especially the cause of separation in the Church, viz. the infallibility of the Pope.

*recta ratio* with revelation.[1] He ascribed to reason, besides the formal functions indispensable to understanding the meaning of any subject, the power of attaining from its own resources a knowlege, real, though imperfect, and requiring to be supplemented and completed by the revelation which we possess in Holy Scripture. The strictly scientific school and method was to him—living, as he did, in those unhappy times in which he had ever to contend against the threatened decay of science—an affair of such urgency, that he devoted thereto many special treatises.[2] His *Apparatus theologicus* furnishes a kind of theological encyclopædia, literary history, and methodology. He first describes the extent of theology and its relation to the other sciences, to history and philosophy, and thus seeks to exhibit in its full extent the theme of the science of theology. "Philosophy and philology are in his view the two wings, without which no one can soar to the higher regions of theological science. Since the doctrines essential to salvation are to be drawn from Holy Scripture, the duty of theology is to state, to confirm, and to defend the contents of Holy Scripture—*i.e.* to exercise the exegetic, dogmatic, and controversial (also the apologetic) functions. His contributions to literary history are not confined to the narrow limits of his own confession, but his glance is directed to every province of Christendom. He makes the course of theological study advance from its first stage, viz.: the summary statement of Church doctrine (called *Summa*, *Catechismus*, *Loci*, or *Epitome*), to exegesis, and then to ecclesiastical history; thence to an acquaintance with the controversies of the day, and, lastly, to a practical acquaintance

[1] He also attempted apologetic works, viz.: *De veritate religionis Christianæ*, 1633; *Discurs von der wahren Religion und Kirche und ihrem Zustand*. 1633. He perceives an element of true religion even in heathenism, and uses this as an historical proof of the necessity of revelation. That which is either disfigured or sought for in heathenism is found in Christianity. This gives us primitive and yet not obsolete truth. When this fact, together with the history and results of Christianity is considered, these furnish, if not a proof of its truth, yet a fully sufficient one of the levity of him who rejects it without seeking to be enlightened by it. He who does so seek, and candidly reads the Holy Scriptures, will be affected by their higher and Divine power, and a *fides certa, quantumcunque evidentissime etiam evidentiæ certitudinem exæquans vel superans* will be begotten in his heart (Henke, i. 470). The intellectual process is here deficient, but not the religious counsel.

[2] *Apparatus theologicus*, 1628. Comp. Henke, i. 421.

with ministerial duties. These five distinct and ascending gradations in the education of a theologian are to be followed by "academic theology," properly so-called. This is to treat each item of doctrine according to the combined point of view of all these stages, *i.e.* exegetically, historically, dogmatically, polemically, and apologetically,—and liturgically where this is necessary. He shows that he is in his element in historical theology. He will not rest satisfied with a mere bare, chronicle-like statement of facts, but regards Thucydides and Tacitus as models of a treatment which makes use of every circumstance and event of the period, for the purpose of placing individuals in the light of this connection, and of judging them accordingly. By his own example, he was able to naturalize historical studies in German theology.[1]

With respect to Method, his two epitomes of doctrine and morality[2] deserve special mention. It was, however, by means of his excellent manual of divinity, a work not written by himself, but compiled from his lectures, that he became the originator of the analytical method, whose fundamental notion is in the genuine spirit of the Reformation, and corresponds with the synthesis of the ethico-religious and intellectual interests. He seeks to treat the doctrines of Christianity, not as disputable propositions, but as saving truths; hence he goes to work in a teleological manner, and in his first general part starts from the *finis* of theology, viz. eternal life or salvation.[3] The subject of this end is man. The principles of this end, and the means whereby it is attained, form the third part. The principles are the Divine counsel and Christ; the objective means, the word and sacraments; the subjective means, repentance and faith. The ministry of the word is appointed to bring man into contact with the objective means of grace. It is thus that the *Church* is

[1] He also contemplated and partially executed a history of Christian liturgies, by way of proving that the Lutheran type of worship had the consent of Christian antiquity in its favour.

[2] *Epitome Theologiæ*, Gosl. 1619. Even so early as 1611, he had already written fifteen *Disput. de præcipuis christianæ religionis capitibus* (Henke, i. 128). This earlier work maintains a strictly Lutheran and anti-Reformed tone.

[3] He here views eternal life in a purely eschatological sense, hence eschatology, including immortality, resurrection, judgment, salvation and perdition, is given in the first part. He also wrote three separate eschatological treatises on the four first-named subjects.

founded. The second part treats more particularly of the Church as militant in this world. It consists of all the nations who have been called. It is a monarchy under Christ, its head, who unites under Himself all those who dispense and receive the word and sacraments. Lastly, he speaks of the means of gathering, preserving, and defending the Church.[1] Not only his own, but other schools adopted the analytical method.[2]

Equally important is his *Theologia Moralis*.[3] In his encyclopædic enumerations of theological sciences, though he did not indeed mention ethics as a branch of study separate from divinity, he gave a sketch of a theological morality. This sketch, incomplete as it was, gave a new and fruitful impulse to the cultivation of this science, which had indeed been commenced so early as the sixteenth century, by Thomas Venatorius, Melanchthon, Chyträus, and Paul v. Eitzen, but had again fallen into neglect. This impulse did not, however, immediately result in numerous works on ethics apart from divinity. His efforts in this field were mainly directed to giving to Christian ethics, as a theological science, an independent position with regard to philosophical morality, which, in the ordinary discussions, kept for the most part the upper hand. This end he attained by making, not men in general, but believers, *i.e.* regenerate men, the subject of Christian ethics. It was their affections and actions which it was its province to describe, not as obtaining eternal life, but as guarding and confirming what had already been obtained.[4] Having laid down the doctrine of the subject of theological ethics, he proceeds to that of the object, by which, however, he

[1] This division of the general part brought the doctrine of God into the second section; the doctrine of God and the creator being laid down as the foundation for the doctrine of the subject of the end. Thus the doctrine of God filled the strange position of standing between those of man and immortality. Hence subsequent analysts had recourse to the expedient of distinguishing between the objective end, *i.e.* God, and the subjective end, *i.e.* the enjoyment of God, for the sake of restoring the doctrine of God to the first place.

[2] Henichius (of Rinteln), *Institutio Theol. dogm.*, 1655, the doctrinal manual of Hanover till the eighteenth century. Schramm, *de Compendio Henichii*, &c., 1711. Joach. Hildebrandt is of the same school; Abr. Calovius also adopted the analytical method.

[3] *Epitome Theologiæ Moralis*, 1634. Henke, i. 514. J. A. Schmid (of Helmstädt) in his *Comp. theol. mor.*, 1705, makes the above his model.

[4] So also Fr. Buddæus, *Institutiones theol. moralis*, &c., Lips. 1711, and Töllner, *Grundriss der Moraltheologie*, 1762.

does not understand the highest good,[1] but the law according to which the regenerate ought to act. In the doctrine of the regenerate man, however, he not only discussed of his state of grace and of his internal virtues, but also touched upon his altered external position in the Church and in civil life. Since all that was universally human was maintained in Christ, he often returns, when laying down the rules of Christian morality, to this great exemplar, but without being able to carry out, in this respect, the theological point of view with which he began.

We now turn to his *doctrine of principles.* In certain respects this did not differ from that which was generally regarded as such. He puts Scripture in the highest place, and attributes to it the power (*efficacia*) of giving divine certainty concerning its own contents. He also calls it the ultimate principle which has of itself certainty, authenticity, and authority. In his view, as in that of others, Scripture is αὐτόπιστος, ἀνυπόδεικτος, nor does he disdain to recommend it by the criteria mentioned above, p. 121. The main point with him is however its indwelling divine authority. This notion he investigates more closely.[2] By authority he means that power which a reasonable being (God, angel, or man) exercises by the expression of his meaning and will, either to induce the reason of another to acquiescence, or his will to obedience. This force of attraction (*vis alliciendi*) arises from the intrinsic excellence of what is expressed; God's is the highest authority, all else has authority in proportion to its nearness to God. Nothing can be placed beside Holy Scripture with respect to certainty and infallibility, because it is full of Divine power effectually to move the heart and constrain it to acquiescence,—a power which it can have only from its Divine Author, and this is its Divine authority. It does not work apart from God, but God works through it. Where it performs its own proper work, it bestows that which is the seal and superscription for the authorship of a book. From this we perceive that he attributes to the *contents* of Holy Scripture the power of self-authentication; and yet even he makes assurance to be, if not exclusively, yet

[1] In the year 1648 he wrote his third eschatological treatise, *de bono perfecte summo sive æterna beatitudine liber unus*, which does not contain any doctrine of property.

[2] *De auctoritate Scripturæ s.*, 1654. He had before this presided over the disputation concerning *Thesis de Script. s.* held at Hackspan, 1673.

chiefly of an intellectual kind, and personal assurance, or assurance of justification, is not in his view fundamental. He also treats the self-authentication of the divine contents as being directly the authentication of the divine form of Holy Scripture, which is the more to be wondered at, since He does not identify with this the Word of God in general. He even thinks that the Church possesses a Word of God, plainly and sufficiently such by its sense and thoughts, though not αὐτολεξεὶ in Holy Scripture. He finds the Word of God, *e.g.* not only in the original text and in correct translations, but also in the apostolic symbol, nay, even in the decrees of the œcumenical synods of the first five centuries. These would, however, have no authority in his eyes if contradicted by Holy Scripture, neither do they add anything thereto, but the sufficiency of Scripture is in any case to be admitted. So also in the case of the intelligibility of Scripture. While estimating primitive Christian tradition very highly, and seeking to secure for it a higher position than usual, he by no means does this, for the sake of making up by tradition for any want of intelligibility in the expressions of Holy Scripture—since tradition, on the contrary, must be tested by its conformity to Scripture—but for the purpose of ascertaining with objective certainty what is really fundamental among the many intelligible sayings of Scripture, what is the central point of Christian truth by which, when it is embraced, the distinctive character of Christianity is secured. That which has been believed by all, always and everywhere, must be essential: all subsequent additions are either not necessary to salvation, or to be rejected.

That association of men upon earth which we call the Church, is the flower of the race, the depositary of the wisdom of mankind; it has the privilege of being permanent, of never falling, in its entirety, into fundamental error. We know that there is ever an infallible Church of Christ on earth, not only from its own testimony, but from that of Holy Scripture, which calls it a pillar and ground of the truth. At present indeed this true Church which cannot err, though existing, has lost much of its capability of being known. The boundaries of truth and error are obliterated by additions and the divisions which have resulted therefrom, but this only renders more conspicuous the Church's freedom from error as shown by the records of the times prior to these innovations, where still it formed an unbroken unity, *i.e.*

during about the first five centuries. Hence an authority of a secondary degree is accorded to the *consensus quinquesæcularis*. The Church of Rome indeed adopted a grievous error when it suffered the papacy to dogmatize, nay, to be pronounced infallible by the Jesuits. In the Popish Church, the Church Catholic, oppressed by this error, cannot make itself heard. This point of view not only served his tendencies to union by furnishing him with an historical basis for it,—for he desired to have the Church brought back to the state it was in, prior to the divisions, that it might again be conscious of its unity,—but was also extremely important to him as offering a freer position to science. For if the Apostles' Creed contains all that is necessary to salvation, all that makes a man a Christian, and if in the ages most worthy of honour nothing more than belief of its contents was required, if moreover the Church demands nothing more for itself than these œcumenical symbols of the unanimous Church, a wide space is left for the freer action of science. To this must be added,[1] that far from intending by such peaceful notions to draw nearer to Romanism as such, *i.e.* to its innovations, and above all to the Jesuit doctrine of papal infallibility, he designed, on the contrary, that his standpoint should give completeness in an important respect to Protestant apologetics and polemics. Roman Catholic opponents accused evangelical doctrines of novelty; they said at the same time that the evangelical thesis concerning the intelligibility of Holy Scripture was a mere assertion, which was entirely refuted by the fact of the numerous and self-contradictory explanations of Scripture. It could not have failed to prove its own intelligibility, if this had really been its intrinsic quality. Hence there was a need of a living and visible supreme judge in matters of faith. To this it had been replied, even before Calixtus, that Scripture was sufficiently intelligible in all that was essential to salvation, and Flacius, the Magdeburg Centuriators, and J. Gerhard[2] had adduced, in favour of evangelical doctrine, witnesses to the right understanding of Scripture from each different century. Since however objections to individual testimony, if opposed to that of the Church of their times, were always possible on the part of opponents, Calixtus—supported by his immense patristic learning

[1] To this Henke first calls attention in his monograph on Calixtus.

[2] Comp. also above, pp. 175, 176.

—ventured to undertake the proof that evangelical doctrine was not only that which was alone consistent with Scripture, but was also, in all things needful to salvation, the common doctrine of the unbroken, ancient œcumenical Church; also that Holy Scripture has proved its intelligibility (*perspicuitas*) by the fact that, during the first five centuries, till the Council of Orange, 529, all that was essential to Christianity was uncompromisingly authorized and unanimously accepted. This moreover involved the controversial reprisal, that Roman Catholic theologians cannot prove, either from Scripture or from the most ancient tradition, those parts of their system which the Reformation opposed; that hence they are constrained by their own principles—according to which the Church is the true Church by the fact of ever possessing the same truth—to acknowledge their subsequent additions to be unnecessary to salvation, if not objectionable. His solid learning and intimate acquaintance with the history of dogmas, enabled him to prove, from a vast series of catholic doctrines and institutions, that these additions were innovations with respect to universal Christian antiquity, while some of them had been thereby rejected. This he showed especially with respect to papal infallibility,[1] the celibacy of the clergy (though he gives the preference to the unmarried state in the Church, 1631), the refusal of the cup to the laity, 1636, the repetition of the sacrifice of Christ in the mass, 1638 (though he acknowledges the Lord's Supper to be a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving), and the doctrine of transubstantiation.[2]

[1] As he showed even in 1614. Comp. Henke, i. 266, &c. Also in 1643, *de visibili ecclesiastica monarchia.* With this are connected the *Theses de Scriptura s.* (Hackspan) 1637. *De auctoritate Scripturæ s.* 1648. *De auctoritate antiquitatis ecclesiast.* 1639.

[2] By these monographs, the Lutheran Church first emulated the labours of Daillé, J. and S. Basnage, Blondel, and certain English writers. Even Calixtus did not furnish a comprehensive ecclesiastical history. The lack of this was chiefly supplied by the enormous mass of material accumulated by the Magdeburg centuriators, and arranged under their rubrics. Shorter compendiums were made from this work; hence during the prevalence of Lutheran orthodoxy their view of Church history was adhered to, a view which was mitigated only in the school of Calixtus. The main features of his views are as follow: Primitive Christendom exhibited the realization of the ideal of the Church; it was full of the Holy Ghost by its possession of pure doctrine, especially that of justification by grace, that sun in the firmament of the Church. If the Protestant Church, which has restored this primitive doctrine, finds herself in bitter strife with the Romish Church, the reason of this must lie in the fact that the latter has

Successful as were the controversial discussions of this master of the history of dogmatic theology, his historical apology for the essentials of Christianity produced no satisfactory results. It gave satisfaction neither to Lutherans nor Romanists, though it regarded even the Papal Church, in so far as it embraced the apostolic symbol and the decrees of the ancient councils, as a part of that true Catholic Church which had not yet lost its unity in the various particular churches. *Catholic* theologians insisted that even such tenets as had but later testimony in their favour had always been virtually contained in the common Christian

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obviously fallen from original purity. This is the work of Antichrist, who conceived the plan of introducing corruption into the Church by means of the papacy and its temporal power, and set up the mystery of iniquity more and more within the bosom of the Church. Thus it was by the lying wonders of superhuman invisible powers that the Church was plunged into deeper and deeper darkness. This was effected chiefly by the exaltation of the papacy, which became the instrument and the concentration of all antichristian powers. Through the power of human sin and of increasing darkness, the doctrine of many, of even the best men, an Augustine, an Athanasius, was not free from blemishes. Yet witnesses to truth were never entirely wanting, and at the Reformation it rose again in full splendour. According to this view *truth* has no history, it is only error which is characterized by growth, both extensive and intensive. Ideal truth is to be found not merely in Christ and His apostles, but also in ancient Christendom. Nor does it need a development and the independent carrying out of its elements, but only *preservation* and defence against the powers which would obscure its already perfect state. Every alteration of that which is primary, as *e.g.* a development of primitive Christian principles, has thus only a negative, and in no case a positive relation thereto. "Correct doctrine" is thus regarded, as in Catholicism, as complete from the very first, as a matter absolutely fixed. Hence this pessimist view of history, which is often of necessity unjust to the papacy, leads to great monotony. The Catholic view of history regards truth itself as fixed, admitting at most the external increase of its confessors; heretics figure on the boundaries of the Church, her part as far as they are concerned is to maintain her own completeness. The annals of Cæsar Baronius, who praises the papacy as the greatest blessing to mankind, and designates its opposite as Satanic, are diametrically opposed to the Magdeburg centuries. He is encountered however not only by Basnage, but also by the Gallicans Alex. Natalis, Fleury and Tillemont, who regard episcopacy as the divinely appointed form of Church government. Calixtus, though strenuously opposing popery, judges the ancient Catholic Church more favourably. He does not even condemn additions to the common Christian faith, if only they are not tyrannically imposed on all. Nor does he indeed define this common Christian faith in a specifically Protestant fashion, perhaps because he did not find that the doctrine of justification was, during the first five centuries, as yet the conscious and common confession of Christians. While, moreover, the Magdeburg centuries and the annals of Baronius made Church history subserve an ecclesiastical and controversial interest, Calixtus showed more impartiality, and a greater feeling for history. Comp. Baur, *die Epochen der kirchlichen Geschichtschreibung*, 1852.

faith, and that a visible ecclesiastical authority was the only lawful power for laying down, in an infallible manner, the dogmas which already existed potentially in Holy Scripture and in the faith of individuals (see above, p. 176). They also called attention to the fact that Protestants did not understand even the apostolic symbol, in the same sense as they did, *e.g.* the article of the Church, so that only an appearance of unity would result, if the advice of Calixtus were followed. In fact the clearness of his practical vision was obscured by the warmth of his desires, if he hoped that Catholic theologians would practically submit to a demonstration which demanded of them nothing less than to give up, or to regard as matters of indifference, the anti-evangelical doctrines of modern Catholicism. To the Jesuits, especially, who had chiefly entered into controversy with him, papal infallibility had become the chief of doctrines, as being the present source and pledge of the unity of the Church. Beside that merely "historical tradition" to which the Romish Church had hitherto appealed, and upon the exclusive and seriously intended validity of which Calixtus had founded his plan of operations, was already placed, though more covertly, the maxim that right is with the living.

His *Lutheran* co-religionists were however, if possible, even more displeased with him, and the result was the *Syncretist controversy*, which was prolonged through several decades. The Saxon theologians who, since the eight conventions of Matth. Hoë of Hoënegg, 1621-1629, had claimed a kind of supremacy, which they subsequently endeavoured to support by the directorial position of their prince in the *Corpus Evangelicorum* (a position acknowledged in matters non-ecclesiastical), sent him an *Admonitio*, and when he refuted it with the indignation of a man conscious of an amount of scholarship which all of them together could not equal, a mass of violent polemic treatises appeared directed against him and some of his adherents, as *e.g.* Latermann of Königsberg, and Hornejus of Helmstädt. When these failed to produce the desired effect, because Calixtus offered a bold resistance, and Brunswick as boldly espoused his cause, and when Helmstädt continued to flourish as heretofore, some conceived the idea of secret associations for the purpose of stifling the plague introduced by him; others, especially the faculty of Wittenberg, which was at first in alliance with that of Leipsic,

thought of composing the strife by a convention of theologians (1652). When this also failed, they drew up a plan for a new confessional document, and actually prepared the *Consensus repetitus fidei vere Lutheranæ*, 1655. In this, after the manner of the Form of Concord, all the controversies which had broken out in the interim, but especially the syncretism of Calixtus and his school, in which eighty-eight errors were enumerated, were to be effectually suppressed by obtaining the signature of all the Lutheran universities, while, at the same time, that the *F. C.* should be rejected by a Lutheran faculty and national church, the evil was to be removed.[1] Upon this occasion ancient Lutheran orthodoxy once more summoned all its strength to check every departure from the common Lutheran type. The undertaking nevertheless failed. Several princes, among whom were not merely the members of the house of Brunswick, but also Ernest the Pious, the Saxon dukes, and the Great Elector, were averse to the prolonged theological strife, which, when once the peace of Westphalia had been obtained, burst forth with new fury among Protestants. The German nation, wearied to death by public disasters, needed other nourishment than the *Consensus repetitus*. But it was through the quiet but firm resistance of the faculty of Jena, with Musæus at their head, that the design was frustrated. They regarded it as unnecessarily narrow and illiberal, and as containing exaggerated and malicious allusions, and accusations of heresy, and as likely to become the fruitful seed of fresh dissensions.[2] The frustration of this design for carrying on the work of the Form of Concord, which would have led to new exclusions, and thus have given a sectarian character to the Lutheran Church, was the first severe blow experienced by the old orthodox party, and Wittenberg in particular. The faculty of Tübingen, in their contest with that of Giessen, had, upon the publication of the arrogant Saxon *Decisio* of 1624, declared that they were not inclined to seek in Saxony a supreme

[1] Helmstädt also found support from those countries which had remained unfettered by the *F. C.*, especially Sleswick-Holstein, Denmark, and Sweden, and from Nuremberg and Altdorf.

[2] The faculty of Jena, since the time of Joh. Gerhard, was generally regarded with much respect in Germany. Gerhard himself was at first unfavourable to Calixtus, but after personal acquaintance, he assumed a more independent attitude with respect both to him and to the over zealous urgency of his own friends, to whom he was more than once far too yielding.

court of judicature with respect to correct doctrine, and no means of opposing their resistance had been found. But the failure of the *Consensus repetitus*, after such an expenditure of means, was a far more certain token to Wittenberg, that after 1655 it had passed the climax of its authority.

The system of Calixtus did not however prevail, nor could it do so, unless the Protestant Church and its mission were to suffer essential damage. Calixtus was no creative genius; his fundamental thoughts, though full of practical intentions, originated rather in the school than in actual life. Such express alterations as he proposed to make in dogmatic theology, were unimportant in themselves, and also unproductive of results. At most he did but moderate certain asperities. He denied indeed the real communication of Divine qualities to the human nature of Christ, and its ubiquity, while he firmly embraced the *manducatio oralis* in the Lord's Supper. He regarded free will as the Divine ornament of man, and did not consider his freedom to be so entirely lost through original sin as to leave him simply obliged to sin. We can, he thought, individually (*distributive*) avoid sin, though our nature, viewed as a unity (*collective*), is powerless for good, without supernatural grace, through which the relation of our primitive state is restored, and a supernatural gift—which is now to be referred to pardon—added to our original constitution. Directing his glance backwards, he sees the perfect type both of the Church and of mankind in their beginnings, and has no clear idea of growth, of historical development. In his work on the covenants of God (*de pactis Dei*), a theme in which he comes in contact with his younger contemporary, Coccejus, he attempts to apply his historical method to the history of religion. He embraces the view that man, in his primitive state, received, besides natural endowments, and especially freedom, supernatural gifts, through which he was perfect, and which he needed only to preserve; while the Lutheran doctrine attributes the Divine likeness, original righteousness, to the nature, *i.e.* to the very idea of man; hence in this point also he was reproached with Romanizing tendencies. Yet a superficial notion of original sin did not result in his case, on the contrary, he considers—like Bellarmine—that these supernatural gifts, though capable of being forfeited, so belonged to the complete idea of man, that general disorder was introduced into human

nature by their loss. On the other hand, he makes no difficulty of allowing the actual perfection of man at the beginning, and is hence also prevented from teaching that more is gained through Christ than was lost through Adam. Christianity—like the Reformation in its degree—is in his eyes merely the restoration of a former state, nor was it indeed anything else in the eyes of his opponents. In the above named work he dates the true Church in the usual way, from the commencement of the Old Testament, supporting his assertion by the fact that one and the same faith was ever necessary for salvation. He will not however admit—because his feeling for exegesis revolts against it—that the doctrine of the Trinity was plainly revealed in the Old Testament, and this is as much as to say that in the New Testament also faith in the Trinity is not necessary to salvation. This however he does not venture to assert, nor to maintain with Coccejus a distinction in the mode of participating in salvation. He uses the expression of his colleague, Hornejus, that good works are not necessary to salvation, but says, that good works are the *conditio sine qua non* of salvation; and admits that grace may be forfeited by certain supposed grievous sins, which he thinks may be distinguished as *peccata mortalia*. But this admirable moral feature in Calixtus suffers from this difficulty, that he nevertheless conceives of grace and freedom, of the Divine and the human, as in external relation to each other. Divine grace assists the freedom of man. This is especially shown in his doctrine of *Inspiration*, which indeed mitigates the more than Alexandrian asperities of the prevailing view, by changing Divine prompting into a Divine assistance for preservation from error, but thereby does so much the less justice to the conception of the union of the Divine Spirit with the human. The orthodox hypothesis indeed, by wholly absorbing the human element in the Divine, embraces the essential extraneousness of the two. He ascribes to the reason and the conscience a true knowledge of the Divine, but without referring this to a perennial Divine communication or revelation in the wider sense.

But even his fundamental idea of union or peace between different Christian confessions, by means of a recurrence to the unanimity originally prevailing, is but partially true. Certainly it is becoming in genuine catholicity to seek out, in a spirit of

love, and highly to estimate the traces of universal Christian consent. It was also natural, and according to rule, to say that the Reformation *desired* nothing but a restoration of primitive Christianity. But the Christian spirit cannot plunge into the pure and primitive sources of truth, and immerse itself therein, without also bringing to light new treasures hitherto unappropriated by the Church. A mere recurrence by a subsequent age to the standpoint of a former, is always and at all times an intrinsic impossibility; in this case it would have been combined with a great loss. For it cannot be denied that Calixtus desired the healing of present differences by a mere return to that which was less definite. The difference between the Church and the school, between faith and theology, may indeed have hovered before his mind, but he also diminished the significance of that which was of real religious importance. For justification through faith, which is not expressly mentioned in the apostolic symbol, is, in its evangelical definiteness, made by him of too little consequence to the salvation of the soul, and the true unity of the Church. Nor must it be overlooked that his symbol of union embraces now more, now fewer synodal decrees, generally requiring the Trinitarian, Christological, anti-predestinarian, and anti-Pelagian decrees of the Councils (of Mileve and Orange). This uncertainty arises from the fact that he seeks support not in a qualificative but in a quantitative manner, in which the more or less involves only a fluctuating distinction. He seeks to limit the supposed fundamental articles of orthodox divinity only as to quantity, but is, as well as his orthodox opponents, caught in the toils of intellectualism, the only apparent difference between them being that he would be satisfied with regarding "fewer" correct doctrines as necessary to salvation. But *dogmatical teaching* is not the substance itself, but only the *image* or shadow of the substance; hence it would have contributed more to the healing of the Church's discords to have recurred directly to the substance *itself, i.e.* to the Person of the living Redeemer. And with all his personal piety, it was just this feature of vivid inwardness which was wanting in the system of Calixtus. Nay, it must be said even of his historical method, that in this respect it did not go back to the real beginning, to the revival and contemplation of the historical image of Christ.

Calixtus had a very numerous following of pupils and friends. Among them must first be mentioned Hornejus († 1649), his faithful friend and colleague through a long course of years, and Titius, the successor of the latter. Also Schräder Scheurl Conring, the Polyhistor, Dätrius, Henichius, and Paul Müller. Beyond Helmstädt, the Calixtine tendency was either advocated or dominant among the theological faculties of Königsberg (through Latermann and the two Behms, father and son); of Rinteln, the second university of the Landgravate of Hesse (through Henichius, Peter Musæus and Eckart), and of Altdorf (through Hackspan, Dürr, Deyling, and others). He had besides followers in Holstein, Denmark, and Sweden, and was a man of European reputation. His son Frederic Ulric Calixtus, inferior to his father in mind and renown, collected his writings, and continued the Syncretistic controversy. His school, besides their labours in history, paid special attention to the cultivation of exegesis, and remained faithful to his desire of union. This was shown with happy effect by the Rinteln theologians, who, in the discussion concerning union with those of Marburg[1] at Cassel (1661), expressed[2] the *status controversiæ* between Lutheran and Reformed in such definite formula, that even the strict Lutherans could find no fault, but after more closely discussing the meaning of their respective doctrines, came to the unanimous decision that Lutheran and Reformed might, and must, regard each other as brethren, and that no necessity was imposed by the Holy Ghost of making use of the Nominal-Elenchus in presence of the congregation. With respect, however, to the relations to Catholics, the admission of Calixtus that those doctrines which alone are necessary to salvation are to be found also in the Romish Church, favoured the secession thereto of many leading persons, and even princes did not sufficiently consider that even a sound and more ancient strata of doctrine may he choked and rendered unfruitful by subsequent layers, nay, may be so adulterated thereby as to be actually false. Nor was this all, for the Calixtine school, in Königsberg, partially

[1] Henke, *das Unionscolloquium zu Cassel*, Jul. 1661, Marburg, 1862.

[2] In the sixteenth century, two distinctive doctrines were chiefly enumerated, viz. those of the Lord's Supper and the Person of Christ; from 1600-1650 a third, the doctrine of predestination, was added. The collocutors of Cassel named the doctrine of baptism as a fourth.

adopted forms of a Catholicizing tendency, which resulted in several secessions. In Helmstädt, moreover, the unsound Fabricius implicated himself, by his inconsiderate advice in the change of creed of a princess of his house. On the whole, the Calixtine tendency was rather a school of learned theologians, to whom the cause of culture and literature was dearer than that of religion and morality. And hence it coincided, for the most part, with the orthodox party in opposing that of Spener. To this remark, however, the pious Justus Gesenius, the friend and pupil of Calixtus, forms an honourable exception.

## CHAPTER III.

### SPENER AND PIETISM. THE MORAVIAN BROTHERHOOD.

### 1. *The Age of Spener and Francke.*[1]

THE history of Pietism, when regarded with respect to its matter, may be divided into two epochs. The first of these, extending to about the death of Spener (1705), exhibits it in its beginnings, and during the period when it was suffering from the attacks and persecutions of its opponents—in a word, in its state of apology and defence, but also of first love. The second, from about 1705 to 1730, shows it acting the aggressive and victorious part.

The *first epoch* may again be divided into several acts. The prologue and first act may be regarded as embracing Spener's ministry at Frankfort on the Maine (from 1666 to 1668), where he instituted, entirely in the sense of the Schmalkaldic Articles, *mutua colloquia* of inquirers and believers in the Church, known by the name of *collegia pietatis*. These held their meetings in his house and under his direction, in the unrestrained form of address and reply, without the interposition of clerical umpireship,

[1] Hossbach has given a picture of Spener and his work (*Spener und seine Zeit*. A. 2, *von Schweder*, 1853), after v. Canstein, Steinmetz, and Knapp. See also Tholuck, *Geschichte des Rationalismus*, Div. i. 1865; and Herzog's *Realencycl.* s. *Spener*; Gass's before-named work, ii. 374-499; H. Schmid, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, 1863; Göbel, *Geschichte des christlichen Lebens*, ii. p. 537; Francke, *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie*, ii. 130-189 and 213-240. The copious materials furnished in Walch's *Religionsstreit innerhalb der lutherischen Kirche* have been partly completed and partly arranged and selected by Tholuck, Schmid, and Francke, especially the former.

and were productive of much benefit. After obtaining, however, in spite of the incipient attacks of *e.g.* Conrad Dilfeld, the confidence even of the authorities, he soon found that some of his most esteemed friends, despairing of overcoming the opposition of the worldly party in the Church to serious conversion, embraced separatist opinions and errors. The effect of this upon himself was a renunciation of the hope that God designed a revival of the whole Church, and a recurrence to the principle of the *ecclesiolæ in Ecclesia* as the only expedient, together with the observance of greater caution. To this period belong his *Pia desideria*, 1675, and his work on the *Spiritual Priesthood*, 1677, which contain a sketch of those notions of reform drawn upon the background of a mind painfully moved by the declensions of the Church. These two classical and very touching works were followed, in 1684, by *The Use and Abuse of Lamentations over a Corrupt Christianity*, which he published for the sake of averting all separatist degenerations and misconceptions. In 1689 he departed to Dresden, where he remained till 1691.

The second act of the drama, extending from 1686 to the foundation of the university of Halle, exhibits the independent course of that movement, to which Spener had but given the impulse, by his writings, his words, and his example. It showed how fully prepared[1] the soil was in all parts of Germany, by means both of what it possessed and what it lacked, for the reception of that which he had but initiated. The people no longer needed, as in the days of Luther, to be for the first time introduced to an acquaintance with evangelical truth. On the contrary, no sooner had Spener given the watchword of *Active Christianity*, than the impulse to make the faith which was confessed by the lips seriously influential on the life, was irresistibly spread by the effects of that evangelical preaching with which the intellect of the people was filled. It was universally felt that to stop at a merely intellectual belief, as if this were the whole end in view, would be to make the life a refutation of the faith, existence a dualism, an unbearable fiction and hypocrisy, nay, the seat of scepticism and unbelief. And the teaching which had now crept into the Church and theology, together with evangelical doctrine, did, where the word of God had fallen on good ground, but the more awaken desires for a purer and more vigorous form of the

[1] Especially by men such as those named above (see p. 167).

Church. It did this, moreover, in a manner which was but a continuation of the Reformation, namely by instilling the universal conviction, in those whom this movement impelled to a more active Christianity, that the reform desired must begin in their own individual cases. For such a purpose it was that they employed the means pointed out, not only by Spener, but by his predecessors—especially the private meetings for devotion conducted by likeminded clergymen, and the perusal of the works of Spener and others.

The movement, however, pursued, as we have said, its independent course. Spener did not inaugurate it in the different towns and countries, but only followed it, interposing his advice, warning against dangers, protecting to the utmost of his ability against attacks, and all with admirable tenderness, perseverance, and wisdom. Its course was not, however, an easy or a peaceful one. On the contrary, strifes and disturbances were stirred up in a long list of cities and countries against the movement as a new sect, by the opposition of the so-called orthodox, who, themselves devoid of spiritual life, sought the support of the unspiritual multitude, which preferred an accommodating churchmanship and a lip Christianity to earnest vital religion. This was the case in Darmstadt, Erfurt, Halle, Gotha, Jena, Wolfenbüttel, Hanover, Peine, Hamburg, and Halberstadt. A more detailed narrative belongs to Church history; for Pietism, generally speaking, is rather a phenomenon of Church life than of theology—a fact for the most part overlooked by its opponents before Löscher, who, in conformity with their inveterate doctrinal tendency, were utterly unable to regard or to treat a phenomenon to them unwonted, otherwise than as a system of doctrine, which they therefore condemned as a heresy or a conglomerate of heresies. From their standpoint, where doctrine was all in all, they were scarcely capable of anything else. Where correct doctrine was in full swing, they thought that everything else must, by a kind of physical necessity, fall out well and harmoniously. For they assumed that if Christian knowledge (*illuminatio*) were, in the first place, but pure and complete, it would of itself so influence the will that all would be ordered and arranged in the best possible manner. Trusting in "correctness of doctrine," they surrendered themselves to a security which pleased itself with dreams of a *florentissimus status ecclesiæ*, and

ignored the fact that they had themselves defiled and adulterated "correct doctrine" unawares, and deformed the Gospel into a law of dogma and a doctrinal codex, confused nature and grace, and frittered away the ideas of faith and regeneration (see above, p. 139). All this excluded them from any comprehension of the new movement, nay, laid them under the necessity of suspecting it as a perversion of truth.

We have but few remarks to make on these contests. We would but observe that in them clergymen usually rose against clergymen. For the movement kept itself, at all events at first, within the bounds, and to the forms, of the ecclesiastical order of the day, and its leaders were clergymen,—but clergymen who desired that believers should attain to "full age," and who were consequently anxious that they should be supplied with fitting nourishment and employment. Also, that the theologians who, during the first epoch of the contest, opposed this serious movement, and ordinarily with external success, showed themselves to be devoid of spirituality, and little skilled in theology, or, where scholarship was not wanting—as in the case of the faculties of Leipsic and Wittenberg—intriguing, ambitious, and even arrogant, hypocritical, and fraudulent. Such dispositions were exhibited, *e.g.*, by J. F. Mayer of Hamburg, and Schelwig of Dantzic, but especially by J. B. Carpzovius, during the disorders in Leipsic, which decided the inimical position of orthodoxy, and at which we must pause for a few moments.

In the same year that Spener was summoned to Dresden (1686), two masters of arts, A. H. Francke and P. Anton, had, without his having any share in their proceedings, joined a *collegium philobiblicum* in Leipsic, for the purpose of entering, together with other masters, rather more deeply into the study of exegesis, a department which had been neglected to an almost incredible degree by the faculty. They were soon joined by several students, and even by citizens. Spener, to whom they were as yet personally unknown, rejoiced at their undertaking and became their adviser and advocate. They placed themselves under the presidency of Alberti, the professor of theology, and under academical permission. The undertaking had the most surprising success; hundreds of students were diligently employed in the study of Holy Scripture, and the *Collegia* and *Dissertationes* of the professors, who handled very differen

subjects and dealt especially in Aristotelian metaphysics, were neglected. Moreover, the united reading of the Scriptures, especially after Francke's second stay in Leipsic, visibly contributed to awaken a spirit of zeal and piety which was not always restrained within the limits of prudence and moderation. An investigation was consequently instituted by the faculty, and though neither Francke nor Anton were convicted of errors in doctrine or life, the *collegium philobiblicum* was abolished, and A. H. Francke deprived of the privilege of delivering theological lectures, without Spener being able to avert such a sentence. Meantime his own position in Dresden had been forfeited, by his faithful exercise of his duties as spiritual father (director of conscience) to the prince, a circumstance which gave Carpzovius the opportunity of declaring open and relentless war against "Pietism," for this was the name bestowed upon the movement by its opponents at Leipsic. Its leaders gradually left Electoral Saxony, and the effects of the stop thus put to its internal development were long felt in that country.[1]

They found an asylum in the electorate of Brandenburg. Spener and Schade were summoned to Berlin, where the former was appointed provost of the *Nicolaikirche*, 1691. Lange was already there. Francke, Breithaupt, and Anton were called to the university founded at Halle in 1694. Thus Pietism obtained "the recognition of a national Church and a theological representation." The new university rapidly attained a flourishing condition, and Halle became the centre of Pietism. A. H. Francke's orphanage, v. Canstein's Bible society, the missionary undertakings started at Halle, and Francke's systematic agency for instruction, all contributed to render it such. But, during this latter part of the first period, opposition was still unceasing. Spener was attacked successively, and, as if on a preconcerted plan, by Schelwig, Carpzovius, Alberti, and the faculty of Wittenberg (of whom Deutschmann was twice the insipid spokesman); Francke, by Mayer, who, by intrigues and violence, had outwardly gained a victory over Horb, on account of his contributions to a revision of Luther's translation of the Bible. The attacks, however, in spite of much literary abuse, were so unskilful, so immeasurably unjust, and so exposed the weak side of those who conducted them, and Spener's defence was so suc-

[1] So also in Brunswick and Hanover.

cessful and indefatigable, that the public opinion of the Church could not be otherwise than favourable to Pietism, though here and there degeneracy had already set in. Thus Pietism entered upon its *second epoch*, which extended from the death of Spener (February 1705) to the fourth decade of last century.

The contest, indeed, still continued, nay, orthodoxy was now more worthily advocated by Val. Ernst Löscher[1] (Superintendent in Dresden, † 1749), a man distinguished both for piety and learning in his *Unschuldigen Nachrichten*, from 1702-1719, and *Timotheus Verinus*, 2 vols. His opponent, a man inferior to him in talents and deficient in temper and humility, was Joachim Lange.[2]

The contest was now for the first time carried on in a more scientific manner, both parties endeavouring to reduce the antagonistic standpoint to the unity of a principle. But neither this controversial literature, nor the friendly discussion arranged by Löscher at Merseburg, led to an understanding. Löscher did not yield the dogmatic axioms which gave just offence to Pietism, nay, he even in some instances made them more stringent, bringing forward, as an author, those accusations which, in oral discussion, he seemed to have withdrawn. Pietism, however, now felt itself the stronger, and took up the part of the aggressor. Hence, the result alone could decide which side was to be the victorious, and this was unfavourable to orthodoxy. Even orthodox theologians like Buddæus withdrew from him, while the majority of the more powerful intellects among younger men preferred trying to unite orthodoxy and mysticism—a union which Löscher intellectually approved, and regarded as necessary, though his doctrinal inflexibility prevented him from introducing the results of this conviction into his theology.

Having thus given an outline of the external history of Pietism, we turn to a consideration of its internal character, so far as this is important to the history of theology. And here *three subjects* must chiefly occupy our attention, with respect to the plans of Spener and his followers for a reform, or rather a regeneration, of the Church, namely *Theology, the Church, and Christian morality.*

[1] Comp. v. Engelhardt, *V. E. Löscher nach seinem Leben und Wirken*, 1856.

[2] J. Lange: *Antibarbarus orthodoxiæ dogmatico-hermeneuticus*, 1709-11; *Die Gestalt des Kreuzreichs Christi in seiner Unschuld*, 1713; *Erläuterung der neuesten Historie der evangelischen Kirche von* 1689-1719, Halle, 1719.

The regeneration of theology which he desired was one not so much of matter as of form—of the manner in which it was treated, and of the method of theological study. The teaching Church must itself be possessed of living faith, must be regenerate. Those possessed of knowledge must, above all, be also believers, and not regard their scientific knowledge as a compensation for their want of Christian piety. For true knowledge, on the contrary, presupposes faith and regeneration—theology having, from the very first, been regarded as a *habitus practicus*, and πίστις ever recognized as the basis of all γνῶσις. To arrive at this transformation of the teachers, a transformation of theological studies was needed. The study of holy Scripture, as the surest means of awakening and conversion, and thereby of true illumination, was to form the central point of the whole, while everything else was to be pursued with reference to the practical aim of self-edification, and to the cultivation of the power of edifying others.

The second subject is *the Church*. Pietism did not contemplate a merely teaching Church, as opposed to merely passive hearers, but a Church of living believers. Spener calls to the remembrance of the clerical order, which now again stood in a catholicizing contrast to "the laity," the idea of the universal spiritual priesthood of Christians, which, in a genuine Reformation spirit, he founds upon regeneration through justifying faith, and regards as first of all bound to the duty of co-operating in the spread of God's kingdom, and then as possessing the right to do so, inasmuch as there can be nothing by which the right of doing one's duty can be forfeited. The inertness and lethargy of the laity must yield to that activity of the moral instinct which, as even the orthodox teach, is the necessary effect of faith. The abyss between clergy and laity must become simply a distinction between those who teach and have the care of souls entrusted to them, and their brethren who are to be, or who have already been instructed in practical Christianity, that they may be their fellow-workers. The Christian laity possess not only the right of offering to God the sacrifice of prayer, both for themselves and others, they may also exercise their priestly office, whether at home or among friends, may help to edify the Church in their house, have the right mutually to edify each other—especially under the direction of their minister—from

the word of God, and to open their mouths, both in question and answer, in devotional meetings. If the whole congregation could be divided into sections with lay-presidents, under the guidance of their clergyman, so much the better. For Spener had an eye to Church organization. He desired presbyterial institutions in close connection with local divisions and their civil authorities, especially for the purposes of Church discipline, selection of preachers, and such matters—an arrangement which had already been partly introduced in 1640, though in too close connection with the civil power, by means of Val. Andreä's Church conviction at Wurtemberg.

The *reformation of morals* formed the topstone of the edifice. The Church must proceed from religion to morals. Sanctification of life must be the chief and earnest labour of the Christian. For this end, Christian morality must repudiate everything which leads to worldliness, or exercises a distracting or destructive effect upon that serious recollection which is needful to the formation of Christian character. Under this head were included dancing, the theatre, gaming, sumptuous apparel, banquets, light and useless conversation and reading. Spener himself did not go so far in this respect as later Pietism. He even recognized in morals the existence of things indifferent (*adiaphora*), and desired to restrict all these pleasures only so far as to condemn their excess. This excess he estimated according to the requirements of the principle that lawful pleasures cannot hurt the soul, and must refresh and invigorate the body.

The so-called orthodox at first received the proposals of Spener with favour. Not only Balth. Mentzer of Giessen, but also Schelwig, Carpzovius, and Mayer, bestowed the warmest expressions of approbation and commendation even upon the *collegia pietatis*. They were, however, thus favourably regarded only so long as the attempt at regeneration confined itself to the region of words and thoughts, or remained in distant isolation. When the matter began, with its personal demands, to touch themselves more nearly, when it threatened to disturb their accustomed mode of life, and attributed to them a different position with respect to religion and knowledge, to their office, and to the people, from that which they were wont to fill, they rose up, in the heat of a rigid and passionate conservatism, against the "innovations;" and the malady which had long been secretly

affecting the Church in its members broke out in full virulence. An inclination, hitherto unconfessed but only too powerful, now became an acknowledged principle; and it was a good sign for Pietism that its antagonists, in opposing it, found themselves forced to an open confession of maxims which were contrary to the spirit of evangelical religion, and which, to an unprejudiced eye, were an obstacle and an injury to Reformation doctrine. An identification of the external and visible Church with the inward and invisible, nay, with the idea of the Church, such as is scarcely found even in Roman Catholicism, was manifested in a series of assertions maintained during the course of this conflict. Schelwig thinks it sectarian to say that the Church needs reformation. For "it is not the Church but the ungodly in the Church that must be reformed." A true Lutheran must not complain that the Church, *i.e.* the external assembly, has many defects, for "this would be to defame the Church."[1] The Church, *i.e.* the external Church, is perfect, is in her most flourishing condition, for she possesses "correct doctrine." The *Wittenberg divines* in their *Christlutherischen Vorstellung*, 1695, say: The symbolical books are, not only in facts and doctrines, but also in other matters, that Divine truth which was delivered to the Church, and which is in all points binding.[2] Mayer requires from the clergy the acknowledgment that nothing but the true word of God is to be found in the symbolical books,[3] and Superintendent Simon, a successor of Mayer, adds: he who errs even in *Articulis minus principalibus* (*e.g.* he who embraces Spener's more refined Millenarianism) is a heretic, and must be excluded from spiritual brotherhood.[4] A continual testing and purifying of the confession by Scripture is no longer to be spoken of. Even the distinction between *fides historica* and evangelical *fides* is all but entirely lost sight of. A divine and inherent authority, to which it is our duty to submit, is attributed to the Church. Schelwig declaims against Spener's conscientious demand, that no one should subscribe to the symbolical books who had not carefully tested them. He thinks, indeed, that every future teacher of the Church ought to read them, but says that it is beyond the powers of an individual to test all that they contain in a fitting manner. For

[1] Comp. Schmid, pp. 234, 235.
[2] *Idem*, p. 244.
[3] *Id.* p. 239.
[4] *Id.* p. 185.

any who are incapable of such an exercise, it is sufficient that, according to their views, these books contain nothing false; they may leave the rest to their mother the Church, and, like dutiful sons, trust her and her testing of the books containing the faith.[1] Hence, it was not astonishing that many attributed to the symbolical books a kind of inspiration (see above, p. 137). But a tradition possessing inherent Divine authority, placing itself beside holy Scripture, and weakening and adulterating all solid study thereof, must be powerless, if represented only by books and words, and not vested also in living persons. This tendency to obliterate the distinction between the visible and invisible Church, to deify the existing ecclesiastical constitution, could not stop here, it must of necessity also endow those who bore office in the Church with Divine qualities. And, in fact, not only does the above-named Simon teach, that the decisions of the clergy are of equal obligation with the word of God,[2] but even a Löscher embraces the doctrine that because there is in the word of God—whether found in Holy Scripture, in the creeds, or in preaching, &c.—an inherent power of bestowing upon every one whose mind comes in contact with it, that illumination which is already the commencement of regeneration, and will assuredly produce its full maturity, there is present in a minister, apart from the consideration of his walk and conversation, a certain Divine official grace (see above, pp. 140, 166). He is not the mere instrument by which, but the place in which the Holy Spirit works, and (adds Schelwig and the Wittenberg divines, without being censured by Löscher) the power which the word has upon the minds of men arises from the office. The controversy with Schade shows with what zeal private confession, and its corollary, absolution by the pastor, which had been left optional by Luther, were embraced. Spener—in opposition to Schade—embraced both, but, like Luther, he did not lay stress upon either the just judgment, or, generally speaking, any judgment being pronounced concerning the actual pardon of the penitent. This was rather what the orthodox were inclined to do, and this was also at the bottom of Schade's erroneous and infinitely troublesome demand for some authorized form of confession. Spener, on the contrary, viewed confession not as a judicial sentence upon the individual, but as

[1] Schmid, p. 235. [2] *Id.* p. 185.

the proffer of pardon, not only to those who were already believers, but also to those who would believe, and upon whom rested the responsibility whether they would let the grace thus anticipatively offered become efficient through faith, or render it vain through unbelief. In such a proceeding it was however the part of the Church to take heed that she cast not that which was holy before swine. Finally, as far as the laity was concerned, this identification, it was said, of the visible with the invisible Church, was authorized by the doctrine of *baptism*. Conrad Dilfeld found Spener's earnest demand that young theologians should seek the illumination of the Holy Spirit and regeneration superfluous. All had been regenerated in baptism, and had received the gift of the Holy Ghost once for all.[1] And if any one did not manifest this regeneration in his life, this might indeed be an obstacle to his salvation, but not to his theological studies. The regenerate had, generally speaking, no advantage over the unregenerate in learning theology: Plato and Aristotle might, by diligent study of Scripture, have become theologians even though they had esteemed the *mysteria fidei* to be fables. Hence Spener, by insisting on special illumination, desired to make men not theologians but prophets, a fact which brought to light his secret fanaticism. We are thus brought into the very midst of the question concerning the *Theologia irregenitorum*, with which the *theological side* of the controversy opened.

The opinions expressed on the part of the so-called orthodox party, show that the Church had again become to them the self-centred possessor of direct Divine authority, endowed, once for all, with Divine powers and privileges; as if the Holy Spirit had relinquished his direct relation to souls, nay, had abdicated his power and energies in favour of the Church and her means of grace. Believers were not indeed, it was said, thereby deprived of their participation in the Divine. On the contrary, the Holy Spirit's agency being confined to the Church, He was ever assuredly present if but one hearer came in contact with the word. Every one who occupies himself with the word receives a Divine self-manifesting light, a supernatural effluence, in virtue of which he already possesses *illuminatio*, and must be presumed to have also the beginnings of regeneration (see above, p. 126). It is evident, however, that this view impairs the

[1] Schmid, p 76.

fundamental relation between God and the creature, is essentially Deism, upon an absolute supernatural basis in a magical form. We are by it cut off from communion with God Himself. God has no longer any vital, actual relation to the world, but has once for all supernaturally deposited in the vessel of the means of grace, and especially of the word, the life and light which He designs to impart. Consequently, the means of grace now work of themselves (*sponte*) by their inherent power, and as it were according to physical law. Experience, indeed, showed but too plainly, that which was already involved in the very state of the case, viz. that union with anything finite, even with that which is supremely sacred, cannot secure to us communion with the living God, for which we need that elevation above all that is finite and sensuous, which is found in faith as distinguished from superstition; and that the natural man remains entirely unaltered in character, while lulled into security by the delusion that he is already in possession of what he has yet to seek. Such qualities as are but natural, were—as J. Lange rightly observes—regarded in a Pelagian manner as Divine, while, on the other hand, a higher, a more heartfelt participation in the Divine was esteemed impossible, and faith in the continued agency of the Holy Ghost, in illumination and regeneration, was branded as fanaticism and enthusiasm.

It is nowhere more clearly manifested than here how the original lively feeling for the divine had gradually dried up in the so-called orthodox party; orthodoxy had so accustomed itself to deal purely with second causes that every mention of the continuous and vital agency of the Holy Spirit seemed exaggerated, incredible, nay, fraught with danger to the Church. It shows to what a feeble state the religious pulse had fallen, in the theology of the day, that the doctrine of the active operation of the Holy Ghost should have become strange and incredible. The subject of both the first work against Spener, viz. that of C. Dilfeld, and the first work of Löscher, the last advocate of this orthodoxy, was "Enthusiasm."

In this respect, then, Spener reopens the living fountains of primitive Christianity and of the Reformation. He represents direct communion with God, a participation in the Divine life, and the reception of the Divine Spirit as not only a possible favour, but as that which it is the first and universal duty of every

Christian to seek. Spener knows a living God, not a God who has betaken Himself to rest behind those means of grace which are to work as His substitutes, but which, instead of being able to supply the place of personal communion with Himself, are but designed to lead to it. He acknowledges a *providentia specialis*, nay, *specialissima*, a constant supernatural agency, yet one in conformity with law. The miracles of Christianity do not, in his view, belong to the "dead past," but are every day continued—as Luther also thinks—in the miracle of the regeneration of the old into the new creature. The means of grace are not mere things of the world, which, by a supernatural force implanted in them, emit, according to fixed laws, Divine gifts and graces; but the means by which the Holy Spirit Himself works directly in the souls of men, and communicates Himself to them, without placing Himself in a state of dependence upon the clerical office, which, on the contrary, He uses as an instrument for applying the word. And it is this gracious readiness of God to impart Himself to man, which emboldens him to require that they who would faithfully and successfully exercise the office of preachers must first of all be themselves born again, and hence experience in their own hearts the power of that Gospel which they are to proclaim.[1]

The first and fundamental point of this controversy was the continued agency of the Holy Spirit and the need thereof. And here we cannot but hail, on the part of Spener, the re-discovery of that original fountain of life unclosed by the Reformation, but again choked up by so-called orthodoxy. This agency of the Holy Ghost creates and consecrates a new personality, living, active, and free, and does not coalesce with the old Ego, whose natural life is passed either in frivolity or in a state of tolerated unhappiness, varied by intermittent acts of pardon by means of priestly absolution. The Holy Spirit, on the contrary, produces, according

[1] Neither Spener nor Pietism in general contemplated any change in the contents of theology, or at least of doctrine. He never says a word concerning union with the Reformed Church, and is quite content with the form of obligation with *quia* for himself. He only desired to transfer what had been already acquired from the head to the heart and hand. Nevertheless, the stress which he lays upon the Scriptures leads farther. For, by replacing them in that fitting position accorded to them by the Reformers, he does in effect deny both to the Church and the State the right of regarding the symbol as a system of doctrine completed once for all, and ever valid, through the authority of the Church. Hence he prefers for the Church in general the form of obligation with *quatenus*.

to His purpose, the one connected life of the new personality, which is ever exercising itself in *increasing sanctification.* Spener and all genuine Pietists were deeply impressed with the conviction that God's purpose in the Gospel is not mere pardon or justification, but that the end to which these are indeed the indispensable means is a truly pure and moral life well-pleasing to God. This *ethical character* is deeply imprinted upon the proceedings of Spener and his school. He does not view even regeneration and faith, as was customary, as simply a work of God, in which man remains *mere passive,*—a thesis in which absolute and dualistic predestination was to be bought off by an inconsistency; but makes earnest contrition and real desires after righteousness the preliminary conditions of the enjoyment of pardon. He says, as do also Musæus and others, that love of what is good and holy is already present, as an impulse and a desire, in the faith which is the means of justification, and grants that *opera sunt in fide præsentia,* though justification is not the product or desert of these works, the germs of which are inherent in true faith. Finally—as has been said—morality maintains its place *after,* as well as *before,* and *in,* regeneration. For the new personality does not exist to rejoice, and to enjoy, but to labour in the work of its own sanctification. This work of sanctification consists partly in self-denial with respect to the pleasures of the world, partly in labours for the increase of the kingdom of those regenerate persons who diligently prosecute the work of sanctification. The more profoundly Spener is impressed with the ethical and productive character of grace, the more does he delight to dwell upon the thought of the happy change which must befall the world when evangelical faith begins to revive. Hence, the hope of better times even on earth was his most cherished persuasion, as he owned upon his deathbed, by ordering that he should be laid in a white coffin and enveloped in a white pall, declaring that he would not take so much as a thread of black with him to the grave, because he had mourned quite long enough over the sad state of the Church, not only outwardly, by his black garments, but inwardly in his heart. This hope was most deeply interwoven in his whole idiosyncrasy. The presence of *hope* is a necessity to the moral activity of the Church, if *love* is to be filled with courage and energy. It is, moreover, needed; because it is hope alone which can form and set before the mind

that ideal, that supreme object, which, thus becoming part and parcel of the will, will be its governing power. He does not, like so many in the Lutheran Church, regard the object of life as attained when the soul is saved by the forgiveness of sin. With Spener *there arose a consciousness that there is a vital duty claiming fulfilment in this life* besides that of seeking pardon and regeneration. The exhibition of an increasing moral excellence by Christians, *i.e.* by Christianity, is in his view an event of the earthly history of the kingdom of God, and is not to become a fact for the first time in the heavenly kingdom. His thousand years' reign does not involve the abolition, but only the diminution, of sin and evil. He does not insist upon a visible government of the Church by Christ, nor even upon substituting sudden and Divine acts for the moral efforts of man. On the contrary, he rather views this reign as, at least chiefly, the result of the labours of regenerate men for their own sanctification, and consequently for the sanctification of others. Thus, the eschatology of Spener occupied, in the second century of the evangelical Church, essentially the same position which the Chiliasm of the primitive Church had done: it was a recall of the human mind—which had been, in a onesided manner, occupied with the transcendental, and turned to a future world, from the delusion that when once salvation has been attained through faith there is really nothing else to be done upon earth but to preserve that supreme treasure until a new stage, consequently conceived of as close at hand, shall be entered upon, in another world. It was a recall to labour here below, to moral efforts in this present world. It was in this insignificant covering of "a hope of better days upon earth" (for it was no weak sentimentality, but a solid moral feeling, which cherished it) that there dawned upon the evangelical Church, as upon the Church of the second century, the conviction that she had been preserved through the deadly struggle of the Thirty Years' war for the purpose of fulfilling a great and universal duty to the world and to herself. Nay, it is to Pietism that we are indebted for the first step in this new direction, as is shown prophetically, though microscopically, by the various institutions at Halle, and by the missionary feeling which it was the means of awakening. For the conversion even of the Jews was an article of Spener's creed; while with the orthodox party the missionary spirit

was, with regard to both Jews and Gentiles, in a wholly dormant state.

This brighter side of Pietism, however, by no means involves the admission that Spener's standpoint was a satisfactory one for the evangelical Church, or even that Pietism in general was blameless. Undoubtedly one main cause of its faults lies at the door of the opposition and enmity which arose, in part from the worldy-minded, in part from those who, intending to espouse the cause of the Church, threw back upon itself a movement originally set on foot for the good of the whole Protestant Church; and thus introduced an asperity and narrowness which did not belong to it in Spener's times, when it was still in a plastic state, and capable of being fashioned into Church conformity. These faults, however, it did not cast off, when it came into power, and had, as it were, to take the place of the old orthodoxy.

This is shown even by its *ethical views*. The Pietistic morality to which a lively faith is to advance is almost exclusively piety. It never attains—at least so far as earth is concerned—to the idea of a world animated in all its varied forms of life by the spirit of religion,—a world whose task it is to bring to harmonious realization all the powers and gifts of the first creation by the principle of the second. On the contrary, from its point of view, morality is the sanctification of the individual, in other words, the maintenance and strengthening of the feeling which revolts from sin and turns to God. Pietistic morality takes up a chiefly negative position with respect to "the world," and is antagonistic thereto. With its strict views of evil, Pietism makes too little distinction between "the world" and "the world,"—a defect to which the circumstance that it takes too onesided a view of the fact that the novelty of Christianity is a new creation not a little contributes. Consequently this system of morals is—so far as relation to the world is concerned—rather of a negative and narrow character. The mind is not as yet emboldened to take the world in hand, for the purpose of bestowing upon it a moral organization and a consistent form, in the full confidence that its innate energies, if used according to the law of their nature, and maintained in a state of normal efficiency, cannot but subserve the interests of the kingdom of God. Pietism makes indeed the excellent

general admission, that every element of life must be holy and dedicated to God; that hence there can be no room for elements of life which have no real moral worth, for so called *adiaphora*, or things indifferent, to which the notion of mere permission is to be applied. But if our relation to nature is to be limited chiefly to one of opposition and abstinence, that positive moral effort which alone can enrich life and develop the principle of active faith, must be for the most part lacking. The moral aspect in which human nature is regarded is still too abstract, and not comprehensive enough to include the whole circle of moral culture. To *art* and *science* especially but a very precarious and incidental position is conceded. Nay, the whole realm of æsthetics obtains no other recognition than that of a necessary evil. Pietism acknowledges no other kind of action to be positively moral than such as contributes to awakening and conversion, and therefore to piety. All that cannot be thus regarded is worthless, if not suspicious and injurious. Powerful indeed as is its ethic conception of piety or faith, its defect is that this ethically conceived faith is as energetically taken for the whole. Here too, as is the case, though in another respect, in orthodoxy, the principle is made so self-sufficient that it resists its own spontaneous development from a fear least it should itself be lost, and its inherent energy is absorbed in the act of ever recurring to the principle. For the only aim of this activity is the self-maintenance of the *principle* in presence of the "world," and the multiplication of its existence by an increase of believing individuals. Nay, if we ask what is the supreme *motive* in Pietism, we shall find it to be "care for the salvation of a man's own soul," which, according to the law of God, cannot be attained by an non-active faith. But thus man is not placed beyond legality and fear, the love of his neighbour is not the motive by which he is impelled; for love seeks the good of him who is loved, it makes him its end, not its means, and does not fulfil duties towards him that it may thereby secure its own happiness. *Lutheran orthodoxy* shows an inclination to stop at faith as involving the possession of pardon, as the religious principle of the new life, and to *enjoy* the principle instead of using it as the beginning and impelling motive of activity. Pietism, on the other hand, does not desire to stop at spiritual selfishness, *i.e.* at spiritual enjoyment; it preaches an

"active faith," and thus incorporates into the Lutheran Church also the essence of the view of faith entertained by the Reformed Church. But even this "active faith" has not yet really burst through the limitations of the *Ego*, for the impelling motive still is a man's own salvation and its preservation, not the salvation of his neighbour; a care for himself, not self-forgetting love. It is in consequence of this ethic defect of Pietism that it exhibits a character of bondage, of want of freedom, of anxiety with respect to duty, and not one of glad activity. In this way of using one's neighbour as a mere means to one's own salvation, as material for the fulfilment of duty, or as the means of promoting God's glory, in this exchange of love for duty is found the hidden reason of that want of true *Church feeling* displayed by Pietism. This Church feeling on the part of the orthodox may certainly have too often arisen merely from natural love, while Pietism was, by a negation of the natural, seeking to attain to a higher grade of life. But—as we have shown—instead of recognizing free, self-forgetting love, begotten of faith, as the supreme end, it was contented to stop at that stage, at which the subject of faith is occupied with himself and his own salvation, to refer all to this end, and to use everything as a means for attaining it. Thus it lost the old natural ties of attachment to external nationality and Church-fellowship—which were also loosened both by persecution and its own antagonism to the world—without being able to replace them by the new and higher bond of the fellowship of Christian love.

With an ampler and more developed knowledge of the world, and specially with a juster perception of the relation between the first and the second creation, it might have been possible to the energy of its ethic instinct to occupy a more satisfactory position with regard to the Church, the State, science, art, and social life. But partly by being thrown back upon itself, and partly from its habit of regarding all truly Christian life as confined within the limits of its own efforts, it took up with a narrowness which was incapable of appreciating these different departments, whether independently or in their relation to Christianity, and which secretly disposed the mind to a new kind of monachism in its views of this life. To dwell only upon *science*, the Pietism of Halle was by no means able to appreciate its value. For its misconception of the great moral duty of the

human race led it to tolerate only that kind of knowledge which is directly serviceable to religion, and thus instead of acknowledging the objective independence and holiness of truth, to regard it under the partial point of view which would make it consist only in that which edifies, in other words, in that which conduces to piety. And not only so, but in the controversy concerning the *theologia irregenitorum*, in which it rightly opposes the language of the religious conscience to a scholasticism which has degenerated into frivolity, it ceases to have right exclusively on its side the moment it expresses itself in a scientific manner. And this not merely because its demand that the true theologian should be also a regenerate man, seems to lay down a principle for the guidance of the Church, and for the selection of individuals, which could not be carried out, without setting up arbitrary criteria of regeneration, nor without great danger of encouraging hypocrisy and fanaticism; but also because, when it opposes to the proposition of the orthodox, that "real illumination may take place even before regeneration, through contact with the means of grace, nay, that it must do so, because it is only from such illumination that regeneration can ensue," the counter proposition, that "regeneration must precede all true knowledge," this also is partial and onesided, and depreciates the element of a knowledge of objective truth in sound piety. A regeneration which is not preceded by true knowledge of the law of God, moral self-knowledge, nay, even by a longing for, or anticipation of salvation, might, if it must of necessity precede all these, happen to man in a blind and magical manner. In this matter neither of the contending parties can be said to be quite in the right, because the truth is, that the vital process in question advances normally in a circle, that which was at first but imperfect knowledge being raised by means of a believing appropriation of grace by the heart and will, to the rank of Christian illumination. So likewise was it one of the grossest perversions of the so-called orthodox, to make the efficacy of the word of God dependent upon the office of the minister and upon official grace. For thus the enjoyment of salvation was—in opposition to the material principle of the Reformation—made to depend upon other conditions than upon the word and faith. But when Pietism suffered itself to be so carried away as to declare, that because none but a regenerate man could be a true

theologian, therefore no preaching but such as proceeded from the regenerate could be efficacious for salvation, this was no less than the before-named thesis of the orthodox party, an encroachment upon the independence of the word, and upon the power inherent in Christian truth as such. On the other hand, when Pietism was constantly reproached with despising the word of God and the sacraments, it was falsely accused. For though it does insist upon direct communion with God through the Holy Spirit, this is not a communion to be brought about without means, but by means of the word. Of the Lord's Supper, Spener even says that it is the chief means by which we are to be made partakers of the Divine nature—a saying which the Wittenberg divines found so little accordant with the genuine Lutheran spirit that they replied: the Lord's Supper is indeed a precious treasure, but by no means to be placed before the word or baptism.[1] It was only to infant baptism that the Pietists could not concede the high importance attached to it by the orthodox, who did not hesitate at the *opus operatum.* The prominence given to the subjective side in the work of salvation, and the stress laid upon the consciousness of being in a state of of grace, may also have not infrequently obscured the perception on the part of Pietism, of the importance of a development of Christian self-consciousness, upon the basis of preventing grace bestowed upon the individual, and testified by baptism.

It is obvious that Pietism, with its peculiarities, could not adequately meet the Church's need of a regeneration, both of its theology and its practical religion. It could as little perhaps be substituted for the whole Church, as monasticism could for the Church of Rome. It is true that the opponents of Pietism were even more defective advocates of the Church's true interest than itself; for that which was true in Pietism, and which was at the same time the great need of the age, was no less presupposed by true churchmanship, than the means of grace are by the Church. But this only shows how urgently both the contending parties needed to be blended in a higher standpoint embracing both.

The Pietism of Northern Germany, though numbering many scholars among its adherents, was notably deficient in the cultivation of theological studies of the severer kind. The utmost

[1] Schmid, p. 245.

energy was devoted to the guidance and instruction of students in a course of pious self-cultivation. But it was not as distinctly perceived that study, serious, solid, scientific labour, undergone from a hearty love of truth, is an article of the morality of students. From philosophy, especially, Pietism expected little or no profit;[1] and yet Leibnitz, the creator of the first system, which in Germany was independent of Aristotle, was a contemporary of Spener. Chr. Wolff was the first to carry out consistently the system of Leibnitz, and Joach. Lange felt himself obliged to invoke against him the secular power, by which he was expelled from Halle. For the rest, a criticism of Luther's translation of the Bible was begun by H. A. Francke, in his *Observationes biblicæ*, 1695, in opposition to the advice of Spener. He was, however, hindered from continuing it in the most absurd and disgraceful manner by J. F. Mayer, when the above described attacks took place.[2] Lange and others subsequently published an extensive commentary on the Bible, in four large volumes, under the title of *Licht und Recht*, &c. 1729, but the unceasing pursuit of edification is not conducive to clearness and accuracy of interpretation. In like manner, his work on *Church history*, from 1689 to 1719, is rather an historical *Oratio pro domo* than an investigation of external events. Of far more im-

[1] Though Lange protested against its being said that he despised philosophy.

[2] He afterwards published his *Prælectiones hermeneuticæ*, 1723, in which he takes exception against interpreting the received canon according to the analogy of faith, *i.e.* according to Church doctrine. He distinguishes between a literal and a spiritual meaning, the latter being accessible only to the regenerate, the former to be attained by study. More important is J. J. Rambach's *Commentatio de idoneo s. literarum interprete*, 1720, and his *Institutiones hermeneuticæ s.* 1723, with his explanations thereof, in two parts, 1738. He—as also J. Lange in his *Hermeneutica s.* 1733 — requires, in an expositor of Scripture, besides philological learning, a certain spiritual tact, and lays great stress upon the need of paying attention to the emphases laid upon words and connections of words in holy Scripture. God being their author, as much fulness of meaning as the words allow must be attributed to them. He insists that the *Analogia fidei* should be embraced as the rule of interpretation, yet more as *Analogia scripturæ s.* than as the faith of the Church. His work was followed by that of C. J. Baumgarten, *Unterricht von Auslegung heiliger Schrift*, 1742. Hoffmann, as well as Rambach and Lange, accepted a manifold sense of Scripture, regarding the mystical sense as allegorical, parabolical or typical; he nevertheless attempted to unite with this the unity of the meaning of Scripture, by conceiving this one meaning as compound. Comp. Hoffmann's *Instit. theol. exegeticæ*, 1754. The Wittenberg divines, Löscher and others, could not forgive these hermeneutical aberrations.

portance in this respect is Gottfr. Arnold, who, however, with all his heartfelt piety, carried his antagonism to the Church so far as to seek for the true succession and tradition of the Church, *i.e.* of practical Christianity, among heretical sects.[1] To this circumstance, however, we owe it, that he has inculcated a more than ordinary appreciation of them, and directed attention to those inward relations existing between the Church and the heretics which make their mutual history an inseparable whole. Finally, the *doctrinal* works which Pietism did not fail to produce contributed nothing to theological science.[2] They form a transition from the scholastic form of treatment to one less heavily accoutred, but there is no farther carrying out of the special problems of theology: on the contrary, the feeling for these is rather blunted, and their meaning left more undefined. The appeal to the experiences resulting from the illumination of the Holy Spirit, so usual in Pietistic, and still more so in its kindred

[1] *Unpartheischer Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie bis* 1688, Frankfort, 1699, four vols., and some time previously *Abbildung der ersten Christen*. His purpose is not purely historical, since he endeavours, at least in an indirect manner, to conduce to edification, especially by giving love the precedence over "correctness of doctrine." He gave a shock, from an historical point of view, to confidence not only in the Church but in the Protestant Church, and directed it towards the suppressed sects, especially the mystics. He was opposed by Ernst Sal. Cyprian and others. The former was the author of *Allgemeine Anmerkungen über G. Arnolds Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*, 1700. According to Arnold, the advocates of "correct doctrine," whether the Protestant ministry *verbi divini* or the Papacy, are exactly they who have manifested least holiness of conversation and least love. Hence, anti-Christianity is not found by him, as by the Magdeburg centuriators, in the Papacy only, but in the clergy, the hierarchy in general. What it praises is sure to be bad; what it blames has the presumption of goodness in its favour. A profound disgust with all ecclesiastical organization and its central point, viz. "correctness of doctrine," prevails in all his writings. The latter he regards as a work of reason, an *opus operatum*—in short, as only a new form of Romish hypocrisy. Since he upset all former modes of viewing the matter, and that in a manner at once violent and monotonous, his opposition could not fail to bring forward the question—What then is the true history? In Weismann's *Introd. memorabil. eccl. hist. s. N. T.*, 1718-1745, the Church is treated with more moderation than by Arnold, and the heretics more mildly than by the orthodox.

[2] Spener, *Evang. Glaubenslehre*, being a course of sermons preached during the year 1687, ed. 1717; Breithaupt, *Institutionum theolog.* lib. ii. 1693; *Theses credendorum atque agendorum fundamentales*, Hal. 1701; G. Anton, *Collegium antitheticum;* Freylinghausen, *Grundlegung der Theologie*, &c. 1704; *Compendium oder kurzer Begriff der Theologie*, 1723; J. Lange, *Œconomia salutis*, &c. 1730, and his more controversial work, *Antibarbarus orthodoxiæ dogmat. hermeneut.* 1709-11. Spangenberg's *Idea fidei fratrum*, 1782, may also be reckoned among those doctrinal works in which practical edification is the leading object.

mystic circles, doubly required the counterpoise of a strictly scientific method, both for the sake of avoiding that subjectivistic aspect so natural to Pietism, and of submitting these experiences to an objective and universally perceptible criterion. But this appeal to the Holy Ghost and His agency was used rather as a substitute than a motive for scientific labour and accurate notions. The Pietism of Halle had, however, a more fruitful influence in the department of Christian morality and practical theology.[1]

After the death of J. A. Francke, Pietism, whose central station was at Halle, gradually degenerated in North Germany. In proportion as its vigour declined, and its energetic efforts ceased, did it seek to retain the spirit of its better days by means of a stereotyped pious terminology, by external discipline, and by the unchildlike system under which Christian piety was to be trained and accustomed to a precocious self-introspection.[2] All

[1] Breithaupt, *Theol. mor.*, Hal. 1734. Joach. Lange, *Œconomia salutis eaque moralis*, &c., 1734. The very title of this work as the *moral* economy of salvation was an offence to Löscher, Chladenius, G. Bernsdorf and Woken, who regarded it as an obscuration of justification by sanctification. The influence of Spener is also felt in the Moral Theology of Jäger, Tüb. 1714, of Kortholt, Copenhagen, 1717, and of J. J. Rambach, 1739, nay, even in Buddæus' *Inst. theol. mor.* 1711, the model of Rambach, in J. G. Walch, and others. In the department of practical theology are Weismann's *Rhetorica sacra*, 1689, and Breithaupt's *Institutio hermeneutico-homiletica*, &c., 1685; J. L. Hartmann's *Pastorale Evangelicum*, Norinb. 1678; Chr. Kortholt, *Pastor fidelis*, &c., 1696; G. Arnold, *geistliche Gestalt eines evangelischen Lehrers nach dem Sinn und Exempel der Alten*, two pts., 1704-1723; and, finally, Spener's simple explanation of Christian doctrine, after the order of Luther's smaller catechism, 1677, and his *tabulæ catecheticæ:* also, the catechism of Gesenius.

[2] Pietism rightly insisted on regeneration and assurance of salvation, and took a stricter view of the former than was taken by the orthodox, who saw therein only a Divine impartation of power, and regarded it as fully effected in infant baptism (see above, p. 156). But the Pietists transferred it to the time of consciousness, in such wise as to lose sight both of the objective basis of preventing Christian grace, upon which alone the new life can safely rest and happily grow, and of the feeling for the direct and the natural. By giving again a higher importance to striving after assurance, they fell more and more into habits of morbid self-introspection, into a life of spiritual reflection instead of a life of simple childlike courageous faith. The constant self-questioning as to the possession of true faith, regeneration, and adoption, which had at this period gained ground in the Reformed Church also, gave rise to secret uncertainty, to a search after uncertain, nay, self-invented criteria of adoption, which was very likely to lead into departures from evangelical truth. The Pietists of Wurtemberg were the first to perceive this, and to return to a sound and Protestant mind in this respect. Comp. Burk, *die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung*, in which he reminds that it is not *consciousness* which effects sonship, but that the filial believing heart will in due time arrive at the consciousness of sonship.

this did but beget, however, much that was unnatural and inwardly untrue; and Pietism now fell into a spirit of legality, which soon showed its infectious power, and had, after the manner of law, a very disintegrating effect upon popular life, by that spiritual pride and unloving temper, that judgment of, and separation from, others, which it is ever wont to introduce, but which was utterly powerless to generate individual freedom through communion with God. On the contrary, not a few of the leaders of the rationalistic movement proceeded from this school of Pietism.

But while the Pietism of Halle was thus becoming, though in a different manner, as debilitated and ossified as the old orthodoxy, the movement which originated chiefly in Spener had thrown out two fresh and vigorous shoots independently of Halle. These, though not equally extensive with the Pietism of Halle, were to have a far more intensive and enduring influence. This they attained by a characteristic feature in which they notably differed from the latter, viz. by their rejection of the real defects of the older Pietism, and their appropriation of those genuine Church elements which it had neglected to adopt. We allude to Zinzendorf and the Moravian Brotherhood, and to John Albert Bengel and his school. These resemble each other in their acquaintance with Christian liberty, and the loveableness of Gospel truth,[1] and in the profound impression they possess of its creative originality. Again, they differ from each other by the fact that, while Zinzendorf's ample, warm-hearted, and intellectual individuality quickly gathered around him a closely-compacted circle of followers, who

[1] Compare *e.g.* with regard to Bengel, Oscar Wächter, *Joh. Alb. Bengel, Lebensabriss, Character, Briefe und Aussprüche*, 1865, p. 361, where Bengel is speaking of those who have indeed a sort of seriousness, strictness and firmness of character, but in whom the true profundity, the sweetness, gentleness, and graciousness of the Divine word and mysteries have no place (p. 391, &c.). In his view, the question is that a man should at once (*actu directo*) believe, and not be always lingering at reflections about his faith. To insist upon a *fides reflexa* (a conscious faith) might lead astray and perplex many who are in the right way, just as a child who is beginning to walk is made to fall by some one startling it and calling out to it not to fall. On the other hand, however, we must try to bring those who are likeminded with the Corinthians to an *actus reflexi*. Bengel is, moreover, full of life, cheerfulness, and plasticity in thought and words, and far removed from the formalism of a system of conversion (p. 418). He says also, speaking of things indifferent: I am not fond of them; but the cord has been too tightly drawn. A natural cheerfulness is, comparatively speaking, far rather to be tolerated than an equally natural, but far more troublesome, sadness.

were soon formed into a Protestant community, Bengel and his school, guided by a broader Church feeling, and touched by the Church's troubles, loyally remained within her pale, while for genuine and vigorous science they struck out new paths, free from the stiffness of scholasticism, and sought, and, in part found, for it a new foundation. This, with all its profundity, did not forfeit connection with the flock at large, but was of a thoroughly popular character, and produced beneficial results in the Christian Church. We cannot but regard Bengel and his school, which far outlasted the eighteenth century, and acted throughout it as a preserving salt, as the precursors, nay, the beginners, of a renovated theology.

### 2. *John Albert Bengel and his School.*

At the period when Pietism, both at Halle and elsewhere, had degenerated or decayed, there arose in Joh. Alb. Bengel,[1] born 1687, at Winnenden near Stutgardt, † November 1752, a *theologian of the first rank* for the Evangelical Church in general, and that of Wurtemberg in particular. This Church had, during the former half of the seventeenth century, drunk to the very dregs the cup of Lutheran orthodoxy, and was therefore only the more desirous for wholesome and more generous diet than was furnished by a J. V. Andrea, a Hedinger, and many more like them. Bengel's thoroughly sound and manly piety was equally removed from the gloomy seriousness of later Pietism and from the softness and sentimentality of Zinzendorf. The leading feature of his character was a combination of *reverence for the sacred majesty of God*, ever most conscientiously maintained as in His presence, and therefore unshaken by the fear of men, and indifferent to either their praise or blame, and of a childlike trust in Him which delivered from a slavish fear and from human limitations, and enabled him to use like a son the treasures of the great house of God, as the inheritance with which his Father had endowed him.

Spener had gained both friends and followers in Wurtemberg before the time of Bengel. Many of these—especially Reuchlin,

[1] Burk, *Bengels Leben und Wirken*, 1831. Wächter, see last note. Hartmann, in Herzog's *Real Encycl.*, art. Bengel. On his theological importance, see Herm. v. de Goltz, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1861, pp. 460-506. Gass's above-cited work, iii. 241. Tholuck, *Geschichte des Rationalismus*, div. i. pp. 41-47.

Weismann, Hochstetter and Jäger—were of the higher class, and the intercourse with Halle was, for a considerable period, of the most active kind. Bengel too visited this seat of wisdom and piety in 1713, and was deeply impressed by all he saw there. But the intellectual independence and peculiarity of the Swabian race, willingly as it imbibed all kindred elements of culture, prevailed, and, supported by that thorough and learned training which had from of old been domiciled in Swabia, became more and more decidedly self-conscious.

To Bengel especially the cause of practical religion was as dear as to Spener. In both, too, were found that tenderness of conscience, dreading the least defilement, which ever distinguishes one set apart and endowed for special and honourable purposes. In Bengel, moreover, not only was the intellectual factor also active, not only did he desire to nourish a growing piety by a knowledge of the connection between God's words and His acts—a piety not yet perfected either through the grace of baptism or the consciousness of sonship; but, compared with the school—and especially the later school—of Halle, he possessed, together with wider views, a larger heart, a warmer interest, not merely in the salvation of the individual soul, but in the whole "great household of God," and in the divine education of the human race, both in the past and in the future. In this respect he coincides in Spener's kindred "hope of better times,"—a hope which was to him the fertile germ of a complete and well carried out view of the universe. In this view, the endeavour to regard all the ramifications of past history as a work of God, referring in its inmost meaning to the kingdom of God, and carried out in closest connection with holy Scripture, is apparent.

He was a faithful son of the Church,[1] but it was just because he had fed abundantly upon the marrow of Reformation truths, that his attitude with respect to the symbolical books, and still more to systematic divinity, was an unfettered one.[2] Filial

[1] See Wächter. He was, on the maternal side, a descendent of Joh. Brenz, of Wurtemberg, the reformer.

[2] With respect to the obligation of accepting the symbolical books, he says: We must not insist upon binding the ministers of the Church to all *particularibus in iis contentis, exegesi*, &c. "Nothing more is necessary than that the main theses —but not the details, the proofs, the exegesis—be believed, accepted, subscribed to. It is easy for those who are content to live on like the rest of the world to be orthodox. They believe what was believed before them, and never trouble them-

attachment and careful consideration, as well as deep inward conviction, united him to the Church; but her teaching was no ban or bolt to him against any further knowledge. His theo-

selves with testing it. But when a soul is anxious about truth, and would deal with it as with a precious jewel, then things are not quite so easy. How wrong is it, then, to rush upon just such sensitive souls, to cross-question and to gag and stun them, when we ought, on the contrary, to give them liberty of speech, that they may gain confidence and suffer themselves to be led aright." Wächter, *id.* p. 369. He disapproved of a merely external and political union between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, because it was a spiritual union that was needed. Such a union already existed between the regenerate in both confessions, while a union with the mass of the unregenerate, not being one of a spiritual kind, would be a union in appearance only. His chief complaint against the Reformed Church is its doctrine of predestination, its "despotic God;" and he thinks that Lutheran opposition to the *absolutum decretum* has had the good effect of obliging the Reformed to more moderation and restraint. Of *Baptism* he says: Children are therein dedicated to Christ, but what takes place within them, according to their several degrees of recipiency, is inscrutable to us. In the *Lord's Supper* he considers that everything depends upon the real presence of Christ's body and blood. It is *ex zelo contra Reformatos* that Oralism is carried to the extent it is in the symbolical books. He does not assert that unbelievers also receive Christ's body and blood. *Sive accipiunt impii corpus et sanguinem Domini, sive non accipiunt, ipsa præsentia realis eadem est. Res potest declarari ex ratione verbi divini. Cœlestia bona appellant imo pulsant etiam incapaces. Ignis appropinquat aquæ per verissimam præsentiam, quæ inde strepit, nec tamen igni miscetur; quid præsentia supposita accipiant actu et quam diu retineant, quis definiet? Catechismus Lutheri agit de fructu, qui utique fidem præsupponit, non de ipsa materia sacramenti*, p. 388, &c. Justification and sanctification are like one cord composed of two threads, each of which is nevertheless distinct from the other. There is an assurance of pardon, and this is ordinarily in the heart *when it first believes*. In its beginning it is a tender thing, and is more readily strengthened by a direct act than by the *actus reflexos* of testing its own strength. The *actus reflexi* (the consciousness of faith) are not however absent, and the less man contributes to them the purer they are; nevertheless, it is the duty of every one to do his part in seeking after this assurance, in increasing and preserving it. The assurance or sealing of *grace* on the part of man is, however, to be distinguished from assurance concerning the *continuance* of the *state of grace*. Even true faith is at first weak, nay, it may again cease. But the nearer a growing faith approaches to its end, the stronger does this assurance of the continuance of the state of grace, and consequent rejoicing therein, become, pp. 418-420. True conversion is, in his view, so great a work and so varying in form, that its beginnings are surrounded by many dangers. *Conversionis comes heterodoxiæ opinio.* On this account it needs forbearance and gentle treatment, p. 370. As regards Christology, it is characteristic of Bengel and his school to bring forward in its full force the human side in the person of Christ, to say, *e.g.* that he walked by faith and not by sight, that he underwent temptation—arising not indeed from His own nature, but from without—in such wise that his nature was accessible thereto, and that He had to maintain His purity by the exercise of His will. He looks upon it as an exaggerated way of speaking, to say that Jesus was from the first moment of His conception seated at the right hand of God, p. 388.

logy was not so much a system of doctrines as a *knowledge of Scripture*. For such knowledge he had, however, an unusual amount of qualifications. He united to an acute understanding, sound tact and sober-mindedness, a thorough philological training. To speculate or to systematize was not his forte, being rather by nature an historian. The most absolute submission, nay, plasticity, with respect to his sacred subject,—a submission shown by fidelity even in the slightest particulars, and based upon an ardent interest in its living realities,—created in his mind an impression of the vital oneness of the subject-matter of holy Scripture. And not only so, for this quality also drew out and fertilized that intellectual function which feels that there must be in the history of the human race, and especially in its central point, a real, a gradually formed system of divine ideas; and it was the general connection and progress in this system which he sought to demonstrate by all the means of human learning at his command.

His first work—a work as arduous as it was devoid of show, and at the same time, unappreciated—was an attempt to obtain a more correct text of the New Testament than the *Receptus*, which had attained a dictatorial authority, submitted to as a matter of tradition, and without investigation. For this purpose he spared no pains in comparing as great a number of manuscripts as he could obtain, and in consulting ancient versions, quotations by the Fathers, &c. In fact, *Bengel is the originator of the criticism of the New Testament text in Germany*, and it is worthy of remembrance in these days, that not a spirit of negative scepticism, but a most reverent and conscientious evangelical faith, was the motive of this science—a science necessarily involving the far more comprehensive questions concerning the genuineness of whole books of the New Testament. In Bengel evangelical faith maintained that *critical element* without which it cannot continue sound and active. The text, he says, which is injured by a number of various readings, must be settled, if we are not to leave apostolic words unused, or to treat the words of copyists as apostolic.[1] The same zeal which cannot tolerate that Divine truth should be treated as merely human, refuses to

[1] *Gnomon N. T. in quo ex nativa verborum vi simplicitas profunditas concinnitas salubritas sensuum cœlestium indicatur*, Tüb. 1742, præf. § viii. [Translated for the first time into English, with original notes, explanatory and illustrative, under the editorship of Rev. A. R. Fausset, M.A., 5 vols. 1866, 6th ed., T. & T. Clark.]

attribute divine authority to the merely human. Both principles need to be applied, not only to individual passages, but to whole books of the New Testament.[1] Moreover, it is the entire Scriptures that must be studied, especially by theologians, and not merely those passages which are adduced in proof of doctrines.

His next work was *exposition.* And here his chief concern was, accurately to ascertain what are the fundamental and distinctive ideas of Scripture? These he finds to be stated, in almost identical terms, throughout the various writings of holy Scripture, as though these formed but one book. At the same time he is however no advocate of a mechanical theory of inspiration, which ignores the individuality and independence of the sacred authors.[2] He neither seeks to narrow by any dogmatic system the full meaning of these fundamental notions, such as faith, life, light, righteousness, glory, eternal life, nor, on the other hand, so to insist upon the so-called "emphasis of the words of Scripture" as to read the text in every possible meaning. The simple sense of the words in their natural connection, is that which his acute but pure perception endeavours to apprehend.[3] He is persuaded that he shall lose nothing by such a proceeding, for he regards holy Scripture not as a mere "book of maxims" for purposes of doctrine or edification, but as a wisely arranged living whole, in which there is nothing superfluous and nothing deficient, but all is perfectly harmonious. Scripture should, in his view, be regarded "as an incomparable narrative of the Divine management of the human race, throughout all ages of the world, from the beginning to the end of all things," as a beautiful, a glorious and a connected system.[4] He has moreover no notion of setting up the scriptural description of this management of the kingdom of God—which embraces in its wise arrangements and organization not only heaven and earth, but the æons—as a system of Christian doctrine: (a method subsequently embraced by Coccejus and others, not without incurring the danger of either

[1] He edited a new edition of the text of the New Testament, with an *apparatus criticus*, in 1734.

[2] He finds St. Matthew and St. John, *e.g.*, more full of genius [*geisterfüllt*] than St. Luke and St. Mark.

[3] He carried out his principles and method in the above-named classical and powerful work, his *Gnomon N. T.*, a book full of solid and useful matter, frequently reprinted.

[4] V. d. Goltz, p. 472.

sacrificing the progressive character of the historical development, or of giving, on the other hand, too insecure a position to the unchanging truth with respect to that changing element from which it must be clearly distinguished, in other words, of suffering the doctrinal to be absorbed by the historical, which could not but lead to a merely historical faith.) He well knows that a knowledge of the history alone is not a sufficient basis for Christian faith, that this deals with things eternal, which he sees gradually revealed in the history. Hence he leaves to scriptural doctrine its rightful position, but insists that, besides their first and most necessary matter, viz. the knowledge both of God the Creator, Redeemer, Comforter, and of sin and grace, holy Scripture furnishes also a second memorial of God in the glimpse afforded of the divine arrangements in the education, not only of individual souls, but of the whole human race. It is his belief that there is a system of divine realities underlying holy Scripture, and that these realities are revealed by the words and deeds of God, although he has not seen fit to state them systematically. In the fundamental notions, however, he has furnished the stones for such an edifice.

It is however with deeper delight and special efforts that he turns his attention to the end of the ways of God—the day of the Lord. For "the object of all the ages in Scripture is the coming of Jesus Christ in glory."[1] That aim and object of the world's history, embracing as it does all fulness of perfection, must determine the significance, as well as the course, of the whole development. He attributes great importance to the dates of Scripture, in attempting to understand this organism of divine ideas impressed upon history. They compose the skeleton upon which the whole form of the history depends, which cannot be understood without an acquaintance with its bones and articulation.[2] If, he says, the various dates scattered throughout the Bible are combined according to the hints furnished in Scripture, we shall have a chronology consistent throughout, composed of well-proportioned parts, and necessarily in conformity with divine wisdom. The external proportions of the appointed periods point to the internal fact that they are the several members of one whole, and the beauty and order in which the

[1] V. d. Goltz, p. 473, &c., 479.

[2] *Weltalter*, 1746, cap. i. ii. *Einl. zur erklärten Offenbarung*, § 34, 1740.

progressive stages of development succeed one another, from Genesis to Revelation, are in his opinion of high apologetic value with respect to holy Scripture and the Christian religion, and manifest the existence of a real and self-commending system. If full light cannot be thrown upon what has already transpired until the manifestation of the ultimate result of the whole divine economy, yet, on the other hand, the long but certain course hitherto maintained, becomes, in its turn, a pledge of the accomplishment of that which is as yet matter of prophecy. On these grounds, Bengel entered into new and learned chronological researches, and gave, in his apocalyptic expositions, an independent system of chronology.[1] His computations concerning the termination of the present dispensation—which, however, he distinguishes from the incalculable epoch of the last judgment, because the indefinite period of the so-called thousand years' reign must be interposed—have indeed been proved by the result to be erroneous,—a fact whose possibility he would himself have admitted. But his lasting and beneficial influence upon theology and the Church has not been thereby extinguished, while his prediction concerning himself, that he should be for a while forgotten, and then again brought into notice, has been fulfilled. His works were the first cock-crowing of that new kind of exegesis which the Evangelical Church so greatly needed.

His efforts met with little favour and much misconception from professional theologians at the universities, and from the clerical order in general.[2] But a circle of genuinely pious souls gathered round him in private, who became, in independent and various ways, the disseminators of his views, and the cultivators of those germs of thought which they involved. The school of

[1] *Ordo temporum a principio per periodos œconomiæ divinæ historicas atque propheticas ad finem usque ita deductus, ut tota series—ex V. et N. Testamento proponatur*, 1741. *Erklär. Offenbar. Joh.* 1740. *Sechzig erbauliche Reden über die Offenbarung Johannis*, 1747. *Cyclus sive de anno magno solis, lunæ, stellarum consideratio*, 1747. The details of his computations will be found concisely stated in Hartmann's article in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*, ii. 60-61, where also are collected remarkable examples of his powers of historical prediction.

[2] He was from 1713 tutor in the monastery at Denkendorf; in 1741 he was called to take a part in the government of the Church as Prelate of Herbrechtingen, where he contributed towards carrying out (1743) the wise and salutary laws of Bilfinger concerning the relation between the Church and Pietism, whereby this current, without renouncing its independence, was brought back with fertilizing effects into the Church of Wurtemberg.

Bengel, however, branched off into two divisions, both inwardly united by their love of holy Scripture and of the people. The one was more distinguished by the *historical* spirit, the other by the spirit of Christian speculation. The former, which was the more influential and the more powerfully represented, was occupied partly in continuing his *exegetical* labours and publishing numerous practical works, among which were those of the subsequent preachers of Tübingen, Jer. Fr. Reuss and Magn. Fr. Roos;[1] and partly in the cultivation of ecclesiastical history, which had already been undertaken in the spirit of Spener by Weismann,[2] while Reuss and Burk devoted themselves to systematic divinity.[3]

The *other* was of a more *speculative* character, though in a theosophic form. To this belong Christoph. Fred. Oetinger, Louis Fricker, Phil. Matth. Hahn, and Mich. Hahn. In them the school of Bengel is connected with J. Böhme, while they also form a transition to the more modern school of philosophy since Schelling. Their investigations and arguments embrace not only the history of redemption, and the whole subject of religion, which they regard as the history of the kingdom of God, culminating in the kingdom of Jesus Christ, but also matter and spirit, the relation of God to the world, of the soul to the body. Oetinger, the chief of this group, opposes the Wolffian philosophy as an obsolete vapid idealism, in which God—under the pretence of exalting the supreme—is dwindled into a lifeless unit, upon

[1] Magn. Fr. Roos, *Fundamenta Psychologiæ ex s. scr. collecta*, 1769.

[2] Weismann († 1747), *Introductio in memorabilia hist. eccl.*, Tüb. 1718. M. Fr. Roos, author of a *History of the Christian Church*, 2 vols.

[3] Jer. Fr. Reuss furnished valuable contributions to ethical science: *Elementa theol. mor.*, Tüb. 1767. Carefully falling back upon evangelical faith, he seeks to prove the independence and superiority of Christian, to philosophic or natural morality. To Steinhöfer and Conr. Rieger we are indebted for an ascetic application of Holy Scripture. Among other authors belonging to this movement may be mentioned Flattich, Storr the elder, and Hartmann. Chr. Aug. Crusius of Leipsic, the opponent of the Wolffian philosophy, was a writer of a kindred spirit with Bengel and Reuss, though a man of independent thought and of a more philosophical turn of mind. His doctrine of Conscience is excellent. He embraces the indissoluble connection of religion and morality,—a matter in which his freer and broader view of revelation comes to his assistance. Comp. C. A. Crusius, *Kurzer Begriff der Moraltheologie*, &c., Leipsic, 1772-1773, 2 pts. He is followed by Gellert, Behkopf, Reichard, S. F. N. Morus. See Stäudlin's above-named work, ii. 643. Crusius well deserves the monument raised to him by Delitzsch for his biblical and theological achievements, 1845.

which the name indeed of the *Ens actuossissimum* is bestowed, but which is so fettered by eternal necessity as to have almost become personified Fate, or the law of chance—a view from which no living relation of "the eternal truths" to history can arise, no intrinsic self-enlarging value be imputed to the course of events. Wolff's doctrine of the best possible world bribes theodicy, as Leibnitz does, with the view that evil—arising from that necessarily finite character of the world and especially of man which belongs to their nature and distinguishes them from God —is consequently necessary;—a notion which does vital injury to moral teleology, and prepares the way for taking the world as it is and making the best of it, since perfection, though called indeed the ethic principle, is yet declared by the said propositions to be unattainable.[1] To this idealism, whose obverse side is a mechanical unideal mode of thought, and a coarse Philisterism, which in eudæmonistic fashion is tolerably content with the present state of things, Oetinger is as much opposed as fire is to water. In his controversial writings he goes as far back as the very first principle, the *idea of God*, which had so long remained untouched and unreconciled with evangelical faith, and which, transmitted in its pre-Reformation form, had already been found very inconsistent with holy Scripture by Bengel. His view of *Heaven*, as a world of realities, could not suffer him to conceive of God as merely an infinite, unfathomable Being, all will and reason. It obliged him to regard Him as the living centre who, while He governs the universe, is at the same time enthroned in a glory and happiness to which He is, through Christ, raising the human race. Hence he could not accommodate himself to the thought that the relation of God to the world was that of a dead law, nor confine His intercourse with man to the judicial functions of commanding, acquitting, and condemning. On the contrary, he insisted on doing justice to the physical and moral, as well as judicial relations of God to the world—a procedure which could not but exercise a reactionary influence upon the received doctrine of the atonement.[2]

These notions were fully taken up, and independently worked

[1] Compare Christ. Hoffmann, *Fortschritt und Ruckschritt in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten oder Geschichte des Abfalls*, 1865, ii. 150.

[2] Von der Goltz, p. 479.

out by Oetinger.[1] God is not in his view mere absolute simplicity, but the unity, absolutely brought about, of the Divine powers. By locating in God vital potencies whose union is indissoluble in Him, though they are capable of separate action, he hopes he has discovered a principle of movement in opposition to the rigid notion of God which is the characteristic of Spinoza, of Wolff's philosophy, and of Deism. On the other hand, he finds, however, the Church doctrine too spiritualistic, opposed to nature and corporeity and to "biblical realism." The glory (δόξα) which holy Scripture attributes to God is not a merely spiritual sublimity, but the intrinsic vitality of God become objective, in other words it is the nature, the incorporate beams of His majesty. God is not to him and his followers merely spirit, but substantial life, which is what they mean to express by the term, corporeity of God. It is this which forms the immediate principle of the world's origin, while the infinite powers in God, which in nature are found only in a separate state, are recombined into unity in man, as the microcosmos and microtheos, though at first this unity is one capable of dissolution. History, the kingdom of freedom, whose end is the happy union of nature and spirit, begins with man. In this union nature is to be exalted to spiritual corporeity, and spirit to attain to substantial power and organization. These notions, which have recently been further developed by Schelling and Rothe, and applied by the latter to ethics also, were indeed too directly attributed to holy Scripture by Oetinger. "Biblical realism," weary of the evaporation of the radical ideas of Scripture, rejected all biblical forms of expression, for the sake of having only "massive notions" in holy Scripture. Hence, even prophecy, *e.g.* Ezekiel's temple, was interpreted according to this principle, and consequently all that had not as yet received its "massive literal fulfilment" is still to be expected. By such notions the school of Bengel, true and profound as was its fundamental thought, that corporeity is the end of the ways of God, frequently fell into a literalism, nay, even into a Judaism, which expected that animal sacrifices and a priesthood would again prevail during the thousand years' reign, and that the Jewish people would, after conversion, have supremacy over all other nations. Thus the danger was in-

[1] Auberlen, *die Theosophie F. Ch. Oetingers*, with a preface by Rothe, 1847. We are indebted also to Hamberger and Ehmann for memoirs of Oetinger.

creased of making Christianity the mere vestibule of a perfected Judaism, and of causing that which had begun in the spirit to be made perfect in the flesh—nay, of being beguiled by eschatological bypaths into a most suspicious proximity to the fundamental ideas of Romanism.

All this must however be regarded as but the mere husk in which this fresh young shoot in the field of theology was as yet enveloped. Though still imperfect in method, it was worthy of all praise for its surrender of that prudery which had been maintained with respect to the "wisdom in the streets" (philosophy), for insisting on a reconciliation with faith, for proclaiming by many valuable thoughts a deeper and more solid philosophy, and especially for already expressing many important propositions of that theory of knowledge which was so soon to occupy the attention of German philosophy. We must yet pause awhile on this subject.

Oetinger tries to discover a speculative theology or philosophy of religion which may embrace both nature and sacred history. In his powerful mind a simple childlike faith was united to an insatiable thirst after knowledge, extensive scholarship, and a clear and philosophically trained intellect.[1] The new science, which he predicted, and sought to inaugurate, was to be no less opposed to the spiritualism of orthodoxy, which degraded the realities of Christianity into empty abstractions, than to the idealism of the Wolffian philosophy. Like the theosophists of the first centuries of the Evangelical Church (see above, p. 179), Oetinger feels a powerful attraction towards nature. Behind the coarse materialism of nature in her present state, he has a presentient feeling of a higher reality, whose manifestation is to be brought about by the eschatological proceedings. He finds attempts to explain nature in a mathematical or mechanical manner specious but unfruitful. Mechanical science does not understand its secrets, nor can they be detected by the microscope. When we have gone as far and as deep as we can, we shall still be obliged to pause and to say that God is past finding out.[2] The truth is that nature is seeking, and has not found herself. For nature is not a self-complete existence, but a development which has God for its end. This development he was desirous of tracing, and for this purpose he occupied

[1] Rothe, *id.*, p. iv.

[2] Comp. Auberlen's above-cited work, p. 55.

himself much with chemistry, in order to investigate by experiments which border on alchemy, the births of things, and the natural life thence originating. Life is to his mind the thing most desirable to be known, it is that which makes itself most evident to the general feeling, the *sensus communis*,[1] while nothing is more concealed from the abstract reason. There is in the very smallest living thing an infinity which involves as great a wisdom as do the largest bodies in the universe. And when things are thus regarded the omnipresence of God shines forth in all life. The true organ wherewith to contemplate nature is, in apposition to philosophic abstraction, the calm sensibility of a well-disposed and devout soul, in which a certain *rapport* with the secrets of nature, such as was enjoyed by her simple and early children is restored. This is the "metaphysical empiricism" of Schelling, which is as applicable in the province of history as in that of nature; it is analogous to the distinction made by Hamann between the hearing of sounds and a musical ear, and between the seeing of colours and the eye of the painter. We must however strive to approach nature by the reason also. He views the idea of life, as an interpretation of two opposing forces which are united in a third. All multiplicity runs at last into a dualism, and through this into a unity. Holy Scripture and the ancients furnish—he thinks—*puncta normativa* and *ideas directrices* for a correct view of life.

He also strives to attain to a philosophy of mind by the union of two factors, viz. holy Scripture and the general feeling for truth (*sensus communis*). Ascertained truth, *philosophia sacra*, is, he says, the result of these two sources, which he is always bringing forward in his principal work, *Theologia ex idea vitæ deducta*. Even in physical life there is a secret attraction to the spiritual, a *sensus tacitus æternitatis*, arising from a certain irradiation of the life of God, which, uniting itself with the life of the inferior creatures, excites in man general presentiments—the sense of right and wrong—and a tact in hitting upon what is most necessary, most profitable or most simple. This he calls that spiritual feeling for the harmony of truth which

[1] Compare his work on the truth of the *Sensus communis* or of general feeling, in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes explained according to the original. *Inquisitio in sensum communem* in Auberlen, p. 66.

is a universal gift from above, and says that where this universal feeling for life and truth is suppressed it can never be restored.[1]

Orthodoxy reproaches him with teaching that does not harmonize with the Church doctrine of original sin, helping to introduce a merely natural theology, confounding nature with grace and mingling reason and the Holy Spirit. But he well distinguishes his *sensus communis* from Christian truth, regarding it only as an instrument for the perception (*sensorium*) of the wisdom everywhere present in life and truth, in right and light. Apart from God he recognizes no power of knowing; we must *have* God in knowledge. The *sensus communis* exists that it may receive the objective manifestation of God; God works in, and speaks through all things, the Internal pours itself forth in the External, and the External denotes the Internal. The *sensus communis* discovers the manifestation of the omnipresent God in all that is purely human, in science, in politics, in society. It perceives, so far as the natural man can, the Divine in the True, the Beautiful and the Good. This feeling for the Divine was possessed by Christ in an exceptional degree. Our *sensus communis*, of which conscience also forms a part, attracts us to Him, and is also the point of contact for the agency of the Holy Ghost in man. The *sensus communis* is His laboratory, and the truths of holy Scripture coincide with the secret convictions of our conscience. It is by means of holy Scripture that the *sensus communis* first becomes stable. It would soon err and doubt itself, unless Divine power which transfigures the psychical into the spiritual life, and holy Scripture with that sacred history of which it testifies, were added. Holy Scripture must however be interpreted according to common sense, as being the general sense for truth, and not according to philosophy of any kind. Most strictly and faithfully does he adhere to holy Scripture and its fundamental notions, as an amphitheatre of the highest and lowest things. Its fundamental notions are the standard by which the whole realms of nature and of mind are to be estimated, while their combination is that fundamental wisdom which is moreover in harmony with the *sensus communis*, and which becomes a *philosophia sacra*. It was his endeavour, in contradistinction to Bengel, to discover the main

[1] Auberlen, p. 70.

features of that great system of Divine verities, which underlies the individual utterances of holy Scripture. This seemed to him indispensable in the presence of modern philosophy. For he perceives that since we cannot get on without philosophy, everything depends upon opposing the genuine fundamental wisdom to false philosophy. Even with respect to holy Scripture he esteems a *philosophia sacra* to be necessary, and as needful to its complete understanding, as the key is to the lock. His sacred philosophy is to include the *rationes universales* of all the three faculties. Like Hamann he gives, for the most part, only fragmentary propositions, which however often contain brilliant scintillations of thought. His *Theologia ex idea vitæ deducta* is alone more systematically carried out, while in other instances the unity and connection of his thoughts lie hidden in his own mind, and have to be discovered by combining his notions. The antiquated, unpolished and unpopular tone of his style is strangely contrasted with the language and method of the illuminism period, which in its better productions not only lays aside the scholastic garment, but also assumes a more intelligible and, so to speak, a more human form. Sometimes this must be attributed to the solitude of his thoughtful life, and to his retirement from literary intercourse, but as often to the originality and depths of his ideas, which indeed are frequently expressed in beautiful and plastic language, but not less frequently are so incrusted in their antiquated coverings, that this extraordinary genius may be compared to a valuable, but quite unpolished diamond.

Not altogether alien from Oetinger's views is the Gnostic system of Immanuel *Swedenborg*.[1] This remarkable man, of noble character and educated mind, who exhibits a strange mixture of fanaticism and cool reasoning, set up, in opposition to the orthodox faith, a system whose ultra-supernatural clothing was designed both to cover and to recommend its heterodox

[1] Imm. Swedenborg, *Vera christiana religio, continens universam Theologiam Novæ Ecclesiæ*, Amst. 1771, Opp. vol. viii., ed. princ. Lond. 1749. *Summaria expositio doctrina christianæ*, 1769. *De nova Hierosolyma et ejus doctr. cœlesti*, Lond., 1858. *Arcana cœlestia*, 1749. For further information, see Schneckenburg's *Lectures on the doctrinal notions of the minor protestant sects*, ed. Hundeshagen, 1863, pp. 221, &c. Haug, on the doctrine of the New Church or the New Jerusalem, in *die Studien der würtemb. Geistlichkeit*, 1842, and Hamberger's article on Swedenborg in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*.

matter, and undoubtedly does, in the sincere opinion of its author, furnish ample security for the truth of its contents, while it is none the less most strongly contrasted therewith.

We must first give a sketch of the main features of his system. This is manifestly not derived from holy Scripture, but at most developed by scriptural reading, just as it might have been by the reading of any other book, so slight is its connection with the Bible. It is also evident that even his certainly characteristic view of Scripture is but a reflex and product of the system which was rising up within his mind, and that his own statements concerning the source of his system lay claim to a special *illumination*, not derived from holy Scripture alone, and said to be bestowed upon himself only, as the prophet or paraclete, for the introduction of the Church of the New Jerusalem (1770, after the completion of his work *de vera religione christiana*). Swedenborg's heavenly, *i.e.* angelic, revelations are said to contain the key to that true understanding of Scripture which is to restore unity and prosperity to the Church. In truth, however, they claim to constitute a canon of Divine authority concerning the canon of Scripture, with which they deal in a very arbitrary manner, both as regards its compass, from which almost all the hagiographa of the Old Testament, and all the books of the New, except the Gospels and Apocalypse, are excluded, and as regards the *meaning* of such books as they allow to remain.

To the Swedish assessor of mines, who was deeply impressed both with the unity and intrinsic harmony of the world, in spite of the sin by which it has been disordered, and with the close organic concatenation of all its members, the indifference of traditional theology towards *nature* was a great offence. Hence he sought, in opposition to theological spiritualism and philosophical idealism, to secure for nature an integral indispensable position in the universe, nay, even in the fundamental categories of being, of ontology, and this it was which for a while attracted Oetinger. Swedenborg regarded nature as the prop of the universe, as that which first provides for the mind and for love their substantial support and their basis. His vigorous and *pious* feeling revolted at the intellectualism of orthodoxy, and longed for a real communion of God with the world, which he endeavoured to reach in thought by a theory of emanation tinged with pantheism. In this desire, too, it is that we must seek the reason

of his passionate opposition to the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. For this had certainly advanced to an unapproachable transcendentalism, degrading to the economic Trinity, and severed therefrom, while the Trinity of revelation was merged in a Divine Trinitarian eternity and unchangeableness, and the bridge of communication between this and the world left undiscovered. This is the more probable, since he calls the true doctrine of the Trinity, which is to teach not a triad of Persons, but a triad of the Person (of the one Lord), a precious pearl, nay, seeks moreover to carry it out throughout the universe, and so to fashion it that God and the world may therein be emanistically comprised into one. Finally, it cannot be denied that there is in his opposition to the doctrine of justification—an opposition resting on a misconception of the evangelical notion of faith—an *ethical* feature. He puts love in the place of faith, understanding by the latter a merely historical assent to truth. His ethics are, indeed, superficial, by reason of the before-named pantheistic feature. For, viewing, as he does, the nature of man, to which he elsewhere attributes freedom, as essentially akin to the Divine, he cannot but reject the doctrine of original sin, and deem the Christian doctrine of atonement unnecessary. He accordingly disputes both, and asserts that human freedom is ever capable of deciding for the good, by virtue of its intrinsic power, while he assigns to man so eminent a position in the universe, as the basis and support of all, that if he should fall, and no restoration ensue, a general destruction would be the result, even as a throne totters when its pedestal has become rotten.

He represents the universe of being under the figure of three concentric circles, in the innermost of which is the Lord, as *love,* surrounded by the various orders of that world of exalted spirits of whose actions *love* is the spring. In the second circle the Lord appears as *Divine truth;* and this circle also is a realm of spirits, but of those whose characteristic is *thought.* The visible sensible world, including our nature, forms the third circle. These circles at present indeed exist simultaneously beside each other, but they are not without active mutual tendencies and relations. For the purpose of exhibiting their mode of existence, a transition is now made from the figure of the circle to that of the cone, from whose apex, representing the circle which, though the smallest, concentrates in itself the power

of all, proceeds, as from the first circle, a movement downwards, which emanatively begets and peoples increasingly widening circles, first the middle or sphere of the *knowing* spirit-world, till it arrives at the last or *nature*. It is the process of God Himself advancing from being, through development, to existence or reality.[1] And because it is but one and the same Divine nature which manifests itself in these circles, though doing so according to the various aspects which are potentially in God, each has a certain relation and reference to the other: everything in the world is full of *correspondences*. When the Divine process of life has arrived at man, God is in the sphere of reality. There is in man, by reason of his at once sensuous and spiritual nature, a combination of all that God has willed, of all that exists in a state of separation outside him, viz. nature, intelligence, love; for man, according to the Divine idea of him, is in communion with all these three spheres. In God Himself exists the triad: the Divine nature of the Lord, or the Father; the Divine *human* nature, or the Son; and the Divine nature which proceeds to operation, to reality, or the Holy Ghost. Man, the aim of the Divine process of life, is the completion of the whole; because it is by God becoming man in a sensuous manner that the Divine nature has its adequate existence, all the potencies latent in God being now realized in him. *Christ* is first of all this true man, in whom dwells the true Trinity—God as the Divine (the *Divinum patris*), as Divine-human (*idea hominis*), and as sensible reality. The Sonship potentially latent in God, and which becomes actual in Christ, has for its contents substantial love, the Divine nature of the Father; the soul of Jesus is from the same, from Jehovah, and prepares for itself a heavenly body, which already had its beginning upon earth. He takes also a material body from the Virgin, so that He may be entirely in the latter as well as in the former. But in saying this he makes Christ disproportionate to his notion. For, while it must be the end of the whole process that Christ should be in all respects divine, the body taken from Mary is not capable of transmutation into the Divine. Hence, either a casting-off of this body or a re-begetting of the same by the power of the indwelling Divinity is necessary. Now, even His human nature, His soul and body, are divine. The first and

[1] *Esse, fieri, effectus.* Schneckenburg, like modern Swedenborgians, here reminds of Hegel.

the last, God and (true) nature, pervade each the other in Him; in Him is the true Trinity realized; He is Jehovah without a duality of natures, a unity which is the essential centre of the universe. Without Christ, faith in God would be like a glance into the blue unfathomable ether. Our consciousness of God's existence obtains a point of support from the fact that God has given to Himself in Christ the definiteness of concrete reality. In Him are found power, wisdom, love, ready to be poured forth. This pouring forth was, according to Swedenborg, brought about by means of *holy Scripture*, which he regards as nothing less than the substitutionary continuation of Christ's incarnation since His departure from earth.

It is not to the Person of Christ Himself, nor to His redeeming and atoning work, that Swedenborg attaches special importance. His opinions were too Pelagian, nay, too rationalistic, to let him feel its necessity. The Christ of history is only important in his eyes as a mode in which the *word* of God was manifested or revealed. It is this which is, properly speaking, the mediator that came down from God. The historical Christ, being again withdrawn from our vision, was so far but a transitory phenomenon; but the Word purposes to appear *in the letter* that it may be ever and entirely manifest. The subject of the word is the Lord Himself; in the word God Himself comes down to us. Man was destined to be the basis or support of heaven; but, having turned away his heart from God, God sent His word to renew man's connection with heaven. According to this, not God made man, but God made word is the means of restoration.[1] Even before Christ, the word played this mediatorial part, as it still does, beyond the bounds of Christendom. It had, however, various forms. Originally it was only oral. Divine truth is originally verbally spoken by the Lord in presence of the angels: it then takes its course throughout all the heavens till it arrives at man. It was the fault of idolatry that the oral word, from which proceeded all the wisdom of the heathen world, became a written word. This is contained in the Bible, which is a miracle, a pendant to the universe; for it contains within itself God in His Trinity, and has therefore a spiritual and heavenly, besides its literal, meaning. In the last its sense is natural; in the inner,

[1] Comp. Hauber's *Swedenborgs Lehre von der heiligen Schrift*, Tüb. Zeitschrift, 1840, 4. Haug. *id.*

spiritual; in the inmost, heavenly. It is no creature, but, as in Christ, so in it—though here perpetually present—the threefold being of God is ideally included, as in a counterpart of God and of the universe; and that in such wise that the Bible occupies in the universe the position of mediator, that thus the combination of extremes which is found in Scripture may be repeated in a personal form in man, who is said to unite in himself the Natural, the True, and the Good. The true explanation of Scripture will proceed beyond the literal to the spiritual and heavenly, and recognize the correspondences everywhere taking place between the three worlds—the worlds of nature, of the True, and of the Good. The key to this understanding of Scripture, manifested for the founding of the Church of the New Jerusalem, is Immanuel Swedenborg.

The essence of Swedenborgianism, apart from the miraculous enveloping in which it lies hidden, is a mystic rationalism, in which the speculative and the practical elements seek a unity, and in which the transcendentalism of the Divine, the passivity of the human aspect, and the spiritualistic contempt of nature are to be overcome. But the process of Divine life which is to lead to this is purely cosmical, and removes us, after a Gnostic fashion, from the firm foundations both of history and revelation.

### 3. *Zinzendorf and the Moravian Brotherhood.*[1]

Count Zinzendorf and his followers consciously turned away from the legal spirit which became increasingly dominant in the Pietism of Halle, and which claimed submission rather by negative restrictions than in a creative manner. They sought compensation in the directness and originality of the religious feeling, and thus again laid hold on that mystic element in the principle of the Reformation which had retreated in Pietism. This they did, however, not in the solitary and isolated manner of those mystics who were constantly appearing in evangelical Christendom, besides the general professors of its doctrines and practice. On the contrary, the great endowments of Zinzendorf united to this spirit of peace and love, this retirement into one's

[1] Zinzendorf, *One and twenty discourses on the Confession of Augsburg*, in the years 1747 and 1748; also, *The Moravian hymn book, The collected writings of Zinzendorf*. For further literature see Schneckenburg's before-named *Lectures on the doctrines of the minor protestant communions*, 1863, p. 152, &c.

own heart, a more vigorous *spirit of association*, and greater power of organization than Pietism ever possessed. Zinzendorf, born 1700, originated in his community, which, though separate from the Church, was free from a sectarian spirit, an organization inapplicable indeed to great national churches, yet partly presupposing and partly fertilizing them. By uniting different evangelical confessions, as merely varying forms of expression, he endeavoured to institute a typical evangelical union.[1]

The stock, indeed, of the Church of the Brethren was furnished by the Moravian Brethren, those remnants of the Hussites, nay, of the Waldenses, which persecution had left. Through Zinzendorf, however, the Lutheran element was more decidedly engrafted upon this stock, and though his followers united themselves externally to no national Lutheran Church, they still inwardly regarded themselves as adherents to the Confession of Augsburg, while he himself passed an examination by the faculty of Tübingen, and was also an ordained preacher. But they found a sectarian narrowness in the scholasticism of Lutheran theology, and sought to enlarge the heart and widen the horizon of those who regarded their own particular church as the whole and sole Church of Christ. By this advocacy of that principle of inward catholicity, which no particular church, however large its extent, can deny without becoming, either in its avowed notions or secret practice, of a sectarian and separatist spirit, the Church of the Brethren fulfilled a high and holy duty to evangelical Christendom, which it is one chief sign of a spurious churchmanship to misconceive. Like a consecrated vestal, she cherished the sacred flame on her own hearth in times of widespread darkness and deadness in divine things. Joy in their common Saviour, a heartiness of feeling which showed itself fruitful in liturgical compositions, in sacred poetry and music,—though it must be confessed that it sometimes exchanged the dignified ecclesiastical style for one too familiar,—so moulded together the hearts of believers, though of different confessions, that they longed to have their inward unity reflected in their outward congregational life. Hence, while Pietism was more a strict instructor, the Church of the Brethren, with its gentle rule of love, displayed a positive and creative power of organization.

[1] Compare Twesten's excellent article on "evangelical union" in Herzog's *theol. Realencyclopädie.*

They felt the love of God to be in Christ a love which was very near and very human. In Christ, whom they worship as the holy Son of Man, because, according to Zinzendorf, the Divine Logos humbled Himself in Mary, that He might become human in her, they feel the very beating of the pulse of Divine love. Zinzendorf regards Christ as God voluntarily laying aside His power, as in the reality of His life on earth wholly and entirely man, as since His exaltation the representative of God, in whom the whole Trinity is, so to speak, united. They specially celebrate the sufferings of the Divine Son of Man, though their acts of worship in this respect sometimes degenerate to the theatrical. With regard to the inner life, they insist that God condescends to dwell in the heart, in the central point of human life. Happy in this pious feeling, in intercourse with the Redeemer, the Church of the Brethren has little interest in theology, and the principle of faith bore but little fruit in this respect.[1] But far from a lively and joyful persuasion of justification and all-sufficient redemption being absent in Zinzendorf, it is just this which forms the very centre of his piety. The fulness of his personal faith and experience inclines towards an emancipation from the formal principle, or at least towards a diminution of its authority. He tolerates very free views of inspiration, and ventures upon opinions which, especially with regard to St. Paul, are very latitudinarian. Nor is he less indifferent with regard to a definite code of morality than to a distinct system of doctrine. In religious matters he rather loses sight of righteousness and holiness, and of the corresponding feeling of reverence, those deeper tones, as it were, of Christian harmony, in favour of a certain familiarity of expression, which, in the language of the Moravian hymns and worship, often degenerates to the trifling. Even Antinomian tendencies were for a time visible; these, however, fortunately disappeared. Attention was directed to these defects by such men as E. B. Löscher, Baum-

[1] Spangenberg's *Idea fidei fratrum*, 1782, instead of advancing the scientific problems, modifies those innovations which in Zinzendorf were rather fermenting in the emotions than laid down in definite form. Recently, however, the Church of the Brethren has begun to render good service to evangelical theology. Comp. Plitt's *Glaubenslehre nach Schrift und Erfahrung*, 2 vols. 1863, 1864, which seeks to turn to account many of Zinzendorf's notions, especially his Christological ideas, but transfers the figure of a family to the Trinity in a manner scarcely differing from Tritheism.

garten of Halle, Fresenius of Frankfort, P. G. Walch of Jena, and others, and especially by the profound and right-minded Bengel.[1] Bengel's expostulations in particular were well received, and after a while the Church collected its strength to strive after greater purity, an evidence of which is furnished in doctrinal respects by Spangenberg's *Idea fidei fratrum.*

It was not, however, till the appearance of its great disciple, Schleiermacher, that it became of high importance to the whole Evangelical Church.

## RETROSPECT.

The elements whose combination was needed in a sound theology had been happily, but only indirectly, brought into *contact* by the Reformers. Their union not having however been secured to the Church—because the relative importance of the several factors had not as yet been scientifically determined, nor their limits and extent established—they were, from the seventeenth century onwards, again separated. By this separation, a process, the reverse of the pre-Reformation growth and ripening of the evangelical principle set in. This dissolution of the Reformation synthesis took place unawares, and under the specious appearance of fully carrying out and securing one side of the principle, *i.e.* the intellectual. This labour was, as we have seen, by no means barren of results; for it remained, when compared with mediæval times, faithful to the Reformation standpoint. But while all minds were thus eagerly concentrated on the task of defining and analyzing notions, the other factors were comparatively dwindling in estimation. The result was, that those other factors which had previously been appropriated were now again given up.

The *preponderance of the doctrinal* appeared in the antagonistic forms of Scholasticism and the *Calixtine school,*—the

[1] *Abriss der Brüdergemeinde,* 2 pts. 1751. The theology of the blood of atonement, to which he (Bengel) is also heartily devoted, must not, he says, be treated either as a novelty or as standing alone. This would be like living for a whole year on nothing but marrow. He blames the Count for wanting to model all people according to his own narrow notions of doctrine, saying that his undertaking is somewhat of the hot-house kind. The garden brings forth abundantly better flavoured fruits in due season.

former of which lays the chief stress upon correctness of doctrine to its slightest particulars, the latter upon a minimum of *doctrinal articles*, which, guided in its selection by an historical standard, it regards as fundamental, in such wise that the intellectual notions of the realities stand on a level with the realities themselves. *Pietism*, by powerfully recalling attention to the practical side of Christianity, to conversion and sanctification, and teaching men to regard Christianity as especially a matter of the will, was the first to oppose this twofold intellectualism, which thought to secure the stability of the evangelical Church by doctrinal propositions. Its next opponent was *mysticism*, which in some instances fell back in an anti-Church spirit upon its own subjectivity, and was thus alienated from the plastic and purifying power of Christian association, and in others (*e.g.* Böhme) preserved a love for the Church, and entertained no idea of separating therefrom, but was estranged by its peculiarity, misunderstood and without the aid of ecclesiastical ministrations. It was no wonder, then, that disordered imagination should take the place of sound reason and knowledge, until at length the free and strong pulsations of the religious affections being combined in *Zinzendorf* with a practical understanding, a select religious society was founded. Each of these forms advocated one important element, and each marked in its own field a stage in advance of the other. But the defect under which they all laboured, and from which a healthy Church feeling alone could deliver them, was the reserve and dislike with which they regarded each other, and in consequence of which, though destined for unity and co-operation, they mutually refused to receive or bestow either love or approbation. What then was the element by which they might be convinced that this reserve was a great fault, and incited so to correct it as to admit that completion by the others which each required?

Certainly the result is an eloquent teacher, especially when it happens to be the reverse of what was intended, when a general decay and impoverishment are found instead of the prosperity that was expected. But the desire to accuse the onesidedness of others as the cause of the mischief is generally stronger than a willingness to acknowledge our own, and the right road is not found by simply discovering that the wrong one has been taken. Besides, it is the curse of spiritual declension, that it is never

perceived to be such; but being, on the contrary, regarded in the light of progress, the readiness to embrace the means of healing and purification is proportionately diminished. A new and positive factor was required, by which obduracy, reserve, and deadness might be fused and subjected to a process in which those elements which repelled might be compelled to seek each other. It was necessary that the cure should begin in the sphere of the consciousness, for only that which is fully recognized to be right can be contended for with confidence and determination. But a very long road had to be travelled over before a renovated theology, begotten by a perception of fundamental truths, and capable of correcting the partialities and aberrations of the different factors, and bringing them into organic and vital unity in the Church, was attained. The first thing required was that *the conditions for such a theology* should exist. These are of two kinds. The first *historical, including exegesis.* Every thing depended upon the mind freeing itself from the fetters of custom and tradition, and regaining a healthy condition by bathing at the fountain-head of holy Scripture. Its genuine historical sense must moreover be disclosed, and the Reformation, *e.g.*, must be understood and reproduced, not only in its finished and statutory results, but in its original spirit. The second condition is the cultivation of *philosophic or speculative reasoning;* the third task is the reconciliation of the historical and the ideal.

At first indeed, science, which ever seeks to originate a movement independent of that which has preceded it, struck out paths more or less divergent from historical Christianity, in consequence of which elements hitherto repressed—some of which are analogous to the natural growths of ancient heathenism, especially the Grecian, and some to Judaism and its legal observances—were again released and broke forth. Yet even such a result was not without its wholesome reaction upon the Church. It not only silenced many a hurtful and fruitless controversy within the Evangelical Church, but also taught men more clearly to recognize that common faith, so often depreciated in the heat of party strife, which united the different schools and confessions of the Christian Church. This it did partly by bringing to light the opposition which threatened all alike, and partly by that cultivation of a feeling for the knowledge of first principles consequent upon the reappearance of philosophy. Besides, such a

course was also favourable to a knowledge not only of principles, but of that solid matter which was to be built upon them, and was calculated to promote the recognition and incorporation of the very element, the neglect of which had hitherto set the mark of imperfection upon every department of theology. We allude to those investigations of the relation of the nature of God to that of man, of nature and the natural world to Christian grace, of the first creation to the second, upon which progress, whether in exegesis, in sacred history, in divinity, in ethics, or in practical theology, essentially depended (see above, p. 5). For in exegesis, and in the view taken of Scripture, the grammatical and historical element received but very meagre justice; in the Gospel history, the human side of Christ's nature was abridged of its true proportions, while a like defect appertained to the doctrine of inspiration. It had been supposed that the divine aspect of Christianity would gain by such treatment of its natural and human aspect. But the result of the great process which now set in was to be, the perception that the more the Divine is revealed, and the more powerfully its self-assertion is evident, the more will justice be done also to the natural and the human, and the true realization of this latter element be attained.

From all this it is obvious how progress, even in the understanding of holy Scripture and of history, depended upon increased acquaintance with the general laws of the first creation, and therefore upon philosophy; while, on the other hand, philosophy and speculation had to expect their fertilization from the light shed abroad by the emancipation of Christian ideas from the dark integuments in which they had been enveloped.

## SECTION III.

### SUBJECTIVITY VICTORIOUS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

### INTRODUCTION.

WHEN the fiercest heat of the Pietistic controversy was over, there arose in the Church a generation which did justice to the mutual accusations of Pietism and orthodoxy, which sought to avoid their faults, and combine their advantages. It was a relatively flourishing epoch of Lutheran theology which now set in, and when we recall the chief names by which it is distinguished, we can but be astonished that the Lutheran Church should still have had to pass through paths so difficult and crises so profound, before it could be healed of the maladies of the seventeenth century. A union seemed concluded between Church tradition and a lively interest in piety, between Pietism and orthodoxy, between faith and the knowledge of faith, which promised to be both beneficial and enduring. And yet this flourishing period passed quickly by, and almost seemed to be introductory to that of negative criticism in German theology.

The men whose names we have now to report (not to mention Bengel and his school) specially devoted themselves to ecclesiastical history, and the history of doctrines. After Gottfr. Arnold and Weismann, † 1747,[1] these were Christoph. Matthäus Pfaff, the preacher of Tübingen, † 1760, in Giessen,[2] John George

[1] Who also wrote *Institutiones Theologiæ exegetico-dogmaticæ*, 1739.

[2] Ch. Matth. Pfaff, *Primitiæ Tubing.* 1718; *Acta et scripta publica Eccles.* Wirtemb. 1719; *Collegium antideisticum.* Also academical discourses on the chief truths of the Christian religion, and several treatises on the history of divinity. In behalf of union he wrote, in 1719, *Die nöthige Glaubenseinigkeit der protestantischen Kirche;* in 1721, A statement of the pending controversies between the Romish and Protestant Churches; and in 1742, Academical discourses on the rights of the Protestant Church, whether general or German (*Collegialsystem*).

Walch,[1] † 1775, John Alb. Fabricius,[2] the strange Von der Hardt, and Lorenzo v. Mosheim, † 1755.[3] These all entered

[1] J. G. Walch, *Einleitung in die lutherischen symbolischen Bücher*, 1752; *Einleitung in die christliche Moral*, 1747; *in die Dogm. und in die polemische Gottesgelahrtheit; Bibliotheca Theol.* 4 vols. 1757; *Einleitung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten ausserhalb und innerhalb der luth. Kirche*, in 5 vols. 1730-1739. He was also the editor of the Halle edition of Luther's works, 1740-1752. *Historia Ecclesiast. N. T.* 1744. He is a thorough scholar and a candid writer, but devoid of imagination, atomistic, and without a notion of a history of the Church's inner life. His son, Chr. Wilh. Franz Walch, of Göttingen (1726-1784), edited, with diligent research, a history of the Adoptionists, 1755, of the Roman popes, 1756, of Church councils, 1759, of heresies, schisms, and controversies before the Reformation (down to the ninth century), in 11 pts.; also a *Breviarum theol. symb. eccl. luth.* 1765, and a *Breviar. theol. dogm.* 1775.

[2] Joh. Alb. Fabricius of Hamburg, *Codex Pseudepigraphus V. T.* 1713; *Codex Apocryphus N. T.*, vols. i. and ii. 1703, vol. iii. 1719.

[3] Lorentius v. Mosheim: comp. Rössler, *Gründung der Universität Göttingen.* This accomplished and elegant preacher had a thorough acquaintance with English, French, and Italian literature. It was in opposition to Toland that he wrote his *Vindiciæ antiquæ Christianorum disciplinæ*, 1720. His other works are his *Instit. hist. eccl.* 1726; *De rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum M. commentarii*, 1753, and his book on Michael Servetus. He possessed an unusual talent for reproducing doctrinal systems, and wrote also a small doctrinal work, and one on the moral teaching of the Scriptures, in 5 vols. quarto, 1735-1753, to which J. P. Miller added four more vols. Far from favouring the strictness and asceticism of the divines of Halle, he advocated, on the contrary, in choice and æsthetically moderate language, Eudæmonism and a philosophical eclecticism, and knew how to introduce theology into good society. As an ecclesiastical historian, he neither observes "the stately pace of the ancient fathers," nor wears "the garment of the preachers of repentance." He is the abbé of Church historians with a strong worldly tincture. Himself devoid of deep religious feeling, he is incapable of understanding the independent nature of the Church with respect to doctrine and practice. Nay, he has neither eye nor feeling for the idea of the Church at all, which he looks upon as a merely human society, and chooses to regard as not without territorial sympathies analogous to those of the State. Although he views events in an objective and impartial manner, yet Church history is not to him the history of the special life led by the Church according to its own principle, but rather a narrative of the treatment it experiences at the hand of the external powers. He looks upon Church movements, and alterations in Church doctrines, as caused only by heretics, who oppose the Church from alien and especially from philosophical principles; though he admits, in addition to this, that a body social must needs have laws (in this case doctrines). He fails to perceive that the very principle of Christianity assumes a history, and has a tendency to develop and fashion itself into doctrines and practices. Hence Christianity is, in his view, rather stationary than progressive; and the course of history runs rather among those movements alien or inimical to the Church, to which he consequently devotes his attention. In a word, his history is rather a pathology than a biography of the Church.

Other historians worthy of mention are: Ernest Sal. Cyprian, who still belonged to the number of the more strictly orthodox, C. B. Löscher, author of the *Refor-*

upon the diligent investigation and publication of documents. They also busied themselves with divinity and morals, in which Francis Buddæus of Jena, † 1729, enjoyed the highest reputation, after the stricter orthodoxy of Hollatius, Krakewitz, and Fecht had died out.[1] All these writers being, however, deficient in power of original production, applied themselves the rather to historical theology, a study whose tendency is to emancipate and enlarge the vision, and prepare for a fusion of doctrines.

Confidence in the orthodox system had been more shaken by the conflicts which had already taken place than was at first apparent. Attachment to the Church, and dislike to sectarianism and separatism, kept up a general adherence to Church doctrine; and where these motives were but feeble—as in the case of Mosheim, who cared far more for the republic of letters than the Church—the fear of offence, and of being accused of heterodoxy even by inferior minds (marauders, as Mosheim calls them), was not without effect. On the other hand, however, there was a desire to be on good terms with the culture of the age and its requirements. With a presentiment of the approaching storm, an endeavour was made to arrest the incipient falling away of the people from their Church, by means of anti-deistical lectures and works, but by means also of yielding those points which were no longer regarded as tenable. The sharp edges of dogmas were everywhere smoothed down; controversial attacks, especially upon the Reformed Church, were silenced; and indifferent matters were dwelt upon rather than chief points. Dissatisfaction, however, and alienation from the faith of the Church had already taken too deep root to be allayed by the sacrifice of the

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*mationsacta*, and especially Christian August. Salig, whose work, *Geschichte der Augsb. Confession und derselben Apologie*, Halle, 1730, gives, in vols. ii. and iii. a history of the Reformation in and beyond Germany, and in vols. iii. iv. and v. a history of the Council of Trent. Belonging to a still earlier period are, *Viti Lodov. de Seckendorf Historia Lutheranismi*, 1692, written in reply to Maimbourg's attacks of 1680; and Hortleder's *Geschichte des teutschen kriegs.*

[1] Fr. Buddei *Institutiones Theol. Dogmaticæ*, 1723; *Instit. theol. moralis*, 1711. He also edited the philosophical works, *Elementa philosophiæ practicæ*, 1697, and *Instit. philosophiæ eclecticæ*, 2 vols. 1705, and the historical works, *Histor. ecclesiastica V. T.* 1715, 1718, 2 vols.; *Theses de Athcismo et Superstitione*, 1716; *Historische und theologische Einleitung in die vornehmsten Religionsstreitigkeiten*, 1724, 1828, ed. Walch; *Isagoge historica ad Theolog. universam*, 1727, enlarged in 1730; *Ecclesia apostolica*, 1729 (an attempt at a history of primitive Christianity, but without a life of Jesus).

more stringent dogmatical assertions concerning original sin, the *Communicatio idiomatum*, and the inspiration of Scripture. The theology of the day was devoid of any new positive principle, which might furnish both the motive and the standard of these mitigations; and, failing in creative power, it was not to be wondered at that it should be incapable of production. Its external garment might be a more suitable one, but it did not go to the root of the disease which needed healing. For, apart from trifling apologetic remedies, it did nothing to bring revelation and the reason of man into closer proximity, to make manifest the need and desire existing in the latter for the former, and to show the fertilizing and elevating effects which revelation has upon the mind—in a word, its congeniality with reason. With respect to *Reason*—the Aristotelian philosophy and the scholastic method having fallen into discredit as pedantic and lifeless, and no other being at hand to supply their place—it favoured an eclectic mode of proceeding, without settled principles or method, in which taste or the general understanding played an important part.[1] *Revelation*, moreover, had for the most part been transformed into its opposite, its contents having come to be regarded as *mystery*. Times unfruitful in theological knowledge are ever wont to fall back upon mystery, and upon the much-abused demand of "taking the reason prisoner to the obedience of faith." They fail to see that an acceptance of that which is simply uncomprehended involves a merely formal relation to the authority to which the mind is said to submit, and at the same time an indifference towards the specific contents of truth; and that therefore such faith cannot be the mother of genuine, positive, and fruitful knowledge, but has fallen from an evangelical to a Romish kind of belief.[2] For by this demand it is not meant to

[1] Some, like Fr. Buddæus, in his Moral Theology, and the acute Schomer, who flourished at an earlier period, appropriated much of H. Grotius and Puffendorf's philosophy.

[2] This decrease of a lively interest in what was specifically Christian—an interest kept up more out of respect to holy Scripture than on account of its own acknowledged importance—is evident in those divines who still desire to advocate orthodoxy, *e.g.* in Jäger (*Comp. theol. positivæ*, 1702, 1740. *Systema theolog. dogmatico-polemicum*, 1715); Hebenstreit (*Syst. theolog.*, 3 pts., 1707-17); J. B. Carpzov (*Liber doctrinalis purioris*, 1767); Walch (*Breviarium theol. dogm.* 1775); Sartorius, *Comp. theol. dogm.* 1777; Seiler, *Theol. dogm. polem.* Erl. 1774. The *Epitome Theol. Christ.* 1789, of Morus also belongs to this insipid kind of doctrinal works.

express merely, in accordance with genuine evangelical truth, that the natural reason cannot of itself rightly understand Divine things, and that there are deep things of God which are inexhaustible and unfathomable even by the scripturally-enlightened reason. An absence of all desire, gradually at least, to penetrate more deeply into the ways of God is also evident. This resigned and indolent retreat upon the mystery of Divine revelation was not a little contributed to by the circumstance that the dogmatic development of important doctrines, such as those concerning the Person of Christ, the Holy Trinity, the work of redemption, and the Lord's Supper, had led to difficulties from which there was no escape, except the assertion that the impossibility and internal contradiction of these doctrines could not be proved.

From the facts of revelation itself orthodoxy had separated itself by its world of ideas, and could at length no longer attain to a lively perception of Christian realities. In spite of the historical tendency which had now set in, it cannot be said that any essential alteration in this respect immediately took place. The historical view had not yet taken possession of holy Scripture itself: this was still, as before, regarded, not as the document in which the facts of revelation are recorded, but as revelation, and took the place of the latter. "Faith in holy Scripture is Christian faith." Modifications of the theory of inspiration, such as Pfaff proposed, made no change in this respect. On the contrary, the doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus S.* to holy Scripture (with respect both to its contents and form) was weakened, and referred to the instructive, reforming, consoling, and edifying power of the words of Scripture. No new ways of exegesis were struck out by any except Bengel: nor are such to be found either in the works of the elder Michaelis of Halle, or in the compilation of Joh. Christoph. Wolff.[1]

The lasting efficiency of this theology was however obstructed, not only by its own nature, but quite as much so by the widespread enmity of the age to the Church, nay, to Christianity itself. The minds of many, in whose eyes the traditional authority of the Church was destroyed, were constantly oscillating from one extreme to another. Others turned to mysticism, which was still frequently combined with alchemy and magic.

[1] Joh. Chr. Wolff, † 1739 at Hamburg, *Curæ philologicæ et criticæ in N. T.*, 1715.

Indeed, in the process of religious decomposition which had now set in, a variegated eclecticism, in which the profound and the absurd, superstition and unbelief, were forced into contact, was, as in the period of the dissolution of the ancient world, seen on all sides. Another and an important factor was furnished by *the natural sciences*, which, being now for the first time developed from their own special principle, viz. that of experience and observation, were beginning a course of free and independent formation. They thus came, however, into inevitable conflict with the prevailing theory of inspiration—a conflict which the theology of the age was also incapable of reconciling in a satisfactory manner. The Copernican system of astronomy, which at first found but little favour, had by the seventeenth century gradually worked itself into general acceptance. This was, however, opposed, in a physical sense, to the Divine infallibility of holy Scripture, if the latter was to be literally interpreted. Many theologians endeavoured to parry this blow, which was calculated to force theology to a distinction between the religious substance—in other words, those facts of revelation which are the end holy Scripture has in view, and their temporary clothing, depending, as it does, upon the notions of the day concerning nature and the world, for its material and mode of representation. But they were unable either to convict the Copernican system of error, or to prove that holy Scripture was itself Copernican.[1] Moreover, not only the standing still of the sun in the Book of Joshua, but also the deluge and Noah's ark, its capability of containing pairs of all creatures not inhabiting the waters, the Mosaic cosmogony, the miracles in Egypt and at the Red Sea, the command for the extermination of the Canaanites, and the spoiling of the Egyptians, Lot's wife and the destruction of Gomorrah, the sun-dial of Hezekiah, the whale of Jonah—in short, a multitude of questions which seemed to bring revelation into conflict with physical and moral laws, were discussed with much theological acumen and scholarship. A satisfactory answer, however, was not found; because attention was confined to details, and not bestowed upon the higher task of discovering a more general theory concerning Divine revelation and its purposes. Theology dealt with these matters as though revela-

[1] As was attempted by T. J. Zimmermann, *Scriptura S. Copernizans*, Hamb. 1706: also, Wideburg (see Francke, ii. 234).

tion, *i.e.* holy Scripture, were intended to make disclosures concerning physical as well as Divine truths. Meanwhile, it seemed as if mankind in Europe, and especially in England and France, had now for the first time opened its eyes to nature and to its strict conformity to law; and they who yielded themselves unreservedly to this tendency more and more lost sight of the independence and existence of spirit. The very idea of God gradually faded before their empiricism and sensualism, and they drifted without restraint into the materialism and sensuous Eudæmonism which La Mettrie, v. Holbach, d'Alembert, and other encyclopædists were then proclaiming. This tendency was, indeed, as yet alien to the German nature, which still retained an element of idealism in spite of the increasing importation of English and French literature of the above nature. The so-called Illuminism obtained, however, precursors and heralds, such as Thomasius, K. Dippel, and Edelmann, the first of whom especially influenced circles of far wider extent than the theologians above alluded to.

Christian Thomasius, born 1655, † 1728, having fallen into odium with the university, and especially with the theologians of Leipsic, both on account of the petulance with which he expressed his latitudinarian views, and because, being a bad Latinist, he was accustomed to deliver his lectures in the German tongue, left that city and became a professor at the new university of Halle. Having fallen out with orthodoxy, he here for a time addicted himself to Pietism, and acted as its legal advocate in its conflicts. He was not devoid of religious emotions and good resolutions, which kept his worldly, pleasure-seeking, and ambitious temper under some restraint. This however soon regained its supremacy, and it was not so much the narrowness and unscientific nature of Pietism that was an offence to him, as its religious and moral earnestness, which in his better days he had highly esteemed. His own scientific mode of treatment had too little solidity, and his knowledge was not sufficiently comprehensive. Indeed Pietism offered no field for his peculiar talent. This consisted in an easy "galant" rhetoric, fashioned after French models, a piquant and satirical kind of humour, which made him one of the most dangerous enemies of pedantry, scholasticism, and every kind of narrow-mindedness, and by means of which he contributed more than

any other writer of the eighteenth century to their expulsion, and to the naturalization of a cosmopolitan and freethinking tone in German literature. He essentially co-operated, by his much-feared, biting, and ready pen, in purifying the literary atmosphere from theological fanaticism and learned insipidity. He exercised, however, a more lasting influence by his *Theory of Church Privileges*, to which we must for a while direct our attention.[1]

After the Reformation, Church power had fallen into the hands of the secular governments (the *Politici*), a fact which the theory of the devolution of the rights of the bishops to the princes,[2] or the legal transfer to them of episcopal powers,[3] was thought to justify, and which was sometimes regarded as a provisional, sometimes as a permanent arrangement. The princes exercised, by means of their consistories, all Church authority, and therefore convoked the clergy *in partem solicitudinis*, but according to their own judgment and measure, with the single exception, that the internal affairs of the Church, such as its doctrine and worship, were wholly entrusted to the clerical order. Thus the people (the *status œconomicus*) were entirely excluded from a share in the government of the Church. Decaying orthodoxy, in the person of Carpzovius, † 1699, sought, but in vain, to give to this so-called episcopal system a position more favourable and deferential towards the clergy.[4] The autocratic power of princes, inaugurated by the seductive example of Louis XIV., was unwilling to give up its prey. The "Apap" in fact took the place of the Pope, to the great grief of the more religious among the community.

[1] Comp. Stahl, *die Kirchenverfassung*, &c., 1840, and Richter's *Kirchenrecht*, § 52.

[2] So Stephani († 1646), *Tract. de jurisdictione* (even of the clerical order) *in Imp. Rom.*, 1611.

[3] So Reinkingk († 1664), *De regimine seculari et ecclesiastico*, Geiss. 1619. He regards the transfer as effected by the restitution to the lord of the land, as such, of his fitting and divine calling to be the guardian of both tables. The *potestas ordinis* (internal Church authority) is to be left to the clergy. This ecclesiastical calling of the governor was supported by the theory that the *magistratus politicus* was also a hierarchical order. Comp. Bened. Carpzovius, *Jurisprud. ecclesiastica s. consistorialis*, Hanover, 1645.

[4] Joh. Ben. Carpzovius (the theologian of Leipsic), *Disp. de jure decidendi controversias theologicas*, Leips. 1695. In *internis* it is the duty of the ruler to carry out the decisions of divines, in *externis* to obtain their consent. To the laity belongs the right of appropriation. His standpoint is advocated in all essential particulars by Stahl.

Orthodoxy was forsaken by its allies, and its augmented pretensions, increasingly in contrast with the actual condition of affairs, could excite only contemptuous pity. In a Romanizing spirit it had made the laity a mere under-age *Ecclesiæ audiens*, and it now had to pay the penalty of this error by succumbing to the secular power; for Spener's warning, which insisted on the rights of the congregation, had been disregarded and treated as revolutionary.

The rulers, though themselves inclining to absolutism, were utterly weary of the theological contentions and strifes which disturbed even the peace of the nation, and declined to make themselves any longer the executive arm of the decrees of theologians. Such was the actual state of affairs, and it was this which was formed into a system by Thomasius, under the name of "Territorialism."[1] His chief propositions are as follows:— Conscience, the inward religion of the heart, is free in every individual, and can neither be forced nor constrained. On the other hand, the ruler has an absolute right to the supreme decision and maintenance of order in all matters which fall within the province of external life. For it is his absolute duty, even by the laws of nature, to establish peace and order in the world. The public exercise of religion—in other words, worship—belongs to the realm of the external. Hence it is subject to the authority of the ruler. This authority he exercises as ruler, not as a kind of *summus episcopus*, or in an ecclesiastical capacity; for the theory of the *duplex persona* is, to Thomasius, a sideroxylon. But the matter over which the ruler has *no* power (in which also neither councils nor theologians nor any human authority can interfere), is the decision of controverted points of doctrine, or departures from orthodoxy. When, then, these occur, there is no judge and no authoritative decision, even though there should be no lack of accusations concerning departures from Church doctrine. Thus the ruler must leave heterodoxy and heresy to themselves, nor is there any human power which need concern itself about them, so long as strife is not thereby engendered. It is, in his opinion, of very little consequence which side is in the right in such controversies. Thus, leaving all that concerns doctrine to the plea-

[1] Chr. Thomasius, *Vom Rechte ev. Fürsten in Mitteldingen*, Halle, 1695. *Vom Rechte ev. Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten*, 1696. *Vindiciæ juris majestatici circa sacra*, 1699. *Recht ev. Fürsten in Kirchensachen*, 1713.

sure of the individual, he delivers the Church, even with respect to her most vital functions, into the power of the State, to which peace is the supreme good. The Church has not even the privileges enjoyed by a trading company, of combining for its own special aims, and of compelling its members to further them. For exclusion from the Church would be a civil penalty, whereby a man's honour would be touched. Of the Church as an independent existence he has not a notion. It was, thanks to orthodoxy, that he viewed the Church as consisting only of the clergy, and that, on the other hand, he contended against their claim to be regarded as the Church, as papistical.[1]

Pfaff's *Collegial system* takes far higher ground.[2] It is akin to the territorial system, in that it regards the Church as originating and existing in the free choice of its individual members. Yet a certain independence of existence and privilege is awarded to her, inasmuch as she is regarded as a *collegium*, as a corporation possessing corporate rights.[3] She can make her own statutes and laws, and can insist upon their observance. The attitude of the State towards her is but incidental, or similar to the position it occupies with respect to any other association. The *magistratus politicus* does not belong to her, the Church consisting solely of teachers and taught. It is only by transference, by virtue of silent or express compact, that the magistracy can receive rights originally inherent in the Church. Results were however at first, and till after the commencement of the nineteenth century, in favour of the territorial system.

Dippel and Edelmann were more adventurous than Thomasius; their attention was, however, directed less to the form, and more to the substance, though still in a negative manner. Thomasius surrendered himself to eclecticism and to Locke's empiricism, and in spite of all his apparent confidence, was naturally of a sceptical turn. He was not so much impelled by a desire of

[1] Stryk said that marriage, being no sacrament, is not a spiritual, but a purely social concern. Just. Henning Böhmer, † 1749, more completely elaborated the territorial system: *De jure episcopali principium evang.*, Hal. 1712. *Jus eccles. Protest.*, vol. i. 28-30.

[2] Pfaff, *Origines juris eccl.*, Tüb. 1719. *De jure sacrorum absoluto et collegiali*, 1756. Academical lectures on the rights of the Church. He is influenced by Pufendorf's opinions.

[3] Pufendorf, who died 1694, had already called it a *Collegium in civitate erectum*, n his work *De habitu christianæ religionis ad vitam civilem*, 1687.

discovering truth and of making any sacrifice for its sake, as by the wish of obtaining, recommending, and also profiting by the useful and the agreeable.[1]

Joh. Conr. Dippel, a physician, † 1734, was versed in alchemy, astrology, and mysticism. He was initiated in the latter in the Berleburg society of mystics, theosophists, and separatists (*e.g.* Hohburg, Hachmann, &c.), which assembled at the court of the Prince of Sayn-Wittgenstein, but evinced amidst all his instability and love of change, a real desire and endeavour to attain to certainty in religion. He insists upon not resting in traditional forms and ceremonies, but upon pressing onwards to the true worship of the heart. He speaks of an inward word from the mouth of God, instead of the external word. But he is utterly devoid of the gentleness and repose of the true mystic, and is indefatigable in his attacks upon both the ministers and doctrines of the Church, especially those of inspiration, satisfaction, justification, and the Trinity.[2] Edelmann, † 1767, also joined for a time the ranks of the Pietists and mystics, but acquired nothing from his association with them except estrangement from the Church and escape from the restraints of Church doctrine. In his work, *Moses mit aufgedecktem Angesicht*, 1740,[3] he proceeded to violent and blasphemous attacks upon holy Scripture, and took part for a short time in the Berleburg translation of the Bible, which was undertaken under Haug's superintendence. His restless state of mind drove him from place

[1] For notices of other less important scoffers and imitators of Thomasius, such as N. H. Gundling, Professor at Halle, † 1729, John Gottfr. Zeidler, and Fassmann, comp. Francke, ii. 331, &c.; of *Treiber*, Professor of Erfurt, † 1727, after a similar course of life to that led by Daumer in our own days, p. 343; of Adam Bernhard of Breslau, † 1748, who wrote under the name of *Christianus Melodius*, on the influence of divine truths on the will, and extolled the popish in opposition to the evangelical doctrine of justification, understood by faith the mere assent of the understanding to the teaching of Christ, *i.e.* to the new law, but made this assent determine the will to the performance of good works which merit justification, comp. Tholuck's *Geschichte des Rationalismus*, and Francke, ii. 335, &c. On Dippel, see Herzog, *Realencyclopädie*, iii. p. 422, and Francke, p. 346.

[2] Comp. *Christiani Democriti* (*i.e.* Dippel's) *Papismus Protestantium vapulans*, 1698. *Orthodoxia Orthodoxorum, die verkehrte Wahrheit und wahrhafte Lügen der unbesonnenen Lutheraner*, 1697. He says that the death of Christ was not an atoning sacrifice, but an encouragement to self-sacrifice.

[3] His other writings are *Die Göttlichkeit der Vernunft*, and *Die vernünftige lautere Milch*, 1744. For notices of him, see Herzog, iii. p. 640; Francke, ii. p. 350; and especially *Selbstbiographie Edelmanns vom Jahr* 1752, ed. Klose, 1849.

to place; he went over entirely to naturalism, with only this exception, that certain pantheistic notions of Spinoza's seemed in his case to have taken the place of religion. Many however revolted at the wild and unregulated nature of these men, shown as much in their style as in their lives, and their passionate and arbitrary assaults resembled rather the attacks of skirmishers than the more regular battles and sieges which were about to follow.

## CHAPTER I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ AND WOLFF, AND THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO EFFECT A UNION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN WOLFF'S SUPERNATURALISM AND RATIONALISM.

PHILOSOPHY began its independent course in Germany with Leibnitz, 1646-1716.[1] Till his day the Aristotelian philosophy —that is to say, the logic and ontology which, though the common possession of scholars, were esteemed Aristotelian—had formed the equipment, whether of Romish or Protestant scholasticism. Well adapted as were such instruments for the formal logical treatment of a given material, they were not calculated to become the means of originating any knowledge which should be substantially new, nor of carrying out a view of the universe consistent with evangelical belief. New matter was already fermenting among those precursors of our philosophical era, the mystics and theosophists (see above, p. 177), in whose estimation however, the philosophical form and method were but the accessories, and the fancifully and enigmatically expressed matter all in all. In the writings of Leibnitz, too, the matter still preponderates. His philosophy is a seed vessel full of philosophical ideas, which do not however forthwith appear in the form of a system, but monad-wise, as it were, in that of larger or smaller monographs. It is as though he strove by such monographs to exhibit microcosmically, and from ever-shifting points of view, that whole which he had in view, but which he never carried out symmetrically and harmoniously. And yet he laid the foundation of a philosophical method. Clearness and intelligibility were, in his esteem, the marks by which truth is distin-

[1] *Opp. omnia* ed. Dutens, Gen. 1768, 6 vols., especially vols. i. ii.

guished. This is more closely defined in his "principle of contradiction"—what is true cannot contradict itself; besides this negative quality, it must however also have the positive one, of a "sufficient reason" for its incorporation into a wisely ordered world. P. Bayle's dualism, nay, scepticism, would have resolved all knowledge, and the whole world, into contradictions. The harmonious and speculative nature of Leibnitz resisted such a procedure. His largest and best known philosophical work, the *Theodicée*,[1] in which he expresses himself more particularly with regard to the relation of philosophy to theology, was written with special reference to Bayle.

His chief peculiarity lies in his *theory of monads*, which again takes up J. Böhme's notion of man as a microcosm, nay, combines it with the fundamental view of Protestantism. For monads are in his view individual centralizations of life and spirit in their most varying grades, substantial existences or independent forces, combining in themselves thought and extension. He thus opposes dynamics to material atomism. Spinoza's substantial Pantheism, which makes every individual object only a *modus* of God, he meets by the statement that monads are spontaneous, self-subsisting, imperishable substances, living from themselves, each differing in kind from another (according to the *principium individuationis* and *indiscernibilium*) yet all held in union by a *harmonia præstabilita*. He endeavours to surmount the Cartesian dualism between mechanically conceived corporeity and the spiritual (extension and thought) by regarding all things, even those compounded of the greatest number of elements, as consisting of different kinds of monads (energies with entelechy), which are moreover divided into three chief grades, according to the proportions in which passivity and activity are combined in them. All are in themselves intelligences, nay, independent worlds, with an independent inner life. But some have only perception, sensation, these are dreaming monads; others have apperception, consciousness, and these are called souls. Soul becomes spirit when it rises to the consciousness of "eternal truths," and of "that which is necessary to reason;"[2] and the potency of reasonable

[1] *Essay de Theodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal; S. Tentamen Theodiceæ; acc. Diss. de conformitate fidei cum ratione.*

[2] And especially of the *principium contradictionis* and *rationis sufficientis*. He

existence becomes increasingly an *actus*. God, or the central monad, is wholly *actus*, there is in Him no still undeveloped potency. And as the more conscious monads are ever destined to rule the unconscious, to become their governing souls,[1] so does God, the absolutely conscious and reasonable monad, wisely rule and direct all to a good end. Bayle objects that there is evil in the world. Leibnitz replies that so far as *metaphysical* evil, viz., finite limitation is concerned, a world would be impossible without this (the *limes*). For if there were nothing but *actus purus*, and no passivity, there would then be also no creature, but only God. *Physical* evils may be viewed as a beneficial arrangement, for they are of such a kind that they contribute both negatively and positively to the promotion of good. Finally, *moral evil* is connected with the *limes* of the creature. The difficulty of embracing a *moralis concursus Dei ad morale malum* is obviated by the admission that among all possible ideas of a world, God chose the best (optimism). In the idea of this best of all possible worlds, God found men inclining to sin and misery, in virtue of the original imperfection of the creature. He, however, prevented sin and misery, as far as the perfection of the universe allows.[2]

Leibnitz takes up a very friendly position with respect to theology. He requires the admission that the reason is capable of deriving certain truths from its own resources, but owns that God may also reveal "truths" in an extraordinary manner. He only stipulates that (according to the *princip. contradictionis*) two truths cannot contradict one another.[3]

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zealously advocated the truths belonging to the nature, though not depending on the will of God (compare especially his treatise *de fato* in Trendelenburg's *Beiträgen*, ii. 1855, p. 108, &c.), but made the freedom of the will too dependent upon the intellect and its necessary ideas, and neither left to God the free yet harmonious play of creative imagination, nor to man moral freedom.

[1] In spite of the monads "having no windows." The monads shine forth from God in harmonious co-ordination, *Princip. phil. Thes.* 1-11, 48-50.

[2] *Theodic.* ii. § 167, 209. The *Limes* belongs also to metaphysical good, which embraces all other kinds of good. *Bonum metaphysicum, omne complectens, est causa, cur dandus aliquando locus sit malo physico* MALOQUE MORALI. The *limitatio* (*creaturæ*) *s. originalis imperfectio* is the *fons peccati*, but in such wise that even the *mala voluntas* belongs to this very *imperfectio*. A hundred years earlier, the denial of moral freedom herein involved, would have given but little offence.

[3] He pledges himself to prove, not indeed the *veritas*, but the *possibilitas mysteriorum trinitatis, incarnationis, eucharistiæ, in theologia revelata*. He was opposed also to Deism, and regarded God not only as the source, but as the ruler and object of the world.

Leibnitz's *Theodicée* was on the whole well received. His system, however, found but little acceptance, while his efforts to effect a union, first of the Evangelical and Roman Catholic, and afterwards of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, neither met with success nor acted as a recommendation to his system.[1]

It was not till the philosophy of Leibnitz was clothed in a strictly consistent and systematic form by Christian Wolff, that its influence became important. Wolff (1679-1754, of Halle from 1706, then after his expulsion in 1723, of Marburg, and again of Halle from 1740-1754) gave to the ideas of Leibnitz, which he had derived from his tutor Tzschirnhausen, a mathematical form, and claimed to have bestowed upon philosophical the certainty of mathematical knowledge. The enthusiasm which he excited in the youthful German mind for form and method may seem enigmatical, especially when we reflect that his was by no means a creative mind, and that the soaring speculation and ideal tone of Leibnitz were lost in his stiff, prosaic and pedantic statements; nay, that very often the ideas of Leibnitz were scarcely recognizable, when concealed in the garment of Wolff's formalism. The dynamics of Leibnitz, full of vitality, seemed in Wolff to have again given place to mechanism, to a deistic fatalism.[2] And, in fact, Wolff's philosophy met at first with an unfavourable reception on the part of theology, those who inclined towards Pietism being almost

[1] He considered a union of Catholics and Protestants possible, on condition that the Pope should—as far as Protestants were concerned—suspend the *Tridentinum*, till an understanding should be arrived at,—a concession of which certain Catholic prelates, such as Spinola of Vienna, Bossuet, and others, held out a prospect. To effect this purpose he combined with Molanus, abbot of Loccum († 1722). To this end he pointed out certain Catholic propositions as acceptable to Protestants, and these he published about 1680, in a work upon which the title *Systema theologiæ*—a title not at all according to Leibnitz—has recently been bestowed (comp. Perthes on Leibnitz's Church creed, *Allg. Zeitschr. für Geschichte von A. Schmidt*, vi. p. 65). This work is, however, by no means a personal confession of faith on the part of Leibnitz, as Catholics like to regard it, but only such a draft of a treaty as a neutral power might bring forward as the basis of an alliance. He was, however, soon convinced of the impossibility of such union, and, in spite of allurements on the Romish side, gave the weight of his influence more and more to the Protestant Church. Desiring subsequently to unite, at least, the two Evangelical Churches, he applied to Spener, who, more correctly appreciating the state of things in both parties, dissuaded him from the attempt.

[2] Besides Leibnitz's logical principles, he retained chiefly his doctrines of the best possible world and of the constant and established concatenation of all things.

unanimously opposed to it. This was the case not only on the part of Joach. Lange, at whose instance he was removed from Halle in 1723, but of such men as J. J. Rambach and Weismann, Budde and Löscher, Walch, Pfaff and Mosheim. They feared lest the effect of emancipating the reason might be a repression of the religious interest, an unwillingness to believe.[1] On the other hand, however, the candour of orthodox belief had been destroyed, and confidence in orthodox teaching shaken, by Pietism, but not as yet to such an extent that it was not generrally preferred, if only it could be justified. In such a state of things, then, a philosophy like Wolff's seemed to have found its mission. It promised, in the first place, to give only fresh

[1] Löscher, in particular, objected, 1735 (compare Engelhardt, *E. B. Löscher*, 1856), that the doctrine of the best of all possible worlds, all being imperfect, made evil necessary, and excluded not only the state of innocence, but the state of perfection. Evil is not mere limitation, nor an imperfect stage of good. Löscher and Lange both found the connection between Wolff's moral principle and religion too lax. Wolff laid down the principle of perfection, as a means of happiness, in such wise that the reason recognizes it as that which is good in itself and to which we must submit. He so applied his doctrine of eternal truths necessary in and by themselves to the reason, that even an atheist, as a reasonable man, must know and choose moral good. To do so was, in the opinion of these theologians, to deprive the moral law of its objective foundation and support in God. We are bound to obey God, without even thinking of our perfection. That is good which God commands, and God does not command anything because it is good, and will make us perfect. Hence, they felt themselves obliged only the more decidedly to oppose the mere positivism of the moral law, to the stress which was laid upon eternal truths, although Calixtus had already a clearer insight in this respect. Men like Crusius and Reuss however treated the matter more judiciously than Budde, Löscher, and Lange, by connecting the universal human conscience with the living God, manifesting himself in the soul, and the conscience with Christianity. Moreover, Wolff also conceives of the natural moral law, which as such is inherent in the reason, as at the same time of Divine origin. God he thinks made the human reason to correspond to His own ; it can consequently work out truths from itself by its own powers. Besides the apprehension entertained by theologians that this dry and level formalism was devoid of an atmosphere of religion and freedom, that Wolff's mathematical method had in it an element of fatalism, converted the world into a piece of dead mechanism, and left no room for an active providence, was not a groundless one. His method accustomed the mind to desire that everything should be proved to the reason, and to reject all that was devoid of such proof. The law of sufficient reason, in particular, might be turned against the so-called "mysteries of religion," if only that which was demonstrable, or involved in the natural connection of things, was to be esteemed as having sufficient reason. This was moreover all the more suspicious to a theology which did not see in Christianity an unveiling of mysteries, as well as those veiled truths which it was the duty of faith to receive blindly, upon the ground of their authority alone.

stability to dogmatic teaching, by proving its "possibility" to the reason, in opposition to the attacks and doubts by which it was assailed. Now, according to Wolff's own meaning, the establishment of the possibility of anything (*i.e.* of its freedom from those internal contradictions which would make it impossible) was already a criterion of its truth, an establishment of the notion as one not merely subjective. But this fact soon ceased to cause apprehension, since the greater the number of subjects found susceptible of the proof, the greater seemed the security thus bestowed upon doctrine. When once religious certitude was shaken, an intellectual surrogate could not but be welcome, and it cannot be denied that Wolff did set up a definite standard of independent philosophical procedure, and, as he was fond of boasting, teach Germans to think.[1]

Thus it came to pass that, from the third decade of this century, Wolff's philosophy found increasing favour. Canz and Bülffinger, the first of whom from being an opponent had become a friend, prepared the way for more friendly relations on the part of theology.[2] They thought to withstand the increasing attacks made upon Christianity, especially in France and England, nay, even to win over its opponents with the weapons of this philosophy. Büttner, Carpzovius, Reinbeck, Reusch, Ribovius, and Schubert, were also supernaturalists of Wolff's school.[3] The

[1] Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, 2 pts. 1736. *Philos. pract. universalis*, 2 pts. 1738. *Philos. moralis s. ethica*, 4 pts. 1750. *Vernunftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch aller Dingen überhaupt*, 1720, and notes to this latter work, 1724. *Theol. christ.* in German, 1739.

[2] Canz, *Philosophiæ Leibnitianæ et Wolfianæ usus in Theol*, 2 pts. Leipsic, 1728, and his *Comp. theologiæ purioris*, 1752.

[3] Büttner, *Cursus Theologiæ revel. omnes cœlestis doctrinæ partes ex S. S. haustæ complectens*, 1746. J. Carpzovius, *Œconomia salutis N. T. seu Theologiæ revel. dogmaticæ methodo scientifica adornatæ*, vols. i.-iv. 1753-54. J. G. Reinbeck, Reflections on those Divine verities contained in the Confession of Augsburg and combined therewith, which are partly inferred from reason, but all deduced from Scripture, and applied to the practice of true godliness, Berlin, 1731-41, 4 pts. ; the five following by Canz, 1743-47. Reusch, *Introd. in Theol. revelatam*, Jena, 1744 (an acute divine of a speculative turn of mind). G. H. Ribovius, *Institutiones Theol. dogm.* Göttingen, 1741, a proof that revealed truth cannot be proved by the reason. J. E. Schubert, *Introd. in Theol. revel.* and *Comp. theol. dogm.* Helmst. 1760. Reinbeck endeavours to deduce the doctrine of the Trinity from the idea of the supreme good which is given in God. For this supreme good has an inclination to impart itself. Hence there is plurality in the Divine unity. Büttner seeks to prove this doctrine by that of the atonement: there must be one Divine person to make an atonement and another to accept it. Reusch views

most influential however of its adherents was S. J. Baumgarten, who taught in Halle with the greatest applause.[1] These theologians endeavoured, by diluting Wolff's philosophical axioms and modifying those of orthodoxy, to bring about an alliance between philosophy and religion,—an alliance whose after effects have been exhibited by many even in the present century.[2]

The following features are characteristic of Wolff's philosophy. Religion is regarded as the *modus Deum colendi et cognoscendi*, as a kind of will and knowledge, a summary of the ethical and theoretical, but not as having an independent existence. Hence, faith is viewed as a matter of demonstration. The *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* was soon distorted into something of a very different meaning—the term itself soon falling into disuse, and demonstration being put in its place. In its original sense, it seemed enthusiastic to the dry and reasoning spirit of the age, so direct a relation of God to man appearing to trench upon the Divine majesty. Such were already the notions of Less and Baumgarten.[3] Even in the seventeenth century, certain *criteria interna et externa* were regarded as accrediting holy Scripture in a secondary manner, in addition to its primary self-testimony through the Holy Spirit. (See above, p. 122.) Among these

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the Trinity as corresponding to the threefold order of thought in God, viz. that of the necessary, of the possible, and of the actual—Canz, Carpzovius and Reusch prove from the necessity of a satisfaction, the necessity of revelation, and of the Redeemer being God-man. The truth of the Christian revelation is also inferred from the fact of its proclaiming that satisfaction has been made. Büttner sought to render the doctrine of original sin more palatable by accepting a pre-existence of souls. The orthodox theologians also, who were Wolff's opponents, embraced the doctrine of moral freedom in a measure which the sixteenth century had rejected. Original sin was made an enticement to evil, which did not become sin without personal consent, while separation from the Reformed Church was no longer maintained on account of its doctrines of the Person of Christ, and of the sacraments, but chiefly for the sake of the doctrine of predestination, which had at first furnished no point of contention, and which was now also on the wane among the Reformed themselves.

[1] S. J. Baumgarten, *Evangelische Glaubenslehre*, 3 vols. 4 ed. Semler, 1759, &c.

[2] In such supernaturalists as Reinhard and Storr, and still more in such rationalists as Eckermann, Rohr, and Wegscheider, the influence of Wolff's philosophy may still be perceived.

[3] Comp. Klaiber on the doctrine of the older Protestant divines on the *Test. Sp. S.* and its dogmatic importance; in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, vol ii. pp. 1-54. Less, *Christliche Religionstheorie oder Versuch einer praktischen Dogmatik*, Göttingen, 1779.

were the consoling and reforming power of holy Scripture. Now, however, it was not merely acknowledged that the Divine truth of the contents of holy Scripture does not of itself prove the Divine nature of its form, but the truth of the contents and the experience of this by *fides divina* were also, after the manner of Pajonism, separated from the vital efficacy of Scripture, while the idea of the testimony of the Holy Spirit was thought obscure, nay, fantastic. The secondary criteria were, on the contrary, still adhered to. It was said that the chief matter was the *experience*[1] which every one could make for himself that Scripture could comfort and amend, or even that the contents of Scripture were in accordance with the feelings of the heart and with sound reason. Thus it is by our own progress in sanctification and knowledge, by the logico-moral effects of the doctrine of the Bible, that we are to become conscious of its Divine origin, and thereby of the truth of Christianity. But, since this so-called evidence of experience could by no means prove that the same effects might not arise from other causes than Scripture, nay, could not even decide what proportion of these effects was to be attributed to Scripture, the confession was inevitable that it did but establish a *probability;* and the more so because this amendment and knowledge still remained but imperfect, while there could be no question that this so-called evidence, of experience, was utterly incapable of bestowing assurance of salvation and of forgiveness, even before sanctification was complete.

It is not, then, astonishing that a more objective proof of the Divine origin of holy Scripture and of the truth of Christianity should have been sought in the place of this precarious evidence of probability. It was the testimony of the reason that was now turned to; and this it was attempted to establish partly in a *rational*, and partly in an *historical* manner. The older supernaturalism of Wolff's school applied itself to the former; that of more recent growth, and eclectic views, which had been chiefly cultivated in the older Tübingen school (Storr, Suskind, Flatt, &c.) to the latter. The former, starting from God's righteousness, holiness, and goodness, in virtue of that idea of God which is naturally inherent in the reason, proves that, sin being a fact, a Divine revelation of atonement must necessarily follow. It first,

[1] Klaiber, *id.* p. 20, &c.

however, establishes the possibility of supernatural revelation in general—in other words, the fact that such a revelation involves no contradiction, and lays down the marks which it must bear to prove itself to be such. Among these criteria are, that it shall contain mysteries, *i.e.* truths which are not accessible to reason as such,[1] nor even to be discovered as truths by reason enlightened by Christianity. Holy Scripture, it goes on to say, does correspond to these criteria, and is therefore to be regarded as the source and self-authorizing form of Christian truth. *Storr's* method endeavours to avoid that obvious weakness of this evidence which consists in laying down criteria of revelation by means of that natural reason which is itself in need of healing, and in appealing to the accordance of holy Scripture with these criteria. This it does by endeavouring to furnish to faith purely *historical* evidence of the Divine origin of Scripture, and thereby of Christianity. It seeks to rise, by a chain of reasoning, from the human credibility of Scripture (*fides humana*) to its divine authority (*fides divina*). The Apostles and their disciples were the authors of the books of the New Testament canon as at present existing (proof of authenticity and integrity). These books are trustworthy; the Apostles could speak the truth, they desired to do so, and must have done so. Now, these books describe, on the one hand, the pure and sinless character of Christ, and, on the other, relate His miracles; and these combined prove that full credit is to be given to what He said of Himself, and to His Divine mission. Again, among other things, Christ promised inspiration to His followers; His miracles prove that He could send to them His Holy Spirit, and His truthfulness is a pledge that they really were partakers of inspiration. Hence, the New Testament, and, for its sake, the Old Testament also, must be regarded as inspired, and all that is taught by holy Scripture must be held to be a true and Divinely-accredited revelation. In saying this, the path upon which Grotius proceeded is entered by Lutheran divines, and certainly not without an improvement upon his method; but the material principle, to which reformed theology was formerly inclined, is now almost entirely disregarded in favour

[1] Wolff, in his *Theol. naturalis*, pt. i. § 447-496, ii. p. 576, &c., had already begun to distinguish between what was above, and what was contrary to reason, requiring the former inasmuch as it contains truths necessary and useful to the reason, though unattainable by it.

of the formal. The whole burden of proving the truth of Christianity is now to be borne by the latter. And that, indeed, in such wise that the power of the contents of holy Scripture, divinely accrediting themselves to the mind, is not even brought into the field (for this would again bring in the material side of the principle, and the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*), but the truth of Christianity is made to depend upon rational and historical proofs, addressed in a purely intellectual form to the understanding. General natural reason is said to have the power of proving the Divine truth of Christianity. It is obvious that Christianity is thus viewed as something homogeneous with the natural reason; and equally evident is the contradiction that the reason, which is said to be strong enough for such a proof, undertakes also the task of proving its own need of a Divine revelation, and therefore its own weakness. *Theological morality* was also often taken in hand by the Wolffian philosophy.[1] Theologians of this school were accustomed to accept two sources of knowledge—reason and Scripture; they asserted the harmony of these two sources, but failed to establish their relation with sufficient clearness. With Wolff, they embraced as the supreme moral principle that of perfection, which is formally self-evidencing and also susceptible of eudæmonistic filling up.

If we now turn our attention to the contents of the *religious system*, we shall find that the relation of God to the world was also defined in a manner essentially deistical in the supernaturalism of the age. For while Wolff's supernaturalism regarded God as ordinarily at a distance from the world, and the latter as governed purely by law, and as existing without any active intercourse between it and God, which was considered inconsistent with His sublime elevation, it admitted that occasionally a glimpse may be obtained of this

[1] S. J. Baumgarten, *Unterricht vom rechtmässigen Verhalten eines Christen, oder theologischen Moral*, 1738, *Ausführlicher Vortrag der theologischen Moral*, ed. Bertram, 1767. A Pietistic influence is evident in this writer. In his view, moral theology is the scriptural doctrine concerning the manner in which man must comport himself to be in a state of union with God. Canz, *Unterricht von den Pflichten der Christen oder theologische Moral*, 1749; Reusch, *theol. mor.* ed. Müller, Jena, 1760; J. E. Schubert, *Inst. theol. mor.*, Jena and Leipsic, 1759. Akin with these is Töllner's *Grundriss der Moraltheologie*, 1762. Reinhard's great work, *System der christlichen Moral*, four vols. 1788-1810, distinguished for its copiousness of ethical and historical material, and for acuteness of moral judgment, exhibits, in its earlier parts, an internal connection with Wolff's system, while, as it proceeds, the influence of Kant is perceptible.

distant God by means of miracles, which are, as it were, openings in the connections of nature, and interruptions of its arrangements. The results of this supernaturalism, engrafted upon Deism, and depriving the world of God, except on extraordinary occasions, are a spurious independence of the world with respect to God, and of the individual with respect to the race. It so far weakens the doctrine of the innate sinfulness of the human race, that while no longer denying the natural moral freedom of the will, it only maintains that the will may be solicited, or allowed to sin by the natural constitution, which is not in itself evil until its suggestions are assented to and adopted by the free will. In like manner, it regards the *Church* as originating solely in the association of believers for religious purposes, and thus makes the subjects its founders and source, instead of the material which it is to assimilate, or the medium by which it is to be maintained. There is here an unmistakable affinity to the subjective theory of the State, at this time adopted, which made the State arise from association (*contrat social*). The same tendency is exhibited in the doctrine of the Divine *image*, and of restoring grace. For man is not so viewed as to make communion with God a necessary component, and participation in the Holy Spirit an integral element, in the realization of his true nature. On the contrary, he is treated as in himself a complete μικρόθεος, destined to moral likeness with God, whose *gracious influences* afford him external assistance, or preserve him from evil, but do not exceed a relation of mere assistance. So too *inspiration* is reduced to Divine assistance, while in Christology, Nestorian opinions are adopted (even by Storr), in an Arminian spirit, with respect to the doctrine of the atonement. For a time, indeed, that is to say in the earlier days of supernaturalism, much was still said about the mysteries of Christianity. But a formal reverence for holy Scripture was no obstacle to its being regarded more and more as a sealed book, while that vigour of mind and dogmatic productiveness which delight in the revelation made by Christianity were wholly absent. But this position of merely formal reverence did not last long, the traditionary formula, especially those in which Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity were expressed, were soon felt to be a mere burden by a soaring subjectivity, and an Arminian phase of thought upon which, as we have remarked, the theology of

Germany had now entered, prevailed even in these objective doctrines. Subordinationism and Arianism were not only advocated on exegetical grounds by Töllner of Frankfort on the Oder,[1] but also adopted by the elder Flatt, Döderlein,[2] and others, while a kind of Sabellianism was embraced by S. Urlsperger (see below, p. 276). As far as Christology is concerned, a declension from the ancient Lutheran doctrine concerning the Person of Christ had long set in even among the orthodox divines. The edifice of Lutheran Christology had been, for the most part, already forsaken by its inhabitants before 1750, the *communicatio idiomatum* limited to the active Divine attributes, and the union of the two natures to a συνδύασις, while a μέθεξις was denied. Properties, it is said, denote the essence of natures, consequently a real participation of the manhood in the Godhead would cause an intermingling of essences. In opposition to this, an essential contrast and an uncongeniality between the Divine and human was still more maintained in the eighteenth than in the preceding century, whence it logically followed that what was contrary to the nature of man could not really be received thereby. Hence the *capacitas humanæ naturæ* for the *divina* was now excluded. Scholastic questions were still discussed, as *e.g.* whether Christ even in death, in which state those parts are separated whose union constitutes a complete man, remained truly man; whether Christ was (by Traducianism) already *in lumbis Adami*, and whether therefore the preservation of a pure mass through a series of generations must be embraced; whether the soul of Christ had a *præ-existantia seminalis* in the soul of the Virgin; whether His blood which was shed remained

[1] Töllner opposed, not without much acuteness and just criticism of traditionary arguments, the *obedientia activa* in the work of Christ. He overlooks, however, the fact, that the passive obedience which he desires to embrace must also be regarded, when viewed in its inner nature, as an act. He maintains also the satisfaction made by Christ, but his Christology, while ascribing to the human nature of our Lord the obligation of obedience, and hence a full and proper personality, supposes—in order to avoid a double personality—a mere co-operation of the Son of God in all the actions of the human nature, especially with regard to knowledge, a co-operation however which takes place only where the human nature is inadequate.

[2] Döderlein, *Institutio Theologi Christiani in capitibus religionis theoreticis nostris temporibus accommodata*, 2 pts., Altdorf, 1780. *Christlicher Religionsunterricht nach den Bedürfnissen unserer Zeit*, 12 pts. 1785, being a translation, enlargement, and a completion of the above work by C. G. Junge.

upon earth and saw corruption, or was transferred to His resurrection body, and such like. Many, and especially the English divines, H. Morus, Goodwin and Edw. Fowler, embraced, with Poiret, a pre-existence of Christ's manhood in heaven, for the sake of teaching the true self-humiliation of His human nature. Against such subtilties even E. B. Löscher now lifted up a warning voice. The main thing was the common active participation of the two natures in the work of redemption, and therefore that which the Reformed had never doubted. Chr. M. Pfaff also denied the communication of the *character personalis* on the part of the Logos to the manhood, without inculcating the personality of the latter, by which treatment it was made a mere garment. Löscher, on the other hand, denied this communication of the personality of the Logos, to leave room for a real progress of the human nature, by which the proper personality of the manhood is admitted. This denial was soon extended to the communication of *properties*. Heilmann,[1] and subsequently Reinhard, instead of affirming the actual possession of Divine prerogatives by the human nature, speak only of its "right and title" thereto. Mosheim insists on a *communicatio mediata;* the Logos alone has and retains the Divine properties, it is only *verbali modo*, or symbolically, that they are ascribed to the human nature of Christ. Of special importance was the work of Haserung in directing closer attention to Christ's praying for Himself, and to His obedience to the law, and ascribing to Christ's human nature, as created, an obligation to both.[2] The full truth concerning the human soul of Christ and a feeling for the ethical aspect in His Person were now brought out with increasing distinctness. If the opponents of this progress endeavoured to deny the moral obligation, by means of the impersonality of this soul, they sacrificed that key-stone of Lutheran Christology, the impartation of the personality of the Logos to the human nature, for the sake of meeting their adversaries on equal terms. But this concession had further consequences, for it not only affected the doctrine of the *idiomata*, but was soon and necessarily followed by the admission of the personality of the human nature. Even Walch, the opponent of Haserung, referring to Buddeus and

[1] *Comp. theologiæ dogmaticæ*, Göttingen, 1761. E. J. Danov, *Theol. dogm. institutio*, Jena, 1772.

[2] Haserung, *De supplicationibus Christi pro semetipso.*

Breithaupt, adopted the doctrine, so long indigenous to Reformed theology, of the anointing of Christ, by which His natural powers were enhanced and increased. But if the need, nay, the possibility of the *unctio* of the manhood of Christ is to remain, it is necessary to limit the *communicatio idiomatum*. This Walch was now ready to do; it continued however to be held for a time, though in a traditional and increasingly restricted sense. It may be shown that from the time of Hollatius and Buddeus onwards, the ethical categories were more and more observed than the metaphysical, with respect to the doctrine of the *idiomata*. The result was that the communication was conceived of as gradual, and not as complete from the first. After 1750, its proper personality is increasingly attributed to Christ's human nature, and the attempt made to bring the Logos into closer union therewith, (*e.g.* by Töllner and Seiler). This was, to those who held Subordination or Arian opinions, by no means easy; for how should two finite existences form a personal unity? It was not so difficult to the Sabellian notions now revived. These were however uncongenial with the Deistical tendencies of the age, and formed only an intermediate stage to the Socinian and Ebionite theology. Sam. Urlsperger, who like Zinzendorf embraced a real and progressive humiliation of the absolute Logos, was almost the only divine whose labours in Christology bear the mark of originality. To the questions: How should God, the Infinite cause, produce, in creation and in Christ, a finite effect? and, How can the Infinite and the finite be combined? he replies as follows:[1] The Son of God is the link which connects opposites, and the medium between God and the world; He is, on the one hand, God of God and infinite, on the other God apart from God, distinct from God. By His infinite power He is capable of self-limitation, of self-destination to finite effects, as well as of combining with finite powers, and elevating the finite work of the world to infinity. The Son, the Mediator, from Old Testament times ever dwelt more and more in the world as the שְׁכִינָה, until His voluntary humiliation and limitation of His essentially infinite powers reached their climax in incarnation[2] and death, in which

[1] *Versuch einer genaueren Bestimmung Gottes des Vaters und Christi*, pts. 1-4, 1769-77.

[2] A history of the self-limitation of the Logos from the Creation to the Incarnation, like that embraced by Hoffmann in his Evidences of Scripture.

he humbled Himself to an apparently lifeless condition. His humiliation was however succeeded by His exaltation, the expansion of His nature and glory, so that He is no longer apart from God, but *in God.*

For a quarter of a century, that is till the sixth decade, Wolff's philosophy flourished, and there was peace between theology and logic. From that time the relation was essentially altered. This was owing to many causes, some of which are to be found in the Wolffian philosophy and its further progress, some in other factors which had meantime become important.

In the first place, this philosophy was not calculated to satisfy the human mind for any length of time. Added to this, its disposition of readiness to believe, of willingness to adhere to the faith, if only its "possibility" could be demonstrated, did not continue. With respect to the latter circumstance, the change was brought about by the influence of French and English literature and the example and court of Frederick II., but chiefly by the fact that the mind, though capable of reasoning and full of self-esteem, was still deficient in copious and appropriate material upon which to exercise its powers. Inwardly alienated from orthodoxy, it felt the legal validity and obligation thereof an oppressive restraint, by which the development of its own fertile germs was stifled and encumbered, and hence it longed for space and air in which to develop its proper nature. As for the nourishment offered, however, by the Wolffian philosophy, its formal rigidity might indeed be beneficial to discipline the intellect, and to give clearness and sharpness to its ideas, but it was no magic wand to call forth fresh knowledge. Its pedantry had always a feature of triviality, which could scarcely hide itself behind its form of shallow science. Hence it was but natural, that when once the course had been gone through, this form should be laid aside and exchanged for a more popular mode of expression, and for the arguments of common sense. Wolffianism passed into *Popular philosophy;* its contents offered no opposition, and it became increasingly shallow and commonplace. The more extensively the influence of Wolffian philosophy had been felt, the greater now became the circle of bold reasoners, confident judges, and improvers of the world. The leaning to the ideal, the transcendental, was almost extinguished in Wolffianism; its Deism and optimism accommodated themselves as well as possible to the finite,

and extolled the present world as the best. Wolffian optimism involves, even when viewed theoretically, a non-ethical eudæmonistic element, nor was its practical side long left undeveloped.[1] The axiom of "sufficient reason" was soon applied to moral good; virtue is good because it is the means of happiness. Thus, finite man was rendered absolute, himself and his finite interests being made the standard and end of everything. The value of things was measured simply by their utility,[2] this tendency to popularity created a new kind of divinity scarcely worthy of the name, the so-called popular or practical divinity.[3] This was first enunciated by Spalding in a book of the title stated below.[4] Christianity, he said, was a thoroughly practical and popular doctrine, and preaching could only fulfil its mission by abstaining from all that was unpractical and speculative. Among unpractical and unprofitable subjects were reckoned the doctrines of the Trinity, of the two natures of Christ, of original sin, of satisfaction, and of the saving power of faith apart from works. Some however, such as Miller and Less, maintained that even doctrines which he had pronounced unpractical were really of a practical character. But others, as Griesbach, Niemeyer, Ammon, consented to pare down their body of divinity to the practical standard. From this prudent abstinence from proclaiming "unprofitable" doctrines there was but one step to

[1] Steinbart, *System der reform. Philosophie oder Gluckseligkeitslehre des Christenthums*, 1778-94, among others. Basedow, *Padägogisches Elementarwerk*, 1785, 4 vols.

[2] Even before 1750, men had grown accustomed to such views, though in a far more innocent form. For, Wolffianism holding the cosmological evidence of the *causa sufficiens* to furnish the only decided proof of the existence of God, this kind of evidence had been most carefully carried out—often indeed in details offensive to good taste—to a physico-teleology, for the purpose of proving the wisdom and goodness of God from supposed finite purposes in nature. So Brockes, Reimarus, and many others.

[3] P. Miller, *Theolog. dogmaticæ comp. theoretico-practicum*, Leipsic, 1785. J. J. Griesbach, *Anleitung zum Studium der populären Dogmatik*, &c., Jena, 1786. Less, *christliche Religionstheorie oder Versuch einer praktischen Dogmatik*, Göttingen, 1779. A. J. Niemeyer, *populäre und praktische Theologie*, 1792. Ammon, *Entwurf einer wissentschaftlich praktischen Theologie nach den Grundsätzen des Christenthums und der Vernunft*, Göttingen, 1797.

[4] Spalding, *von der Nutzbarkeit des Predigtamts*, 1772. In his remarks on the value of the affections in Christianity (1761), he warns against the danger of religious feeling, and desires to expunge all Pietistic elements. In his second work, in order to render the clergy useful servants of the State, he makes them the depositaries of public morality.

openly opposing them, whether such opposition were carried on by attempting to improve and perfect the New Testament,[1] or to prove that the denial of these doctrines was in accordance with its teaching,[2] and this prepared for a further advance.

So arbitrary and superficial a manner of coming to terms with doctrine as was practised by neological illuminism, could but ill accord with the German mind and its conscientiousness. It demanded a more solid mode of procedure. It had indeed found itself ill at ease in the edifice of ancient orthodoxy, but it felt itself secretly in alliance with Christianity, and began to inquire whether primitive Christianity were really identical with the doctrines of the Church, and with its claims to be regarded as authoritative. Might not an unprejudiced and faithful exegesis furnish doctrines which would give less offence? Might it not be shown that the dogmas now established in the symbols owed their form to the Church, and to the co-operation of incidental occurrences in the Church? Thus a return to the sources of *exegesis* and *history* was demanded, and the battle was to be fought out upon this neutral ground, which was admitted by all. The German mind, instead of an arbitrary rupture with orthodox doctrine, determined on the tedious way of a regular siege, for the sake of gaining for a good conscience, nay, in virtue of a good conscience, such space and freedom as should no longer be restricted by the symbol of the Church.

At the head of this more solid, but certainly more comprehensive and far-reaching work, which was afterwards to lead to unexpected results, were Ernesti and Semler, the former of whom devoted himself to exegesis, the latter to historical theology.

Ernesti, a well-practised and elegant interpreter of the classics, advocated the grammatical interpretation of the New Testament

[1] W. A. Teller (of Helmstädt and Berlin, † 1804), *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens*, Helmstädt, 1764 (arranged according to the contrast of sin and grace without the doctrine of God or of the Trinity). *Religion der Volkommenen*, Berlin, 1792. *Dictionary of the New Testament*, 1772. He subsequently advanced to the perfectibility of Christianity.

[2] A. P. C. Henke, *Lineamenta institutionum fidei chr.* 1794. Eckermann, *Comp. theol. chr. theor. bibl. histor.*, Altorf, 1791. *Handbuch zum gelehrten und systematischen Studium der christlichen Glaubenslehren*, 4 vols., 1811, &c. *Erklärung der dunkeln Stellen N. T.*, 3 vols., 1806. *Theologische Beiträge*, 6 vols. 1790-99. J. D. Michaelis, *Comp. theol. dogm.*, Göttingen, 1760 (subsequently published also in German).

as the only correct one.[1] In so doing he maintained, in opposition both to the mystical and allegorical method, which had reappeared, especially in the Pietistic school, and to Coccejus' principle of emphases—that "holy Scripture has but one sense." Not less however did he at the same time oppose interpretation according to the analogy of faith, by means of which current Church doctrine was made beforehand irrefutable on exegetical grounds. Only between such different explanations as are equally possible on philological grounds, is a decision to be made according to the analogy of faith, *i.e. of other authors*, just as other books are to be understood according to the analogy of the subject of which they treat. Thus he insists that exegesis should again be perfectly free, and should proceed according to its own law. Now its law is grammar, *i.e.* the science of language, which has respect not merely to the possible significations of words, and to the laws of their combination, but also to which of their possible meanings was the one intended by the author, when the age in which, and the purpose for which, he wrote, are taken into consideration.[2] In saying this, he certainly goes so far as to insist upon treating holy Scripture by exactly the same rules of interpretation as profane authors, since he demands no special enlightenment for its interpreter, although he admits it to have been inspired by the Holy Ghost. Hence it is not faith which is to interpret Scripture, nor is this needed for criticism. He proceeds in general as if holy Scripture were capable of being the sole foundation on which the Church is supported, and as if the theopneustia and divine authority of Scripture could be established even without the material principle. The formal principle is to be entirely independent of the material, and is itself to be bound only by general human laws. It cannot be said that Ernesti's requirement, that the human side of the New Testament language should be recognized, gave a new impulse to exegesis. And yet it was in connection with his tendency that *biblical theology*, which has since attained a constantly increasing importance, became a *special science*. To this belong the labours of A. F. Büsching, G. J. Zachariä Hufnagel, Ammon, and G. L. Bauer.[3] These beginnings of biblical theo-

[1] *Institutio interpretis N. T.*, Lips. 1761 (and often afterwards).

[2] Hence Ernesti, even in his grammatical method, recognised the truth of the historical method of interpretation.

[3] Büsching, *Epit. theolog.*, Lemg. 1757. *Diss. exhibens Epit. theol. e solis literis*

logy[1] still indeed exhibited marks of strong doctrinal leanings. By means of holy Scripture the Reformed Church was to be brought to own the justice of the censure passed upon the objectionable points of her divinity. Besides, exegesis itself was not free, inasmuch as exegetical results were regarded as beforehand doctrinally binding. It was not till Ph. Gabler of Altdorf defined biblical theology, on the ground of Semler's leading ideas, as being, with regard to divinity and morals, a purely historical science, that it attained the full significance of an independent notion.[2]

This brings us to Semler, with whom we must stay somewhat longer. Though a pupil of Baumgarten, who may be called a personified compendium of modified Church doctrine, Pietism,

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*s. concinnatæ*, Göttingen. G. J. Zachariä, *biblische Theologie oder Untersuchung des biblischen Grunds der vornehmsten theologischen Lehren*, 4 pts., Göttingen and Kiel, 1771-75, 5th pt. by Volborth, 1786. Hufnagel, *biblische Theologie*, Erlangen, 1785; ii. 1, 1789. E. F. Ammon, *Entwurf einer reinen biblischen Theologie*, Erlangen, 1792, 2 pts.; ed. 2, 1801, in 3 pts. G. L. Bauer, *Theologie des A. T.*, Leipsic, 1796. *Biblische Theologie des A. T.*, 2 vols, 1800. Even Bahrdt profited by the times, and attempted a biblical system of divinity, in 2 pts., Gotha and Leipsic, 1769 (see below, p. 289).

[1] The numerous collections of and commentaries on *dicta probantia*, or *loca classica, illustria* of holy Scripture, by Seb. Schmidt, Hülsemann. Baier, J. H. May, Weismann, and others, were composed only from doctrinal motives, viz. as evidences of Scripture, and that only in a disconnected and incidental manner.

[2] Semler, in his *Vorbereitung zur theologischen Hermeneutik*, 4 pts., 1760, and especially in his *Apparatus ad liberalem N. T. interpretationem*, 1767 (*ad V. T.*, 1773), advocates the historical interpretation as the only correct one. He looked upon historical investigations concerning the occasion and purpose of a book, the circumstances of the times, the ideas of the age in which it was written, and its internal structure and spirit, as parts of such interpretation. Gabler, in his introductory programme, *de justo discrimine theologiæ biblicæ et dogmaticæ regundisque recte utriusque finibus*, 1787 (comp. Schmid, *biblische theologie N. T.*, 1853, p. 1, &c., and his treatise *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1838, 4), brings forward, in accordance with these principles, the demand: *discerne scripta, discerne tempora et mores.* These principles, excellent in themselves, were soon applied by Semler to justify himself in accepting the notion of an accommodation on the part of Jesus and His Apostles to the prevailing opinions and errors of the age, so that even in the New Testament the permanent must be distinguished from the temporary and the local. He finds also a proof from history that Scripture has ever been differently understood in different ages of the Church, each phase of opinion—the Judaizing, the Gnostic, the Pelagian, the Augustinian, &c.—having treated its own views as the ruling *analogia fidei*, and applied them to interpretation as elucidating hypotheses. The question therefore is, after deducting accommodations, &c., to discover what was the special aim and inmost intention of Christ and His apostles (see below, p. 284, sqq.).

and Wolffianism, it was chiefly through him that those friendly relations between revelation and natural theology which had generally prevailed in the Lutheran Church, and which Wolffian supernaturalism seemed to have confirmed, were dissolved in Germany. He was neither a philosopher nor a philosophical theologian. Besides an abstruse and pedantic style, he received from Wolff little more than such a notion of religion as was almost merged in morality, and a tendency in his ethical notions towards a refined kind of Eudæmonism, while he regarded piety and Church doctrine as antagonistic in a manner which reminds of G. Arnold.[1] All that was prescribed and established by the Church appeared to him as doctrinal restriction, and religious despotism, arising from ambition, and poisoning or repressing true piety, which can only live in an atmosphere of freedom. It is with real pathos that he endeavours to fashion the whole course of Church history, and especially the history of doctrine, into a controversy against the Church and her teaching, and a defence of the sole right of the individual and his subjectivity. But comprehensive as were his studies, and diligent as were his investigations of authorities with respect to the various schools of theology, he was unable to combine them into an intelligible whole, or to carry out any consistent view.[2] He does not even succeed in giving a consistent exhibition of history; for together with the idea of the Church, which is to him partly a matter of indifference and partly a mischievous institution, he loses both the starting-point and goal

[1] Comp. Baur, *Epochen der Kirchengeschichte*, pp. 132-135; *Tübinger Jahrbücher*, 1850, p. 533, &c. On Semler, compare especially Tholuck's sketch of the changes which have taken place since 1750, in his *Vermischte Schriften*, pt. 2. Uhlhorn, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, ii. 3, p. 650, &c. Schmid, *die Theologie Semlers*, 1858. Ehrenfeuchter, *Geschichte der neueren Theologie*, in Lucke and Wiesler's *theologischen Vierteljahrschrift*, 1847. Semler wrote his autobiography, in 2 pts., 1781-82.

[2] His chief works on Church history are: *Hist. eccl. selecta capita*, 1767; *Versuch eines fruchtbaren Auszugs der Kirchengeschichte*, 3 vols., 1773-78; *Neue Versuche die Kirchenhistorie der ersten Jahrhunderte mehr aufzuklären*, 1788. Semler's other principal works are: *Von freier Untersuchung des Canon*, 1771, 3 pts.; *De dæmoniacis*, 1768. (He also re-edited Balthazar Bekker's *bezauberte Welt* and L. Meyer's *Philosophia scripturæ interpres.*) His doctrinal writings are his *Instit. ad doctr. chr. liberaliter discendam*, 1774; *Apparatus ad libros symb. eccl. Luth.*, 1775; *Versuch einer freieren theologischen Lehrart*, 1777; *Ueber historische gesellschaftliche und moralische Religion der Christen*, 1786; *Letztes Glaubensbekenntniss über natürliche und christliche Religion*, 1792.

of historical theology. Till Semler, it had been customary to regard the primitive age of the Church as that in which its ideal was realized—a view embraced not merely by the Magdeburg centuriators and Arnold, but even by Schröckh.[1] This indeed involved the admission, that the subsequent career of the Church must be regarded not as a progressive development of the Christian principle, but only as a declension therefrom. And thus, even if

[1] Joh. Matth. Schröckh, *christliche Kirchengeschichte*, in 35 pts. (down to the Reformation), Leipsic, 1768-1803. *Christliche Kirchengeschichte* (since the Reformation), in 8 pts., parts 9 and 10 being by Tzschirner, 1810-12. He was the first to give up dividing ecclesiastical history into centuries, and to attempt a division into periods according to subjects (*e.g.* the periods of Constantine, Charlemagne, the Reformation, &c.). He does not attempt, like Mosheim, a history of the community professing the Christian religion, but a history of the Christian religion itself. Hence he concerns himself much with doctrine, of which he gives a series of separate sketches, after the manner of a picture gallery. He does not indeed suppose that events follow each other in a merely accidental manner, but expresses his purpose of "writing a pragmatic history" (pt. i. p. 251), which is to investigate the internal concatenation of different events. But pragmatism is with Schröckh only subjective, and in conformity with the spirit of his age. He inquires into the subjective impulses and causes of historical data as though the subjects alone constituted history, and Christianity and the Church were not themselves also a power, possessing independent vitality, carrying out its functions by means of its organs the subjects, and having, above all, its own aims and purposes. But this subjective pragmatism is carried still further by Spittler (*Grundriss der Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, Göttingen, 1782), Henke (*Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Kirche nach der Zeitfolge*, in 6 vols., 1788-1804), and especially by Planck (*Geschichte der Entstehung der Veränderungen und Bildung, unseres protestantischen Lehrbegriffs vom Anfang der Reformation bis zur Einführung der Concordienformel*, 6 vols., 1781-1800; *Geschichte der christlichen kirchlichen Gesellschaftsverfassung*, 5 vols. 1803-1809; *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie von der Concordienformel an bis in die Mitte des* 18 *Jahrhunderts*, 1831). The pragmatism of the two first is frequently made to subserve their often violent attacks upon the Church and its doctrines. The learned Planck is more moderate and cautious, but even his first work exhibits an indifference to doctrine to which Henke's and Spittler's enmity is almost preferable. A penetrating minuteness to the patience displayed by which it would be impossible, considering his contempt for doctrine, to refuse the tribute of admiration, if it did not, like an obtrusive cicerone, make too great demands upon that of the reader, everywhere discovers purpose, preconcerted design, ambition, hatred, and other passions, to have been the motive forces in the process of doctrinal history. Thus the progressive and independent development of dogma is resolved into psychological dispositions and tendencies, while, at the same time, the author's own doctrinal indifference is unconsciously transferred to the agents of the dogma-forming process, by the axiomatic assumption, that doctrine alone would have been incapable of exciting so much interest or contention. In his eyes doctrine is an antiquated matter, which is properly destined to oblivion. In this method, the view being restricted to efficient causes, and the inherent activity of final causes lost sight of, even the efficient causes are not comprehended in their entirety. Comp. Baur, *Epochen*, &c

general connecting ideas were not entirely lost sight of, a very monotonous relation of all centuries to the idea of the Church was the result. Now Semler did not admit a flourishing period of primitive Christianity, as such, but depicted the early Church in anything but glowing colours. And yet he too did not on that account raise the history of the Church above the monotony of an unproductive movement without rest or pause; for even the history, and especially the teaching of Christ, is made by this "historical interpretation," and the accommodations he embraced, quite an uncertain quantity; so that at last scarcely anything remains as certainly taught by Christ, except an advocacy of individual liberty in religion, without any more definite matter. With its starting-point he loses also the goal of the Church, and thus its history, instead of showing a progress, an approximation towards this goal, does but exhibit repeated outrages of individual freedom, or, at least in the province of doctrine, a chaos of fancies in which he is unable to perceive either value or religious element. While impetuously demanding from the Church an unbounded toleration, which is to see in countless individuals only the thousand-fold gradations of the one truth whose treasures are contained in Jesus, he himself makes no kind of arrangement for exercising this toleration towards the Church, or for entering intelligently into the various doctrinal phenomena. It only remains to say, that it is but the fermentation of elements dissolving, intermingling, attempting new combinations, undergoing fresh decompositions, unexpected even by the spirit which set them in a state of fusion, which is generally reflected in his mind, devoid as it is of independent and higher ideas. For Semler is rather carried away by the process which is going on within him, than able to guide it. His daily work betrayed him into taking a very different part from that which he purposed, and he was almost an unconscious instrument of the impulses which ruled his age.[1]

The results of his studies are deposited in 171 works, generally on historical or exegetical subjects, but always written with a view to doctrinal criticism. It is a fundamental characteristic

[1] This is seen in his position with respect to Bahrdt's *Glaubensbekenntniss*, which shocked him (*Antwort auf das Bahrdtsche Glaubensbekenntniss*, 1779), and to the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist: *Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenannten insbesondere vom Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger*, Halle, 1779.

of all that he has given to the world, to resolve every subject into its constituent atoms, and to exhibit the opposition existing among the latter, while he is wholly devoid of a feeling for that higher unity by which things differing from each other are harmonized. Thus he resolves the history of doctrine into a countless number of views which oppose each other, which appear and disappear in an arbitrary and accidental manner, but which are all equally indifferent opinions so far as religion is concerned. Incapable of attaining to the principle from which doctrine originates, and of perceiving the one end which restrains and combines the unceasing ebb and flow of its restless waves, he can see nothing but change and variableness instead of unity and progress. Only external powers such as Platonism, Stoicism, Judaism, &c., are, in his eyes, the occasions of these movements. Hence, he too knows only of a pathology, and has no acquaintance with the energy and dynamics of doctrine. In a like spirit also, he prefers solving questions of biblical criticism and exegesis, by the adoption of glosses, appendices, and the negative or positive influences of the notions of the age. And yet he made some discoveries. Thus he was the first who brought forward the importance of the opposition between the doctrine of St. Paul and the Judaizing party in primitive Christendom. He views the Catholic epistles as having a conciliatory intention with regard to both these parties. Relying upon Luther's example, he also reopened the way for a more enlightened criticism and investigation of the canon. Like him he insists, in his numerous contributions to the criticism of the canon, on not being exclusively led by historical arguments, and least of all when these are not of an entirely reliable nature. He perceives that a doctrinal principle must also concur in deciding on the canonicity of a book, in other words, that its contents must be in harmony with the Christian faith. He desires not to base the authority of holy Scripture on evidence addressed merely to the understanding. The only evidence which can fully satisfy the candid reader is an inward conviction produced by the truths he meets with in Scripture. This, however, he explains in the following manner: "The proof lies in the advantages of Christianity to every man," or "every man who makes use of the teaching of Scripture perceives that he thereby becomes wise to his true welfare." This he calls *fides divina,* which he refers to the

*Testimonium Spiritus Sancti.* For he always embraces the influence of the Holy Spirit, by means especially of the word of Scripture. While the ancient *fides* of the Evangelical Church had for its object Christ and His salvation, the object of faith is, according to Semler, the morally improving truths taught by Christ. The feeling for truth, however, upon which he falls back, may—as degrees of moral and religious culture differ—assent to very different propositions, and is besides a very subjective criterion. That which is not edifying, which does not subserve the improvement of man, he regards as worthless—and this is a standpoint which may banish much that is of intrinsic value by designating it as unpractical, especially where the religious interest is apt to stop at generalities.

The following are the results of his critical investigations: the Pentateuch, whose intrinsic credibility he embraces, did not attain its present form till long after Moses, it is nevertheless based upon Mosaic writings; Genesis is founded on pre-Mosaic documents; the historical books, as well as many among the Hagiographa, do not give the impression of being inspired writings; Esther contains a Jewish fable; the Proverbs of Solomon may have been in part collected by the men of Hezekiah, and the Psalms not till the time of Ezra. With respect to the New Testament, the three first Gospels contain, in his view, too much σὰρξ, too many miracles, while he highly esteems the fourth, and the writings of St. Paul. The Apocalypse is a Judaizing production.[1] It is worthy of remark that, at its commencement, the whole critical movement of modern times coincided in this assertion, and after attacking almost every book in succession, at last arrived at the conclusion that the Apocalypse was genuine, chiefly for the sake, indeed, of turning it against the genuineness of the Gospel.

We have remarked above that, according to Semler, history is a mere stream, an incessant becoming, devoid of a real existence for its firm foundation and uniting bond amidst all mutations, and having no certain end in view. He is also deficient in that "genuine historical intuition which is at once genetic and teleologic." His vast reading showed him a mutability of "theological opinions," from which he could find no

[1] Kleuker, Storr, and others, are, on the contrary, the special defenders of its genuineness.

other means of escape than by regarding them as all equally indifferent, so far as religion itself was concerned, and by retreating from them, as well as from the orthodoxy formed by them, to what he calls his "*private religion.*" A great truth, viz. the distinction between religion and theology, is here fermenting within him; but what he calls religion is independent not only of divinity and scientific method, but almost entirely so of knowledge, and is therefore something utterly indefinite, meagre and unconnected with the public religion. Accepting a theorem of Thomasius the territorialist, who, while assigning to the ruler the right of regulating the external forms of religion, reserves the freedom of its inner province, Semler allows in the subject, the free and unrestrained prevalence of the most opposite views and errors, because these are, in a religious point of view, indifferent. He fails, however, to perceive that this entails a consequence which he does not really desire, viz. that the Church, which cannot exist without doctrine, would be dissolved, and that private piety would in such a state of separatism be starved and wither. Piety, while desiring to distinguish between that which is essential to Christian truth, and that which is incidental to the external association, needs the support of settled positive convictions, and these, wherever they are found, will manifest a tendency and power to form a community. Uniformity of doctrine would, he thinks, limit the power of comprehension inherent in the Christian religion (which, according to his own view of it, he most earnestly embraces), a power extending to the most differing ages, races, and individuals; while he regards diversity not as a hindrance, but as a vital condition of true religion. But if all is thus susceptible of change, the subject is left without any objective eternal truths, any standard of judgment. Hence, he is willing to admit a solid substance in the external covering of Christianity, and regards Christianity as a revelation arising from a Divine inspiration of those ideas and truths, which serve to heal or improve mankind. It is, however, obvious—from the fact that he finds in the greater part of holy Scripture, nothing more than a repetition of that natural religion which was sufficient for God's purpose among the heathen—how vague and indefinite were his views both of these truths and of the spiritual improvement of mankind. The smaller and remaining part of holy Scripture states the very few distinctive

doctrines concerning the best way of entering into union with God. He is a Christian who orders his life according to Christ's teaching and example. Agreement concerning non-practical propositions is not necessary; on the contrary, each individual needs, for his moral improvement, something different from that which is required by another. As no two Christians are exactly alike, so also will each have, properly speaking, a different Bible. It is self-evident how the already described tendencies of Less, Spalding, Miller, Jerusalem, Nösselt, &c., which estimated all Christian doctrines according to their practical utility, and set up for this purpose a so-called practical divinity, inwardly coincided in this standpoint.

Semler preserved to the last his personal piety, and his love to the Person of the Redeemer, of which he gave some touching instances. But this personal side, never attaining to a form in which it might have become transferable, was therefore without effect. That which did influence his age was rather those negative conclusions which shocked, nay, uprooted, all that was established, and which found the more acceptance because Semler combined with a study of authorities, which was of most unusual extent, an earnestness of mind far removed from all frivolity. The adversaries of Christianity regarded him as their associate, until his opposition of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist, which did not, however, hinder them from appealing to him, and that with great satisfaction. And yet Semler's method was not quite without better fruits. Among these are Hess's works on Scripture history, in which this is viewed as a Divine education of the world. The same author also wrote a history of the life of Christ.[1] It was in connection with the labours of Semler that divinity now again frequently took up the history of doctrines.[2] At all events, it is to him that we are indebted for setting the example of the historical method. He is estimated far too highly when he is regarded as the father of modern theology in general. For the historico-critical mode of procedure forms but one of its factors, nay, only one of its postulates. Neither did he carry this out to certain principles or established inferences. It is not,

[1] Hess, *Kern der Lehre vom Reich Gottes*, 1819. *Bibl. Geschichte A. u. N. T.*, &c., 23 vols., † 1828.

[2] So *e.g.* Döderlein, *Institutio theol. dogm.*, 1782. Also, the Cotta edition of J. Gerhard's *Loci*, with its excellent supplement. Döderlein's views are Arian and semi-Pelagian, while Gabler goes as far as Socinianism.

however, saying more than the fact to own that he has attained to lasting importance by the introduction of the historical factor into theology. The older theology had beheld in doctrines a system complete from the very beginning, in the canon of Scripture an unalterable whole, beyond the province of criticism, in the Old Testament essentially the same contents and an equally direct source of instruction as in the New, and had failed to perceive in sacred history a gradual and progressive revelation. Now, Semler opened the way for an historical view of all these questions by again agitating them; and thus one important element of the Reformation again took the place of that absence of all criticism which had since set in. Upon the whole, however, the chief result of Semler's labours was rather to destroy than to build up.

To this the above-described (see p. 268) general tendency of the age not a little contributed. Sam. Reimarus, professor at Hamburg, 1728, † 1768, Moses Mendelssohn of Berlin, † 1786, Nicolai, Biester, Gedicke, Abr. Teller of Frankfort on the Oder, Steinbart, † 1809, of Halle, Eberhard, 1778-1808, and the superficial and low-minded Bahrdt, † 1792, were the chief advocates of negative illuminism.[1]

Reimarus was the author of the seven so-called Wolfenbüttel Fragments,[2] edited by Lessing from 1774 and onwards (that on the purpose of Jesus in 1777). The "anonymous" writer was not merely concerned for the toleration of Deism, but attacked in the rudest and most daring manner the moral character of Jesus and His disciples. Jesus desired to appear as a reformer of Judaism, and to give Himself out for an earthly king, but His plan was frustrated. His disciples then explained His plan as having alluded to a spiritual kingdom, and invented the tale of His resurrection, which is however self-contradictory. The

[1] K. F. Bahrdt, *Briefe über die systematische Theologie*, 1770, *Glaubens bekenntniss*, 1779. *Briefe über die Bibel in Volkston*, 1782-83. *System der moralischen Religion*, 1787, 1791, 3 pts. *Von der Gottheit Christi*, 1775. *Plan und Zweck Jesu*, 1784.

[2] On the toleration of Deists; on the decrying of reason from pulpits; the impossibility of a revelation in which all men could have a well-founded belief; that the Books of the Old Testament were not written to reveal a religion; on the history of the Resurrection; on the purpose of Jesus and His disciples. Others were published in Niedner's *Zeitschrift*, 1850-52. Comp. the latest defence of "the martyr;" Strauss's *H. S. Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift für die vernunftigen Verehrer Gottes*, Leipsic, 1862.

author declares himself to be conducting an "historical" investigation, but fails to perceive that he is himself obliged to invent a fiction, and descend to the most unworthy and unhistorical view of Christianity, to impress upon the character of Jesus a stamp of ambition and fanaticism, and to represent His disciples as deceivers.[1] The Fragments did indeed cause a commotion, but their attacks were based upon assumptions so arbitrary that no lengthened or productive controversy resulted.[2] On the contrary, the contest was soon merged in that between Lessing and Göze (see below), of which the Fragments were rather the occasion than the chief subjects of discussion.[3] To understand the agency of Nicolai, we must remember that, subsequently to the seventh decade of this century, theological questions were no longer confined to professed theologians, but transferred to the general and increasing circle of the reading public. The widely spread order of freemasons had aimed at a universal humanistic religion, which, though it was sketched but in broad outlines, had in reality a destructive influence.[4] Since the time of Thomasius, Latin had more and more given place to German, though this language was, for the most part, but awkwardly handled. Rousseau, Voltaire, and the encyclopædists, with their naturalism and sensualism, nay, even materialism and atheism, had been imported from France, as the new learning of the most cultivated of nations; and the court as well as the opinions of Frederic II. were favourable to French influence. The Deistical literature

[1] Semler, in his above-named work, makes it a matter of reproach that, with all his Church-destroying views, he was aiming at condemning the minds of men to uniformity, though, indeed, a negative uniformity. He desired that freer views should be maintained in the department of private religion.

[2] The assertion that the history of the resurrection involves contradictions is certainly acutely carried out, but it is forgotten that the narrative presents far greater difficulties on the assumption of concerted design and fraudulent invention on the part of the Apostles.

[3] Other works in a similar spirit are: Paalzow's *Hierocles*, 1785 (a discourse between Michaelis, Semler, Less, and others), 1785; Rhiem, *Reines Christenthum*, 1789; *Christus und die Vernunft*, 1792 (K. Venturini, † 1807); *Natürliche Geschichte des grossen Propheten von Nazareth, Bethlehem*, Copenhagen, 2d edit., 3 pts., 1806; *Geschichte des Urchristenthums im Zusammenhange mit der Geschichte des grossen Propheten von Nazareth*, Copenhagen, 1807 (Von Langsdorf, † 1834); *Gott und Natur, Religion Christi und Religion der Christenheit*, 1828; *Einfache Darstellung des Lebens Jesu*, 1831. According to Venturini, falsehoods and intrigues were the sources of Christianity.

[4] Comp. Niedner, *Kirchengeschichte*, latest edit., 1866, pp. 813, 936.

of England, at first known through its refutations, was soon translated into German and very widely spread. All this was used by Nicolai, the bookseller of Berlin, for the purpose of systematically setting the fashion of decided illuminism, and ensuring its triumph by the publication of the *Allgem. deutsche Bibliothek*, 1765-1806, to which he was also a contributor.

Eberhard[1] wrote in a more dignified tone. But he too regards God as the author of Christianity only in the same sense as He is the author of all things, viz., in an indirect manner; for miracles would be an infraction of the order of nature, and inconsistent with Divine wisdom. Christianity arose, according to Eberhard, from a union of the Eastern mind, *i.e.* of the feeling for the supersensuous, with the Western Greek mind, *i.e.* the sense for a reasonable inculcation of virtue.[2] This union of oriental and Greek culture gave to Christianity its character of universality, while before its appearance all public religions were special and national, and all morality consisted in the observance of civil law. Semler had already made the one Church and its canon, which included the writings of all the Fathers, originate from two parties, the external Christians who followed Peter, and the internal Christians who were followers of John and Paul, each of which had its own books, gospels, &c.; and Eberhard now adopted the notions of a strife among the apostles themselves, between the Petrine party and the more liberal party of Paul, who, himself superior to Jewish narrowness, was the first to complete in himself this union of the oriental and occidental mind.[3]

A deistical atmosphere seemed to have settled upon this generation, and to have cut it off from vital communion with God. To order one's self according to mere natural reason and self-complacency in this finite state of existence, and to think of nothing beyond it, were regarded as true wisdom and sound common sense. Religion was converted into morality, and morality into the politic teaching of Eudæmonism, in a coarser or more refined form. Reasoning and arguing were the order of the day,

[1] J. A. Eberhard, *Neue Apologie des Socrates oder Untersuchung über die Glückseligkeits lehre der Heiden*, 1772, and *Geist des Urchristenthums*, 3 vols., Halle, 1807.

[2] Recalling Renan and Strauss in our own days. Comp. Strauss, *Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk*, 1764, pp. 168, &c.

[3] Excellent humorous descriptions will be found in Schlegel's *Athenæum*.

and the very faculty of imagination and originality seemed lost. And though neological theologians, such as Abr. Teller, Gedicke, and Biester, whom Spalding and Jerusalem followed at some distance, maintained for the most part some moderation, yet the influence of the so-called illuminism was widespread, and, till the close of the century, unintermitting. The symbolical books were, for the most part, consigned to oblivion, and the obligation to receive them became an empty form. Busching discussed the right of the Evangelical Church to impose such obligations, and decided in the negative. The extent of the apostasy from the confessions of the Reformation is shown by the fact, that the edict of Wöllner, 1788, which was intended to oppose a barrier to neology by its admonitions concerning the obligation of an oath, and the power of the State to inflict penalties, had exactly the opposite effect. Its abolition, which was one of the first acts of Frederick William III., was a declaration that the contest which had arisen was to be allowed to take its course, without the intervention of extrinsic force. It may be truly said that this was not doing justice to the *rights* of the Church, which is no mere association of inquirers, or of men accepting the articles of faith of Moses Mendelssohn. But this makes it only the more obvious that the new turn which was soon to be taken and to press triumphantly onwards originated from the intrinsic free power of the Church itself, and the establishment of such a fact was of more value than all that external force or fully upheld rights could have maintained or effected.

Harbingers of this new turn appeared as the representatives not indeed of affected but of a genuine and deeper mental culture, during the whole period of illuminism. The mention of these now leads us to a review of the other aspect of the præ-Kantian period.

## CHAPTER II.

THE REACTION OF THE FORMLESS BUT VIGOROUS INTELLECT AGAINST THE DEADNESS OF ORTHODOXY AND THE EMPTINESS OF ILLUMINISM: KLOPSTOCK, HAMANN, CLAUDIUS, LESSING, AND HERDER.

We are apt to undervalue, with respect to theology, the period succeeding 1750, by conceiving it to have been more meagre and negative than it really was. Meagre indeed it was, as we have already seen; nay, for the most part, utterly flat and stale, so far as the prevalent theology was concerned. Half-heartedness and false compromises lowered the standard of Christian faith, for the sake of satisfying the philosophic notions of the age. But along with all this, mighty impulses were working as they had never before done in Germany, and these called forth a new German literature, and produced mental tendencies which at first advanced together in a peaceful, nay, a friendly manner, but then separated to seek, after most serious conflicts, for a new union, and to effect a rejuvenescence of the intellectual life of the German nation. These impulses were, some of a religious and some of a secular kind.[1] They did not indeed at first exert any influence upon professional theology, but as literary productions they fertilized the soil of popular life, from which, in the fulness of time, a higher theology was to be born. On this account we must pause awhile at this period, for this is the atmosphere in which the creators of modern science, theology included, were brought up and came to maturity. It is among them that we shall find, in the form of presentient feelings, the germs which were afterwards developed. And first *Poetry*, which was now approaching its classical period, must come under consideration. Christian poetry took a new flight in Klopstock, Claudius, Lavater, and Stalberg; Goethe, and Schiller, after Lessing had opened the way, advocated the universal human, while Herder and Jacobi occupied a middle station between these two groups.

[1] Compare Schlosser, *Geschichte des 18 Jahrhunderts*, iii. 2; Gervinus, Gelzer, *die neuere deutsche Rationalliteratur*, 3d ed. 1858; Hettner, *Geschichte der neueren Literatur*, iii.; Jul. Schmidt, *Geschichte des geistigen Lebens in Deutschland von Leibnitz bis auf Lessings Tod*, 1681-1781; *Gesch. der deutschen Liter. seit Lessings Tod*, 1858; Vilmar, *Gesch. der deutschen Nationalliteratur*, vol. ii. Marburg, 1851; K. Barthel, *die deutsche Nationalliteratur der Neuzeit*, A. 5, 1858.

Klopstock, 1724-1803, the German Milton, is distinguished for having bathed that orthodox doctrine, which he left entirely unaltered, in the fervour of religious feeling and imagination, and thus implanted, with renewed youth and vigour, in a thousand hearts, those old traditional beliefs which had hitherto been confined to the understanding. He attained this end by leading men's minds from Christian *doctrine* to its fountain head, to the life of the Saviour, which he described in animated verse. It was a hopeful omen for the new literature that the "Messiah" should stand on the threshold which separated the ancient from the modern period, just as a new era dawned upon the German nation with the Heliand. It may moreover be considered a characteristic and honourable distinction of the popular mind of Germany, that the reception of Klopstock's great poetical creation should be so enthusiastic, at a time when, both in England and France, a contempt of all ideality, a despair of a higher standard of human life, was so widely spread by the chilling influences of Deism and materialism, and by a systematic egotism. It was as though the German mind was to be consecrated and equipped for the approaching era of those historical and critical researches whose central point was increasingly to be the image of the Redeemer. It cannot be denied that the great poem did not do justice to its subject; though narrating history, its tone is rather lyric than epic, and the portraiture of Christ is defaced by a certain indefiniteness and immateriality. The Divine and Eternal element does not seem sufficiently incorporated in the earthly and historical, and does not tread the ground with sufficient firmness. Christ appears more as the symbol of compassionate, saving, divine love, than as a real Person, carrying out a freely chosen work in the midst of the opposition and attacks of actually existing powers. A great part of the poem is occupied by non-historical matters, the connection between which and the subject is more or less slight. Neither do we find an adequate representation of the fact, that the conflict in which the universe was concerned had its centre of gravity in this world, and that the Saviour's divine-human heart, agitated as it was by real struggles, fought the battle and gained the victory in a corner of this earth, which thenceforward became to the whole race a sacred place whence inexhaustible blessing and salvation flowed forth. The very men of the Messiah have, as has justly been

remarked, too little individuality; they do not seem to live and breathe, but are rather exemplifications of certain notions or sentiments, *e.g.* of devoutness, humility, or fidelity, than strongly-marked characters. Such an image of Christ was essentially in conformity with the theology of the day, which still abridged the human in favour of the Divine side of His nature, and failed to perceive that the Divine, in so far as it does not become human, remains unrevealed, and hovers in a sublime indefiniteness, which cannot become a subject of vivid and plastic contemplation, but only one of aspiration and ecstatic feeling. But Klopstock, standing as he did on the threshold of a new era, and already influenced by its subjective character, by making the Son of Man, so far as he had hitherto been developed in the mind of German Christendom, the subject of a poem, secured—as Milton did in his days—the sacred and supreme treasure of mankind, against the overflowing floods of a destructive age, and preserved it in animated words, which the longing heart could feel and understand, even at a time when its mystery was to become an enigma, nay, a contradiction, to the more powerfully stirred reason.

When Klopstock does descend from the sublime and the enthusiastic to the earthly and the actual, it is to celebrate his fatherland, whose language, customs, and independence, he endeavours, even at the time when the German empire was at its lowest point of depression, to maintain pure and intact. His patriotism, which was elevated into a religious feeling, and which tuned the lyres of a series of other poets, contributed not a little to the impression that his piety was sound and vigorous, and to the popularity of his poems. Yet even in this respect also there is a want of that moral manliness, which might have acted as a middle term between the German mind and the realm of Divine. He is ever the German youth, with his ideal aspirations, his soaring imagination, his excited feelings. The life of the fully-developed thought and will is cast into the background. If, however, the blossoms of the ideal feelings do not set in fertile fruits, in which they continue to operate as a power of silent but creative vitality, such feelings do but evaporate into vagueness, or lose in inward truth by repetition, and give an impression of the pathetic rather than of the animated. Klopstock, it may be said, stands before us as the venerated herald of the coming age, a herald who

directed attention to the highest object. But his works, like sabbath bells, gave to the world and to Germany rather the promise of living and spiritual worship than its reality.

Hamann[1] is a kindred spirit, on account both of the profundity and inwardness of his Christian feeling and of his enthusiasm for Christianity, which he proclaims not in verse but, like one exercising the gift of prophecy in the primitive Church, in language unconnected indeed, but often sublime, and still oftener enigmatical by reason of its fulness of matter and abundance of allusion. Hamann is a far more philosophic spirit than Klopstock, more fertile in new views, endowed with unusual profundity, which ever enables him to grasp things in their divine and eternal relations, but which, through his lack of dialectic talent, and under the pressure of immense but desultory learning, is often expressed in unconnected and oracular sentences. Goethe, who occupied himself in collecting his works and called him our intellectual great-grandfather, was deeply impressed by this fertile genius, who brought forth, as from a rich vein of ore, an abundance of original thoughts suited to the wants of the age. Highly esteemed by the greatest men of his day, by Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Jacobi, he obtained the name of the Magus of the North. The freedom and largeness of his views raised him above the anxieties entertained by the pious of his age, because deeply rooted as he was in evangelical Christianity, he was firmly persuaded of its intellectual superiority to the whole kin of neologists, and could look with the triumphant certainty of amusement at their efforts to overthrow it. Himself well versed in classical antiquity, he recognized the affinity of Christianity to all that was eternal in the classic world. While to the mass of his contemporaries, Christianity and humanity, historical and eternal truth, the human and the Divine, are terms expressing irreconcilable opposites, he is able to perceive their unity. His favourite thought is, *omnia divina et humana omnia.* The whole world is to him full of signs, full of meaning, full of the Divine. Man is a tree whose trunk is nourished by two roots, one of which turns to the invisible origin of all things, the other to the earthly and the visible. In history—and not merely in the history of revelation in the Old and New Testaments—he

[1] Hamann's *Werke*, ed. Roth, 1821, 8 books. For particulars concerning him: Gildemeister, 1857, Herbert, and others.

sees the historicalization [*Geschichtlichwerden*], the incorporation of the eternal; and faith is, in his view, the faculty of perceiving God's acts in history and His works in nature, the power of beholding the unity of the metaphysical, the eternal and the historical, and of intuitively discerning the divine in the temporal. His mysticism is not merely the subjective mysticism of the feelings, but is open to objective concrete matter from nature, and especially from history; in fact it is theosophy. Thus faith being the focus which comprehends in its entireness, and therefore grasps at its centre of gravity that which unbelief separates in either a non-ideal or material manner, he finds in such faith the truth of things (ὑπόστασις), and therefore the source of true knowledge. Herein it is that he radically differs from the rationalism of the age, which acknowledges none but eternal truths and accepts none but the mathematical mode of proof. He sees in such notions only superstition, delusion, and philosophic juggling. He is however no less opposed to the mere experience of the senses, for he perceives that this tends to materialism and atheism. Flesh and blood know no other God than the universe, no other spirit than the letter. He also discovers the inward relation between the intellectualism of orthodoxy and the rationalism of the age, which alike resolved the higher spiritual life into a work of the understanding. The main thing is that that religious susceptibility which forms the very basis of our existence should attain assurance, and be united with God by realities which are their own evidence, and which bring with them conviction to the soul. Thus are we transferred from mere reasoning, or from the impulses and perceptions of the senses, to the atmosphere of true life. And here it is specially by means of the documents of the history of revelation that—according to Hamann—we become conscious of the presence of God in history. God, at whose bidding are the storm, the fire and the earthquake, chooses for the token of His presence a still small voice which we tremble to hear in His word and in our own hearts. Grace and truth are not to be discovered or acquired, they must be historically revealed. Revelation takes the form of a servant both in Christ and in the Scriptures; the eternal history bears a human form, a body which is dust and ashes and perishable, the visible letter; but also a soul which is the breath of God. And it is by such self-humiliation of the Spirit of God

to the pen of man, such self-abnegation of the Son of God, that the Spirit and the Son dwell among us.

Creation itself is a work of God's word. The wish "speak that I may see Thee" is fulfilled by creation. All God's works are tokens of His attributes, all corporeal nature is a parable of the spiritual world. At first, all God's works were a word of God to man, emblems and pledges of a new, an unutterable union. But sin interposed. Separated from God, the world became an enigma to us. The knowledge of God, without which love to God is impossible, acquaintance and sympathy being necessary elements of love, is no longer possible through the contemplation of His works, which less know and less reveal Him than we ourselves. But the books of the covenant as well as the book of nature contain secret articles, and these God has been pleased to reveal to men through their fellow men. Hence revelation and experience, which are intrinsically harmonious, are the most indispensable crutch, if our reason is not to remain hopelessly lame. God's word is heard in nature and in history; and the noon of history, that is God's day, is in Christ. Judaism had the word and signs, heathenism reason and its wisdom, but Christianity is that to which neither the men of the letter nor the men of speculation could attain; it is the glorification of manhood in the Godhead, and of the Godhead in manhood, through the Fatherhood of God. He regards religious spiritualism, which was then appearing in a deistical form, religious materialism and literal traditionalism as inwardly allied. Deism and Roman Catholicism, he says, have but one root, the one expresses the secret and the tendency of the other—superstition and unbelief, which stand or fall together. On the other hand, he holds poetry, religion, philosophy, history, scripture, and spirit to be intrinsically united, but this union he only perceives intellectually and indirectly, without the power of making a connected and orderly statement of the reasons which induce this view.

Lavater was like Klopstock, a poetic genius and full of feeling, but his imagination was less rich, and he had more tenderness than power. Together with a breadth and versatility for the reception of outward impressions, he exhibits a vigorous concentration upon the central point of his mental life, and it is the loyalty of a grateful heart which binds him to the Person of

Christ.[1] His chief concern is not exactness of doctrine, but that higher life which emanates from Christ. He, too, favours the view which regards Christianity as the religion of humanity, but he seeks the *true* man, and finds only wretched ruins of the true human image where this has not been reinstated by the Saviour. His lyric poetry, like his other literary productions, aims at something more than to describe and to please; it does not satisfy him to collect all that is great and beautiful in history, nor to idealize reality through the power of imagination; he is concerned for a *real* idealization, a moral transfiguration of the disfigured and obscured image of man. His desire is that his words and poetry may *exert an influence*, and his is not merely a lyric but an ethic pathos, which however but too often delights in rhetorical flights. But though he too contributed to the formation of that mental atmosphere and temperament in which the age became susceptible of freer and deeper views of life and of religion, he also was deficient in the possession of solid objective truths, of truths which are not only established, but have also been assimilated by the reason, in that philosophic mind and in that feeling for historical criticism which alone can secure lasting influence. Renouncing the quiet but safe path of scientific thought, ever seeking after fresh excitement of feeling, and straining his ideal emotions to their highest pitch, Lavater was betrayed both in his doctrine of prayer and in his theory of physiognomy, into extravagances which had the effect of limiting his influence. The same may be said of Jung Stilling, who while, by his *Grauen Mann* and other works, he contributed to the revival of religion in many minds, and opposed to the dead Deism then so prevalent a lively faith in Providence, was yet not free from subjectivistic admixture, for he unconsciously made his faith in a special and intentional guidance of his life subserve a certain self-love and self-complacency, which inclined him to regard himself as a chosen instrument of God designed for special purposes. A great part of the blame however of this morbid side of the characters of these distinguished Christians must be laid upon the age in which they lived, characterized as it was by general dissolution, and their consequent isolation. There was a total absence of the corrective influences of the higher kind of

[1] So too Pfenninger, his Zurich friend, *Jüd. Briefe an der Zeit Jesu von Nazareth*, 1783.

social life, and it was but the reflex of such a deficiency that the intercourse of these ardent love-craving spirits was confined to the scattered few, the elect, the sympathizing, and Christian love made to appear in the form not always of an "heroic" affection devoted to good works, but of a "romantic" enjoyment of mutual love and friendship. The epistolary correspondence of the age testifies to this fact; much of its best feeling is deposited therein, and if subsequent times have overcome the deficiency above alluded to, we may still wish them the possession of equally strong and ardent affections.

Among the above-named friends the name of Claudius, 1743-1815, is pre-eminent for that solid and thoroughly healthy faith, which, nourished by the marrow of those facts of Christianity, which are ever renewing their youth, was opposed both to an ossified orthodoxy and to neology—a faith which replied in popular and heart-reviving language to the attacks of its opponents, and which, whether they were Goliaths or pigmies, encountered them with the weapons of humour and pungent wit. His character exhibited a happy and delicate combination of the love of nature and the love of God. His large blue eye rested with joy and gratitude upon all that was beautiful, upon all the moral excellences of the old, and even of the heathen world. Philosophy inspires him with respect when it is an impulse towards the true and the good, "for if thou wilt not honour this in man, what else has he that is worthy of honour?" More especially has he a lively sense of the calm and simple dignity of holy Scripture, nor does he suffer himself to be defrauded of the solid treasure they contain, either by the manner of interpretation then in vogue which emptied them of their meaning, or by a senseless bondage to the letter. Among the sacred writers St. John is his favourite. The holy image of the Saviour casts him upon his knees. Such moral greatness and goodness as the Bible relates of Him never entered into the heart of man to conceive. He rises like a star in the night upon the poor pilgrims of earth, and satisfies their inmost wishes and aspirations. With such experience of the inherent power of Christianity, Claudius has a genuine perception of its independence of theological crises. He knows that the sacred object of faith is untouched by its multitudinous assailers. He does not fear for God and for Christ, but for His children, whom he seeks to withdraw

from the perils entailed upon them by the spirit of the age, by endeavouring, in opposition to the prevailing mode of education, to keep alive in them the impression of life and originality, instead of using that reasoning and reflecting method which admits the validity of nothing that cannot be proved by argument.

In Lessing's mind (1729-1781), clear and sharp as a well-cut and polished diamond, were accumulated, as in but few peculiarly gifted spirits, all the various interests by which the intellectual world of his age was stirred.[1] The chaos of a world falling into ruins, and the superficial attempts at new formations, were taken up by his extensive learning, to be weighed and examined by the standard of an inexorable logic and love of truth. His was a mind fitted by nature for the work of bringing to a close the process of dissolution taking place in that which was perishable, and of purifying the intellectual atmosphere like a sharp and healthy wind. In doing this, however, he was far from contenting himself with cheap expedients, whether old or new, or with still cheaper contempt for all that was old. So much feeling, nay reverence, for history was innate in him, that he could not look upon the new as standing the test, unless internally connected with the old, preserving its germs, and developing them in freer forms.

To this very day uncertain and often opposite views are held concerning Lessing. Some are inclined to ascribe to him a more positively Christian, though not an orthodox character, in proof of which they appeal to his construction of the doctrine of the Trinity from the self-consciousness, or to the stress that he lays upon the Apostles' Creed as the rule of faith. Others designate him, with either praise or blame, as the head of the "Illuminists;" while others again not only impute to him a change from orthodox to heterodox opinions, but even deny that any settled positive views at all are to be found in his works, because he was always ready γυμναστικῶς and indifferently to side first with one party

[1] Compare Lessing's works by Lachmann, 13 vols. 1838. On Lessing himself, see Ritter, *Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie*, ii. pp. 480, &c.; and on his philosophical and religious principles, the *Göttinger Studien* for 1847. Guhrauer, *Gotthold Ephraim Lessings Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts und Lessings Leben*. Schlosser, *Geschichte des* 18 *Jahrhunderts*. Gelzer, as above. Gervinus, *Literaturgeschichte*, iv. Bohtz, *Lessings Protestantismus und Nathan der Weise*. C. Schwarz, *G. E. Lessing als Theologe*. H. Lang, *Religiöse Charaktere*, i. 215-257. G. R. Röpe, J. W. Göze. *Eine Rettung*, 1860.

then with another. Nay, in a celebrated saying, he renounces on principle the knowledge of truth, and calls himself one ever seeking without hope of finding. We can agree with none of these notions, but hope that the following remarks on his philosophical standpoint may lead to the formation of a certain and correct decision.

Lessing appeared to many a Deist and an advocate of natural religion, because he was the editor of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, yet he opposed three kinds of Illuminism; that of dry ethics and tedious moralizing without imagination or sentiment; hence he is antagonistic to Campe, Salzmann, and Nicolai, the reformers of education, and to the profane Bahrdt. But no less so to Eberhard, who tried to represent Christianity as Deism and rational religion. Finally, he was also opposed to Semler and his school, who sought, by critical operations of an anti-dogmatic kind, to arrive at a primitive Christianity, which was but a summary of dry and abstract philosophical maxims. Jacobi declared him to be a follower of Spinoza. But he is far from being this, for he acknowledges a God of providence, who is a free and conscious spirit, and who, as the Final Cause, purposes the education of the human race. Spinoza's inactive, inert eternity of substance is infinitely tiresome to Lessing. In his view God is a unity which does not exclude multiplicity; for God, as the sole Principle and Creator of all things, must bear within Himself a multiplicity of principles. Leibnitz's theory of monads was no useless notion to Lessing, though he makes no pretension to be able to deduce multiplicity from the unity which is God. He also believes firmly in the reality of God's existence and in that of the world; and this is the starting-point of the knowledge of God. Though he confesses himself unable to deduce the many from the One, yet the truth of the many depends, in his view, on the fact that the thoughts of God, in which are truth and being, are in the many. The thoughts of God must be divided, or they would not be many; but, by virtue of the unity of God, the many thoughts of God are nevertheless harmonious, and form a connected world, in which all, moved by *one* thought of God, is soul or life in a higher or lower degree. Matter denotes the limits of finite existence on the one hand, the soul, made in God's image, on the other, takes the highest rank. But the latter being at first subjected to the confusion of the concep-

tions and the power of sensuous impulses, is therefore morally enslaved; and this is in his idea the doctrine of original sin. Since however the whole race of man, as well as each individual, begins in the confusion of sensuous impulses, man alone could not educate mankind, hence *God is the Educator of the human race.*

This idea of a Divine education of mankind involves a view which, Christian as it is, was long misconceived by theology. For the withdrawal of the human side in the history of religion, the absolutely supernatural character which was attributed to the Old Testament religion left but a precarious position for an actual history of the progressive stages of revelation. On the other hand, the idea of the Divine education could not but be more favourable to an historical view, as being adapted to throw light upon the manifold wisdom of the love which was in process of revealing itself.[1] At the same time it incited to an investigation of God's education of the whole human race, and not of the Jewish nation only, and to the attempt to reconcile the apostolic statements, that God suffered the heathen to walk in their own ways, and that He left not Himself without witness.

It is in this wide sense that Lessing embraces the idea of the Divine education. His opinion, to speak more strictly, is, that it is an error in natural theology to assume an innate and complete knowledge of God and of His will. It was necessary that man, being at first in the debased condition above described, should be educated by positive revelation, to which he must occupy a position of believing obedience. The truths of the reason [*Vernunftwahrheiten*] are the essence of this revelation. These are clothed in the form by means of which they become accessible to the standpoint of each age, and this covering contains as much as the human mind is at each epoch capable of comprehending. This form or covering is not indeed the essence, not necessary for salvation under all circumstances; the inner revelation is alone indispensable; this is a continuous miracle in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, a miracle wrought by the Spirit of God, since it is His thought and His creative power which is ever present and active within us. This Spirit excites religion within us, and this is not a matter of the understanding, but

[1] Hess also (1741-1828) carries out this idea in his *Kern der Lehre vom Reich Gottes*, 1819, and in earlier works (see above, p. 288).

of the heart and the feeling. These feelings are inspired by God, and are the means by which God leads us to the knowledge of all the truths of the reason. Nevertheless, external revelations are also necessary for certain stages, though these external matters, such as miracles and prophecies, are but a scaffolding which is to lead to the internal, to that substance of religion which is in men inspired by God. Positive revelations are in his view by no means an arbitrary addition, a purposely chosen covering for ideas, or those reason-truths which these God-inspired men possessed without any symbolical covering. On the contrary, he sees in positive revelation the necessary primitive form of truth, without entering further into the inquiry whether such form is to be regarded as of divine arrangement, or whether all which he reckons as pertaining to the scaffolding is to be set to the account of men, and of that God-ordained limitation which is God's appointment, and by reason of which they could do nothing else than clothe the original divine impulse in those forms.

Lessing attempts to prove both historically and philosophically the existence of different stages in this education. The Old Testament was an elementary book for a childish people, hence its temporal punishments and rewards, and its silence on the doctrine of immortality. This nation, coming into contact with foreign nations also children, was enlightened concerning the revelation given it, by the reason of those nations which had been developed without revelation. But since to stay too long over an elementary book would only narrow the mind, it was taken out of their hand by a better teacher, even Christ, who was the first practical and trustworthy teacher of immortality. The motives of moral action now become purer; for punishment and reward are transferred to an invisible and future state of existence. The second period, namely, Christianity is moreover promoted to the doctrines of the Trinity, original sin, and satisfaction. According to Lessing, even reason must conceive of the Trinity as a necessary process of the Divine self-consciousness, but it is not in his view essentially connected with Christology. Satisfaction means that God forgives men their sins with reference to Him, near whom, and in whom, all imperfection disappears. Original sin has been already spoken of. The second period however, viz. that of youth, must be followed by

the maturity of manhood, which is the aim of this education, *i.e.* by the time of the new and everlasting gospel, in which man will do good neither from fear or hope, whether in this world or the next, but because it is good. Then will all revelation be changed into reason-truth, for revealed truths are no absolute mystery, but are like the answer which the teacher of arithmetic gives his pupils beforehand, that they may arrive at it.

Thus he assumes that, in the first stage, truth must necessarily be clothed in the form of positivity and external authority.

His *Nathan* seems, however, not to coincide with his *Education of the human race*, inasmuch as the latter work admits a difference of value between different religions, and especially attributes a superiority to the Christian over the Old Testament religion, while the celebrated parable of the three rings appears to teach that all positive religions are equally true and equally false, that therefore religious toleration is alone the climax of human development, and that though this toleration must not proceed from indifference to truth and religion in general, it will yet regard love as the substance, and as that which is one and the same in all religions. Nay, if we look at the grouping of the characters, it would even seem as though it were more difficult to find humanity in the Christian than in the Jewish or Mahometan religions. *Nathan* is, however, a poem written with a tendency. Lessing's chief concern is to influence Christians thereby; he therefore feels it incumbent on him to put them to shame by characters of other, and even inferior religions. The view that the more fanatical, narrow-minded, and uncharitable his Christian characters may be, the more is their conduct in accordance with Christianity, would be by no means consistent with this purpose of putting them to shame, nor is there the slightest hint that he entertains such a notion. On the contrary, such a purpose is better served by making Jews and Mahometans, with their imperfect religions, act less inconsistently with that love which is the substance of all piety, than Christians whose religion is least compatible with fanaticism. It may also indeed be justly asked whether the toleration of Nathan is a plant growing in a Christian or a Jewish soil, as even the monk expresses it when he says: "Nathan, you are a Christian; by heaven! you are more a Christian than a Jew." It could not, indeed, have been

Lessing's opinion that it would be best for us to return to Judaism, though certainly the poem is based upon the notion that the purest morality is possible in other religions than the Christian. He thus opposes the exclusive power of one religion to sanctify and save, and thinks that the humanity and toleration, which are in his eyes supreme, do not arise from the power of the positive truth contained in a religion, but from those contents of the reason quickened by the Spirit of God, which are not wholly absent from any religion. It is not the aim of the poem to decide on the comparative value of different religious doctrines; on the contrary, the fable of the rings is precisely calculated to put this question aside, and granting that it cannot be decided which of the rings is genuine, the humanity and toleration of neither the religions can be denied. A reverence for one's own religion is in his eyes compatible with a rejection of uncharitable fanaticism, and intolerance consists not in believing in the revelation of one religion, but in believing that all other religions are absolutely excluded by revelation, in other words are false religions. This is perfectly consistent with the view advocated in the education of the human race, that in another aspect one religion is better than another, better not only with regard to the individuality of different nations, but also absolutely; one being a further advance towards pure reason-truth than another. He seems however to think it at least possible, that the highest stage of reason and morality may be attained without this transition from one to another. It is further an established principle with him, that no religion can be regarded as absolutely perfect, that revelation is not completed, but is advancing with the development of the reason, and that on this account none of the positive religions can attribute to themselves the character of universality and exclusive authority. All religions are but individualizations of reason according to time and place, and a product on the one side of the entire culture of a nation, and on the other of Divine communications and plans of education. Thus he embraces the view of an objective perfectibility even of Christianity.

It was because he viewed the essence of religion as consisting in eternal truths independent of history, that he was able to regard with more composure than others the work of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist. He certainly would not have edited the Frag-

ments if he had not expected from them the fruits of at least an indirect cure of existing evils. He was himself, however, very far removed from the standpoint of the Fragmentist. The latter saw in positive revelations nothing but human frauds, while Lessing desired in some sort to include the historical element in the Divine education, and to attribute thereto, or at least to faith therein, an importance in the process of religious education. The Fragmentist favours pure naturalism, and scarcely exhibits any specific religious craving. With all his strength of understanding a deep mystic element is unmistakeable in Lessing. Though he did not bind himself to write a refutation, he yet desired, by the publication of the Fragments, to give rise also to works by which they might be refuted; in short, he introduced into theologic discussion that unrestrained freedom of investigation which he had at heart even in the interest of religion itself. He had derided a Nicolai with his "Berlin freedom of thought and writing," this freedom being confined to the mere liberty of exposing for sale as many follies as a man might choose to utter against religion, and such a freedom he thought any right-minded man should be ashamed to use. Free discussion, however, seemed to him indispensable in the existing state of theology. An inward persuasion of Christian truth was, for the most part, cast into the background, and it was the fashion to support the eternal and Divine truths of Christianity by the historical element and its evidences to confirm the *fides divina* by the *fides humana*, faith in a Divine revelation in holy Scripture by human testimony; a procedure whereby also the contents of revelation had been greatly diluted, and at last reduced by interpretation or by notions of accommodation to certain general reason-truths. Lessing judged that the acceptance of a supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost, which these new-fashioned advocates of historical evidence rejected, had, on the contrary, been from its first beginnings the very basis of Christianity, and could hardly be refuted by mere philosophical reasoning. He desired to do nothing consciously which could be an obstacle to the realization of that direct agency of the Divine Spirit, the possibility of which he did not dispute.

It cannot be denied that there is in his course of action a religious and moral feature of a genuine Protestant kind. He is not contented to stop at the outworks of Christianity, but presses

onward to the supreme authority, to the original vital source of all tradition, that he may rejoice in its eternal treasures, as in a present possession. He is governed by an ardent instinct for truth, and that not of a merely theoretical kind; he longs for a personal appropriation of truth by the affections, the reason, the will. These were the motives which guided his operations in the Fragment controversy—a fact not understood by Nicolai, who had no feeling of "the wide and terrible gulf" between "the incidental historical truths" and "the eternal spiritual truths," which to Lessing's sorrow would allow of no passage from one to the other. A mind like Nicolai's could rest satisfied with "a natural history of the great Prophet of Nazareth," and an explanation thereof which, as far as possible, deprived the world of God, and deistically viewed the Divine as estranged from the world. Hence he also thought he must necessarily expect from Lessing's reason a simple acquiescence in the Fragments. This however was constantly refused by Lessing, in whom the desire of laying down a bridge between the historical and the eternal, the ideal and the earthly in Christianity, was never extinguished, but who was able neither to detect in the eternal unhistorical truths, to which his Leibnitzian and Wolffian training bound him, the very germ even of a movement towards history, which he felt on the contrary constrained to transfer exclusively to the human side, nor for this very reason to discover in history the realization of the Divine. Hence, Lessing's standpoint in the Fragment controversy is always an uncertain and varying one. He tries to make the best terms with that which he regards as settled, and while reserving to himself an elaboration of the doctrine which makes the testimony of the Holy Spirit turn to the advantage of the historical in Christianity, opposes the confirmation of Christian truth in a purely historical manner by means of holy Scripture.

Hence Lessing takes up a very different position from that of the Fragmentist. The latter, as well as his supernaturalist opponents, takes it for granted that Christianity rests upon holy Scripture alone, and while endeavouring to prove the internal contradictions and impossibilities of the accounts given in Scripture, nay, to attribute these accounts for the most part to a fraud, he thinks he is thus overthrowing Christianity itself. Lessing has a more exalted view of the sacred history; he is far

from accusing the early Christians of fraud. He also very aptly opposes to the ten supposed contradictions in the history of the resurrection, the practice of all history not to reject the common substance for the sake of contradictory details. But the chief point is that Lessing does not concede to the Fragmentist that Christianity must fall together with its customary evidences. All that follows is that the supposed supports were not the right ones, not that Christianity admits of no other proofs. There is in Christianity an inward truth, which being self-testifying, can dispense with all other kind of evidence. What he does concede to the Fragmentist is, that the present state of the sacred writings is not only unadapted to prove the truth of Christianity, but also loads it with difficulties. He thinks however, that these difficulties may be solved, by distinguishing between an oral and simpler primitive gospel and our gospels, which are in part the deposit of oral tradition and in part enlarged editions of this primitive gospel. A return to the simple principle of Christianity, in the place of the more copious literature of the New Testament, seems to him to obviate the difficulties of the latter, without obliging us to adopt, with the Fragmentist, the idea of a wilful disfigurement of the historical. Lardner, † 1768, had already set up the hypothesis of an original oral gospel. Lessing so far elaborates this as to suppose that a small collection of narratives, under the name of the Gospel to the Hebrews, was formed from the oral narration by the apostles of the life and teaching of Christ, before our four Gospels, that this was partially transferred to the three first Gospels, while St. John, acquainted with the original documents which bore a Nazarene character, and proceeding upon a more ideal view of Christ, wrote that Gospel by means of which Christianity was first capable of existing as a special religion in the heathen world. This simple principle of Christianity is contained, in his view, in the *Regula fidei*, which he holds to be older than the Scriptures of the New Testament, these being not the source of the *Regula fidei*, but its first documents. There was also a church before the existence of the books of the New Testament. The *Regula fidei*, and not the Scriptures, is the rock upon which the Church of Christ is built, and by appealing to this he thinks he proves Christianity to be independent of holy Scripture. In so doing, he is placing as it seems one foot

upon the soil of dogmatic tradition, without however treading firmly thereon or being really in earnest about it, and also without expressing any more definite opinion concerning either the historical image of Christ, or the form assumed by tradition during about the first thirty years after the Resurrection. He is more concerned to show that oral tradition, together with the *Regula fidei*, has far more claim to be regarded as the foundation of the Church as it is, than holy Scripture, and cares less about actually taking his own stand on the ground of that tradition accepted by him as primitive. For that which he regards as the inner truth of Christianity, which shall never pass away, but is ever present, consists in those eternal reason-truths which can neither be proved by incidental historical truths, nor fall with them. He desires to withdraw the inner truth of Christianity from criticism, while exposing the external and historical thereto, and this is the entrenchment which he would secure to the "feeling" Christian, when the latter can no longer venture, with his bolder theologians, to take the field (of the historical). He declares that he never means to write against religion; but against theology; not against Christianity, but only against the bad proofs which are brought forward for it. Christianity, he points out, is the foundation, the Bible only the document, and indeed the secondary form, in which the foundation appears; Christianity is a rich and universal principle, the creative cause of a variety of phenomena, and not fettered to a work which, having been composed on various occasions and in detached portions, does not contain in a final and regular form the rule of faith. On the contrary, "a distinction must be made between the gross, packages included, and the neat."

But this Christianity—as he views it—consists only, as we have before remarked, in eternal and non-historical truths, and history is to him not only no confirmation, but even a contradiction of these. Historical truths are of another order, and belong to an entirely different sphere from that of eternal reason-truths. The former are essentially accidental, and granting their possibility, even, *e.g.* that of the miracles, to be established, he denies the power of such historical evidence to prove the eternal truths, and thinks the notion of fashioning all metaphysical and moral ideas according to history, or that which claims to be such, unjustifiable. Thus he recognizes no internal connection between the

eternal and the temporal, the former is to him immoveable in its stability, non-historical; and the historical, because essentially incidental, is not history filled with ideas. If this is really the case, the question arises: How then can the historical be educational, how can the Bible be a book of even elementary instruction? If history cannot maintain itself in the presence of eternal truths, or if it is devoid of any significance with respect to them, then indeed the "terrible and broad gulf" which separates historical certainty from eternal truths can never be overleaped, and no one will—in Lessing's mind—be enabled to earn the Divine reward by being guided to the leap. But this only is because, when his view is more closely regarded, it may be perceived that he does not admit that there are two firm shores separated by a gulf, but always sees firm footing only in the eternal truths. The land of historical and yet ideal truths is to him a land existing in the imagination only, at a certain stage of culture. Lessing's realm of eternal truths needed to be penetrated by life and motion, by an inward tendency towards reality and history. But it was here that the narrowness of his philosophical standpoint exerted a powerful influence, and threatened to defraud him of his grand idea—replete as it is with vitality—of the Divine education of mankind, which must remain only an empty saying, if idea and history are but asymptotes. The philosophical defect had this effect, that the world could not, in his view, attain to an actual independent existence and self-destination for its own sake. On the contrary, the world originated only because God, as well as possessing and conceiving Himself as unity, also possesses Himself as divided. Hence there can be no real history, no progress in the world, which must like God be ever essentially equal to itself. And the world having neither self-destination nor freedom, but only peculiarity, he is unable to carry out that distinction of the world from God which he insists on. For this would require that the distinction should be conceived of as not merely one thought by God (an ideal one), but also one supposed by the world, that the active world distinguishing itself from God and thus supposing, *i.e.* reproducing itself, should be thought of as a real causality. Since however, under the influence of Wolffian determinism, he abolishes freedom with respect to God, there exists for him neither the need nor the possibility of an actual inter-

action between God and the world, through which alone a history both active and ideal, a course of action not human only but also Divine, could take place. However decidedly Lessing in other respects places himself on the side of concrete reality, in opposition, *e.g.* to Spinoza, the defect pointed out leaves to reality, nay, even to Lessing's decided love of freedom, a very precarious existence.

One might almost think that he was desirous of again bringing to remembrance *that material side of the* principle which had been nearly forgotten by the theology of the age, and that he did this from a just perception of the danger to which this side was exposed, if Scripture were to be made the sole foundation. But the *Regula fidei* is itself only a formal principle, on a reduced scale. His eternal truths have indeed the independent certainty, which forms an essential element in the material principle, yet with their immoveable non-historical abstraction, they have nothing to do with justifying faith in Christ, and scarcely exhibit the slightest point of connection therewith. For the Person of Christ, as well as His deeds, *e.g.* His miracles, belongs, in his view, to the department of history, it can therefore only incidentally contribute to the awakening of faith, and can never be the proper foundation of faith in the redemption and salvation of man. Otherwise real religion would, to his mind, be constantly in danger of being unsettled by criticism. He insists upon that "religion of Christ" which is expressed in the Testament of St. John by love, and exalted above all criticism and doubt, while he regards the "Christian religion" as coming into irreconcilable collision with eternal truths, and as forming only the scaffolding, which is to be taken down when the edifice is completed. It is possible that though he speaks so much of reason-truths, he yet in mind places practical Christianity, humanity and toleration above that which is merely theoretical, and gives the highest place to the "Christianity of the heart in which the Christian feels himself so happy." This Christianity of the feeling however is without any real reference to Christ, and to redemption through Him. It is moral Christianity, though not after the fashion of a dry rationalism, but reminding rather of Jacobi.

There is in Lessing's standpoint much that is unmistakeably obscure, ambiguous, nay contradictory, and which cannot be reconciled by the consideration that he did not always remain

like himself, but that, on the contrary, after the controversy with Göze concerning the publication of a portion of the legacy of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist, he took up a more negative position towards historical Christianity.[1] On the one side, he advocated, as decidedly as possible, the persuasion that the essence of religion, nay, of religions, does not consist in doctrines interwoven into history, but in the saving, enkindling, strengthening power of love. This is, in his view, the virtue of the genuine ring upon which all depends. He embraces an affection of the human by the Divine Spirit, not merely in the case of founders of religion, but also in that of believers; and this would of itself, if further developed, make religion appear as a vital relation of an actual kind, a becoming historical [*Geschichtlichwerden*] of the eternally Divine, and an elevation of historical existence to an ideal standard. But, on the other side, he takes up a position antagonistic to all that is historical; because, after the manner of Leibnitz and Wolff, he always makes the eternal revert to lifeless eternal truths, which he then sets up as truths latent in the reason, in opposition to all historical revelation, as the chief matter and essence, without perceiving that he is thus again viewing religion in a purely intellectual manner. Again, on the one side, he endeavours to explain the necessity of historical and positive religion, by the requirements of the lower stages of the constantly renewed generations, and those of the religious community in general; because the cold abstract propositions of Deism cannot satisfy his warmer conceptions. On the other side, he thinks the development of reason involves the dissolution of the positive, the destruction of the significance of the historical, and consequently of the bond of religious association. It is also another contradiction, that on the one hand he gives the highest place to *universalism* in religion, regarding all that is particular as injurious, while on the other hand he grounds toleration and his rejection of particularism on the assertion that every man can have the truth *only* in an individual manner, thus renouncing the universal validity of religious truths, and leaving nothing but a particular, nay, an individual, religion analogous to Semler's private religion. As may be supposed, the commandment of love is esteemed by him as universally valid; but then this is

[1] The *Education of the human race*, abounding as it does in positive thoughts, was first published contemporaneously with the fourth Wolfenbüttel Fragment.

not necessarily of a religious kind, and consequently his very toleration and humanity do not very well stand the test by which they are to be distinguished from indifferentism, for then they would have had zealously to espouse the cause of truth, as the supreme good, against the dulness and frivolity of indifferentism. Indulgence towards the indifferent seems to have become easier to Lessing than zealous opposition of frivolity and religious obtuseness, easier too than to maintain that tolerant demeanour towards the zealous confessors of a positive creed, which he regarded as a toleration of intolerance. He certainly sought to bring about the union of culture and religion, but without preserving to the latter a position essentially distinct from mere human morality. His words to Mendelssohn (1771) show that he was not as yet satisfied either with general moral and religious truths or with the position he had taken up towards Christianity. "It is not since yesterday only that I have felt anxious lest, in casting off many prejudices, I may not also have cast away much which I may again have to fetch back. That I have not partly done so already is owing to the fear of gradually dragging all the trash as well into the house again." But, incomplete as his standpoint may be called, it may yet be said that his works are full of suggestive elements, which subsequently sprang up like seeds and attained to independent maturity. This is shown by his affinity not only with Semler and Mendelssohn but also with Kant and Herder, nay, with Jacobi and Schleiermacher. He by no means agrees indeed with Leibnitz and Wolff, nor with Reimarus and Laurence Schmidt, the disciples of the latter, in his idea of God. As little does he coincide with Spinoza; for he adheres to a self-conscious, personal God of providence, and assumes a living relation of the Spirit of God to the world. To this Spirit he also leaves room for an internal revelation, even when he attacks the external in its historical credibility, and relegates it to the domain of mere authority. Yet not only are his tendency to Determinism, and his ever-recurring idea of a rigid and unchangeable relation of God to the world, connected with the influence of Wolffianism, whereby the latter becomes devoid of history, but the effects also of Leibnitz's theory of monads may be seen in his insistence upon the rights of the individual. His idea of humanity, which he regards as the essence of all religion, unites him with Herder; while he

resembles Kant in the energetic moral feature which he displays, and in the stress he places upon immortality. This he holds, it must be confessed, in the form of the transmigration of souls, and in such wise that it is by means of immortality that this process of purification, which will certainly attain its end, is to be realized, although, in his treatise *On the eternity of Punishment* he admits that punishment will consist in the inextinguishable results of evil actions. He differs from Kant, however, by that power of imagination and feeling, which place him in close relation to the realm of art, and also to Jacobi and Schleiermacher. For his "eternal Gospel" announces an ideal age, in which the spirit of love is to animate all minds. It may be asserted that there is a special affinity between Lessing and Schleiermacher, inasmuch as an unusual acuteness of critical talent is combined in both with deep and ardent feeling. A union of these is not, indeed, uniformly exhibited in Lessing, upon whom the star of his critical reason ever exerts the preponderating influence; yet even in him both the impulse and encouragement to his criticism are ever given, by a real interest in, nay, possession of, his subject; and it is to be ascribed to the disfavour of his age, as well as to his fault of burying his deeper wants in controversy, instead of seeking their satisfaction, that he did not carry out this positive matter in a more full and definite form. Besides, justice to Lessing demands the acknowledgment that the blame must be shared also by the general *state of theology* in his days. He felt the genuine Protestant longing inwardly and vitally to appropriate the positive, and not to suffer his mind to be loaded with dead ballast, which could only be brought into relation with it by means of external authority. The theology of the seventeenth century had however so little laboured at the work of making historical religion its special and conscious possession, and the strength of the whole character, that it had, on the contrary, dissolved connection with the universally human, neglected the province of morals, and exchanged the living and saving facts of Christianity for a system of notions by which alone salvation was to be obtained. In such a state of things a breach was inevitable. The universal human and the moral, misconceived and ill-treated as they had been, stood on their defence against the supernatural and against historical religion, which had both become inimical to them, nay, but too well

requited the contempt they had met with. But even this result was obliged, under the higher guidance of history, not only to contribute to the restoration of the balance between the human and the Christian, but also to assist in bringing into notice the points of connection offered by the former to the latter, and to manifest the internal relation between the fulness of Christianity when truly understood and those various deficiencies and vacancies which human nature, especially in its ordinary state, bears within it, without being able to supply them. The vassalage in which the universal-human was still held by the prevailing view of Christianity was to be abolished, nay, the attempt was to be made to establish its self-sufficient independence. But the very contest which reason began against Christianity by claiming supreme sovereignty showed that these two powers cannot continue in a state of mutual indifference, but are destined for mutual interpenetration and union. Lessing's noble mind, viewed in its entirety, expresses, both by its love for truth and its doubts, by its moral earnestness and its religious cravings, an ardent longing for such a consummation. Undoubtedly he was chiefly occupied in gaining a position for the universal human, in opposition to the prevailing view of Christianity. But he was far from conceiving of the reason of man as complete from the beginning, or even as having always had a normal development. On the contrary, he knew it to be plastic, and capable of education, and that by God, whom he does not regard as an inactive spectator of the proceedings of the world. Hence, he furnishes us with a series of premisses, which, being powerfully taken up by subsequent writers, and especially by Schleiermacher, secured a worthier conception of historical religion, by the recognition that the historical attains to an increase in eternal contents, and that the world of eternal truths is a world full of life, a world of divine powers of revelation becoming history [*geschichtlich-werdender Offenbarungs-kräfte*].

A prelude to a more favourable relation to revealed religion and its documents is exhibited in Herder, whose mind, besides the manly spirit of Lessing, seems to bear a stamp of womanly tenderness. His gift consisted in a special and delicate skill for discovering the universal human in the literature of all nations, and therefore also in the books of holy Scripture, which he was thus the means of again bringing into more favour and respect with his contemporaries.

A new age is fermenting in Herder also. The peculiarity of his nature lies in his perception of the indissoluble alliance between poetry and religion. His knowledge was less exact than extensive, and he is deficient in a talent for philosophy in the stricter sense. The profundity of Hamann captivated him, because it was united with a poetical view of the world, but his relation to him was rather a recipient one. He sought to reanimate a dry and barren theology by means of poetry, and to advance it to something beyond the mere exercise of a learned profession. He desired to lead both empty rationalism and stiff orthodoxy, both pedantry and shallowness, illuminism and feebleness of faith, from their contentions, to a feeling for the original and the divine in religion. This he attempted, not by definite and connected doctrines and notions, not by the accurate knowledge which was dependent on the school, but by that poetic fragrance and atmosphere which he knew how to shed over whatever material he received into his mind, for the purpose of bringing it forth again with the impress of ideality, and expressed in noble and melodious language. He possessed the rare gift of being ever able to discover the beautiful, the true, and the great in secular literature and in history, as in a world of symbolism, and especially to discern the noble and the lovely, and that genuine human element which had been so long misconceived, in the sacred records, which he thus commended in a new and hitherto unperceived aspect, to the love and reverence of his contemporaries. In this respect it is with regard to the Old Testament that he has rendered the greatest service; indeed he may be said to have reconquered its prophetical and poetical portions for the national literature of Germany.[1] He had a poetic, as well as a religious feeling for that union of the human and the divine which had been so long misconceived, and this in-

[1] Compare his *kritischen Wälder* on Klotzen's Homeric letters. "I willingly admit that, as far as representations of beauty, sweetness, and a certain human dignity are concerned, we have much to learn from the Greeks and Romans, especially the beautiful conciseness, the absence of exaggeration, the dignity and the consistency which are found in their descriptive passages. But of the wisdom, power, majesty, sublimity, and, so to speak, the inconceivability of the Godhead, the poets of the East, and the chief of these, viz. the poets of the Old Testament, are far more copious, nay, are inexhaustible sources." *Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst*, pt. 5. p. 67, 1769. "In such images the Romans, compared with Job, Moses and Isaiah, are as a drop to the ocean; and it is a disgrace to be licking at a drop when such fathomless depths of greatness, sublimity and dignity are before us."

spired him, especially in his earlier days, with esteem for the fundamental facts of Christianity. Yet it is rather their direct and, so to speak, natural union that he perceives. The world of will and of history, sin and redemption, are far less accessible to him; hence his lack of a deeper understanding of the Person and work of Christ. Poetic frames and inspirations everywhere testify, he thinks, to the existence and agency of a higher power; but though he succeeds in giving a soul-enkindling expression to his notions, they failed to attain, in his own case, the stability, symmetry, and certainty of convictions. On the contrary, the lack of a thoughtful establishment of his religious feelings, and his deficiency of penetration into the world of will, brought about their own retribution during the later period of his life, when he was resident in Weimar. For here he not only lost his former religious feelings, but embraced, under Goethe's influence, more pantheistic opinions, and thus abandoned his own special vocation and the source of his strength and independence, even in the presence of a Goethe. Having but little acquaintance with objective doctrine, and knowing religion chiefly as an exalted frame of mind, it may easily be understood that humanity appeared to him to form the central point of Christianity, and to be indeed intrinsically one with religion. He formed a more ideal conception of human nature,[1] regarding the human in man as divine. Like Lessing, he subsequently felt obliged to distinguish between "the Christian religion" and "the religion of Christ." The religion of Christ teaches us to honour and love the Father as His children, the Christian religion is encumbered with dogmas. But humanity is now independent of its Founder, and it is of

[1] Compare *Zur Philosophie und Geschichte*, pt. 3 (*Propyläen zur Geschichte der Menscheit*), p. 217: I could wish to sum up in the word *humanity* all that I have said concerning man's being formed for reason, liberty, &c. For man has no nobler word whereby to express his destination than himself, on whom the image of the earth's Creator, as far as it could be made visible, is impressed. P. 227: To investigate this humanity is the genuine human philosophy which the philosopher said descended from heaven. But the first and last philosophy has ever been religion. P. 228: Religion, if regarded merely as an exercise of the understanding, is the highest humanity, the noblest blossom of the human soul. But it is more than this, it is an exercise of the human heart, and the noblest direction of its powers and capacities. Man runs wild when the law which he obeys is only himself, when he does not discover and obey God's law in nature, and make his earthly and human life an imitation of the Deity. True religion is therefore an imitation, in human form, of the Most High and Most Lovely.

no consequence whether the name of Christ is named in supplication or not. This also is a matter of indifference to Christ, whose aim was pure love to man. Thus Christ ceases to have any significance, and to be the living source of all true morality. In his lawful efforts to reconcile Christianity with general culture, and to lead the mind beyond the narrowness both of the creed and the nation, he loses in his infinite expansiveness the counterpoise of necessary concentration, and, for this very reason, falls into a vague and helpless universalism, and loses himself in generalities which are contrary to history. He desired to advance from the world of mere ideas to practice, to view the divine as everywhere active, and therefore as active in human self-manifestation, whether in Christ the Son of man, or in the Scriptures, which were written by men for men. But being no longer able to perceive in the history of Christ the organizing centre of the world's history, he exchanges the solid foundation of life for mere indefinite abstractions.

He interested himself in Spinoza, who makes everything turn upon gladness of heart and freedom, upon knowledge and happiness. It is true that he wants to set him right in his mode of expression, to conceive of God as the supreme power, who knows, enjoys, and possesses Himself; and that with all his inclination towards Spinoza's system, there is always mingled a righteous displeasure with its leading idea of God. Not only however was he incapable of rightly apprehending Spinoza, but his effort to see God in all things prevented his arriving at a perception of the distinction between the existence and agency of God, of a teleology and history of His self-revelation. Even the absolute personality of God seems to become more indifferent to him, when that which is supreme, the perception of universal love, becomes all in all. The secret reason of this was, the deficiency of his ethics, the ignoring of sin and of the moral aim of man. This deficiency is manifested also in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menscheit*, which is full of glorious ideas, expressed in charming language, as long as he pursues only the progress of God from nature to man. But the history of man is a sealed book to him; for humanity, of which he makes Christ the Announcer, is still too indefinite and negative a matter. The work of Christ is not in his eyes the impartation of life, but merely the stripping off of additions by which

human nature was fettered and disfigured. In the whole period subsequent to Christ, he sees little else than a declension from the pure religion of humanity. He thinks that Christianity was, by means of philosophy, changed from a principle of active love into a system of mysteries. It is no wonder, therefore, that he felt unhappy and impoverished in his latter days.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that he did good service to theology, especially with respect to the Old Testament, the general human aspect and beauties of which he pointed out with unusual beauty of language and truth of perception. He triumphantly opposed the profane explanations of John Dav. Michaelis, which deprived it of all meaning, by that poetical apprehension of its sense which raised not so much the judgment as the inclinations far above prosaic interpretations. His letters on the study of theology (in four parts) had also the effect of exciting the attention of many, and of awakening a consciousness of the ideal aspect of the clerical calling, by placing it in the light of a poetic sublimity and beauty. In this respect he furnishes a wholesome counterpoise to the utilitarians, who would make this office nothing but one of ordinary teaching for the purposes of everyday life. It must also be confessed that he contributed not a little to the depreciation of laborious reasoning and solid scholarship, and seduced the youthful subjectivity of the age into an over-cultivation of the imagination, which led in some instances to romance, mental luxuriousness and dissipation, or to an exaltation above objective matter, and thus estranged the mind from the serious realities of actual life. All things considered, however, it must be admitted that, when the German nation was, in the age preceding Kant, threatening to fall a prey to a level intellectualism, nay, to a spirit of low utilitarianism, he was able to strike those chords which diffused a disposition for the ideal, and thus to prepare the soil for a new epoch. Herder did not directly lead the mind of the nation either to theology or the Church; but he advocated poetry and the freer and nobler aspirations of the soul, and thus called forth the possibility of those new and deeper views which were to be awakened by the further progress of philosophy, and to become a lasting and assured possession.

## CHAPTER III.

SUBJECTIVE PHILOSOPHY. KANT, FICHTE, JACOBI, AND THEIR RELATION TO THEOLOGY.

It was by Immanuel Kant that the fundamental questions which agitated the age were first expressed in a manner more corresponding to their importance, or it was at all events by him that a way was opened for their thorough and progressive investigation. By that earnestness of moral purpose which was manifested even in the strictness and conscientiousness of his method, not only was a limit set to the superficial eudæmonism and arbitrary reasoning of the popular philosophy, but a more definite direction was also given to the desultory, not to say the dilletanti-like, attacks which Lessing and Herder, with a flavour of æstheticism, had made, in the interest of the principle of humanity, upon historical Christianity. This indeed was only done at the cost of making the opposition against Christianity far more deep reaching, of directing it against religion in general, and of basing it upon a connected antagonistic view of the world. This antagonism arose both from the formal and material aspects of the Kantian system. And yet it contained a germ which shows an internal affinity with the principle of the Reformation. This is, on the one side, an ardent and manly longing for certainty in the highest concerns of human life, and on the other, the moral tendency of his system—a tendency which was to make room for that side of the Protestant principle which had as yet been too little cultivated, and thereby to smooth the way for a regeneration of theology. The side thus brought forward—and which the older theology had, to its own hurt, neglected—was that of conscience, and of a personal conviction of the intrinsic goodness of the good. And was not this favourable to the tendency of the Reformation to salvation and to the personal appropriation of salvation? It would indeed be generally acknowledged to be so, if only Kant had not stated that the grace of God might be dispensed with, and insisted on making the hitherto neglected element all in all.

His criticism of pure reason annihilated the rationalistic arro-

gance of popular philosophy. That which was stable, which could keep its ground before such criticism, was not God, but morality, in other words, practical law-giving reason, a belief in the absolute authority of law, and in moral freedom. He has the merit of having fixed, by means of his categorical imperative, and with a lucidity never before attained, the specific peculiarity of morality in opposition to eudæmonism, and of having again proclaimed, like a philosophical Moses, the supernatural majesty and holiness of the moral law. Everything is however resolved into this certainly not lax morality. Religion is only a means thereto, and a means which it did not necessarily stand in need of, for autonomy, as well as autarchy, befits the reason as such. Kant, who rejects all evidence of the existence of God, regards Him as only the regulating principle of the reason. But thus it is possible that He may exist only in the reason. Of his objective being we can have no knowledge. Nor can there be, properly speaking, any revelation; for if God were to exert an influence upon our mind, there would be, according to Kant, an end to our freedom and to the value of virtue. The Reformation age had at first laid such emphasis upon the divine side and upon grace as to esteem the freedom of man irreconcilable with the influence of God, and consequently to deny this freedom in the interest of religion. The Kantian philosophy now retaliated by a denial of the Divine influence in the supposed interest of human freedom. Kant thinks that Divine legislation would place our reason under an external authority, and would, even in case the reason were able to perceive its internal goodness, be either superfluous to the choice of good for its own sake, or make such choice impossible. For, according to Kant, we must will not what is good for God's sake: that would be courtiership, venality, heteronomy. Confident action must be based on a belief in the agreement of the world with the moral will, this agreement being a pre-established harmony which we cannot originate. Hence we must act as though God were, so to speak, the power which harmonizes the natural world with the moral.

On the other side, Kant does not mistake the distance between the ordinary reason and his conception of it. The practical reason is enslaved by radical evil, by means of which the good is crippled, and the supreme maxim in man corrupted. This is why he regards Christianity and the Church as valuable.

Christ indeed is not, in his view, to be regarded as an historical Person; the notion of Him, however, which lives in the Church, not only affords a living embodiment of law, but also exhibits the ideal of human nature well-pleasing to God. He is at the same time that Divine idea of us which expiates our sinful reality when the new man strives after its attainment. The moral, moreover, can only flourish in a moral community, and this requires an historical apparatus.

Theology was not slow to descry that aspect of the Kantian system which was favourable to its cause, and it was upon the soil of a partial subjectivity that *the second attempt to form a union between theology and religion* was made (comp. p. 269). Kant's antagonism to eudæmonism, and the moral earnestness of his system, aroused a manly enthusiasm, and refreshed the barren land. Scarcely any other philosophical system of recent times has left such lasting marks upon theology. But it was in *morality* that his system was most directly productive. A series of moralists sought to prove the perfect harmony existing between Kant's practical philosophy and Christianity. Among these were J. Bartel, Tieftrunk, C. F. Ammon, S. G. Lange, and P. S. Vogel.[1] This harmony was however disputed, and that to the prejudice of Christian morality, by other Kantians, not only by Cannabich, but also by Stäudlin in his earlier period.[2] *The one school of philosophers* affirmed that all the moral precepts of Christianity might also be proved to be the precepts of reason, and though they appear in a positive form with respect to their first introduction, yet Christianity does not demand obedience to them for the

[1] Tieftrunk, *Einzig möglicher Zweck Jesu*, 1793; C. F. Ammon, *die christliche Sittenlehre nach einem wissenschaftlichen Grundrisse*, Göttingen and Erlanger, 1793, 1798. He subsequently wrote, 1800 and 1806, two compendiums of religious and Christian morality. His last composition on morality leans more towards Jacobi's standpoint. G. S. Lange, *System der theologischen Moral*, Leipsic and Rostock, 1803; P. S. Vogel, *Lehrbuch der christlichen Moral*, Altdorf, 1803, and *Compendium der theologischen Moral*, 1805.

[2] G. L. Cannabich, *Kritik der praktischen Christlichen Religionslehre*, i. Leipsic, 1810, C. F. Stäudlin, *Grundriss der Tugendlehre*, 1798, and *Grundsätze der Moral*, 1800, in which he makes use of Kant's metaphysical original foundations of the doctrine of virtue, and Fichte's system of morals according to scientific principles. He subsequently retracted much in his *philosophischen und biblischen Moral*, Göttingen, 1805. Stäudlin also edited a history of the moral teaching of Jesus in 2 vols. 1799, 1802, and a history of Christian morality since the revival of science, Göttingen, 1808, and did good service to the history of ethics in general, by separate treatises on prayer, oaths and friendship.

sake of this their external, but for the sake of their inherent and internal authority, in other words, for the sake of their truth. *The other school* not only pointed out the fact that Christian morality was devoid of a systematic form, but also called attention to its employment of the sensuous motives of reward and punishment. Cannabich disputed also the perfection of Christ's example. The difference between Kantian and Christian morality was shown to be still greater by the non-Kantian party. The former was reproached with its separation of morality from religion, and its incidental relation to revelation, and not less with its exclusion of the agency of Divine grace. It was called cold, proud, and unfeeling, and the superiority of living Christian love to a lifeless respect for the law of reason was pointed out. Kant's purism also, and his antagonism to inclination and sensuousness, were declared to be a spiritualistic contradiction to the constitution of man.[1] Schleiermacher, in his outlines of a criticism of the moral system, and also Fichte coincided in this last objection. The former brought forward the essentially formal and negative character of Kant's morality, and accused it of stopping at the standpoint of mere legality, and of changing ethics into a science of law in spite of its opposition to legal enactments. Nevertheless, theology obtained, subsequently to Kant, the solid gain of an elevation into an ideal region, above the morality of eudæmonism and the sphere of merely finite utilitarianism, and Schiller may, in this respect, be designated as the poet of the German nation who was inspired by Kantian ideas.

The Kantian system had, however, a still deeper influence upon divinity and apologetics. In these respects it was embraced in very different manners even by those who favoured it. Some rejoiced in its scepticism with regard to the power of the theoretical reason, and its appeal to the belief in the practical reason. To others its powerful advocacy of the moral idea seemed to promise a foundation for revelation in general, and especially for one which taught an atonement, and thus to cast a favourable light upon the central point of the Gospel. This was the view of the Kantian supernaturalists.

The law is a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ, and it showed itself to be such in the present instance also. Theology indeed

[1] Döderlein, *Entwurf einer christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1789, 1794. Reinhard's above-named work.

views the law which is to lead to the Gospel as a Divine enactment, Kant as the law of reason. And yet an alliance between his philosophy and theology was attempted in two different respects, first as a foundation for Divine revelation in general, *i.e.* the Divinity of its form, and then as a foundation for a confirmation of the *contents of the Christian revelation*, especially *the forgiveness of sins.*

With regard to the first, Wolff's investigations concerning the possibility and necessity of a revelation were now further carried out by comprehensive discussions of an ethical kind. It was asked whether Christianity were postulated or excluded by the moral idea. Fichte's *Criticism of all revelations* (1791) was the first work devoted to this subject. It was followed by the similar works of Tieftrunk, of Kant himself (*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, 1794, *Works*, x.), and of Stäudlin. Fichte's work, which attracted so much attention that it at first passed for Kant's, regards the possibility, nay, necessity of a revelation (*i.e.* of a proclamation of God as the moral lawgiver by a supernatural fact in the world of sense) as well founded, in the case of a degradation of the human race so deep that it could be remedied only by a fresh announcement of the forgotten moral law. Stäudlin endeavoured to extend this still farther, and to show that revelation was of use only to morality. Kant, on the contrary, has regard to the fact that, in the individual, the true moral law is ever and again obscured by radical evil in the struggle with sense. This radical evil is not an isolated feature, but an enigmatical egotism, exercising a crippling effect upon the autonomy and freedom of mankind. Not till a moral common will, a moral association (the Church) exists, can the law have a stronger advocacy, or the elevation of the individual above the natural moral condition be possible. The moral lawgiver is then indeed, properly speaking, only the ideal Church (the common reason), which gives a law to itself and obeys itself. But that the ethic association may become a real power, giving help to the individual, it must adopt statutory enactments, and assume a sensible form. Now a visible Church presupposes a founder, and thus Kant arrives at the postulate of an ecclesiastical founder for the moral community. The founder will proclaim the moral law in God's name, in the form of a statutory enactment, and clothe it in a

sensible covering. And this is what took place in Christianity. This deduction of a revelation from the necessity for the Church was afterwards carried out by Karl Ludwig Nitzsch in 1808.[1] His notion is that revelation was necessary, that the moral standard might, by means of external authority, be brought before the mind, until the mind, having attained to maturity, should be capable of recognizing the internal authority and truth of the standard. This recalls the notion already expressed by Lessing, when he inculcated the necessity of external authority in the childhood of the human race, for commending or bringing to consciousness the moral truths already contained in the reason. Others held that revelation did service by giving stability and intelligibility to the moral truth of the reason; by rendering it objective in a living personality. Thus Stapfer, like Lactantius, regards Christ as the incarnate moral law.[2] Others again credit revelation with an extension of the cognition of the reason, or an acceleration of its development. Thus Klein in his *Religiosismus*. Such men, among whom may be reckoned also Tzschirner, Schott, and at an earlier period Ammon and Bretschneider, leave some remnant of the supernatural, at least with respect to the form of revelation. But they generally regard its contents as something which the reason has already appropriated by its own powers, and scarcely any, except the older Tübingen school (the elder Flatt and Susskind), seek, as we shall see, to point out the practical utility of a revelation with regard to any other truths than those of the moral law of the reason.

But this basing of a revelation, whose form—but whose form only—was considered supernatural, on Kantian foundations called forth the opposition of *Kantian Rationalism*. It was asserted that an *enlargement* of the contents of the reason by revelation could not be thought of. For all truths must have a moral reference, hence the reason must itself perceive them, if it is to embrace them; otherwise its obedience would be but blind, and not a free moral action. Nor could the external authority of revelation either *commend* or *introduce* those truths of the reason which are of a practical kind; for good must be chosen purely for its own sake. If there were, on the contrary, a demonstrative certainty of religious matters by means of revelation, this would

[1] *De revelatione religionis externa eaque publica*, 1808. So also Böhm.

[2] Compare Schneckenburger's article on Stapfer.

be only injurious to morality, by diverting to false motives that free submission which should be rendered because of the intrinsic goodness of the good. Even the possibility of *knowing* revelation to be such, supposing it confined itself to being the form in which moral law was promulgated, was disputed in Löffler's *Magazine for Preachers.* And in fact the scaffolding of a miraculous revelation, which should offer to the reason nothing more than its own contents, would be an expenditure altogether out of proportion. If the contents of Christianity are to be defined in the rationalistic fashion adopted by formal supernaturalism in general, the stricter Kantian rationalists, such as Löffler, Henke, Schmid, Krug, Paulus, Röhr, and Wegscheider, are by far the more consistent; and it is not surprising that they should have been subsequently followed by such men as Ammon and Bretschneider. The above-named stricter Kantians differ indeed from Kant in the idea of God, which is to him an uncertain one; but they only revert in this respect—and especially is this the case with Paulus, Krug, Röhr, and Wegscheider—to Wolffian Deism. They regard the world indeed as having been originally made by God, but (says Röhr[1]) having made it He left it to itself, and allowed it to go on like a good piece of mechanism. It would be an unworthy notion of God to suppose it needful for Him to take the clockwork of the world in hand again for the purpose of improvements and repairs; in saying which Röhr most strangely ignores, or subjects to the general mechanism of the world, that human freedom which, together with God and immortality, forms the supreme triad of Kantian rationalism. Wegscheider, in his *Dogmatik*—which went through eight editions, and was distinguished for its Latin style—carries out the Deistical standpoint in the most undisguised manner. Religion is defined in a Wolffian manner, and miracles said to have originated either in superstition or in oriental rhetoric. Christ is indebted for the high position He holds in the Christian religion to the circumstance that the orientals refer even the natural to God. "*Non sine numine* were His works performed" is the utmost he can say concerning Him. Röhr does not scruple to affirm that Christology is no integral element of the doctrinal system. Paulus takes up a rather different position. He firmly embraces the formal authority, *i.e.* the historical credibility, of

[1] *Briefe über Rationalismus,* 1813.

holy Scripture, and, still feeling the influence of those reverential feelings which were cherished by the Tübingen school, to which he had belonged, declares it worthy of belief, but manages by his explanations to remove from the history and teaching of Christianity every supernatural element, and tries to make Scripture a witness for his most decided rationalism. The way for such a process had been paved by a theory, originating with Kant, that even the promulgators of a statutory religion might allow themselves to use accommodations. Thus, *e.g.*, the Apostle Paul accommodated himself to Jewish notions in his doctrine of Christ's sacrificial death, for the sake of doing away with the offence of the cross. Paulus endeavours to draw the whole of the New Testament history within the limits of the natural, by insisting that the sacred writers only speak of the miraculous to those who do not rightly understand their meaning. To preserve the historical character of the New Testament and of Christianity, nothing is needed beyond the accommodation theory, and that we should mentally add to the supposed miraculous narratives that which is necessary for their performance. In the feeding of the five thousand, *e.g.*, we have but to imagine that the necessary bread had been previously concealed in a cave. A similar explanation is offered of the miracle at Cana, where Jesus is said to have furnished amusement at the wedding by the surprise He caused. Thus the miraculous power is transferred to the exegete, who does not indeed make something out of nothing, but manages to change something into nothing, and then tries to give out this nothing as something, throwing away by such vindication the kernel of the history while retaining the shell.

But, if the alliance between Kantian philosophy and theology was concluded only on the basis of the form, or on the assumption that certain eternal reason-truths formed the whole contents of Christianity, and that the sole use of revelation was to introduce or establish them, such an alliance could not be a lasting one. For it follows that, when reason has mastered and become assured of these truths, revelation has become purposeless and superfluous, and may be laid aside, like the ladder which has been used for gaining a certain height. Nay, more, since reason, which was the learner, has now become the teacher, since progress is a duty, and every new acquisition tends to the perfection of knowledge, it is the privilege and duty of our

age, which has proved the maturity of its reason by its cognizance of the ideas, Godhead, freedom, and immortality, to *perfect* Christianity. Thus the doctrine now reached was that of the "perfectibility of Christianity." Certainly, if Christianity is only an inculcation of eternal truths, it must be perfectible: culture, development, the association of ideas—these denote an ever improveable work of the human mind. Christianity cannot be conceived of as raised above the possibility of superannuation, unless the *object* of doctrine forms that primary element in its constitution, of which doctrine itself is but the increasingly perfect and more adequately expressed reflexion. Abr. Teller had already conceived, from a Wolffian standpoint, the notion of introducing a perfecting of Christianity in the interest of such a merely intellectual view of that religion (see above); and Krug's letters on the perfectibility of Christianity express the same design from a Kantian point of view. With these coincide Ammon's idea of carrying out Christianity into a universal religion, from Jacobi's standpoint. Finally, Zeller advocated, in a Hegelian aspect, the objective perfectibility of Christianity, which notion of perfectibility will necessarily follow as long as Christianity is regarded as teaching only those eternal non-historical truths which are contained in the reason. For in this case it must submit to the lot of ever leading by its agency to something beyond itself, whether this superior something be called the eternal Gospel or the stage of purer reason.

The other series of Kantian theologians escaped the contradiction in question between natural revelation and its merely rational contents by supposing revelation to furnish that which was unattainable by reason. It was of less importance in this respect that Susskind[1] should designate revelation as necessary in order that God might be manifested as the ideal of all perfection, as the author of the moral law, as the pledge of the harmony between virtue and happiness, and admit that other teaching than the moral law might be practically helpful, as *e.g.* the doctrine of original sin, and that of the agency of Divine grace. But it was of very material importance that the assertion which is connected with the central point of evangelical consciousness, and with the material principle, viz. that revelation is necessary on account of the *pardon of sin*, was now earnestly discussed,

[1] *Flattsches Magazin*, pts. i. iii. ix.

and its bearing upon the principles of Kantian philosophy investigated.

If the forgiveness of sin were regarded as necessary, revelation might be required either for the purpose of the *promulgation* or even of the *acquisition* of pardon. The latter, because punishment was inevitable from the standpoint of justice, while a remedy and amendment were required from the standpoint of the moral purpose of the world. But this even the Kantian supernaturalists scarcely ventured to advocate, and stopped for the most part at the necessity of promulgation. Tieftrunk held that the forgiveness of sin, being a restoration of the internal harmony of man through consciousness of reconciliation, is a condition of all happy progress in goodness. From this Susskind drew the conclusion that man must, at all events, be assured of pardon for the sake of his sanctification, but that this consideration only involves the possibility of forgiveness, and that its reality can only be known by the fact of a Divine promulgation. Tieftrunk objected that we can nevertheless only believe in such a promulgation in the world of sense, if the practical reason itself consents to such pardon—in other words, recognizes from practical principles not merely its possibility but its necessity. Hence, instead of this promulgation, nothing was needed but the recognition of the doctrine of pardon as an eternal reason-truth. Susskind replied that the notion of the execution of punishment is easily reconcilable with that of a moral world. If then the forgiveness of sins is not self-evident, we can only know God's real intentions from His positive revelation. This mongrel standpoint, which regarded moral opposites as equally possible to God, and thus ultimately subjected the ethical to an arbitrariness based upon no reasons, was opposed on the part of Tieftrunk by the statement that, a decided answer might, on the contrary, be derived from ethical principles, and this on the mere grounds of the need of pardon, because the chief concern of the moral law is its fulfilment in sanctification. On his part, indeed, he overlooked the fact that if evil is forgiven at once, and even before amendment (for the possibility of the latter is said to be caused by the forgiveness of sins), then in the place of justice there must be an indifference on the part of God to the distinction between good and evil.

Hence other Kantians took up *the idea of justice,* and arrived

by another side of the system at the absolute necessity of punishment, and the *impossibility* of the forgiveness of sin. Kant had already said, in his *Religion within the Limits of pure Reason*, that it is never possible to abolish guilt. If man, after a change of heart, ceases to accumulate new debts, this cannot pass as payment of the old. For he can never earn aught to spare, being always bound to do all the good in his power. He tried, however, to escape the consequences of this admission, while strict Kantians, such as Schmid,[1] more consistently insisted, that all and every remission of punishment, on condition of amendment, is opposed to the Divine justice.[2] Others carried this so far as to say that the practical law of reason is not merely a law of commands but of merit, and of the most perfect justice. Immorality deserves punishment, and a certain amount of penalties must necessarily be awarded thereto. If, according to practical reason, that which practical reason declares worthy of punishment is not to be punished, this would be an antinomy in the law itself, by which its validity would be imperilled. Hence punishment is *necessary*. Such views were long advocated by the younger Flatt.[3] He endeavours to show that there is no atonement; that even the New Testament teaches none. We must nevertheless labour confidently in the work of our own amendment, in the belief of finally attaining to perfection. According to his maxims, or rather according to his perversion of them, every one may, even during his state of punishment, be certain of the Divine approbation, and hope for the Divine assistance. He does not, however, reflect that the law and the knowledge of a God who must necessarily inflict punishment, beget a fear with which love cannot coexist. Besides, by making man certain before punishment of the Divine approbation of his efforts after improvement, he does not regard the very essence of punishment as consisting in God's displeasure, and thinks less seriously of the power of sin than of its guilt, which absolutely exposes to punishment. The latter indeed, being compatible with the Divine approbation, already approximates to mere chastening. Susskind, adhering to his propositions, rejoined: It

[1] *Moral philosophie*, 1793, p. 307.

[2] Comp. Flatt's *Magazin*, ix.

[3] *Philos. exeg. Unters. über die Lehre von der Versöhnung*, 2 pts. 1797, p. 88, § 43, &c.

is possible for God to forgive, *i.e.* to pardon, the sinner, upon adequate amendment; but it is possible also that punishment, as such, may strike the repentant offender; hence a revelation to declare which of the two is His will is necessary. This supposed double possibility in God is, however, as unevangelical as it is contradictory. It is the latter, because, while the motive of the forgiveness of sins is said to be that sanctification is better promoted thereby than by punishment, on the other hand merit, and therefore amendment, is said to precede pardon. Hence revelation could as little be proved by practical reason to be the mere means of promulgating the forgiveness of sins, as it could thereby be shown to be nothing more than the instrument for proclaiming the moral law. On the contrary, it was precisely this earnest moral philosophy which led to an antinomy not to be solved upon Kantian principles. For, on the one side, practical reason, as the law of justice, *i.e.* of the connection between virtue and happiness, demands inexorably the punishment of sin, and regards remission as impossible; while, on the other, the moral law, as a law of holiness which must be fulfilled, indispensably requires the forgiveness of sin, unless the notion of punishment is to be diluted. It was no wonder then that, with such an antinomy of the practical reason, Kantian supernaturalism should appear more and more untenable. No one any longer ventured to advocate the Christian doctrine of the atonement, which affirms both the necessity of punishment and the forgiveness of sin, but instead of making them subsist as an antinomy unites them, by ascribing to Christ a real mediatorial acquisition of reconciliation, and thus announces the pardon of sin on the basis of an expiation to Divine justice. Storr had already turned to the acceptilation theory of Hugo Grotius. And it was Kant himself who more than others approximated thereto in his last-named work. Christ, he thinks, may be conceived of as the ideal of a manhood well-pleasing to God, whatever may have been the relation of Jesus thereto. This ideal is by substitution set to the account of the man who is sincerely disposed to amend his ways, for God accepts the will of the ordinary man for the deed, if only he has become in heart a new man. It may also be said, since sufferings often continue after amendment, that the new man suffers by substitution for the

old man.[1] It is certainly very significant that Kant should, for the sake of legitimizing the anticipation of peace, make so much of the idea of substitution. Knowing, however, nothing of preventing grace or pardon, he is always obliged to presuppose the goodness of the human will, in order to make substitution applicable, while in fact the conversion of the will itself is dependent not upon the mere hope, but upon the assurance of pardon.

For this reason it was soon evident that a Kantian *non-knowledge* of God was but a mock support for evangelical faith, which insists upon being an affirmation of assurance. Undoubtedly Kant's criticism of all objective knowledge struck also at the knowableness of revelation in general. Hence the Kantian foundation for a union of religion and philosophy being found deceptive, the supernaturalist theologians also, who depended upon it, receded farther and farther. Orthodox theology gradually lost its power of resistance, and one capitulation followed another. Thus those deformities, supernatural rationalism and rational supernaturalism, as represented by Tzschirner, Schott, Mertens, Klein, and others named above, got the upper hand from 1810 to 1820. Even Tübingen, which had long been esteemed the stronghold of orthodoxy, was increasingly inclined to Arminianism; while the younger Bengel was already tending to rationalism and to a Socinian Christology.

A crisis, arising from internal causes, was, however, coming upon the Kantian system itself. The distinction of "the thing in itself," from the *à priori* pure intuitions of space and time, without which no *conception* of a given object was possible, and from the forms of thought or categories, the pure notions of the understanding, without which no *judgment* and no *experience* could take place, and finally, from the *ideas* or contemplated aims of the reason, without which there can be no *moral action*,—a distinction which called in question all knowledge of objective reality—was indeed adapted to humble the scientific arrogance of popular philosophy, and to awaken a higher idea of knowledge. At the same time, however, it turned like a two-edged sword against Kantianism itself, and gave it an utterly sceptical tenor, unless some terms were come to with this obscure remnant of the thing in itself. This might, however, be done in two ways.

[1] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 69, &c., 86, &c.

Kant's criticism attempted to declare and establish the conditions of cognition. Since then these conditions or factors of cognition form its *prius* or *à priori*, an insight into these conditions is an insight into the faculty of the *à priori*, into pure reason, and thus a metaphysic is asserted, nay a germ furnished thereto, which divides itself in a threefold manner, viz. into theoretical and practical, while the former again branches off into an *à priori* knowledge of the senses and of the understanding. Thus the reason contemplating itself by the critical method, perceives thereby a series of original faculties. It has in itself sense, understanding, and the power of conceiving practical and ideal aims. But thus was given the problem to comprehend this multiplicity in a unity, and, if possible, to perceive how this one and the same reason exists in these different forms of being or functions, or determines and opens itself thereto. After Reinhold had attempted to find the unity of sense and understanding in the representative faculties, because both intuitions and notions are representations, Fichte proceeded to seek also the unity of the theoretical reason (under both its aspects) and that of the practical reason in the fundamental activity of the reason as such, *i.e.* in the self-consciousness or the ego. Fichte's doctrine of knowledge attempts to deduce all knowledge from the ego, and to abolish that obscure remnant, the thing in itself, by conceiving of the non-ego as the postulate of the ego,[1] a step which, in a manner to be subsequently mentioned, formed a transition to Schelling and Hegel, in whom the identity of subject and object attains a clearer expression and juster balance of both sides than in Fichte. In the latter the object appears to be absorbed in the subject, because in his earlier period he, in a subjectivistic manner, made the object to be only the act of the subject, without inquiring whether the subject were not itself fundamentally of a universal nature, and that which it postulates only the medium by which this universal foundation acts.[1]

But just as Hume's philosophy was succeeded in Scotland by the psychology of the Scottish school,[2] so also—and this was the *other possibility* of that dualism which remained in Kant's system—an advance might be made in the direction of attempting to

[1] Comp. Kuno Fischer, *Akademische Reden*, 1862; *Die beiden Kantischen Schulen in Jena*, p. 86-90.

[2] Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart.

overcome the scepticism therein contained, by abandoning the tendency to *à priori* science or metaphysics, which was given in Kant's investigations of the *à priori* conditions of the possibility of all cognition, and thus degrading the criticism of reason to that mere empiric knowledge of the human reason and its powers, which might be attained by self-observation or inward experience, *i.e.* anthropologically, and therefore in the way of psychology. So thought Fries, whose standpoint was akin to that of Jacobi.

Fries's empiricism, to which not metaphysics but psychical anthropology is the *philosophia prima*, then, however, attempts to base metaphysical science upon this inward experience, and to construct thereon a system of philosophy. He too insists upon a criticism of reason, but upon "a new criticism of reason," which does not treat the contents of the reason as produced, but as directly given in the mind. Since we do not create, but merely perceive these contents, the reason must, according to Fries, possess a faculty of passing through some kind of inward experiences, and this he calls the feeling of truth. This feeling is, however, at first obscure, and consequently needs a critical revision; thus the power of *reflection*, which can observe the given, and elucidate the obscure, is to be posited as a second faculty. This power of reflexion is, in his view, the *understanding*, which however cannot produce, but only become conscious of that which is experienced in the feeling. The feeling of truth and unity in Fries answers to the perception of the Infinite in Jacobi, the exaltation to the idea of the perfect and the ideal, which is higher and better than the ego, to the religious feeling which becomes conscious of the true world, while the world of sense, with time and space, is imperfection, which the ideal feeling transcends. *Faith* has indeed, according to Jacobi, also a signification for the world of sense, for as religious faith is a consciousness of God, so is there also a direct consciousness of the reality of the external world. But while the understanding, with its notions, categories, and necessary thoughts, is able to grasp in thought the world of sense, according to its limited appearances, the same understanding, though it can long for the Infinite and the Divine, is not merely insufficient to grasp such an object, but annihilates it in the attempt, because it makes everything finite upon which it reasons. The understanding is, by its very nature, a born denier of God; the Divine is thus

wholly inaccessible to our powers of definite knowledge, and only present to our feelings in moments of ideal exaltation. Every-day life is, on the contrary, life in the understanding, and therefore without God. It was Schleiermacher who, though coinciding with Jacobi in the denial of all objective cognition of God, first surmounted his psychological dualism between the understanding and the reason, by the acknowledgment that the religious feeling, by which alone we are conscious of God, vibrates in every element of our being, even in the "understanding." Nay, the two lines proceeding from Kant, the one leading from Fichte through Schelling to Hegel, and that of Fries and Jacobi, do in a certain measure unite in him. For in his dialectics he makes, on the one hand, his *empirical* starting-point to be not thought only, but thought desirous to become knowledge; and on the other, so constructs from this the *à priori* or *metaphysical* conditions or presuppositions of knowledge, as to produce a metaphysical science, not based upon experience alone, but derived also from the necessary idea of knowledge.[1] We must, however, pause to consider Fichte and Jacobi more closely.

Kant's standpoint was a half one; there was no stopping at its dualism. *Either:* That tendency to an *à priori* knowledge, threatened as it was at every moment and about to be of necessity resolved into merely subjective, though necessary intuitions and notions, by the obscure thing in itself left in the background, must be solely and energetically carried out; in other words, the reason itself must exorcise and overcome the threatening spectre of the thing in itself by abolishing its independent self-existence, and regarding it as a mere assumption of the ego. Fichte by doing this, in his first period, transformed the scepticism and criticism of Kant into the absolute knowledge of idealism. The ego renders itself absolute; it produces all the non-ego, at first as limitation, but afterwards also as material, which the ego in its *Progressus in infinitum* exercises itself in overcoming, and by which it recovers its liberty. Non-action, idleness, is the evil, action the good, and its result is that moral government of the world which takes the place of God. In this there remains indeed a weak point, namely, that the ego, according to Kant, also bears within itself the unknown thing in itself, and since moreover we do

[1] Chalybæus has carried out this thought with special vigour and independence in his metaphysics.

not know whether the ego, as apprehended in the immediate apperception of self-consciousness, corresponds to the real ego, the vanquishing of the thing in itself at this point also, in other words of the ego in itself, seems to lead too far. For it threatens to abolish the real substratum of the thought itself, and to leave nothing behind but action, the motion of the thought, which is at the same time an assumption, and thus we have functions without anything to exercise them, and predicates without a subject to bear them. *Or:* The thing in itself must be acknowledged as something objective, something given and not supposed by the thought, and this will be the case not only with the thing-in-itself of things external to us, but also with that of the self-consciousness; and between these two lines of connection may be drawn. But then Kant's propositions concerning the autarchy and autonomy of the reason, and his germs for a metaphysic, producing in a creative manner a real system of knowledge by means of pure speculation, no longer stand. On the contrary, we must then acknowledge that the reason itself precedes its own speculations and assumptions, not being first posited by the thought, but given to itself as a thing in itself, and must therefore cease from its claim to be completely absolute, because it points, on the contrary, to something which absolutely posits itself, to an objective and truly absolute Being, whence our thought and existence originate. To this latter conclusion not only Jacobi, but even Fichte, in his second period, turns, though in another form. For he now not only gives up representing this motion of act and thought as the assumption of the subjective ego, but proceeds to assume, as the real substratum of this motion of the thought, instead of the subjective ego, which is itself rather an assumption of the motion of thought, the absolute objective Being or God, in whom the individual is but a single point, a wave of the universal life; and who, even though but momentarily, makes himself subjective in individual minds, that is, treats them as mediums of transmission to His assumptions. God, it is then said, loves Himself in man, and man attains His truth by sacrificing himself to God. Thus from the proposition: "The ego is everything, is God," the other and opposite one: The ego has no substantial existence, there is nothing but God, and God is also the essence of the ego, is reached. And this is substantial Pantheism, nay, an objectivism which absorbs subjectivity.

In this, however, Fichte was already approaching the fundamental fact of Christianity. In his criticism of all revelation he had found, like a genuine Kantian, no other importance in Christ than that of preserving the idea of God in its purity, in the presence of the rudest sensuousness. He had seen in the doctrine of the God-man, only a statement which made a being entirely limited by the conditions of sense, an expression of the moral attributes of God, an incorporate practical reason, a God as it were of men; but he left the objective significance of Christ undecided, and required that every one should be at liberty to make use of it or not. Subsequently however, and especially in his lectures on the doctrine of the State in 1813,[1] he more inclined to a recognition of Christianity and of the historical Person of Christ. He still indeed, as before, rejected miracles in the province of external nature,[2] but acknowledged miracles in the province of mind, as the products, or even the self-manifestations, of that God who was to his ardent conception a wise and loving Providence. The more his moral judgment advanced to the perception that the legal stage was subordinate, discordant and enslaved, and that the Kantian categorical imperative was barren, and mere dead law, the more decidedly did he turn to love as the supreme principle specially proclaimed in St. John's Gospel. This love he regards as not, in the first place, a product of human effort and will, but a Divine gift and appointment, which he compares with geniality. He sees that the categorical imperative and self-respect bear but dead and cold fruits, devoid of benefits either to their producers or receivers, and accompanied by an ever increasing hatred to the law, and an absence of joy, enthusiasm and liberty. By the Divine gift however, a firm will, in which liberty and necessity are combined, and which was in Kant merely a matter of desire and endeavour, becomes actually existent. He also applies the notion of geniality more comprehensively to the progress of the world's history. This progress is effected by elect personalities, the organs of the Godhead, who do not first become

[1] *Works*, vol. iv. 370, &c., and especially 535, &c.

[2] *Works*, iv. 546: They would be magical means, and would presuppose an arbitrary God, their reception would be a denial of the law of God. iii. 100: It would even be immoral to think of producing moral effects by means of miracles; in the kingdom of God nothing must be altered within the world of sense, except through freedom, under the Divine command.

what they are in the way of development or reflexion, but directly through God, who not merely prescribes law, or an order of the world, but Himself operates as the creative order of the world.[1] Theirs is a *spiritual nature*, and reason acts in them with the irresistible power of instinct. Now if the manifestation of absolute truth in an inspired personality in general is logically inexplicable, and to be regarded as an act of Divine freedom, *i.e.* a miracle, then the existence of Jesus is the greatest miracle in creation. Jesus was, without any act of will or reflexion, by His very existence a citizen of the kingdom of heaven. His will was absorbed and captivated in a higher will, of which He was the instrument, and as such became conscious of Himself. He was what we call a decided, an artistic, a practical genius, with an innate impulse for founding the kingdom of heaven. Contemplating then and comprehending Himself, He knew Himself to be not merely thus impelled, generally speaking, but to bear within Him also the notion and the character of this fact. He both knew and chose, that it should be his destination to be the founder of the kingdom of heaven. He had by His very being power over all. We may also perceive that this Person was absolutely necessary. Mankind is by the exertion of its freedom to destroy an antagonistic condition, and to form itself into a kingdom of God, into a world in which God alone is the principle of all activity, and in which nothing is done without Him from whom all human freedom proceeds, and to whom it is surrendered. This must indeed take place in detail through each individual, and that power of freedom which determines him. But for this purpose there was needed an example of this determination to self-immolation and self-surrender. Whence was mankind to have this? *It could only have it by means of a previously possessed freedom, and yet in its present state it can only obtain freedom by means of this example. Thus a circle arises: freedom presupposes the example, the example presupposes freedom. This circle is only to be abolished by the fact that the example should once be actual reality, absolutely original, beginning from the very roots, and realizing itself in a person. Now this did take*

[1] Fichte already advanced in his definition of man from Forberg's definition of God as the order of the world, which is the product of man (*ordo ordinatus*), to God as the *ordo ordinans*, and afterwards from this formal definition to the real one, that God is, after all, the creative principle of a living and moral order of the world, and also of freedom and love.

*place in Jesus. He is unique through His originality. All who enter the kingdom of heaven attain it only through Him,* through the example which He sets up in Himself for the whole race; for *all are to be born again through Him, while He is the first, and the first-born Son.*

Thus does Fichte endeavour to infer from an *à priori* law the necessity of the Person of Jesus. But, he continues, that which Jesus had in so original a manner, all may have, now that they have such an example for contemplation, in other words, they may now, without special geniality, become, by means of their freedom, what He was. He calls Jesus absolute reason, or religion become direct self-consciousness, the perfect sensible manifestation of the eternal word: it was only the imperfection of subsequent ages; which made Him an unapproachable ideal; it was His design to be entirely and undividedly repeated in the character He exhibited.[1] His blood and His mind having entered into us make us pure. If by our freedom and understanding we have so far attained that God lives in us, His Person is a matter of indifference to us, and the historical element in Christ loses its importance; we do not need the ladder after we have gained the height.[2] It is contrary to Christianity to make belief in the Trinity—even in that economic sense which he alone embraces—and in the person of Jesus, a condition of salvation. That none indeed can come to God without the Son and the Spirit is ever true, but the Son and the Spirit can save a man without his knowledge or gratitude. Not to comprehend the Trinity is but an obscurity which, as such, shall be abolished. All multiplicity, even though only duality, is but in the image, in the appearance; in another world this will be absolute unity. Hence we have only to teach that God has manifested Himself as Father, Son, and Spirit, not in words, but in act. The Father is that which is absolutely given previous to the appearance of, and the separation into, individuality; the Son is the absolute enhancement of the appearance to the intuition of the kingdom of God. The great eternal miracle is that God (as the Spirit) gives a new heart to all who draw near to Him. For we must teach that there is in the world of spirits a living and active God.[3]

Jacobi goes still more deeply into the nature of man, advancing from Kant's ego of the will, which makes itself absolute, to

[1] v. 489. [2] iv. 552. [3] iv. 555.

the sphere of feeling [*Gemüth*], of direct perception of God; from the province of morals to that of religion; though still equally building upon only a subjective basis. This subjective inwardness, this directness of feeling, is inimical to all interposition of means in the matter of religion. The objective history is regarded as the mere symbol of this inward sentiment, and not as the source and rule of healthy religious feeling. So too, as has been already hinted, the world of intellectual speculation is, in his view, opposed to that world of religion which absolutely withdraws from conception. The intellect cannot help conceiving that on which it speculates as finite. Spinoza rightly said, *omnis determinatio est negatio.* He regards God as higher and better than the ego, because He is infinite, though His nature is undefinable, and His properties cannot be expressed. Every positive statement concerning God is anthropomorphic or anthropopathic, hence it is idolatry to designate Christ as both God and man.

Great as was the influence of Jacobi as the advocate of feeling, and the enthusiastic prophet of religion and its primary rights, his standpoint is involved in self-contradictions, in a constant and innate dualism between reason and faith, intellect and feeling, and not less in a dualism between the inner world of high ethereal feeling and the outer world. Within is "noble nature," which conceives of itself as pure and divine, the fair soul which breathes forth its feelings; without is the hard, stony, unideal world, in which the laws of gravitation, of mechanics, and of cold reason prevail. Regarding nothing as certain but negation, and conceiving of the Divine as separate from the world of the visible, or at most as merely reflected thereby, he can admit no external revelation, and tries to make that which is found in man sufficient.

If however we only know that God *is*, but are absolutely incapable of knowing *what* He is, we cannot know whether pantheism, against which Jacobi so decidedly pronounces, is not in the right; whether God, that Being who is better than the ego, is not after all the ideal ego becoming conscious, in its so-called religious feeling, of itself, or of that which is infinite and divine in its own nature. So, too, is the moral element, of which we are sensible, and which he defines as that which corresponds with the divine element, utterly indefinite, nay, subjective in his system. The ego, as that noble nature which esteems itself divine, is to decide

in individual instances what is good, and is itself superior to law. This ego does not choose aught that is objective because it is good, but it is good because this ego chooses it. Fries and Schmid, as before pointed out, try to fill up this undefined outline of the moral psychologically, and attain at best to that only which is adapted to human nature, but not to that which is good in itself, and therefore that universal good by means of which alone human consciousness can become reason.

It was an easier and more attractive task to *unite theology* with Jacobi's standpoint than with Kant's, or even with the earlier teaching of Fichte. This called forth the antagonism between *supernaturalism and rationalism* in a new and *third form.* The rivals now appeared not in their intellectual or moral, but in their æsthetic forms. On the side of æsthetic supernaturalism are Eschenmayer (formerly a Schellingian), Vater, Steudel, Emmerich, Heydenreich, and others. Like Jacobi, they are opposed to all scientific apprehension or knowledge of things divine, on the ground of the absence of all proportion between the finite intellect and the infinite God. Steudel[1] disputes our right to make either the holy feeling or the holy presentiment the exclusive source of knowledge. "We must," he says, "derive our religious knowledge from all that is authenticated, especially from holy Scripture." He then inculcates reverence for the historical side of revelation in general, and is the last advocate of any importance of so-called biblical supernaturalism. For the rest he takes up a freer position towards the symbolical books, especially with regard to the doctrines of natural sinfulness, and of the atonement; and insists upon the freedom of the will. But the stricter followers of Jacobi, such as Koppen and Schmid, declare with negative mysticism that the eternal cannot enter into time without making itself finite; that language itself is but the symbol, not the expression, of thought, and that even supposing there were an objective revelation, man could not therein find truth for the first time, but only find again that which he already bears within him. No external revelation, accredited by miracles, &c., can attain the power of conviction possessed by the primitive perception of God within us; as a thing external it cannot grow together, or

[1] *Von der Haltbarkeit des Glaubens an geschichtliche höhere Offenbarung Gottes,* 1814.

in like manner, with the mental organism, nor become an element of its freer and higher knowledge. To speak of an incarnation of the infinite is a self-evident contradiction, and nothing but superstitious idolatry. It was here that Jacobi came into violent collision with friends to whom his heart was united, with Matthias Claudius, and Hamann, who would neither regard his irreconcilable antagonism between the intellect and the perception of God as an irreversible decree, and the mind of man as involved in a necessary discord, nor deprive the mental life, whether of the pious or the intellectual, of its unity. The last objective reason of the dualism in which Jacobi's noble mind was involved, is his view of the absolute antagonism of the divine and the human, which he shares with Wolff, Kant, and Fichte, and which his own pious feelings struggle, at least momentarily and at intervals, to overcome, as *e.g.* when, in spite of Fichte's saying that personality is limitation and finiteness, he clings to the idea of a personal God, or when he appropriates to himself Goethe's saying—

> "Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
> Wie könnten wir der Sonne Licht erblicken?
> Lebt' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
> Wie könnt' uns Göttliches entzücken?"

Jacobi is the philosopher who, with the intellect of a heathen and the heart of a Christian, stood between two opposing currents, and when carried upwards by the one was as constantly borne down again by the other. Ever alternating between seasons of piety and periods in which he was utterly without God, he was continually in that state of conflict which we observed in pre-Reformation mysticism, in its interchange between seasons of rejoicing in God and seasons of deploring His absence.

The *rationalism* based upon Jacobi's foundation was more lasting than that æsthetic supernaturalism, whose place was soon occupied by Schleiermacher and his influence. For æsthetic rationalism was the form which was variously assumed by all those who, on the one hand, turned away from the dryness and poverty of so-called vulgar rationalism of the Wolffian or Kantian kind,[1] and who yet, on the other, were unable to perceive the

[1] As *e.g.* Hase, who in his controversial works against Röhr, has rendered essential service with respect to the older rationalism.

dogmatic importance of holy Scripture, and thereby to find themselves in more internal harmony with Church doctrine.

Among these may be enumerated Ammon in his later period, Hase, de Wette, and Rückert. Hase, of whose services in the department of historical theology we shall hereafter have to speak, and who commenced the long series of works of the kind by his *Leben Jesu*, in which he embraces the perfect sinlessness of Jesus, affected in his youth by the writings of Schelling, nay, even of Schleiermacher, was unable to stop at a dead conception of the relation of God to the world. Instead, however, of assuming in man an infinite receptivity for the acts of God and for communion with Him, he defines Him after the manner of Pelagianism, as of divine nature, as "becoming God" through His freedom, while he also calls God "the absolute man." There is however, in his view, a *progressus in infinitum* between the two. Atonement and redemption are to take place by means of freedom, *i.e.* by man's appropriation of the infinite through love.[1] He had at an earlier period[2] held that the appearance of Christ was necessary for the purpose of a divinely-accredited announcement of the forgiveness of sin, an announcement which His own perfection confirmed and proclaimed. This was a bond of alliance between him and Tübingen supernaturalism, but a bond which was soon broken.[3] De Wette, a prolific writer in exegesis and criticism, author of many works which manifest a noble and truth-loving nature, though he did not in his doctrinal statements scientifically overcome Jacobi's dualism,[4] was personally increasingly[5] favourable to historical Christianity.[6]

[1] *Ev. Dogmatik*, § 51.

[2] *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 1526, p. 367, &c.

[3] The standpoint of the learned Baumgarten-Crusius, who however too slightly organizes his material, is a similar one.

[4] First expressed in *Religion und Theologie*, 1815, and subsequently in his *Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkt des Glaubens*, 1846.

[5] *Commentar zur Apokalypse*, 1848, Preface. (The conclusion of his *Exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament.*)

[6] At the present time a tolerably large contingent is furnished to æsthetic rationalism by those who, falling away from Schleiermacher and stopping at that standpoint of reflection which makes the object of theology a *matter* of argument, have revived that antagonism between rationalism and supernaturalism, feeling and intellect, ideal and real, which had been reconciled by Schleiermacher. To these belong the majority of the contributors to the *protestantischen Kirchenzeitung*, and the writers of many articles in Schenkel's *Zeitschrift*, while H. Lange's *Zeitstimmen*, retrograding still farther and misconceiving the independent rights of

## RETROSPECT.

We have thus in our third section pursued that development of subjectivity, whose course was one of uninterrupted victory. Blow followed blow in rapid succession; secession from the authority of the Church, self-severance from holy Scripture from all external, and from even the Christian revelation, surrender too of that internal revelation for which Semler, Lessing, and Jacobi had still left room, in favour of Kant's moral self-certainty of the subject shut up in itself, nay, of Jacobi's claim of the subject to be supreme, and superior even to the objective moral law, and of Forberg's rejection of religion itself.

In a dangerous malady, the constitution rallies its vital powers to struggle for the mastery. So also did Protestantism during the period when subjectivity was most in the ascendant, viz. from 1750 to 1800, when philosophy with its successive systems was the order of the day, shake off all that it felt to be the cause of the bondage into which it had fallen, all that oppressive narrowness of external form which its inner nature could not assimilate, and which yet sought to lord it over that nature. That which thus cramped its energies and stifled its breath was not the Divine itself, but the human additions and form which had been mingled with it, and which made the historical appear unspiritual, nay the Divine uncongenial, and destructive to thought, freedom, and will. For supernaturalism too, with its deistic admixture, had just as little knowledge that reason and Christianity harmonized with each other as the idea of true manhood and Godhead. To such a human addition had human science grown, nay, overgrown. Antiquated theology went down to its grave, but *the Christian faith* remained, nay, was even now reviving with fresh vigour, to bring forth in due time a new theology. To this result philosophy, even in its specially critical

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religion, transfer them to the practical or intellectual interest. A theological and philosophical eclecticism makes this group appear very numerous. The key-word by which they are held together is "culture," which has taken the place of the older watch-word "illuminism," but has for the most part preserved the same negative signification. The fact that there was on the other side also a relapse to the older forms of supernaturalism, and especially to its ecclesiastical form, contributed not a little to this state of things.

period, furnished its contribution. Its attitude indeed was, during the above-mentioned period, for the most part alien, nay, antagonistic to Christianity. Its labours nevertheless subserved a higher cause than its own, and formed a regularly advancing process, which was not all loss, but also profit, because it showed beforehand how intrinsically akin were the factors of the human and the divine, of nature and grace. For that tendency, which first appeared in the three aspects mentioned in the second section, in a positively Christian form, viz. in Protestant mysticism, in Calixtus, and in Spener and the Church of the Brethren, was now seen to advance consciously, and by similar stages, in a philosophic form, modern science now, in the form of philosophy, opposing the forerunners of the modern period (from Klopstock and Hamann to Herder), and attacking this modern correlative of the ancient mysticism, teeming as it was with fertile germs. Its assaults were made first in an intellectual form by Leibnitz and Wolff, the self-assurance of the mind was next sought in a practical and ethical form by Kant and Fichte, this being the philosophical correlative of Spener's movement, while, finally, Jacobi carried on the process in the form of religious feeling. Not one of the subjective aspects of consciousness was indeed self-sufficing; each was attacked by the advocates of the others who could make a case against it, yet each again represented a true aspect of the nature or the idea of man. The whole process was inwardly connected with Protestantism and its intrinsic tendency, especially with the material principle. For as the material principle promises inward assurance and freedom in God, nay, makes these a duty, so also the fundamental feature in this subjective process is, that whatever would exercise authority over man, or claim his submission, must be homogeneous with his nature, feeling, perceptions, and will, and capable of being assimilated thereby, that so it may become his personal possession and his personal assurance. Even the essential affinity between the human and the divine was brought to light by the efforts of that very subjectivity, whose desire it was to pause at and to ponder over itself, and which subserved such a purpose involuntarily, and, it might be said, to its own surprise. For the absolutely valuable predicates of knowledge of truth, desire of good, and feeling for the infinite and the divine, being acknowledged not to transcend human nature, but to be elements of the true nature

of man, so many lines of communication were thus drawn between the idea of the human and the Divine, in opposition to their traditional separation. Hence the idea of their mutual exclusion and alienation appeared no longer tenable. It is true that the strong desire for subjective self-assurance led philosophy at this stage zealously to decide against objectivity; but the rapid succession of systems in the line of subjectivity, and their ceaseless conflicts with each other, suffered neither a premature repose nor a true self-assurance to be attained, but rather impelled them, though in the form of conflict, towards seeking their union and interpenetration.

That remarkable apparition Fichte, who pushed subjectivity to the furthest conceivable limits, not only showed that it must necessarily be exchanged for objectivity, but, besides consistently carrying out subjectivity, gave philosophical expression to the principle of objectivity. Thus the spirits of two ages exhibit themselves as comprised in him in all distinctness. It is true that their manifestation is successive; but at the same time they approximate so closely, as most absolutely to demand that union, which alone could put a stop to the restless exchange of one for the other which had hitherto been taking place on both sides,[1] and introduce, instead of an ever fruitlessly repeated circle, the straight line of progress, in virtue of the combination of these two antagonistic factors.

The *theological problem* as yet left unsolved by the Reformation, viz. *the scientific union of the material and the formal*, of the subjective and objective principles, is only a concrete expression, with reference to the Christian religion, of the *philosophical problem* of the union of subject and object, of thought and existence. It is very significant that at about the same time when philosophy was in the state of agitation we have pointed out, a respectable theologian should, from the ranks of the biblical supernaturalists, have recalled attention to the material principle of the Reformation, which had been almost buried by the one-sided emphasis laid not indeed upon Church teaching, but upon the formal principle.[2]

[1] In the eighteenth century, from objectivism to subjectivism, and then *vice versa*.

[2] Reinhard's *Reformationspredigt*, 1800.

# BOOK III.

## THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, OR THE REGENERATION OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY.

# FIRST DIVISION.

## The German Protestant or Evangelical Church.

ONE of the most important results of the commotions which during the eighteenth century had agitated the Evangelical Church, was the altered attitude of the different Christian, and especially the different Protestant, confessions towards each other. In the seventeenth century their controversies had too often been characterized by self-exaltation, want of charity, and a spirit of binding opponents to conclusions which they repudiated. Both confessions had ignored those treasures of evangelical faith which were common property, and shown a disposition to disparage their common Christianity, or to restrict its natural effects. The onesided dwelling upon what was individual, and the morbid depreciation of what was common, weakened the feeling for evangelical catholicity, the obverse of which could only be a tendency towards sectarianism. This was chiefly shown on the part of Lutheran theologians by their claim that their Confession, as being in possession of correct doctrine, was the only true Church of Christ on earth, and in the most flourishing condition. Opposition to this error, which turned attention from the fundamental evangelical truths, and placed in their stead those doctrinal distinctions which were morbidly overvalued, was never indeed wholly absent, though it continued without result till the commencement of the present century.[1] It was carried on in the seventeenth century, not merely by the efforts of Dav. Pareus, Rud. Maldenius, and the unceasing but somewhat unintelligible productions of the Scotchman Dury, but also by public transactions, among which was the colloquy of Leipsic, 1631, between Matthew Hoë of Hoënegg, Polyc. Leyser, and H. Höpfner on the one side, and J. Crocius, J. Bergius, and Theoph. Neuberger on the other, although osten-

[1] It was held in the same year as the Synod of Charenton, which granted to Lutherans the right of partaking the Lord's Supper without accession to the Reformed Church.

sibly this was only a private discussion between the divines of Brandenburg, Hesse, and Saxony. Hoë had ten years before proved that the Reformed Church agreed in ninety-nine points with Arians and Turks (the "Eastern Antichrist," who was as bad as the Western and Roman), while the articles of the Confession of Augsburg were, with the exception of those on the impartation of the divine properties to the manhood of Christ, and on the Lord's Supper, unanimously consented to at Leipsic. In the question of predestination, foreseen faith was indeed insisted on on the part of the Lutherans; but this was declared to be entirely and exclusively the work of God. While the colloquy of Thorn (1645, see above) had rather contributed to exasperate the antagonism of the two Churches, the great Elector carried his point against Saxony, of obtaining in the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, a recognition of the political equality of such subjects of the German Empire as were members of the Reformed Church. In 1653 the *Corpus Evangelicorum*—which included both parties, and had been in formation, though in a looser fashion, since 1582[1]—was formally organized at the diet under the directorium of Saxony. Still more favourable than even the Leipsic discussion was the Union colloquy at Cassel in 1661, between the Lutheran divines, Peter Musæus and John Heinichen of Rinteln, disciples of Calixtus, and the Reformed theologians, Seb. Curtius and John Hein of Marburg. Here a far-reaching agreement, even in distinctive doctrines, was manifested. By these colloquies it was shown that the protest against an exclusive and inimical position of the two confessions towards each other was, even in the seventeenth century, not only constantly carried on, but that it had obtained, so to speak, to citizenship within the Lutheran Church. This was, however, not less the case with the opposite position, which continued to be the dominant one till the times of Pietism. The Lutherans would not even give up the Nominalelenchus (the condemnation and opposition by name of the doctrines of other confessions), and princely mandates had to come to the rescue in the cause of the Church's peace. Even Pietism at first hesitated at an approximation to the Reformed Church. A union, Spener thought, would but make four parties instead of two. Since however he called to purity of life as well as doctrine, the value

[1] V. Bülow, *über Geschichte und Verfassung des Corp. Evang.*, 1795.

of distinctive doctrines could not but fall, the interests both of religion and morality forbidding their being placed on a level with the cardinal doctrines which were common to both confessions. Hence Pietism furnished but few contributions to confessional controversy, while Lutherans were abundantly occupied in attacking Pietism. They nevertheless found time, in the first half of the second century, to carry on, though certainly with gradually increasing moderation,[1] the controversy against the Reformed. Such controversialists became however an ever-diminishing minority, and so greatly had the disposition of the Protestant States altered about the year 1700, that many esteemed their reproofs as praise. In Southern Germany also Wurtemburg, through the influence of Pfaff and Klemm, and Franconia through that of Urlsperger, were in the eighteenth century well-affected towards union. Zinzendorf however set up, in his three tropes of doctrine, a typical Protestant community, which, while maintaining its own doctrinal peculiarities, combined the different Protestant confessions into one Church, on the ground of the fundamental doctrines of salvation. Few attempts at union were however made by the several national churches during the eighteenth century.[2] The critical, nay, destructive spirit of the age since 1750, removed one obstacle, but at the same time extinguished almost all motive and inclination to union. Confessionalistic zeal, seizing upon accessory points, had, as we have shown, resulted in the neglect of fundamental doctrines and of insisting upon their decisive importance, and this was a preliminary condition favourable to those attacks, which now came like a judgment upon the Church, and washed away, together with the fundamental doctrines, those accessory dogmas which had so long been subjects of contention. But illuminism had no real desire for union, its aspirations were rather for the total dissolution of the Christian Church, for its evaporation into a cosmopolitan ideal of humanism. Negations

[1] An exception is formed by such men as Fecht, who, irritated by Pfaff's zeal for union, exerted his ingenuity to prove that the Reformed Church was guilty of heresy in respect of each of the twelve articles of the apostolic symbol.

[2] The *Collegium charitativum* of Berlin, 1703 (consisting of Bishop Jablonski and Strimesius, and on the Lutheran side of Propst, Lütkens, and Winkler, under the presidency of Bp. Ursinus), was ineffectual, and even came into bad odour, through Winkler's work, *Arcanum Regium*, in which he came forward as an advocate of union in a territorial, imperial, and papistical sense.

are not of a creative nature. Unbelief can have no hearty interest in any bond of religious union.

On the other hand, the great intellectual revolution of the eighteenth century certainly helped to moderate expectations, and to break through the narrowness to which the mind had hitherto been subjected. If the torrent had swept away all Christian doctrines, and involved them in a common destruction, this necessarily called for deliberation as to what really constituted those vital articles of evangelical faith, for whose recovery or preservation it was needful, with all earnestness, to contend. The result of this newly acquired knowledge and reawakened love was the inward alliance of those kindred spirits in both confessions, whom their common faith enabled to overcome confessional restrictions. The judgments and deliverances of the subsequent Napoleonic era were instrumental in reviving a truly Christian fear of God and love to the Church, and these were the conditions whence a desire for union arose—a desire to which Frederick William III. of Prussia gave a simple expression, but one which was joyfully re-echoed on all sides, by his summons of Sept. 27, 1817. The third centenary of the Reformation was to be the signal for the retraction of the injustice and narrowness which had attached to the great spiritual act of the German people. What the king at the same time effected against the liturgical anarchy which had set in, was equally to bear the impress of the spirit of the Reformation.

Nassau was united by a general synod (August, 1817) even before Prussia; Anhalt-Bernberg in 1820; Waldeck, with Pyrmont and Baden, in 1821; Hesse in 1818-1823; while Marburg became a united university. Dessau was united in 1827. As far as Prussia was concerned, the points of difference were overlooked in the midst of that first enthusiasm for union, in 1817, which was hailed by all Protestant Germany, and the revived appreciation of the saving value of the fundamental truths. According, however, to Harms' prediction, the fulfilment of which was hastened by the violence and blunders of the authorities, a Lutheran movement against the union arose, and a Lutheran separation was formed by Scheibel, Steffens, and Huschke about 1830. This, though confined within narrow limits, served to show, after a few decades, the consequences of giving free course to an arbitrary spirit of separation. After this

the distinctive doctrines were allowed ecclesiastical existence within the union, and after many fluctuations, which need not be related here, the original and absorptive idea of union was so modified that the two confessions, with their mutual distinctions, were to be regarded as different tropes of evangelical doctrine, in the one evangelical national Church, which was conscious of possessing a common and copious treasure of evangelical and fundamental truths and facts, and had therefore a church government independent *in interim* of the State, and one and the same constitution. The feeling of unity on the ground of a common faith was to be proved by their mutually admitting each other to a participation in the Lord's Supper, without requiring a previous change of confession, and by their maintaining a spirit of mutual peace and forbearance.[1] That which was thus legally enacted in conformity with the principle of the Reformation, was voluntarily adopted as a custom in other countries, without any formal appointment, so that we can now speak with truth of One German evangelical Church, whose living members manifest a lively sense of mutual fellowship, both by activity in various Christian works, and by sympathy in each other's sufferings. Such a feeling is shown in the "Evangelical Conference" in Eisenach, of deputies from the several governing bodies of German churches, the Gustavus Adolphus society, the German

[1] Schleiermacher was, both by his course of action and his own inclination and purpose, the chief intellectual leader of the union. Its supporters after him were C. J. Nitzsch and J. Müller. Schleiermacher (see below) had, in 1804, already spoken in its favour in the first of his *zwei unvorgreiflichen Gutachten in Sachen des protestantischen Kirchenwesens*, but had expected too much from, and made too much, to depend upon a declaration of the State, insisting that the State should not regard a participation of the Lord's Supper, or an arrangement with other confessions, as a change of confession. Subsequently he desired, without surrendering the distinctive doctrines for a barren and indefinite vagueness, to have their separating agency abolished by the declaration of a synod. Of such a synod there was for some time a prospect, but it never came to pass. Schleiermacher's important principle of individuality leaves neither the right nor the need of abolishing peculiarities, but only that of freeing them from any morbid elements, among which may especially be reckoned a position of separatism towards other individualities. The unity of the Church not only subsists, but becomes more vital and complete when its life is carried on in different branches, provided these branches mutually acknowledge each other, and an interchange of gifts is not prejudiced by this consciousness of unity on the ground of the same Christian grace. Thus *Conf. Aug.* vii. "That subordinate differences do not abolish the unity of the Church," was applied also to subordinate *doctrinal* differences, an application already effected by the apology and the Smalkaldic articles.

evangelical diet, the Central Committee for the Inner Mission in Germany, the Committee for Foreign missions, the Bible, and other societies. Thus the German evangelical Church of the nineteenth century, viewing the progress already made, may confidently encounter the future, while her *science* may also rejoice in the broader basis now furnished for its development by this co-operation of forces.

To this latter subject, and to the history of its progress since the commencement of the present century, when a onesided subjectivity had reached its climax, we now proceed. We shall find that the union forms an important factor even in the movements of the theology of the last decade.

## SECTION I.

### SCHELLING, HEGEL, SCHLEIERMACHER.

A NEW era of German science in general was inaugurated, first by Schelling and Hegel, and then by Schleiermacher. But it was the latter who laid the foundation for a revival of theology by establishing principles which overcame the twofold partiality of the preceding epoch, viz. the partiality of objectivism, which had prevailed from 1600, and that of subjectivity, which had been dominant since 1750, and by raising to the rank of a ruling idea the persuasion of the intrinsic connection between the objective and the subjective.

The development of subjectivity to that absolute climax which it reached in Fichte, exhibited the unexpected result that the ego, however highly it may rate itself, cannot conceive of itself as primary and constant, but that, on the contrary, Being properly so called rests only in the objective absolute. But egoism being thus swallowed up in God, Fichte's second standpoint could only lead, after Spinoza's pantheistic fashion, to a renewed prevalence of partial objectivity, and was incapable of uniting the contending factors which had, since 1600, been in vain, and with alternating success, struggling for supremacy.

Before, however, Fichte's transition to this his pantheistic mysticism, Schelling, who, instead of retreating to a standpoint which had been surpassed by the Reformation, addressed himself boldly to the work of inward reconciliation, had already appeared. His efforts were followed up by those of Hegel, who, even in his *Phänomenologie*, 1807, declared it to be the fundamental problem, to mould into one another Spinoza's substance and Fichte's subjectivity.[1] So, too, Schleiermacher, after speaking in his Discourses on Religion in 1799 of the intention or feeling of the absolute ("of the universe"), and of absolute dependence thereon, proclaimed the very next year, in his Monologues, the divine freedom of the true ego united with God. These writers, acknowledging, as they do,

[1] *Phänomenologie*, p. xx. xxi.

the equal rights of subjectivity and objectivity in true knowledge, and not less so the necessity of indissolubly and inwardly connecting them, are forced to seek for an ultimate principle in which both are united and involved. This ultimate principle is in their view "the absolute," which can, if there is to be any knowledge at all, be neither mere substance, the inflexible objective existence of Spinoza; nor, on the other hand, mere primary subject, the self-contained primary monad on which Deism insists. On the contrary, it is the original combination and unity of subject and object which forms, in their view, the presupposition of the possibility of any knowledge. The absolute is, especially according to Schelling, to be assumed as the original unity in which the two—viz., substantial existence and subjectivity—interpenetrate each other, even to absolute identity. As substance is of its own nature also subjective, so also is subject of its own nature substance or object, the absolute is *subject-object*. As such it is neither the one nor the other only, but is by its own nature both, and may thus be the principle of both the subjective and the objective in the world also, and the pledge and rule of the unity both of thought and being. Since then subject and substance thus interpenetrate each other in God, the idea of God becomes animate; and this living God, the contrast to the immovable God of Deism and of Spinoza, is thus the ideal of knowledge, because in Him thought and being are combined into absolute knowledge. He is, moreover, the ideal of the ethical, the supreme point of union for all the antagonisms of existence, even those of nature and mind. If, then, He is the ideal of knowledge, nay, its first principle, that process of thought which abstracts and detaches itself from Him can no longer lead to knowledge; and the jealousy of the subject and of its freedom with respect to God is proved, on the contrary, to be a self-deprivation as unnatural as it is foolish. On the other side, *that* knowledge is alone worthy of the name which is neither mere subjective reasoning and assumption, nor a merely passive relation to its object, whether in a materialistic, a purely empiric, or an authoritative form. On the contrary, the fertile idea of knowledge, and its living principle now is, that the old twofold exclusive dualism of God and the world, of infinite and finite, of freedom and necessity, of subject and object, in which also the inferred antitheses of mind and nature, individual and species,

participate, is surmounted as untrue, and that the indispensable and hopeful means of attaining to truth is, in opposition to such a view, now admitted to be the perception of the mutual interpenetration of these antitheses. Hence the claim was now set up that the movement of the subjective thought is at the same time the movement of the matter, which is present in the thought, and is that power over the mind which is the source of its knowledge, and to which it occupies not merely a passive, but a vitally receptive and reproductive relation. *Truth and certainty are rendered possible to the mind by this power, which fills it with its presence, and obtains it as the organ, to which it testifies of itself and makes itself evident.* And this is to say, first of all, that it is only through God that we can know God. It is obvious how akin these fundamental thoughts of modern philosophy are to the creative principle of the Reformation, and that the Reformation is their native soil. Hence, too, it arose that attention was now directed to those objective notions of God, of the Trinity, &c., which the Reformation, from its anthropological starting-point, left untouched, and which subsequent ages obscured or denied, and that the work of the Reformation was now for the first time continued. Science, from the time of Schelling onwards, seems to be animated, as it were, by a new breath, and to have found again its true centre. Schelling himself expressed his consciousness (in his *Statement of the True Relation of Natural Philosophy to the amended Fichtian Doctrine*[1]) that a great turning-point of time had arrived.

But there was room enough on the common ground of the new era for widely differing views, and much labour was needed before those various stages were passed through, the earlier of which, far from grasping Christianity in its central point, furnished, at most, certain prerequisites for its recognition, especially with respect to the nature of God and of man, in general.

The first stage of the new era grasps *the absolute with physical, the second with logical, the third with ethical precision.* The first result was brought about by Schelling as the founder of natural philosophy, the second by Hegel, the third especially by Schleiermacher. In analogy with this progression was that of ancient philosophy from physics to dialectics, and thence to ethics.

Schelling in his earlier period views the absolute as universal

[1] *Schellings Werke*, div. i. vol. vii., 1806.

life, as the universe rich in forms and beauty. He limits the contents of knowledge chiefly to the physical, whether of a real or ideal kind. This universal life of nature, however, subjectuates itself in man, and in his consciousness for the purpose of knowing itself. His organ of higher knowledge is genial and "intellectual" intuition. Religion is, in his view, only the living and conscious union of the subject with the harmonious universe, and hence not as yet definitely distinguished from the æsthetic, from life in the beautiful and in art. The universe itself is the union of the many and the One, the absolute organism.[1] God is related to it as the universal soul, which ever has its actuality in the world. The absolute is the union of the soul of the universe and the organized world. God is ever by means of the process of nature, becoming man. The deistical standpoint, its naturalism or rationalism, can indeed see nothing but pantheism in all this. And yet more inwardness of religious life, though of an elementary kind, was compatible herewith than with Deism, which separated God from the world. Spiritualism and the idealism which avoided nature regarded it as error, nay, as materialism. But contempt for nature, which prevailed not only in Kant and Fichte, but also, though in another manner, during the middle ages and down to the seventeenth century, is, as Oetinger especially already perceived, anything but favourable to Christian science. This is shown not merely by the Christian doctrine of creation and eschatology, but also by Christology and the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, and, to the greatest extent, by the requirements of Christian ethics, which cannot, without nature, attain to a doctrine of ethical entities. Nature or corporeity is the essential condition of real history. According to Schelling, it is also in itself a world of thoughts which have become real, and is therefore not without mind. It is the reality, the lively manifestation of valuable ideas. Oetinger had already thus expressed the same truth in the saying, "Corporeity is the end of the ways of God," since without an adequate corporeity the mind cannot be aught but mere ceaseless motion nor attain to a condition of permanence, an indwelling in nature [*Naturirung*]. By such views Schelling was no abettor of materialism, but rather, like Fr. v. Baader, an adherent to the realism of J. Böhm and Oetinger, who endea-

[1] Schelling, *Bruno, ein Gespräch*, 1802; *Works*, div. i. vol. iv., 213, &c.

voured to find the roots of nature in God Himself, and thus to prove its absoluteness. In his period of natural philosophy, however, he made nature the end as well as the beginning, and did not attain to an actual philosophy of mind, to a true system of ethics, nor to a philosophy of religion, even if, as he subsequently declared, he had these also in view from the very first. Even the contents of the mind are made by him too much a mere knowledge of nature. In the universal life he does not actually distinguish between the One and the organism, and is hence unable, as yet, to get beyond a physical kind of pantheism. Hence, too, superior as Schelling is to Jacobi in his perception of the scientific problem and in method, the opposition of the latter, with his postulate of a personal God, is justified on religious grounds.[1]

Hegel and his great school aspire to surpass the natural philosophy of which the absolute *will*, immanent in nature, but only as a plastic element, as a principle tending to consciousness, is the motive power. Conscious that if by virtue, so to speak, of a philosophical eclecticism, the aristocratic gift of "intellectual intuition," of geniality, is required as the condition of true knowledge, exactness and universal sufficiency of method and of philosophical proof may be sacrificed to a desultory or artistic imagination, Hegel, carrying out more especially the second part of Kant's criticism of pure reason to a speculative form, demands that the stage of speculative consciousness should first of all be gained by means of a general phenomenology of mind, and then that logic, or the self-perception of thought, should be therewith combined; in other words, the insight how the thought in its necessary processes, which are not only of formal and logical, but also of ontological importance, develops itself to the multiplicity of the different stages and matters of knowledge, and at the same time comprises this multiplicity in the unity of the mind. He perceives that it is inadequate to suppose the contents of the mind to be merely physical, and makes the form of the mind as thinking, in other words, the reasoning dialectic process which logic represents, to be the true and substantial contents of the mind. By his ontological logic, however, he gains only a

[1] Compare Jacobi, *Von den göttlichen Dingen, und ihrer Offenbarung*, 1811. Schelling, *Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen des Herrn J. H. Jacobi*, 1812; *Works*, div. i. vol. viii.

shadowy kind of knowledge, a knowledge of knowledge in general, or of its idea, which, as such, has yet to be realized by the fulness of solid and lasting reality. Instead of acknowledging that his logic gives only a knowledge of possible knowledge, but not as yet a knowledge of reality, his system makes logic so much the whole of truth that both nature and the intellectual provinces of ethics and religion, are therein resolved into logic, etherealized into mere notions.

We alluded to the trilogy which led in ancient philosophy from physics to dialectics (or logic), and thence to ethics and to laying down a philosophy of religion, and which was now repeating itself in regular succession in the development of modern science. Schleiermacher, as an ethical and religious philosopher, not only represents the third member, but while Schelling and Hegel confined themselves chiefly to the provinces of their special talents (natural philosophy and logic), also awards to physics and dialectics their necessary position in his system. Schelling, in his second period, *i.e.* from his "Doctrine of Freedom" onwards, was, in his "Philosophy of Mythology," and his "Philosophy of Revelation," more and more decidedly tending to mind, will, and a personal God, but did not apply himself in a connected manner to logic, (unless we should adduce under this head his "Negative Philosophy," or doctrine of potencies, the world of external possibilities,) and did but little for ethics. He insists upon a history of mankind, a history ruled by providence; but the history of the world is to him at the same time the history of God. There are, in the eternal God, three potencies in original and indissoluble unity.[1] In the primitive man, made after God's image, these were in soluble combination. Schelling conceives the world to have originated in the following manner, which is to solve the enigma how the imperfect should be developed from the perfect. Since God intended there should be a world, the material of a possible world must first be posited. This came to pass because God excited the first potency, which is ever in Him, and in unity with others, the potency of "boundless being," and permitted its independent agency. Thence arose, not indeed the actual material, but the possibility and postulate, still in the ideal world, of all creative formation.

[1] Potential existence, real existence (*actus*), and the power of remaining in the *actus*, or of continuing to exist.

This forming and fashioning of an ideal world is accomplished by the two other potencies, and the creative will in the ideal world forthwith hastens onward without restraint towards its end, which it attains in the primitive man, who, being in the likeness of God, manifests in the world also the same union of potencies which is ever in God. The primitive man however fell, and an overthrow was thus brought about. *God* could, without contradiction of His nature, and without thereby causing evil, set free the potency of the boundless within Him, because He has absolute and eternal power over it, and can again restrain and reduce it to its original state. The primitive man also had in his freedom this potency of boundless sovereignty. *He* too could excite this potency within him, and allow it to act independently, but he ought not to have done this; on the contrary, he should have maintained his position, and preserved the union of the potencies within him. By doing then what only God might, and what he ought not, viz., setting free the potency of the boundless within him, he caused a disturbance; a subversion of potencies, and the lowest became the highest. Such a world as this, in which gross matter and the elements of chaos must be contended with, can only be understood by means of a disturbance in which man involved the whole universe. This he did freely, yet almost inevitably. The union of these potencies in the world also, is, however, still the end to be attained. For the conquest of the principle of the boundless, and for the restoration of harmony, God suffers the two other potencies also, which were eternally in Him, to separate in history. He acts in a restrictive and formative manner upon matter, ever introducing new and higher forms, in which matter is more and more subjugated by thought, by the form according to which it is to be fashioned. This ascending process, which is at first carried on in nature, and reaches its climax in the earthly man, is then repeated on the higher stage, or in an intellectual manner, in human history, whose central point is the history of religion, which, beginning at abstract monotheism, advances through the different stages of mythology, and through the Old Testament to Christianity. The mythological stages especially answer to that series of steps by which boundless existence was fashioned and vanquished till it reached man. Thus it is by means of an historical process

that human nature, which had fallen a victim to the subversion of the powers of nature, becomes, through the agency of the second potency in man and his reaction, the master of these powers through culture. This second potency, which again became the lord of existence, becomes man in Jesus of Nazareth, but ethically sacrifices its sovereignty and glory, because all mere humanity and culture, though good in themselves, still pertain to existence apart from God, and devoid of the central life. Hence the God-man sacrifices His glory, *i.e.* existence apart from God, in order to re-enter entirely into the original Divine arrangement, and then there proceeds from Him the Holy Ghost, who leads back to God the rest of mankind. In the beginning a tautousia of principles prevailed in God by the fall of man; this became a heterousia, a struggle of divine potencies against each other. For the effects of the fall reached even to God. The certainty, however, of that perfection which is ever realizing something higher than that which previously existed, shows that God ever remains master of these His potencies, although He actually suffers Himself to be in a state of struggle. For while at first the principles were only in tautousia in the Father, the end is the homousia of the second and third principles, which, by means of history, have also become persons as well as the Father, who is eternally such.

The reason why this conception, grand as are many of its features, met with little favour, nay, even with little criticism, may perhaps lie in the hovering position between ideality and reality thus given to the ideal world, and especially to the primitive man. It may be found also in the obscure ambiguity by which the Divine potencies are conceived of as being, on the one hand, properties which may become common to many, and, on the other, substances with the power of independent existence, and thus as having a duplex existence, in God and apart from Him. Under one aspect they are ever harmoniously united in God, under the other they are exposed to disturbance and to participation in the effects of the fall of the primitive man. Such participation could not be conceived, without Divine self-detriment, unless God be thought of in a definitely ethical manner, and thereby as a union of self-assertion and self-sacrifice. And this would be to assume that God could, without deterioration of His nature or obscuration of His eternal glory, make that

which was His own common to all, and give to His potencies an existence apart from Himself.

With respect to the application of Schelling and Hegel's philosophy to theology, it may be said that both have exercised a reviving influence upon many recent theological works. Schelling especially zealously adopted the doctrines of the Trinity and the atonement, which were almost given up by theologians, and showed that far more profound and important matter of thought was involved therein than was usually supposed. Daub, Marheinecke, Bockshammer, and Eschenmayer, followed him in this respect. The Trinitarian scheme was, first, God in Himself; secondly, an objectuation of the world in the Son of God, which Sonship found its perfect manifestation in Jesus Christ; thirdly, the return of the world set free from God into oneness with Him ("the Odyssey following the Iliad, or the kingdom of the Holy Ghost"). Daub, whose mind was of a strictly ethical tendency, and full of speculative energy,[1] captivated in his youth, first by Kant, then by Schelling, applied himself, in his *Judas Iscariot*, 1816, 1818, to clearing up the problem of evil. Starting from Schelling's standpoint of natural philosophy, he arrived, like Eschenmayer in his *Philosophy of religion*, at the view that good and evil were in a state of polar opposition; this indeed made the existence of good dependent upon evil, and involved the eternal co-ordination of both, in other words a dualism. Justly desiring a stricter method, he subsequently turned to Hegel. This was also the case with Marheinecke, after an ingenious and imaginative first attempt in divinity.[2] His original sketch was, with respect to God, the world, the God-man, left essentially unaltered in his second design.[3] The impression of the whole was, however, more formalistic, and with respect to evil and the doctrine of the last things of a more negative kind. A trinity apart from the world is not admitted. In his view the world is God in His state of existence apart from Himself, the Son of God is God objectuating Himself, the Holy Ghost is mankind

[1] Daub, *Theologomena*, 1806, *Einleitung in das Studium der Dogmatik*, 1810. We must begin from God. We can only know God through Himself, *i.e.* by means of His revelation, at first in the reason, then objectively. Reason is the organ, not the source of the knowledge of God. History is the symbol of the idea.

[2] Marheinecke, *die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik*, 1819.

[3] Marheinecke, *die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*, 1827.

returned to God, as in the Church. God is the nature of man, and man the reality of God. This reality goes through a process which is at the same time human and a process of God, that by which He is ever becoming subjective in man. He, as well as Hegel, regards evil as belonging to the vitality of the process; while freedom, as the power of decision for or against God, is denied; immortality is the ζωὴ αἰώνιος in this world, and the resurrection the self-liberation of the spirit to itself. These speculative explanations of doctrine are clothed in Church expressions, but are yet not so disguised as to conceal their real meaning. On the other hand, Marheinecke embraced the historical God-man Christ Jesus, and unwearyingly opposed supernaturalism, rationalism, and the artificial revival of orthodoxy. He looked upon supernaturalism as nothing else than disguised rationalism, because it leaves the treasures of revelation unutilized, while rationalism, which he therefore calls obscurantism, denies all real speculative knowledge of God. He also directed his attacks against the extravagant speculations of Strauss and Baur, and was for a long period at the head of Hegel's school, so far as it desired to be in union with Church doctrine. Christ is in his view a pure manifestation both of the race and of God, and the introducer of the process of reconciliation, *i.e.* of the knowledge that the true God is in us and we in God. Daub, who was much occupied about the method of speculative knowledge, and who maintained a still greater attachment to church doctrines than Marheinecke, is more distinguished by his exalted idea of theological science, his enthusiastic pursuit of it and the energy with which he officially advocated it, until his happy death, than even by his extensive works. He displayed a singular and penetrating knowledge of the nature of supernaturalism—especially of so-called biblical supernaturalism—and rationalism, and showed the necessity of surmounting this antagonism.[1] He sought to give a position of necessity to the miraculous, which he designated the point of union between the ideal and the historical. He also contributed to the improvement of ethical science. The first edition of

Daub, *die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit oder die Selbstsucht in der Wissenschaft des Glaubens* (originally a recension of Marheinecke's Divinity), *Jahrbuch für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1827, 1828; *Prolegom. zur Dogmatik Theol. Moral.*

Rosenkranz's *Encyclopedia*, which was written with youthful ardour, and attracted many disciples to this school, was of a still more positive tendency. In the second edition, after the appearance of Strauss' *Leben Jesu*, this earlier standpoint was considerably altered, the phenomenology of the religious consciousness being changed into a theogony.[1] Conradi,[2] who at first shared this tendency, increasingly absorbed the Person of Christ in the universal spirit. Göschel may also be included with the above-named, though he sought to enter into closer relations with orthodoxy, and differed from Hegel especially in the doctrines of evil and of the atonement.[3] These, together with a few others, formed the so-called right side, which at first alone gave the key-note in matters theological.[4]

The supposed peace, however, between theology and philosophy proved but illusive; for neither orthodoxy nor indeed Christianity can be restricted within a system which reduces everything to an affection of the thinking powers. Richter, in his work *Von den letzten Dingen*, 1833, proclaimed the denial of immortality to be the secret doctrine of the school, and maintained that this was the necessary consequence of the endless process in the Divine life. He was opposed in this assertion especially by Rosenkranz and Göschel, who espoused the part of the school, but without producing much effect.[5] But it was

[1] To this tends that chain of reasoning on the part of Rosenkranz, which makes the world to be of the nature of God, to form His manifestation, to arise and to have arisen through His abstention; comp. his *Encycl.* p. 49, &c. On the other hand, he insists indeed that the world is made for freedom, and that the Triune God must be conceived of as the absolute subject, pp. 53, 47. He also seeks, in opposition to Strauss, to establish the *uniqueness* of Christ, an absoluteness of His self-consciousness which is far more than mere geniality. His mission was to manifest the necessity of freedom as the truth of the mind, and only this, p. 66. The two sides in his idea of God seem to me, however, not satisfactorily harmonized.

[2] *Selbstbewusstsein und Offenbarung*, 1839, and *Kritik der Dogmen; Christus in der Vergangenheit Gegenwart und Zukunft.*

[3] Göschel, *Beiträge zur spekulativen Philosophie von Gott, den Menschen und dem Gottmenschen*, 1838.

[4] *E.g.* Petersen, *Idee der Kirche*, 1839, 1842; Jul. Schaller, *der historische Christus und die Philosophie*, 1838. Gabler endeavoured to show that Hegel's system, rightly understood, assumes a self-conscious absolute reason before the world-process.

[5] Göschel, *die Beweise für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele im Lichte der spekulativen Philosophie*, 1835. Erdmann and Conradi also dealt with this subject. Beckers and Jul. Müller wrote on it from an anti-Hegelian point of view.

chiefly Strauss[1] who destroyed this semblance of union. Strauss rejected those rude attacks upon Christianity which endeavoured, after the manner of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist, to attribute it to fiction, fraud, and supposed accommodations, and also treated with derision Paulus' natural explanations of the miracles. He, on the contrary, opposed that biblical supernaturalism which sought to base the truth of Christianity upon inspiration, miracles, and prophecy, by *the mythical view.* This regards the image of Christ in the Gospels as the result of certain legends whose historical basis is obscure, and upon which Old Testament and especially Messianic figures bestowed an element of unintentional fiction. He insists, moreover, that since Christ, to whom the Messianic predicates were attributed by the Church, could not have been a supernatural phenomenon, because miracles in general are impossible, the four Gospels could not have originated with apostles or eye-witnesses, to whom, with their better knowledge, an intentional fraud would thus be imputed. He then seeks also for internal contradictions in the Gospels, for the sake of proving thereby their non-historical character. These contradictions being, however, but unimportant, it was obvious that they were not to be regarded as that which, properly speaking, was to determine the point. Strauss demands a criticism free from all assumptions, and yet makes, according to what has been stated, a double, *i.e.* a *dogmatic* and an *historical* assumption for his mythical theory.

The dogmatic presupposition is a pantheistic, nay, a naturalistic idea of God, which excludes a moral government, and a moral end of the world, æsthetically confounds the ethic and the physical, and would, if it could be established, render all further discussion superfluous, nay, make a scientific course of argument a mere delusion, because the result would, with regard to Divine revelation, have been already decided in the negative. He holds, with modern philosophy, that God is no rigid existence, but active life, and opposes Deism and the supernaturalism which alienates God from the world, by the doctrine which admits an inward and essential relation between God and the life of man. He does not, however, conceive of this inward relation as unity in distinction, but identifies God with the world. The finite, the negative, must not be viewed as apart from God: the Infinite

[1] *Leben Jesu*, 2 vols. 1835; *Dogmatik*, 1839.

takes limitation and negativity into His own nature, and thereby becomes active. In accordance with Schelling and Hegel, he desires so to fashion the idea of God that the idea of the divine-human life, so long rejected, should form one of its essential elements, but to apply to mankind in general that which the Church ascribes to Christ alone, and to teach a universal incarnation of God. The infinite extension of the Infinite in finite reality is the expression or actuality of the Infinite. But for this very reason it is not possible to treat one single quantity of the infinite universe, which can only adequately represent God in its totality, in its ever equal harmony, as a self-manifestation of God. It is not the manner of the idea to pour out its fulness in one specimen and to be niggardly towards others. On the contrary, every individual form is imperfect, finite, and therefore sinful, and needs completion by other specimens of its genus. The predicates which the Church bestows on Christ are due, not to the historical, but to the ideal Christ, *i.e.* to mankind in its ideality. This it is which is ever begotten of God, which works miracles, suffers, dies, which is ever moreover rising again and ascending to heaven. Hence the species and not the individual Jesus is the God-man. Thus Strauss thinks that if an individual were possessed of perfect goodness, holiness, and knowledge of God, there would be nothing left for others; while Origen had, on the contrary, long before perceived that the peculiarity of spiritual possessions consisted in this—that they never diminished by being shared by many. But Strauss again treats the spiritual like a physical quantity, by believing the moral and spiritual perfection of mankind and also of Christ to be excluded by finity, and by conceiving in a thoroughly unethical manner a compensation for the deficiencies of some by the excellencies of others. He rests so much upon the external, the province of differing vocations and partial performances, that he entirely overlooks the fact that every individual, so far as the disposition and desire of his secret soul is concerned, can will, nay, must will, all goodness and therefore all truth; because not even the most trifling individual good action is really good unless goodness in general is willed therein. His depreciation of the ethical is also seen in his lavish use of the term "God-man." For he thus designates all, even on account of their natural dispositions; while in moral estimation everything depends not

on the mere disposition or possibility, but upon its realization. The same physical standpoint which suffers him to bestow the title God-man upon all, suffers him also to say—nay, this is but its reverse side—that men are only specimens of the species. If Strauss had comprehended the ethical idea, he could not have found the notion of the Divine and the human, and consequently of the divine-human, in merely physical existence, or in the logical, and could not have made its relation to the moral indifferent. Then, too, a more exalted, another idea of the Infinite and the finite would not have been absent. If the moral constitutes the supreme in God, then His majesty and unchangeable nature consist in His holy love. In this, moreover, is secured both His activity and distinction from the world, which He nevertheless created from love, and also His self-impartation to the finite without self-diminution. On the other hand, the ethical point of view leaves room, even in that which, metaphysically viewed, is at first but finite, *i.e.* in man, for the absolutely valuable, for the intensively infinite in knowledge and will, without the limits of personality being thereby surpassed—that personality whose infinite recipiency cannot, on the contrary, be satisfied with any less attainment.

Strauss' dogmatics also share this purely physical standpoint. He says that, while animals are but races, men have the knowledge that they are a race.[1] But knowledge is not action; conscious nature is, as yet, not mind, not a principle of history. In nature, life does but revolve upon itself. Thus Strauss too knows nothing of a history, nor of an end of history. The world is to him ever entire and perfect; the restoration of all things is ever taking place by the constant production of good out of evil.[2] The world is good as being a union of good and evil. If evil were to die out, good, *i.e.* life, would die out too. Hence, to require holiness from an individual would be in contradiction to his nature. If any one should regard himself as evil, and therefore feel that his conscience condemns him, Strauss regards this as an abstract and isolated view. In the right view of things, every one knows himself to be reconciled, if only he knows himself to be a completed member in the complex of all creation. Consequently it would be erroneous or evil to strive to surpass those necessary limits of good which pertain to metaphysical

[1] ii. 697. [2] ii. 696.

goodness. Strauss does not indeed thus get rid of evil, which returns in another form; and he leaves this notion as an enigma, an unexplained phenomenon. This enables us to judge what becomes of German science, philosophy, and theology, of religion and morality in Strauss' views, or rather his assumptions and hypotheses. Religion is to Strauss something to be surpassed, an inferior, nay, an erroneous, stage of consciousness—that in which man, not as yet conscious of his own Divine nature, does not venture to conceive of the Divine as his own, but, on the contrary, mistakenly transfers his own nature to an extraneous object, *i.e.* to a God not merely in the world (*immanent*) but also above the world. The ethical idea is broken up into the absolute infinity of works, powers, and virtues mutually completing each other, and occupies much the same position which the moral fills in fables of animals; while the true view is said to be that which sees in every defect and in every moral imperfection only the obverse of some quality or virtue possessed by others. Thus the whole is to answer vicariously for the deficiencies of the individual. And what is this but a pseudo-protestant, degenerate naturalization of the Romish dogma of a magical, substitutionary virtue of the whole of the *Corpus Christi mysticum* for the individual, to whom this needful completion is said to be imputed without his will or knowledge? It is a caricature, no doubt, of the Romish doctrine, but it is at the same time full of instruction, as an undisguised exposure of those unchristian and immoral elements which are left, when this false idea of substitution is deprived of the positive and miraculous covering in which it is enveloped; full of instruction also as the consistent, *i.e.* the pantheistic, carrying out of the depreciation of free moral personality.

Religion and ethics having been thus treated by Strauss, æsthetics still remained. "Modern culture" is indeed Strauss's spell. This culture, for which he uses that word so indispensable to a physical mode of reasoning, "humanity" has begun to create for itself a *cultus*, that worship of the geniuses among mankind, to which the learned, "the cultivated," dedicate themselves, whether by giving or receiving homage. The learned possess in philosophy what the multitude have in faith; the cultivated have also their secular saints or demi-gods, their Walhalla, into which "culture" is ready to admit Christ also. Strauss is aware that here too he is but effecting a secularization of the Romish

notion, and affords a proof of the truth of the old saying, that it is impossible to swerve from the evangelical standpoint without in one way or another falling back upon the Romish one.

*The second assumption* made by Strauss, in his criticism of the life of Jesus, is of an *historical kind.* It is that the gospels could not have been written by eye-witnesses, because they narrate miracles, and apply to Christ such exalted predicates as, admitting the sincerity of His disciples, could only have arisen in the unintentionally fictitious legends of a subsequent generation, and must have entered into the faith of Christians through their desire to enhance the glory of their founder. But here too it is obvious that such a hypothesis prescribes beforehand the result of that criticism to which the historical documents are subjected, and that therefore the cause of the evangelists has fallen into the hands of a partial judge. For if the apostolical origin of even one gospel or miraculous narrative were admitted by Strauss, there would be nothing left for him but to fall back upon the theory of intentional fiction and fraud, like the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist, whose standpoint he had previously so decidedly rejected,[1] but who certainly, as far as the criticism of historical documents is concerned, was relieved from many a difficulty to which the mythical view is exposed. For its fundamental view is at variance with those arguments which attribute to the three first gospels, to the portraiture of Christ in the New Testament, and to primitive Christian literature in general, a high antiquity.

This leads to another deficiency in Strauss's work. He denies, *à priori,* the genuineness, and not merely the credibility of the gospels. Now these, as well as the other books of the New Testament, being actually in existence, require some historical position, and indeed one within primitive Christianity, from which they may be historically comprehended. Strauss does indeed remove them from their place, but even this work cannot be called complete, till some historical quarters are provided for them. With respect to all this, and to the actual character of the apostles and chief apostolic men, Strauss says as good as

[1] More recently, indeed, in his work on G. Reimarus, he threatens theologians, in case they do not accommodate themselves to his mythical standpoint, to join the standard of Reimarus. In so doing, however, he unintentionally passes sentence on his own standpoint. We shall soon see that this lapse from the mythical level to that of the Fragmentist, is not a matter of choice, but the inevitable result of opposition to Christianity.

nothing in the way of historical explanation. These gaps were not filled up till Baur's works farther and significantly carried on the critical process.

Powerful as was the first impression produced by Strauss's *Leben Jesu*, this impression was neither deep nor lasting. Five and twenty years after its first appearance, he alluded, not without a touch of humour, to the jubilee which ought to be held, lest it should be forgotten or overlooked. The joint effect of the numerous counter-works of Hase, Neander, Ullmann, Tholuck, W. Hoffmann, Osiander, Lange, Ebrard, Ewald, Schweizer, Weisse, Baumgarten, Riggenbach, &c., showed itself to be equal to the impression which Strauss's work had made, so that in less than ten years, many manifested a security, almost amounting to levity, which neglected unsolved and important questions, and was occupied with subordinate points of controversy. This was induced not only by the really solid and talented contents of these counter-writings, but by the discredit in which the left side of the Hegelian school had involved itself, by its farther development of the philosophical and dogmatical assumptions from which Strauss too had started. Those irreligious and immoral consequences, which had been partly concealed even from himself by Strauss's elegant diction, were drawn in the most offensive manner in Ludwig Feuerbach's work, *Das Wesen der Religion*. Strauss still insisted that the Divine should be acknowledged as reality, *i.e.* as the *universal nature* of mankind. Feuerbach, however, pressed onward, and urged that if God is nothing more than the nature of man, it is not He who exists, but man, who cannot indeed be conceived of apart from his own nature. To continue to speak of God is to continue that religious self-delusion in which man, not having as yet become conscious of his own Divine nature, projects the same from himself, transfers it to another and an imaginary being, and personifies it in God. Absolute anthropology is to be the word. There is nothing absolute and universal, but everything is individual, each man with his own instincts and desires is his own standard. How far removed was such language from the dizzy yet still ideal elevations of Fichtian self-deification, and what utter shipwreck did it make of philosophy, ethics, religion, for which, if there is nothing general, nothing of absolute value, no place is left! The language held concerning the natural, Divine,

or Divine-human glory of our race is a *mulier formosa superne*, but it ends in making man nothing but a specimen of a genus, an intelligent natural being, without feeling or calling for that which alone ennobles him, *i.e.* for the Divine. This naturalism paves the way for materialism, the denial of spirit and reason. Ed. Zeller endeavoured still to preserve a place for religion, by recognizing it as a pathological necessity implanted in our nature. In his criticism, however, of Feuerbach, he too treats it as merely a psychological function, employing with such subjective ideas as may address it, but indifferent as to whether they are false or true: a dualism between the religious craving and the reasoning intelligence, which in a speculative manner unexpectedly reminds of De Wette and Jacobi.

The chief obstacle, however, to more lasting effects being produced by Strauss's work was the influence of Schleiermacher and his theology, an influence which the schism in the Hegelian school could not but augment.

Schleiermacher rises above both physical and logical pantheism, and that deistic idea of God held by rationalists, with which even supernaturalism was infected. On the one hand he opposed certain ancient and deeply-rooted errors by asserting the independence, the special character and rights of religion, as also its distinction from the moral and intellectual spheres, while on the other, by thus recurring from the derived to the original, he brought forth, and deeply impressed upon science, with a clearness found neither in a Herder nor a Lessing, the difference between religion and theology, between faith and dogma, between the Church and the school of theology.

His heartfelt piety, nourished in the midst of the Moravian Brotherhood, together with his great talents, and the methodical power of his constructive genius, fitted him to form a point of transition to a revived evangelical theology. The Moravian Brotherhood was his Monica, but the Grecian mode of thought, particularly the philosophy of Plato, was the nurse of his mind. It was more especially by the restoration of the Scriptural and Reformation principle of faith, and the doctrine of the necessary self-authentication of Christian truth through the continued agency of the Holy Ghost upon the consciousness, that he effected a regeneration of the doctrine of belief. With this most decided advocacy, however, of the independence of the individual,

he united a no less vigorous feeling for the association; it was he who first restored to power and energy the idea of *the Church.* It was here that he found the combination of the religious and ethical factors, of the individual with the social consciousness, of tradition and history with the present and the future, and hence he exercised an invigorating and purifying reaction even upon the Romish Church. He effected a transformation of ethics by his doctrine of ethical entities and the highest good, and his recognition of the importance of individuality, and it was through these two principles that mankind, and especially Christendom, formed, in his view, one moral organism composed of many members. In exegetic theology he gave the example of a criticism arising from faith, and inspired it with new life, both by insisting that Scripture should be used and consulted as a whole instead of being only searched for in single passages in proof of any matter (*dicta probantia*), and by distinguishing between the different types of doctrine found in the New Testament, in whose variety he saw not the divisions but the organic unity of primitive Christianity. He set before ecclesiastical historians the task of making Church history a real exhibition of Christian morals, and by certain monographs on the history of dogmas (on Athanasian and Sabellian teaching, and the doctrine of election) gave an impulse to this kind of writing also. While he thus set forth the Divine and human aspect of the Church in divinity and ethics, he also, by his clear perception of the essential laws and vital functions of the Church, was the first to raise practical theology to the rank of a science.

It was in 1799 that, as an enthusiastic preacher of religion, he first began, in opposition not only to Fichte and Kant, but also to the Philosophy of nature, to maintain the absolute rights, dignity and independence of religion against those who despised it, and to prove in a classical manner, which was a general boon, that religion is no mere work of either the intellect or the will, but something quite peculiar in its nature, the affair of a God-surrendered heart, a contact with, an apprehension by, God Himself, a vital communion with Him. Though often favourable to the founder of the Philosophy of nature, he yet maintained and defended a philosophy of mind by means of religion and religious science,[1] and allotted to it, together with physics and ethics, a

[1] This is shown especially in his recension of Schelling's method of academical study in the Jena *Allgem. Literaturzeitung.*

secure position in his dialectics. If pantheistic elements are sometimes found in his writings they exhibit no deification of self, but rather a touch of overweening mysticism; this again finds its corrective in his vigorous moral consciousness, which asserted its freedom with respect to the world on the ground of its absolute passive dependence upon God. This was first expressed in his Monologues (1800). An air of originality and experience pervades both these productions of his youth, and already announces the future of the man and the comprehensive nature of his mind.

We must pause awhile at his *theological standpoint.* The chief service which he rendered to theology, and that which above all else makes him an important figure in its history, is that he overcame that antagonism of rationalism and supernaturalism which prevailed till about 1820. This he did in an internal manner, *i.e.* radically, a scientific achievement which could only be effected by combining such true elements as were found in each, not eclectically, but by means of a higher principle surpassing both. This principle was his more vital conception of religion, which both, as we have shown, regarded as only a function of the will and intelligence, a *modus Deum cognoscendi et colendi*, while their notion of God was essentially deistic. That which was true and just in rationalism was its desire for personal conviction and mental appropriation of truth, instead of blind subjection to merely external authority, and its consequent tendency to a strict combination of man's natural and moral being. Supernaturalism, on the other hand, was right in its assumption that man, in his highest relations, does not stand upon his own resources, but needs the Divine agency; in more specific terms, that Christianity is not a natural growth; Christ in His peculiar excellences is not a product of the race which preceded him, but a supernatural phenomenon, which being historical, and therefore not a supposition of the reason, is above the reason. Now Schleiermacher, by his recurrence to the fundamental Reformation views, united freedom and authority, personal appropriation and tradition, the ideal and the historical, upon the foundation of religion or *faith*, in the evangelical sense of the word. This faith, the vital material principle of the Evangelical Church, he restores to the post of honour, and proclaims its rights, its independence and its internal certainty, as distin-

guished both from a merely historical faith, and from the conclusions and persuasions of the reason. This evangelical faith he advocated not by merely standing on the defensive, but especially by an exhibition of the rich abundance of its matter, which of itself creates an impression both of the inward reasonableness of Christianity, and of its being a compact and united whole. True faith is in his eyes, as in those of our ancient worthies, a *fides divina*, a thing of Divine origin, a restoration of direct vital communion between God and man, brought about by a mental contemplation of the historical image of Christ, and by its attractive power. This faith submitting to the Redeemer, participates, by means of His continuous agency[1] in His Spirit and life, and attains at one and the same time to the consciousness of personal salvation and of the power of redemption which dwells in Christ,—in other words, to a conviction of His redeeming glory. This process, viewed from our natural and redemption-needing life, is supernatural, a miracle; while viewed from that community which, founded by Christ, inalienably partakes in His life and likeness, it is but the continuation of a state naturalized in history, and destined before the foundation of the world for mankind, an element in the idea of man, and the accomplishment of that end for which he was created. Hence, so far as the starting-point of the Church itself, *i.e.* the Person of Christ, is concerned, the super-rational and supernatural are here also both truly rational and natural, when viewed from the side of God and His eternal counsel, which embraces all things, and which ordained even a need of redemption for the reception of redemption. The spiritual part of man (νοῦς) though as λογικόν, it is the centre to which all else bears the relation of circumference (for all in man that is not reason must be organism for reason), is in its natural state powerless, nay, so little in a condition to deliver itself from its impotence, that the sensuous part, on the contrary, obtains the supremacy. Hence arise the abnormal and the immoral, and hence the νοῦς being under the dominion of sense (ψυχη and σῶμα), is justly regarded by Christianity as belonging to the flesh. On the other hand, however, it is with the νοῦς alone that the Divine Spirit can directly unite, that thence, as from a centre, He may take possession of the entire psychical and corporeal organism. We

[1] *Christlicher Glaube*, ii. § 104, 5, 105.

must therefore teach[1] that the appropriation of Christianity presupposes a primary communion with Christ, viz. an inward longing of human nature for Christ, which finds its satisfaction, and becomes a vital power of reception, when His manifestation is presented before it. On the one side, the human νοῦς is so far from being as yet the Christian πνεῦμα, that, apart from Christ, it is incapable of transforming its receptivity into spontaneity; in other words, the spirit, in the Christian sense, is not as yet to be taken for granted by the existence of the spirit in the universal human sense, and this is the truth of supernaturalism in opposition to all Pelagian notions. On the other side, however, it must be admitted, for the sake of the unity of the world and the constancy of the ethical process, that the unity of the Christian spirit and the νοῦς was also assumed, namely, in that longing of the latter for the Christian πνεῦμα, which cannot indeed be satisfied by itself, but only by the manifestation of Christ. The view, according to which the πνεῦμα of Christ is nothing more than a higher development of the spirit in the general human sense, is indeed rationalistic, but the distinction ceases to be one merely fluctuating between less and more, if combining what is true both in rationalism and supernaturalism, we say: the νοῦς is indeed, in itself, one with the πνεῦμα, and is πνεῦμα of inferior potency; but this inferior potency could not be raised to the higher grade by any self-produced increase; an increased desire of the νοῦς for the πνεῦμα is only an increased consciousness that the πνεῦμα, as such, is not yet implanted as *power*, though present as a presentient perception, and therefore as a harbinger to announce that the fulness of the time for the communication of the Christian πνεῦμα is come. "Thus the difference between these two forms of opinion is reduced to a nullity, a result which is always necessarily arrived at when the opposition is carried out to the uttermost." What we call spirit in a general human sense, and what we call πνεῦμα in a Christian sense, belonging essentially to each other, there is a certain original identity between them; the reason can only be understood as a transition of the other human functions to the Divine principle manifesting itself in Christ, and the πνεῦμα is but a higher development of what we call reason, such development not

[1] Comp. *Christliche Sitte*, pp. 300-306; 312 *sqq.* 370, and *Christliche Glaube*, ii. p. 186 *sqq.* 108, 6.

being brought about by the reason. Christianity itself, however much it may differ from the limited reason of man, is reasonable in itself; it is a revelation of the Divine wisdom which is itself reason. Hence it is no self-contradiction to say, on the one hand, that Christianity is above the reason, inasmuch as it can absolutely be no product of unassisted human reason, and, on the other hand, that it is for the reason, which it raises from the stage of desire to that of possession; and similar to its relation to the rational and the super-rational is that which it fills to nature and grace. The notion of *nature* teaches what the νοῦς may become, whether viewed independently or in combination with the other functions; but the manifestation of Christ, and that propagation of the πνεῦμα which arises therefrom, is *grace*. If this is the case, there is no absolute opposition between nature and grace. On the contrary, nature is only what it is—its receptivity for grace being thus assumed—on the presupposition of the existence of grace; and grace is only what it is with reference to human nature. Now naturalism says that the development of man by grace and his natural development are but one and the same process; but supernaturalism says that the natural development of man by reason is entirely different from his development by grace. This opposition also is annihilated, and may be comprehended from a higher standpoint as a merely relative one. It is only important because we refer our empiric constitution to the historical appearance of Christianity. Supernaturalism is in the right when the matter is viewed from the side of the empiric human agency and what it is capable of effecting; for then that which is given in Christianity surpasses nature, in other words, is supernatural, and never could have been produced by all the continuous agency of the reason left to itself, without the agency of the Divine principle which appeared in Christ, was implanted in human nature in the Person of Christ, and is communicated thereto by Him. But supernaturalism is in the wrong when it designates the manifestation of Christ as absolutely supernatural, *i.e.* as so with regard to God and God's idea of man; and rationalism is in the right when it only says that, viewed from the unity of the Divine counsel, the supernaturalness of the manifestation of Christ appears, on the contrary, perfectly natural, inasmuch as the Divine counsel is one, and has eternally ordained the connection and coherence of that which to us and

in time is divided. Thus regarded, God's counsel of creation cannot be separated from that of redemption and perfection. Both are equally natural and consistent with the Divine character; and hence there can also be no counsel of redemption and perfection, unless combined with that of creation. Again, creation can only be perfected by that counsel in which Christ is included, and must therefore be conceived of as possessing from the first recipiency for the redeeming and perfecting power of Christ.

Although the deterministic view of Schleiermacher, which admits even evil into the Divine counsel, is traceable in the last named detail, yet the matter in question is not affected thereby, because the intrinsic unity of the Divine counsel, the interdependence of its true elements, is not abolished by making the Fall the free act of man, unless it were supposed that God had not foreseen it, and that, so to speak, it surprised and found Him unprepared. On the one hand, we cannot but say with Schleiermacher that nature is only the accomplishment of the Divine counsel in time and space; but to admit this is to insist upon a higher idea of nature than rationalism and Pelagianism are wont to advocate. It is to hold that in the notion of nature is included even the appearance of Christ, while such a view is taken of this appearance that it is regarded as not possibly deducible from the agency of the collective reason or of the powers of the race that preceded Him, but must, on the contrary, be referred to an original Divine intervention, an act of God. This act, however, combines, in the Divine counsel, of which all nature is an expression, into unity with the Divine counsel of creation.

It is by faith in Christ that we participate in His sinlessness and blessedness, that we experience a deliverance from the consciousness of guilt and sin. We are reconciled because "God beholds us in Him,"[1] as quickened by Him, or as parts of His manifestation. He has implanted in the Church the principle, at least, of His divine life, a pure and blessed commencement of that manhood which He has united to Himself. This life, therefore, the Church propagates and diffuses by means of her faithful reception of the image of Christ, until the limits of Christendom are at the same time the limits of the human race. All religions are destined to be transformed into the Christian religion. The essence of Christianity, however, consists in redemp-

[1] *Christlicher Glaube*, ii. 99, &c., § 100, 101; p. 139, § 104, 4.

tion through Jesus of Nazareth,[1] which is destined to be the ever-present, all-ruling power in the life of the Christian, and is capable of being implanted in every element of the consciousness, as the purest form of the consciousness of God, which again is, on its part, the highest stage of self-consciousness. By this definition of Christianity the Church is, as he shows, sufficiently distinguished from all that is non-Christian. For the definition includes two notions, that of the *redemption* of mankind and that of the *Person of Christ.* The former would be destroyed if mankind possessed, without Christ, the power of self-redemption, or if human nature were incapable of redemption. The first supposition is the Pelagian, the second the Manichean heresy, and redemption would be in the one case superfluous, in the other impossible. The second notion, that of the *Person of Christ*, depends upon attributing to Him full and complete redeeming power. Granting that His peculiar pre-eminence in this respect were admitted, but His true humanity denied, as in the Docetic heresy, He would lack the possibility of historically affecting human nature, and would hence be deprived of full redeeming power. If, on the other hand, He was indeed, like us, a true man, but devoid of that absolutely perfect Divine nature which alone renders His redeeming power sufficient for all times and all men, if He were therefore, *e.g.*, only a distinguished human being without specific dignity, this would be the "Nazarite or Ebionite heresy," which would again do away with the notion of the Redeemer. All opinions, however, which keep themselves within these limits he regards as Christian, and, in virtue of their acknowledgment of these limits, as corrigible if needing correction. In the Redeemer, who thus forms, in his view, the central point of all that is Christian, he sees the union of the ideal and the historical. In Him the consciousness of God was developed to absolute vigour, nay, became in Him the perfect Being of God, so far as human nature in general is susceptible thereof. In Him God was manifested not only as the almighty, the holy, the righteous, but also as that love and wisdom which *He Himself* is,[2] and no higher revelation is either to be expected or necessary, the believer knowing himself to be a partaker through Christ of a principle which is sufficient for His perfection, because all that could

[1] *Christlicher Glaube*, i. 67, &c., § 11. [2] *Ibid.* ii. 165, &c.

obstruct or disturb such perfection finds no support from this principle, but stands in direct antagonism thereto. If it is said that this union of the ideal and the historical in the Person of Christ must remain problematical, or be designated an impossibility, because the notion of ideality, even if it be embraced, involves no guarantee for its historical realization, nor, on the other hand, is the recognition of the historical any pledge of ideal purity and perfection, these being spiritual and internal, his answer is: To affirm the impossibility of the ideal being realized, is to affirm the impossibility of our moral destination, and is a combination of Manicheism and Ebionitism. If then it must be regarded as possible that the ideal did appear in Christ, the assertion that it is impossible to *recognize* the ideal in the historical must be met by the statement, that they who make the experiment, and surrender themselves, as beings needing redemption, to the impression of Christ, do receive the assurance of His redeeming power and specific dignity. He admits that a *construction* from the notion of ideality is not commensurate with the historical, and in like manner that there is a certain perception of the historical in which the ideal worth of the object is lost. But there is in his view still a medium, and this is *the view which is at once historical and spiritual.* In this view that which is not in other ways possible is produced, viz. a real perception of the union of the ideal and the historical effected in the Person thus offered to the gaze. Just as a work of art may be long contemplated without being understood until the happy moment in which the ideal conception of the artist, the idea realized in the work, is, so to speak, raised up again in the spectator through the medium of the empiric, so is the spiritual glance of faith far from being a merely subjective conception. On the contrary, it points back as a specific effect to a specific cause, viz. the historical view. And this is, though differently expressed, what Schelling's philosophy of revelation states, when it demands a "metaphysical empiricism" which faith is to effect, not a merely historical faith, or a mere speculation on certain "eternal truths," but a perception of the unity of the metaphysical and the historical.[1] And that which the living intuition of faith thus per-

[1] So too Fichte, *Works*, iv. p. 53. Schelling, in his doctrine of freedom, already says: only the personal can heal the personal, *Div.* i. *Works*, vii. 317, &c.

ceives is not the mere notion of the ideal, but ideal reality and real ideality.

The dignity of Christ is thus established. But since the seat and nature of this dignity lie entirely within the provinces of the consciousness of God and the being of God, it is certainly not established for that province for which He did not directly appear. It is, however, established in the most decided way, and in such wise that nothing is lacking to the central, *i.e.* the religious province. For that knowledge of the Person of Christ which is accessible to true faith, is not only satisfying and certain in itself, but where it is genuine, there also will be experienced a communication, at least in principle and sufficiently for full development, of the unclouded happiness and sinless perfection which were in Him. This communication took place, and is taking place, by means of His *threefold* and still continued *office*, especially by His high-priestly acts and sufferings. He is still full of sympathy, and able to put Himself in our place, that He may, by feeling for us and communicating His grace to us, appropriate us to Himself. God beholds those whom Christ has drawn into His fellowship as it were through Him, and therefore as reconciled. They are partakers of His Spirit, and are therefore regarded as part of His appearing. Viewed from this point, supernatural proofs of the divinity of Christianity, and the Divine-human nature of Christ by means of miracles, prophecy, inspiration, appear but weak. These are however abundantly compensated by that demonstration of the Spirit and of power, which Christianity in its continual rejuvenescence never ceases to furnish. From this point, too, the unevangelical character and the weakness of a dread of criticism are manifested. For the obverse side of that trust in evidence offered to the understanding as the proper confirmation of the Christian faith—a trust which can never rise to certainty—is a mistrust of the special power of Christianity to commend and evidence itself to the mind.

That central position which Schleiermacher awards to faith, and by which he reverts to the Reformation basis, also teaches him to distinguish between *faith* and *dogma*, which it is always so easy to confound. This is especially the case in intellectual-

Schleiermacher, moreover, frequently reiterates: Christ must above all things operate upon our self-consciousness by the entire impression of His Person. *E.g. Christlicher Glaube*, § 10, appendix.

ism, and even in supernatural intellectualism, which is ready to bestow the name of faith upon a reception of doctrines supernaturally revealed, *i.e.* mysteries. But doctrine is not redemption, nor the power of redemption; we are, moreover, destined to real communion with God through Christ. Not till this exists is there real Christian piety. And this is something more than changing our system of notions or our maxims of life. Doctrine, too, is regarded by him as independent of faith, viz. as a proclamation of the gospel (κήρυγμα), for without such a proclamation faith could not exist. It is, moreover, distinguished from dogma as being originally simple, its power lying in proclaiming Christ, and faithfully and vividly bringing His image before the mind. Dogma, on the contrary, when regarded as to its origin, has no existence till after faith, and is the scientific expression of the appropriation already made by the Church of the proclamation of the gospel. It arises through reflection and from the expressions of the Christian state of mind; it therefore depends upon the constitution of the latter, and has neither the unchangeableness of the proclamation of the gospel, nor the fixity and self-consistency of the New Testament Scriptures, to which a normative importance, as the treasury of all pure primitive tradition and the original historical *documents* of revelation, must be ascribed.[1]

According to this it is obvious that Schleiermacher awards a more important position to the *Church* and *Tradition* than was customary in evangelical teaching before his time. In his view, indeed, Catholicism is distinguished from Protestantism by the fact that the former makes the condition of the individual depend on his relation to the Church, while the latter makes the relation to the Church depend upon the relation of the individual to Christ. But he does not hereby deny that the individual only attains to faith through the Church and her ministrations;[2] nay, he says that the Church propagates the Holy Spirit in individuals, and will own no other agency of the Holy Ghost than that which is brought about by means of the Church. Of this, indeed, he reckons also the Holy Scriptures which it preserves, and the sacraments which it dispenses, component

[1] This is carried out farther in a very luminous manner by Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik.*

[2] *Christlicher Glaube*, i. § 6 and 24.

parts, and assumes that the continued agency of the Holy Spirit is combined with its ministrations, without, of course, advancing to the position, that the Holy Spirit is so bound to the Church, or even to certain of its institutions, that whatever the empirical Church does the Holy Spirit does also. But for the sake of conceiving of Christianity in its continuity, and as a historical power, he accorded a high position to *tradition*, and did in a measure infuse life and pliability into this hitherto rigid notion, a circumstance which did not fail to exercise a great after-effect upon the Romish Church, and certain of its distinguished theologians, *e.g.* Drey, Möhler, Klee, Staudenmaier, Leop. Schmidt, and others. In his free and broad views of the *Church*, its vital laws, sufferings, and sorrows, he ever kept in view its unity as the work of Christ upon earth; and laboured unwearyingly for an ecclesiastical reconciliation of the differences between Protestants, whether as a practical advocate of the union or as a divine. Indeed his *Glaubenslehre*, 1821, which appeared three hundred years after Melanchthon's *Loci*, is consciously intended to be a body of divinity for the Protestant Church returning to unity after its division, just as Melanchthon's work was actually the divinity of the as yet undivided Protestant Church. He also takes up an extremely conciliatory position with regard to the Roman Catholic Church, notwithstanding his persuasion, that the antagonism between the two churches had not yet reached its climax. The basis of this friendly feeling is his conviction that the Catholic Church is separated from our own, not merely by its non-evangelical tenets, but also by a special Christian individuality, which he finds in its tendency to symbolics.

By his whole method, calculated as it was to build up and repair, and especially by his above described discussion on the nature and limits of Christianity, Schleiermacher accustomed theology to a freer and juster estimation of individual doctrines, because an estimation according to principles. Every doctrine was to be estimated exactly in proportion to its approximation to the principle, and this again brought to consciousness and threw fresh light upon a never wholly forgotten, though often obscured, distinction—the distinction between the foundation which is to support the whole fabric, and that which is built thereon (1 Cor. iii. 10-15). It was by this distinction that his conduct with regard to the various theological tendencies and also his ecclesiastical

position were determined. For with respect to his relation to the two evangelical confessions, the inmost reason of his love for *the union* was not a liberty averse to all Church creeds; for at first, and indeed on principle, he positively embraced the symbols of the Church. Neither was it a doctrinal indifferentism; for he dedicated his best energies to theology, and reckoned an advance to greater definiteness in its tenets as one of the vital functions of the Church.[1] Nor, lastly, did it arise from merely external considerations. That which exercised a deciding influence on his mind was, on the contrary, the conviction, that there is no fundamental difference between the two communions, that their distinctive doctrines meet on the basis of a common principle, and that the peculiar religious view of each being therefore essentially identical, can have no significance capable of destroying full church union, for otherwise the principle of which it is the expression could not be one and the same. But, if this be so, the necessary consequence is, that the separation of the two evangelical confessions cannot be justified on moral grounds, and that at a time when far more important differences have to be tolerated in the same church, the way to expiate an old fault is to abolish the separation, not, as already remarked, by the levelling of dogma, but by mutual accordance of full church-membership. Not till such an act of reconciliation is effected can the Evangelical Church, now consciously returning to the Reformation standpoint, harmonize her ecclesiastical practice with her theological admission of the necessary distinction between the foundation and that which is built thereon, and between religion and dogma. By such an act only can those morbid tendencies, which at all times necessarily ensue from confounding distinctions, be decidedly and consciously repulsed. We allude to Intellectualism, whether negative or positive, ecclesiastical or subjective, which ever derives its power from confounding religion and dogma, and to that obscuration of the principle which checks its vigorous development. Nor is this

[1] These thoughts are very lucidly argued and carried out by Twesten, art. *Union* in Herzog's *theol. Realencycl.* He shows that there can be no church at all if absolute ideality of doctrine be required, that every existing church does in fact acknowledge the validity of church membership, in spite of differences of doctrine, for the sake of a common faith, and that when this identity of principle exists in fundamental articles of doctrine, church communion with different confessions, especially in the same place, is a duty. See above, p. 355.

the only result of such obscuration; which also makes it easy to put a false accent unconsciously, and according to individual inclination, upon this or that side of church doctrine, which being thus made the central point, works with disorganizing effect upon the whole. To such a decomposition of evangelical doctrine, by weakening the influence of its principle, is it alone to be ascribed, that the main stress was laid by the Evangelical Church upon, *e.g.*, its tradition, its sacraments and clerical office, or upon the authority of the canon alone, without regard either to criticism or to the security of the material principle. If the Reformation principle of justification through faith in Christ is in any degree removed from its position, other doctrines must of necessity become at least co-ordinate therewith. Such a deposition from its sovereign station is a necessary transition to making the ruler a subject. For as there must be a power which accredits all doctrines, this, if withdrawn from the evangelical principle, is transferred to something else, whether to the authority of the Church, or of the canon, or of human reason. When the principle is obscured, and its sovereign position yielded, there always follows an adulteration which causes the entire evangelical system to be called in question. At the same time we thus perceive that the high importance given by Schleiermacher to tradition, when viewed in that active sense in which he regards it, contributes essentially to the purity of the character and principle of the Evangelical Church. For tradition, as he views it, is that power of Christian testimony which is ever being renewed by the Holy Ghost—a testimony which has such a certainty in itself, through the Holy Spirit, as neither arose nor arises from the authority of the canon, but is produced by that proclamation of Christianity whose rule and standard are found in holy Scripture. Thus holy Scripture is accredited to evangelical Christians, not by rational proofs and historical evidences, nor by the authority of the Church, but by a real experience of the act of redemption through Christ. Hence it is, by *means* of Scripture, or of that proclamation of Christ of which it is the standard, that we believe, *for Christ's sake,* in the divine authority of holy Scripture. From this it is obvious that tradition, rightly understood, consists in the continued generation of consciously believing personalities by the agency of the Holy Ghost, by means of a preaching of Christ in conformity

with Scripture. This world of new personalities, moreover, takes up a relatively independent position with regard to holy Scripture; for the latter owes the decisive corroboration and recognition of its authority only to the authority of Christ, who has, through the Holy Spirit, revealed Himself to faith as the Redeemer.

Schleiermacher, originally a member of the Reformed Church, but educated and brought up among the Moravian Brotherhood, which is specially indigenous in the Lutheran Church, belongs exclusively to neither of the two confessions. By combining Lutheran mysticism with Reformed reflection and dialectics, he attained that original mode of viewing his subject, which gave such animation to his scientific operations. He restored to its rightful authority, with regard to the criticism, exposition, and canonicity of holy Scripture, that relative independence of the material side of the principle upon which Luther especially had laid so much stress. A Lutheran tendency is also discernible in the facts, that he enters into closer alliance with ecclesiastical tradition and history, though not at the expense of Christian liberty,[1] and assigns to nature and corporeity a more important position than they had hitherto occupied,[2] a change which, while it had a specially fruitful influence upon ethics, was also of importance in respect of the relation of the word and sacraments to the Holy Spirit, and of the whole manner in which vital religion manifested itself in Christian worship. His strict insistence upon the universalism of grace, in opposition to Calvinistic particularism, and the greater stress which he lays on love than on justice, both in his estimation of the Old Testament with relation to the New, in the doctrine of God, and in the ethic relation of the regenerate Christian to the world, are also Lutheran features. On the other hand, his denial of human freedom, in respect of the Divine Omnipotence, his adoption of the Reformed counterpoise against absolute predestination, his more lively feeling for the ethic world, for the moral features of the Christian life, and especially for Church organization, are the particulars in which he leans towards the Reformed

[1] He first restored the Church authentication of the theses on faith, from the Reformation confessions.

[2] Comp. Löwe, *Luther, Schleiermacher, and the Mecklenburg Church*, 1858; also Schleiermacher's *Grundlinien einer Kritik der Sittensysteme*, pp. 349-352, in which he reproves Fichte's idealism and Kant, for an avoidance of nature. Compare also the introduction to his philosophical ethics.

theology. It was thus that he combined with the high position assigned to the doctrinal idea of the Church in the Lutheran, the ethical notion of the Church prevailing in the Reformed confession. In the above exposition of the boundary lines by which Christianity is separated from possible fundamental errors, it is to be regretted that he mentions only anthropological and christological, but not theological errors, such as the opposites, Deism and Pantheism. Having established monotheistic opinions by his notion of religion, namely, as involved in the consciousness of absolute dependence, his purpose was to assign to Christianity the highest station among the various forms of monotheism, and to distinguish between Christian theology and the merely *philosophical conceptions* of God set up by so-called natural theology, by the fact that the latter have never been capable of forming religious communities. He regards both Pantheism and Deism as belonging to these *philosophical* conceptions. It is nevertheless to be wished that he had joined to his two pairs of heresies—in each of which the individual members have again a near affinity to the respective individual members of the other—Deism and Pantheism as a third pair. For these may be designated as the theological opinions which correspond, on the one hand, with Pelagianism and Ebionitism, and on the other with Manicheism and Docetism, and both have undoubtedly a religious, nay, a fundamental importance. It is just here, however, that a deficiency, fertile in results, is found in Schleiermacher's system. His *doctrine of God* is developed no further. In his zeal to exhibit religion in its self-sufficiency and its independence of philosophical systems, he goes so far as to find in the religious self-consciousness, primarily and specially, only a motion of the personal feeling, and not also a concrete objective knowledge of God. Certain forms, indeed, of Deistic opinion are already excluded by him through the consciousness of absolute dependence, which is conceived as perennial, so too is a false God, as being a self-dependence of the world with respect to God, which supposes limited individual life. This absolute dependence also refutes such pantheistic opinions as would make the world God, and attribute to man either absolute knowledge or an absolute feeling of liberty.[1] On the other hand, his theory of belief makes no sufficient protest against regarding everything

[1] *Christlicher Glaube*, i. 19, &c. § 4.

as taking place in virtue of eternal determinations, whether these be conceived of in so distinct a manner that each detail is eternally determined by the order of nature, or in so pantheistic a manner that recourse is had at every moment to the principle of the supreme world-power itself,[1] and even the world of mind regarded as no freely moving, relatively independent causality of its causation, *i.e.* of its formative agency, nor as an independent self-existing life. There is unmistakably a something which is Docetic in the latter view, as there is in the former the same false self-dependence and reality of the world as a whole, which Pelagianism and Ebionitism think must be ascribed to the human side. His Deterministic opinions, in which the chief weight falls upon absolute causality, or the omnipotence of God, is then the reason why so precarious a position is left to those Divine attributes which, in their full conception, are the conditions of the moral nature of man, his freedom, responsibility, accountability, and guilt—in other words, to the *justice and holiness of God.* Hence he is unable adequately to appreciate the dignity and abiding value of the Old Testament, although he insists that omnipotence must be conceived of as spiritual, and views it as transfigured into absolute love and wisdom in Christianity.

In Schleiermacher, however, all this is combined with a denial of a knowledge of God, and a firm persuasion (in which again he resembles Jacobi) that the subjective pious affection is the only form in which the mind can receive the Absolute. The category of personality he deems inadequate, and too low for the infinite nature of God; and this again is a notion capable of being combined with laying undue stress upon His physical infinity in comparison with His spiritual and moral nature. According to Schleiermacher, as surely as there is a knowledge, in which knowledge the necessary duplexity between thought and being finds its unity, as surely, moreover, as there is on the part of the will the necessary antagonism between what is being willed and what has been willed, which again must be capable of combining into unity in the actions, so surely must we grant that there is an absolute transcendental principle, or God, in whom also the ultimate antagonisms of the world find the absolute possibility of their union secured.[2] Without their absolute union

[1] *Dialektik*, 527.

[2] This is fully carried out in his dialectics.

in God, even their partial union in the world would be impossible, and they would necessarily remain absolutely separated ("as qualitative opposites"), and so exclude the possibility both of knowledge and action. Hence, so surely as knowledge and action are possible, so surely must the reason admit the existence of God. But as to what God is, he thinks that it is impossible for us to know His nature, and that philosophy is merely a knowledge of the world, though certainly a knowledge which presupposes the transcendental God. Theology, too, which also can be no real knowledge of God, is in his view only the knowledge of Christian consciousness, or Christian piety. It is therefore only self-contemplation, self-consciousness, proceeding upon a presupposition of God as the absolute causality and supreme unity, a knowledge which, being at the same time essentially at the service of the religious community, the Church, is therefore not animated by an interest for theory as such, or objective knowledge, but refers everything to the Church.[1] Hence, theology is to be kept free from philosophy, and the fluctuations of its systems, and may as certainly be kept distinct therefrom as the religious life is a thing independent with regard to thought and will. Since, moreover, we know nothing of God's nature in general, an intrinsic Trinity in God is excluded. And it is so especially by the way in which he arrives at God, whom he considers necessary as the absolute unity of all antagonisms. All distinctions originate only from the world; hence his trinity is but an œconomical one. In this he only carries out the notion of God held by the old divines, especially their doctrine of the simplicity of God and of the non-objective distinctness of His properties, with an inflexible consistency which must of necessity declare itself against the doctrine of an immanent Trinity. But in doing this he avoids the consideration how the opposites found in the world—if they are not merely apparent and the result of subjective contemplation, which fact would itself be an enigma demanding its solution—could possibly have originated from this supreme unity, if God is *only* absolute simplicity entirely excluding distinctions. Nor does he discuss how the Divine counsel, or idea of the world, with its multiplicity of forces combining into unity, could be possible, if there were not in God also a principle of multiplicity as well as of unity. And yet God is again, in his view, not only the one Being, the supreme

[1] Comp. *Encyclopädie, Einleitung*, § 6.

unity of all antagonisms, but that Being also who developes from Himself the supreme antagonism and all the antagonisms combined therewith.[1] It may be thought that all this may be reconciled if Schleiermacher supposes God to be simply the unity of the ever multiplex world, and conceives of the world as the correlative of God, or as the Absolute, the unity embracing God and the world. But this again is not sufficient; because he regards God, as we have said, not only as the supreme world-power, but as its absolute principle,[2] the principle of the order and laws of the world, as the causality of its existence. Besides this, God is not the supreme unity, but forms, together with the world, that supreme antagonism above which an absolute unity has to be sought. Hence, a sensible gap is here all the more apparent, inasmuch as this reduction of God to simple and absolute unity removes Him so far from the world that many propositions result therefrom resonant of Deism, and inconsistent with his own vivid feeling of God's presence.[3] It must also be confessed that the infiniteness which he ascribes to the Divine unity is too much akin to indefiniteness (ἀόριστον). If we conceive of God as the Being absolutely devoid of definition, as the union of antagonisms in such a sense as to make His nature indifferent to all antagonisms, He is then indifferent also towards the antagonisms of the finite and the infinite, towards being and becoming, true and false, good and evil. He must be the union of even these opposites, and thus something logically impossible. Indeed, it cannot then be said what He is not, since He is the union of all opposites, even of those which are self-contradictory. Schleiermacher, however, does not go so far; consequently it must be possible, nay, necessary, to say something definite, whether of a positive or negative kind, concerning God. In fact, he does this himself, as Christianity also requires, when he says that the notion of God can be only in God Himself,[4] that He is the primal form of knowledge,[5] that He is not merely the supreme conception including all others, that as existence He is not only the supreme

[1] *Dialektik*, § 135. [2] *Ibid.* p. 527.

[3] *E.g.* the exceedingly negative relation of God to time and space, the doctrine of God's unchangeableness, according to which His operations are always the same. This is stated in detail in my treatise on the unchangeableness of God.

[4] *Dialektik*, p. 56, note. In saying this, self-consciousness is in fact attributed to God. [5] *Ibid.* p. 87.

force or species, the identity of the ideal and the real, occupying one and the same position as all besides, and only so conditioning all things as to be itself conditioned by all; and when, on the other hand, he calls God the unity which also is not identical with the totality of knowledge and being, but their absolute foundation;[1] when he says, further, that God must not be called the indifference of consciousness and the lack of consciousness, but that He is that Being the notion of whom can be only in Himself, and not in us; and when he finally calls God not merely spiritual omnipotence, but says also that He is love and wisdom.[2]

With regard to the *school of Schleiermacher*, little as he, who was a lover of liberty both for himself and in others, desired to be the founder of a school, there is not one, at least among the more famous of modern systematic theologians, who is not indebted to Schleiermacher for essential assistance. Those, indeed, who profess most decidedly to be his heirs are not, for the most part, those who most manifest the truly progressive, fertile and constructive genius of Schleiermacher (see above, p. 343). Many among them, on the contrary, fall back to earlier standpoints, especially to æsthetic rationalism, or were eclectic popular theologians who, more influenced by ecclesiastico-political than by theological interests, entered into alliance with every shade of rationalism, even in its speculative form, and even combined with theological pamphleteers in whose eyes Schleiermacher was a romancer, and Lessing a mere illuminist. There are others, on the contrary, who, notwithstanding their independence, may be regarded as the genuine cherishers and preservers of the spirit he introduced, and who carried on the regeneration of theology in its various departments. In that of New Testament exegesis may be named the acute Lücke,[3] the trustworthy Bleek,[4] also Usteri, Neander, Schmid,[5] Olshausen,[6] Tholuck,[7] Osiander, Messner, Riehm, Weiss, Lechler,

[1] *Dialektik*, p. 135, &c. Comp. p. 115.

[2] *Christlicher Glaube*, ii. § 167 p. 516. Comp. § 168; 1, § 55, p. 291.

[3] Lücke, *Commentar über die Schriften des Johannes*, vol. i. and vol. ii. *Evangelium*, vol. iii. *Briefe*, ed. 3, 1856; vol. iv. *Einleitung in die Apokalypse.*

[4] Bleek, *Hebräerbrief*, 3 vols. 1828-40. *Beiträge; Einleitung ins N. T.;** *Synoptiker.*

[5] Schmid, *biblische Theologie*, 4th edit.*

[6] Olshausen, *Commentar zum N. T.* 1835, &c.*

[7] Tholuck, *Bergpredigt;** *Glaubwürdigkeit der evangelischen Geschichte; Evang Johannes*, ed. 7, 1857;* *Römerbrief*, ed. 4, 1857; *Hebräerbrief*, ed. 3, 1850.

* These have all been translated in Clark's *Foreign Theological Library.*

Holzmann, and many others. In *historical theology:* Neander,[1] the father of modern ecclesiastical history, with Hagenbach,[1] Jacobi, Piper, Uhlhorn, and Reuter, also Gelzer Hundeshagen, Stähelin, and A. Schweizer, as well as Hase, Henke and Baumgarten-Crusius, in all of whom traces of Schleiermacher's influence are not wanting. In *dogmatic theology:* K. J. Nitzsch, Twesten, Jul. Müller,[1] Rothe, Tholuck, Sack, Vogt, Hagenbach, Martensen,[1] Liebner, v. Hofmann, Auberlen,[1] Ehrenfechter, Schöberlein, Lange,[1] Ebrard,[1] Landerer, Pelt, Thomsen, W. Hoffmann, J. Köstlin, Reuter, Erbkam, Beyschlag, Gess, and others, in spite of their independence and individuality, and the manifold diversities they exhibit, are they who most exhibit the impress of Schleiermacher's genius. The Deterministic side of his system was, however, embraced by hardly any except Alex. Schweizer of Zürich, Romang of Bern, and Scholten of Leyden. All these construct their doctrine of belief, which they distinguish from biblical theology, no longer upon the formal principle of holy Scripture, as biblical supernaturalists, nor upon natural reason, as their opponents insisted on doing, but upon the material principle of the Reformation, viz. faith, combined with holy Scripture. Nor was the animating, exciting, and renovating power of Schleiermacher's influence less productive of results in the province of ethics. This is proved by the works on speculative ethics of J. N. Wirth, 1841, of Chalybäus and Rothe; as well as those on Christian morality of Schmid and—in spite of his opposition to Schleiermacher and Rothe—of Wuttke.[2] By again bringing into prominence the *idea of the Church,* Schleiermacher's creative mind, together with his skill as a preacher, first opened the way to a scientific treatment of *practical theology.* The fruits of his ideas are to be found in the independent labours in this department of K. J. Nitzsch, Ehrenfeuchter, Palmer, Liebner, Schöberlein, and Brückner.

There was but one field in which Schleiermacher did not labour, nay, which he scarcely redeemed to Christian theology, and that was the Old Testament. Hence, Old Testament exegesis remained yet awhile oscillating between the old antagonisms, viz. a traditional handling after the manner of biblical or old orthodox

[1] All translated in Clark's *Foreign Theological Library.*

[2] *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre von Ad. Wuttke,* 2 vols. 1861. Sartorius, Thomasius, Philippi, Harless, Harnack, and Beck are less directly influenced in systematic theology by Schleiermacher.

supernaturalism, and the various forms of rationalism, without experiencing a parallel and similar regeneration to that which took place in other branches of theology. The more closely, however, the Old Testament and the history of the ancient covenant are connected with the historical side of Christianity, the more sensibly must the want of a really historical view of the Old Testament necessarily react upon the view of Christianity, and contribute towards an idealistic treatment of the latter.

## SECTION II.

### FROM THE FIFTH DECADE TO THE PRESENT TIME.

THE period during which the influence of Schleiermacher, and of the tendency to which he had given the first impulse, was at its height began about the year 1820, and lasted till the middle of 1840. From about 1827, indeed,[1] till the appearance of Strauss' *Leben Jesu* in 1835, Hegel and his school were able to dispute its pre-eminence. This work, however, revealed the contradiction of the Hegelian philosophy to Christianity, and, at the same time, introduced into the former a process of dissolution, nay, in part also a transition to a Hegelian popular philosophy. The consequence was that Schleiermacher's far more enduring influence upon theology was again triumphant.

After the commotion caused by Strauss' *Leben Jesu* was allayed, and confidence in the historical basis of Christianity restored, a vigorous Christian life began to revive in ever-increasing circles. A lively and faithful proclamation of the Gospel again resounded from the pulpits, the people turned to their Church with renewed affection, and the Church began to bethink herself of her so long neglected moral duties, especially of those of church organization and of home and foreign missions. The hope that the ground lost by evangelical religion in the German nation, during the eighteenth century, might be recovered by an internal and peaceful development, without farther storms, without violence, and without legal intervention or prohibition, and that the period of both internal and external prosperity now setting in for the Church might no longer be such to a merely clerical Church, seemed to be justified. Such hopes, however, were not so speedily fulfilled. Certainly very much had still to be done with respect to multitudes, who were either indifferent to, or still averse from Christianity. Redoubled zeal, however, the higher education of the clerical order, and the application of the talents

[1] When the *Jahrbücher fur wissenschaftliche Kritik* began to appear.

of laymen to Church work, seemed equal to accomplishing the task, if the positive forces would but—now that a feeling for the idea of the Church had chiefly, by means of Schleiermacher, been revived in the minds of the pious—faithfully and harmoniously co-operate in cautious, patient, and persevering efforts to set up a worthier form of the same. The forces collected for the positive building up of the Church were, it must be confessed, not entirely homogeneous. Not to mention the diversity already mentioned of *the circles led by Schleiermacher*—which still, and for some time longer, remained within the limits of such divergence as is caused by that reception of more or less of evangelical faith and doctrine at all times existing—there were others who represented rather a revived biblical supernaturalism, without at first being conscious of its fundamental weakness, but also without laying stress upon the symbols of the Church. Upon this *second class,* who had hitherto been accustomed to regard Christianity as wholly and exclusively based upon the formal principle, *i.e.* upon the inspiration and Divine authority of holy Scripture, a deep impression was made by the work of Strauss and the critical assertions concerning the New Testament connected with it. The many unsolved difficulties, the perseverance with which critical investigation was carried on, combined with a feeling of uncertainty as to its final results, awakened in many a *doubt* as to whether the formal principle of the Reformation were of itself, as they had so long assumed, capable of supporting the entire edifice of Christianity. For, according to the standpoint of biblical supernaturalism, faith must be suspended so long as the proof of the inspiration of the Canon remains imperfect—a proof which, while the rights of biblical criticism are admitted, can never be regarded as perfected and concluded once for all. Now the legitimate deliverance from the discomfort of this justifiable doubt would have been found by surmounting the stage of biblical supernaturalism, and returning to the power and self-certainty of the material principle, whence critical operations may be contemplated with serenity and confidence, nay, actively shared in without anxiety. But very many stopped short of seeking deliverance from their uneasiness concerning the supporting power of the formal principle alone in that evangelical truth which makes itself certain to faith, and of attaining satisfaction by finding a higher than a merely historical certainty

—which of itself can never amount to more than probability—in the self-corroboration of Christian truth through the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, they struck out a path which was, from the evangelical standpoint, an illegitimate one, even the *authority of the Church to determine and interpret the Canon*, and sought in this authority a compensation for what was lacking in the formal principle when standing alone. Thus this tendency of biblical supernaturalism entered also, in accordance with the leanings of the age, into the *Church phase*, and Strauss, instead of overthrowing Christianity, as he expected, powerfully contributed to revive the principle of tradition, *i.e.* catholicizing ideas of authority, and to seduce many to a denial of the Protestant axiom of the sufficiency and perspicuity of holy Scripture for the purpose for which it is given. It is easy to understand how this class—such is the power of an adopted principle—gradually glided into that *third class* which we have yet to describe.

This consisted of those whose theology, though they had partially forsaken Pietism, had not as yet been sufficiently imbued by the material principle of the Reformation, and among whom there arose, as the product of reflection, a *churchmanship* of such a kind as to put the stability of objective Church doctrine in the first place, and expect the safety of the Church from the restored authority of the symbols. But aiming at this authority not in the way of free inward reproduction and appropriation, but in the apparently shorter one of law and external enactments, they did not keep themselves free from that spirit of unevangelical legality which, according to the saying, "the law worketh wrath," soon called forth discontent among hitherto friendly fellow-labourers.

All these differences, however, amongst the constructive forces might, in the further progress of a self-renovating theology, have been accommodated, if only the desire for renovation had stopped at generality, if the intellectual, moral, and religious process which had been inaugurated had been unimpeded by force and external means, and the Church left free to follow the laws of her own life, unrestrained by hindrances from without. An interruption, however, occurred, partly in consequence of Strauss's *Leben Jesu* and the movements connected with it, and partly in consequence of the claims of the last-named party to pronounce for the whole Church. The course of events was as follows:—

*Rationalism* had, by reason of that regeneration of theology which had set in, found itself compelled to retreat from one position to another, and had for a long period seen with regret that "the mystical tendency" was spreading in even wider circles through the influence of Schleiermacher and his theology. In order, then, to make a stand against the power of a regenerated theology, the still existing remnants of those different kinds of rationalism which had been wont to despise and contemn one another, now gathered themselves together. Among these were found the so-called vulgar, *i.e.* Wolffian and Kantian, and the æsthetic rationalists; nay, even certain "speculativists" of the Hegelian school joined their ranks. Their one purpose was to form a barrier against the revival of Reformation faith; for liberty of thought and doctrine seemed to those who had appropriated only the negative side of Protestantism to be threatened by a restoration of evangelical church order. Encouraged by the movement dating from Strauss, they united themselves into an association known as the "friends of light," and claimed, as enemies to all "constraint of symbols," an unlimited freedom of doctrine within the Church. None, indeed, of the before-mentioned positive parties agreed in this desire for the abolition of all confessions. Even the most doctrinally undecided demanded that the development of the individual and of the Church "should proceed from Christ and tend to Christ." The difference, however, between the more legal, and the freer evangelical standpoint was very obviously manifested on this occasion. They who belonged to the former betook themselves, in the place of more patient, but in this case safer and surer transactions, to monster protestations, which, by putting a stop to scientific and ecclesiastical intercourse, looked like a desire to determine the personal creed of their opponents, and to obtain verdicts against them, rather by majorities than by arguments. The leaders of this party showed more confidence in the power of the State, and in the juridical administration of the symbols, and therefore in the effect of depositions and intimidations, than in the silent but increasingly triumphant power of evangelical conviction. They chose rather, by a hasty demonstration, to produce an appearance of general unity in doctrine, than to bear patiently and loyally the consequences of that common fault of the Church, which they knew to be the reason that faith, where

it still existed, was so meagre and impoverished. And they chose this course of action, although these consequences had been, already so much alleviated in the way, not of law but of internal remedies.

But the effect of these proceedings within the party whose positive tendencies had united it against rationalism and against Strauss, was, that some opposed this warfare of protests, and the danger with which they believed evangelical liberty to be threatened by the proceedings just described, by counter protests, enhanced by declarations on the parts of the magistracies of great cities. Separated from their former associates, and setting themselves up as the party of "the friends of union," they took up a more negative position than they had hitherto done.

An extreme right and a left were now in decided opposition to each other, while a middle and numerously represented tendency, consciously distinct from either, adhered to the original standpoint.

Such "protests" against the fundamental characteristics of a whole ecclesiastical or theological standpoint involved separation, if not a kind of excommunication, in the place of agreement, while such a mode of contest transferred the right of the Church to decide on Church-membership, to believing or unbelieving individuals, to the disturbance instead of the promotion of intellectual labours. Hence the judicious and enlightened Eichhorn, Minister of Prussia, which was the very centre of the strife, perceived that the decision concerning such things, and especially concerning the obligatory power of the confessions of the Reformation, must be taken out of the hands of a subjective, though ever so well-meaning, arbitrariness, and must, on the contrary, be made the basis of *enactments* in accordance with the spirit of the age, which might secure the conditions indispensable to the existence of an ecclesiastical community, as well as the rights of Protestant liberty. This was necessary, that the Church might, upon the basis of the immovable principles of the Reformation, be preserved in a course of peaceful and internal development, and of progressive acquisition of convictions, without being exposed to the tumultuous waves of anarchical caprice. For this purpose it was that the general synod of 1846 was convened, and it was in this sense that it laboured for the peace of

the Church. Every shade of opinion was represented in this synod, from moderate rationalism to strict orthodoxy, but, on the whole, its determining and uniting power was that tendency which sought to combine liberty with loyalty to the confession, and without making any alteration in the confession itself which had descended from former days, to define as accurately as the necessities of the times rendered possible and desirable, the *position* which the clergy must be expected to occupy thereto. It was in the earnest and strenuous labours which were concentrated upon such questions as the form of the ordination oath, the arrangements concerning union and the constitution of the Church, that the practical fertility of the recently attained perception of the principle of the Reformation and its confessions, and of the distinction therewith admitted between religion and theology, fundamental and non-fundamental, was manifested. With such a feeling did the synod draw up the famous "ordination formulary" and the order of instruction, which, after long and instructive debates, in which these subjects were thoroughly discussed, were accepted by all its members, with the exception of an insignificant minority. Frederick William IV., however, thought himself obliged to withhold his sanction from the decisions of the synod, through which alone it seemed possible to secure the Church from anarchy and from falling back into a fresh nomism, and to preserve it without violence in a course of healthy development. He was led to this course by the above described third party, which expected the welfare and restoration of the Church from theological legislation, especially from a judicial administration of the existing symbols, and found an obligation to except the fundamental facts and truths of the confessions inadequate, demanding that the latter should, on the contrary, be made binding in their full extent, though intending in practice to deal leniently with nonconformity.

This victory of the party inclined to judicial restrictions imposed upon it the task of proposing better measures for settling the questions of confession and union than those of the general synod. The period, moreover, of mental exhaustion, and general reaction against innovations, which set in after the unfortunate revolution of 1848, and the shipwreck of the national hopes combined therewith, together with the powerful patronage of the

minister V. Raumer (1850-1858), afforded them both opportunity and power to attempt the carrying out of their ideal of the unity, purity and security of the Church.

What then, it may be asked, was effected by that party in the German evangelical Church which had the upper hand for about ten years after the general synod?

It endeavoured to enter into closer connection with history and tradition, made the age conscious that the Church was a vital power of no slight importance, and promoted the vitality of the Church by reviving the affection for its ancient treasures of confession, hymnology, liturgy, &c. But it committed also great and grievous faults.

It opposed with its utmost power that church organization which was a widely felt necessity, and for which the general synod had proposed a scheme, and it succeeded in putting a stop to the work thus commenced. It consequently laboured by the use of every means at its disposal to effect the dissolution of *the union.* It had formerly advocated the union, even in opposition to seceding Lutherans; it now sought to bring about an explosion of the union, and especially of the union of the Prussian national churches, from within. The motives of this change were rather juristical and canonical than doctrinal. For designing to give full authority to the confessions by means of the external assistance of the executive, the union appeared to them an obstacle to the unlimited validity of the symbols, which must above all things be got rid of. Regarding the confessions of faith in the light of a code of law, this party perceived in the union as such a fatal danger to the plenary authority of the symbols, because it was through the union that a portion of the confessions, viz. the *dissensus*, had lost its absolutely binding obligation, and therefore its separating power, in the national church. In this diminution then of the authority of a portion of the confession, which was not legally excluded, they believed the authority of the whole to be threatened; and in vain was it represented that simple evangelical intelligence was well able to discover, as far as was needful, those fundamental doctrines which are common to all, and that when these are sincerely believed and maintained, danger to the Evangelical Church is out of the question. That it was a juristic motive, and not a doctrinal interest in the subject-matter of the distinctive doctrines and

their value, which was here at work, is obvious from the demand that the Reformed should, on their part, be bound by their own symbol to its full extent, as well as the Lutherans by the Lutheran symbol—a demand at which our old Lutheran orthodoxy would have been horrified, as sanctioning and promoting false doctrine. When one and the same individual, *e.g.* a member of the Reformed Church, makes such a demand on behalf of both sides, what can such a proceeding be called but a doctrinal indifferentism, which can scarcely be reconciled with an interest in truth and its victory?

It must be confessed that this tone was far more frequently held by Lutherans than by the Reformed, and especially by those who had quitted the Reformed for the Lutheran Church. But even these could not but pay unconscious tribute to the union, by introducing into the Lutheran Church old-reformed elements, or elements more akin to the Reformed confession, in virtue of that possibility of intercourse between the two communions which had been brought about by the union. Such elements however it would have been more historically correct not to regard, or call Lutheran or High-Lutheran. Among these may be reckoned a decided Old Testament tinge of theology in general, a onesided stress upon the formal principle, for which indeed, as regards matter, tradition was substituted, a certain tone of legality, and the construction of the whole fabric of theology upon a theory of inspiration which, if not the Alexandrine, was yet that of the seventeenth century. The stress laid upon the confession of faith in the form of dispensing the Lord's Supper, recalls the Zwinglian *Professio*, that intellectual human performance, while the objection to the admission of others than Lutherans to the "Lutheran" Supper, evidences that more importance was attributed to the exhibition of church membership in this ordinance, than to Christ's impartation of Himself. And finally, while the English and Scotch alone, among Reformed churches, had hitherto ascribed Divine authority and institution to their respective forms of church government, and the Lutheran had decidedly renounced any such claim, certain members of this party, in their zeal for the legal and governmental establishment of the Church, suffered themselves to be so far carried away as to impute to the governing body (*Kybernesis*), and therefore to the consistories and high-church councils, or to the clergy, direct

divine appointment and authority. Nay, in many German lands there were not wanting those who designated the pastors as successors of the apostles, claimed for them a priestly character, made the "ministry of the means of grace" [*Gnadenmittelamt*] the condition of spiritual blessing, and insisted on regarding the sacraments administered thereby as the central point of the Lutheran system of doctrine, instead of justifying faith. This priestly character was, moreover, said to show itself in the power of the keys, which the clerical order alone could exercise, and in the requirement of private confession and absolution, and it seemed as if the fundamental doctrine of the Church, *i.e.* of the Church according to this clerical fashioning, were about to become—that Christian piety is of no value apart from modern "churchmanship." Of the two aspects of the Church, viz. its invisibility and its visibility, the former was, in opposition to the entire testimony of the Reformation, opposed, and the latter alone dwelt on, while this was only considered valid if specifically Lutheran. "Churchmanship," which had to authenticate itself chiefly by its rejection of Reformed and Unionists, nay, for a time by its enmity to all Christian association, in so far as the laity should take any other than a passive share therein, was esteemed the flower and essence of Christian piety. Old customs, old liturgical forms, hymns, and catechisms, were zealously restored in most of the countries of Germany, and these were not unaccompanied by the benefits proceeding from the recovery or readoption of these forgotten treasures. But their introduction was, in many instances, accompanied by a painful and repulsive adherence to antiquated forms, and too hastily and dictatorially effected, without previous preparation, and the free acquiescence of the congregation. Safety was hoped for from a restoration of the Church of the seventeenth century, nay, frequently pre-Reformation times were recurred to, and the Reformation itself retracted in a Catholicizing fashion. Attacks were even made upon the Protestant freedom of teaching of the theological faculties, and these were successful in Göttingen and Rostock, while in Prussia the downfall of the evangelical union seemed imminent. This was the stage corresponding in Germany to that of English Puseyism, which preceded it by some decades.

Such proceedings, however, brought this party into conflict with the genius of the German Protestant people. In its zeal for

restoration it also broke through the thread of history, a procedure which was, in its manner, of as revolutionary a character as the opposite one in the eighteenth century. The priestly pretentions gave the greatest offence. For a long period the Protestant laity regarded the acts of their spiritual leaders with silent, or with only muttered disfavour. When, however, they were directly affected by these antiquated changes and Catholicizing principles, and, disturbed by their being carried out into practice, great commotions arose among the people, who rejected these tendencies, and opposed these attempts. The ecclesiastical authorities experienced in many instances bitter disappointments, the effects of which were however salutary, if they served to bring to remembrance the true source and nature of the strength of the Protestant Church.

Thus this party not only learnt that it had over-estimated its powers, but found by experience that the real wants and susceptibilities, as well as the ecclesiastical inclinations of the people, had been more correctly appreciated by the other side, whose opposition was the more successful now that the party which specially gloried in being called "the Church" party began to be rent by internal dissensions. Some, though sympathizing with this party in its opposition to the union, supported the rights of the Protestant laity against Romanizing desires of a priestly kind, and powerfully and lucidly set forth, that they who desired to naturalize hierarchical tendencies in the Lutheran Church, were forfeiting all right to use the symbols as a weapon against the opponents of church doctrine, and to maintain that their obligation was binding, for this would be to take out the mote from another's eye while a beam was in their own.[1] Others, better affected towards the union, desired to advocate freedom of theological research and science, against a legalized petrifaction of doctrine, which ignored unsolved problems, and sought to merge theology in a mere defence of tradition.[2]

Hence these attempts at restoration were unable to effect anything permanent, and at best succeeded more or less in putting old cloth upon a new garment in certain German churches.

[1] So Höfling, v. Hofmann, Guericke, and Ströbel, the *enfant terrible* of the age for Lutheran theology.

[2] V. Hofmann, Baumgarten, Kahnis, and others.

This tendency had, in the year 1860, passed its culminating point by about a decade. In certain countries, as Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover, the Church governments profited by these experiences,[1] for they proceeded upon a more correct appreciation of the positive tendencies, each of which might have perceived that not one of them, apart from or in opposition to the others, could accomplish anything complete, and that the first step to be taken was to endeavour to surpass that narrow idea of the Church which had been the cause of so much pernicious separation.

In the year 1867, the parties mentioned p. 405, impelled by certain external ecclesiastical motives, combined with each other for the purpose of opposing that forcible introduction of uniformity with the Prussian national Church, into the Lutheran provinces recently acquired by Prussia, which was at that time unjustly apprehended. Facts having already made it obvious that this apprehension is ill-founded, it is to be hoped that the natural relations and the actual state of affairs will soon make themselves felt again. The new political arrangements inspired many with the hope that German Protestantism was now making a rapid advance towards the high aim of a German Protestant national Church. Others, on the contrary, entertained the fear or hope that the Prussian national Church, and that union with it which sanctioned the retention of a special Church government, might be dissolved. Premature as were, however, the hopes thus cherished of a Protestant national Church for Germany, the latter expectations are still less the goal towards which the spirit of German national Protestantism is tending, and the ecclesiastical condition in which it is seeking repose and satisfaction.

It is much to be desired and hoped that a good understanding upon the basis of the recovered perception of the power of the

[1] In Hanover a church government with lay elders was, soon after the commotion concerning the catechism (1862), unanimously adopted by the synod; while here, as well as in Saxony and Bavaria, lay agency was increasingly developed in the work of the inner mission. Wurtemburg, with its thoroughly educated clergy, and its church firmly rooted in the affections of the people, which, while rationalism was elsewhere dominant, was still feeding on the wholesome nourishment afforded by Bengel's school, also received deep and lasting benefits from Schleiermacher's teaching. The progress of this church was comparatively free from the tumults in North Germany, and was not materially interrupted by opponents such as Strauss and Baur. It also remained favourable to the union in the sense indicated above, p. 355.

Reformation principles, and the danger of any alteration of them, may continue to increase in the whole German evangelical Church. There is not only in the whole course of our Church's history, but also in her present state, a serious warning to all who wish well to the evangelical Church, and are averse to anarchical agitation, from whichever side it may arise, against the insatiableness of controversy, and a no less serious admonition to appreciate and to satisfy the real and urgent needs of the age. For it is unmistakeable that the process, so happily begun, of regaining to their Church the hearts of the German nation, came to a standstill through the variance of their spiritual leaders, who still embraced the faith of that Church, and especially through their warlike attitude against the union and the Reformed, together with their archaic and hierarchical tendencies. For it thus became uncertain to the masses what true Christianity was. On the one side, many even worthy and pious clergymen, in consequence of the failure of their well-meant efforts at restoration, fell into a state of variance and irritability with public opinion in general, and lost that joyful hope, courage, and enthusiasm in their work, nay, even that hearty certainty about it, which subserves the good of all. Hence, certain eschatological theories, announcing the approaching end of the world, were the only consolation left to many, when they perceived the impossibility of effecting what they had accustomed themselves to regard as indispensable to the welfare of the Church. On the other side, such a disposition, avoiding, as it did, the duties of testing and revising its self-made theories, naturally evoked the mistrust of the people against the clerical order and against Christianity itself. And yet it was so doubly needful, now that the tendency to materialism was so widely spread and fashioned into a theory, whose influence was hitherto unexampled in Germany, and when so many destructive forces were at work, that the hearts of the people should be opened to the Gospel, that thus a new creation, resulting from the energy and unity of the German nation, might be brought forth from the mental chaos. The schism in the positive tendency of the modern evangelical Church, and the temporary domination of the third party, with its threats against Protestant freedom of teaching, and its frustration of an evangelical Church-constitution, produced another effect, viz. the formation of the "Protestant Association" in 1863.

This association seemed at first to insist upon an ecclesiastical organization upon the broadest and most democratical basis, one in which civil and political qualifications should avail for Church membership. It soon, however, adopted a more moderate tone in this respect, the Church authorities themselves having seriously taken the matter in hand. Its present aim is chiefly the advocacy of Protestant liberty of teaching, and the reconciliation of Christian faith with modern culture. In opposition to the tendency which gave the tone at the Prussian General Synod, it has no absolute antagonism to that liberty of teaching which is innate in the principle of the Protestant Church, if accompanied by its correlative of freedom of hearing, and feels that the question is not what essentially Christian element may be sacrificed to propitiate modern culture, but how to win for the latter new modes of exhibiting Christian truth, and how more and more to animate it with a spirit of Christian morality.

These ecclesiastical complications moreover, while they alienated the people and interrupted the progressive development of the evangelical Church, upon the soil of the newly-acquired basis of evangelical faith, had also their effect within the province of theology. They contributed both negatively and positively, if not to produce, yet certainly to give more widespread importance to that recent movement with respect to the life of Christ and to Christology, which was called forth by Renan,[1] Strauss,[2] and Schenkel.[3] Theology, after the first appearance of Strauss' *Leben Jesu*, instead of setting itself to solve the problems thereby suggested (see above, p. 373) with regard to the Person of Christ, had, during a period of many years, been for the most part occupied with the questions of the union, confession, the Church, the ministry, the power of the keys and the sacraments, and had been building with security or contending with vigour, as if all were settled about the foundation. Hence the unexpected appearance of Renan's book, and the works of Strauss and Schenkel, produced a sudden alarm, disseminated all kinds of uncertainty among the different ranks of society, and found a favour out of all proportion to their scientific value. They were not, however, merely external causes which led to the outburst

[1] Renan, *La vie de Jesus*, 1863 and 1864.

[2] Strauss, *das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, Leipzig, 1864.

[3] Schenkel, *das Charakterbild Jesu, ein biblischer Versuch*, 1864.

of these fresh attacks upon Christianity: the *internal progress of the matter*, which could only, to a very superficial survey, have seemed satisfactorily settled in the first stage of the discussions on the *Leben Jesu* (see above, p. 373), contributed quite as much to this result. These fresh, and at this time unexpectedly combined, attacks mark *a new phase of the contest.*

Even the popular form of these works, and their rejection of a learned and theological apparatus, was new. They were addressed to the people, to the educated world in general, and hence it was quite in keeping, that, in a large number of towns, popular apologetic lectures should have been delivered in reply. Among these were the thankfully received lectures of Held, Luthardt, Versmann, v. Zetzschwitz, the works of Weidemann and Schaff, and especially the excellent lectures of Uhlhorn and Niemann in Hanover. But these popular efforts by no means satisfied the existing need. For the treatises of Renan, Strauss, &c., agree in professing to give *a real, concrete image of the history and Person of Jesus*, which they oppose as true history to the faith of the Church. Hence the question is not merely to answer these attacks, or to defend isolated posts, but to awake from the careless security induced by trusting to the authority of the Church to answer for the canon and its contents, or by devoting the energies to the defence of such disputed points as lay within the province of the Church, but were devoid of a more deep-reaching importance. What is wanted is to attain, by means of the earnest labours of evangelical science, a criticism-proof, faithful portraiture of the Person of Jesus, one in which a sincere love of truth may do ample justice to all the lawful objections of criticism.

In this respect the history of criticism, since the first appearance of Strauss' *Leben Jesu*, offers most instructive hints as to the course to be pursued.

The decades next following the appearance of the mythical standpoint were extremely prolific in critical works on the New Testament. Those of Baur of Tübingen and his school, of Zeller, Schwegler, R. Köstlin, Hilgenfeld, Volkmar, Holsten, and others, appeared during this period. Nor were their opponents idle, as the works of Weisse, Schweizer, Bleek, Lücke, Uhlhorn, Ewald, Weiss, Holzman, Meyer, and others, bear witness. Baur's criticism of the New Testament seemed at first simply favourable

to Strauss' mythical theory, Strauss, he said, "had tried to surprise the fortress and take it by storm; it had been shown, however, that a regular siege was still necessary, and this he was now about to undertake." Agreeing with Strauss in his denial of the supernatural, he perceives that there is no historical foundation for that interposition of a longer period between the era of the Apostles and the origin of the gospels which Strauss had stipulated for, in order to be able to carry out his mythical standpoint, instead of adopting the view of fraud or delusion on the part of the evangelists. In short, he is sensible that the removal of the gospels from the position they have hitherto occupied, without assigning them a definite one elsewhere, does not avoid the appearance of *à priori* arbitrariness in a matter of historical criticism. Hence he endeavours, from certain scattered historical data, to make it probable that the Gospel of St. Matthew first appeared about 130, that of St. Luke some twenty years later, St. John's Gospel subsequently to the year 150, and that, with the exception of the four larger Pauline epistles and the Apocalypse, no book of the New Testament is of apostolic origin. Thus an open field seemed to be gained in which the mythic theory might revel at pleasure.

But the support afforded to the mythical standpoint by Baur was but one side of the matter, the other was soon to be exposed and to lead to unexpected results.

The fact was, that Baur's investigations introduced a new phase in the researches of criticism concerning the life of Christ, and one more favourable to Christianity than the obscurity of the mythic theory, because it reduced everything to a simple alternative.

Baur, endowed with more historical feeling than Strauss, perceived that historical matters cannot be discussed without historical documents, and that a criticism without documents degenerates into an *à priori* construction of possible hypotheses, which may be opposed by other possibilities without any kind of historical knowledge being obtained by the process. While then Strauss simply denies off-hand the credibility of almost all the books of the New Testament, without giving himself any farther trouble about their origin, Baur plants at least one foot upon the soil of historical data, and tries to connect them therewith. And even this one step was to be fatal to the mythic hypothesis.

Baur, indeed, trod this historical soil with scarcely any reference to Jesus as an historical personage. Like Strauss, in his first *Leben Jesu*, he keeps Him quite in the background, and is able to say scarcely anything more about Him than that, in opposition to the hypocrisy of the Pharisees, He preached righteousness and pure love, and thereby invited men into, nay, opened the kingdom of Heaven. But he charges Strauss with *endeavouring to give a gospel history without a criticism of the gospels.* His tactics consist in refuting the three first gospels by that of St. John, and the latter by the former; thus creating a confusion as to what is to be adhered to with respect to the sacred history. He reminds his readers that whatever they may think of the life of Jesus, the fact of the New Testament literature exists, and is an historical quantity, which must be historically accounted for, as being incapable of originating itself.

The Christianity then of the New Testament literature forms a contrast to Judaism and heathenism; and how is it to be explained? To answer this question Baur starts from the historical fact, that in the apostolic era Judaizing and heathen Christians, "Petrine and Pauline" as he calls them, formed a contrast to each other. The former, among whom he reckons the original apostles, were and continued in the main thorough Jews, being only distinguished from their co-religionists by their acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah. They embraced the necessity of circumcision for salvation, the law, and Jewish particularism, hence too their Christology was necessarily Judaistic, *i.e.* Ebionite. In *Paul*, on the contrary, who was converted by a subjective vision, a way was made for the recognition of the calling of all nations to salvation, and for a more ideal conception of the Person and work of Christ.

Paul had, all his life, to contend against this Judaism. After his death, however, the sharpness of the antagonism between these two parties was somewhat lessened. The increasing enmity of the Jews to even the Jewish Christians, and the tragic fate of this people, contributed to deprive the Petrine party of their external hold upon Judaism. A series of conciliatory writings, the memorials of which are the remaining books of the New Testament, continues Baur, caused a growing union between these parties, till after the first half of the second century, the Catholic Church, with its peaceful formula, faith *and* works,

arose from their combination. The gospels especially were works of later date, written in accordance with the aim of these parties at this stage of their existence. Hence their contents must be understood according to the *tendency* which they were designed to serve. Matthew represents the Jewish Christian, Luke the Pauline standpoint, Mark, who follows them, already exhibits complete neutrality, while in the Gospel of John the Gnosticism which proceeded from Paul is naturalized in the Church. Thus Christ and His apostles are held guiltless of the supposed fictions of the gospels, a result which cannot indeed be arrived at, if the books of the New Testament are allowed a greater proximity to the era of the apostles, who cannot then be regarded otherwise than as implicated in the unanimous "glorification of Jesus."

Upon this view Christianity might indeed have had, properly speaking, no personal founder; it might have first arisen as a gradual alienation from Judaism, in consequence of these transactions between a Petrine and a Pauline party. Baur thinks the persons themselves are of no consequence, they are but names, the idea is everything.[1] But light cannot be thrown at this cheap rate upon the primitive history of Christianity, while silence concerning the Person of Christ is thus persevered in, or an unpersonal conciliatory process substituted for a personal founder. *The question concerning the historical origin of the books of the New Testament involuntarily leads on to the question concerning the historical founders of Christianity.* Whence, we ask, do we obtain the two factors which are said to be the cause of this historical movement, and which being, in spite of their diversity, constantly under the influence of a force which keeps them together, are ever tending towards each other till they unite?

How was it that a party arose in the midst of Judaism believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and therefore enduring sufferings and death for following Him? The Tübingen school, acknowledging, as it does, the historical existence of Jesus, cannot but admit that it was He who by His words, His actions, and His fate gave rise to this faith. How then could the primitive apostles have remained essentially Jews, when, in direct opposition to the prevailing Jewish faith in a Messiah,

[1] Comp. Uhlhorn, *die moderne Darstellung des Lebens Jesu*, 1866, p. 12.

which had also been their own, they believed in a lowly and a crucified Messiah? If they were thus anti-Jewish in their Messianic faith, that cardinal article of the Jewish creed, what brought them to this faith, this rupture with Jewish prejudices? This is the point at which, without something analogous to what the Gospels narrate of the acts and resurrection of *Jesus*, of the marvellous impression made by His Person, and of His own teaching concerning His Divine dignity, the historical enigma baffles all solution. It is, however, a self-made mystery, which the Gospels explain in a natural, psychological and transparent manner. Least of all can the exalted eschatological utterances of Christ concerning His own Person be, with even an appearance of historical justice, impugned; for the entire primitive Church, its Jewish no less than its Gentile portion, was filled with eschatological expectations, the central point of which was the appearing of Christ. If to this it is added that the Apocalypse, which is esteemed genuine by the Tübingen school, gives a most exalted representation of the majesty of Christ, speaks of Him as the Lamb who was slain for us, and in whose blood believers have washed their robes and made them white—in other words, speaks just as St. Paul does of the atoning death of Christ, of the rejection of that self-righteousness which feels no need of redemption, and of other matters; so rich a treasure of common faith between St. Paul and the primitive Apostles is exhibited, that Baur's hypothesis of their hostility falls to the ground. The original Apostles did not remain Jews, but became Christians, though at first they adhered more closely than St. Paul did to their Jewish nationality and the Jewish law. The supposed result of the long conciliatory process had already actually taken place in the association of the original Apostles with the Apostle Paul.[1] Finally, it was Christ Himself, and not "a process of the

[1] An unprejudiced mind, maintaining that high estimation of the character of St. Paul, which even Baur does not entirely deny, will never be able to understand by the "false brethren" (Gal. ii. 3) the original Apostles, nor to impute to St. Paul, who pronounces an anathema upon every other, and especially every Judaizing gospel (Gal. i. 8), that he nevertheless gave the right hand of fellowship to Judaizing Apostles (Gal. ii. 9). If he had done so, he would have been a greater dissembler than St. Peter, whom he reproved. He reproved him, moreover, because, though not at heart a Judaizer, he acted in a Judaizing manner (ii. 11-14). But perhaps the criticism of the nineteenth century is better acquainted with the opinions of St. Peter, than St. Paul was when he gave his testimony concerning them.

idea," nor this nor that apostle, who was the Founder of Christianity, the Founder in the first place of the faith of the apostles, a faith unanimous in all essential matters, because defined by the impression made by His Person in its entire self-manifestation.[1] Besides the impossibility of carrying out Baur's mode of constructing the early history of Christianity, a mode which creates new enigmas, and is involved in contradictions, the fact must be added that his hypotheses concerning the dates and authors of the books of the New Testament are regarded as extreme, even by a portion of his own school. His disciples, Volkmar, Köstlin, Hilgenfeld, hit upon the first century as the date of portions of the synoptical Gospels; while Ewald, and also Weiss and Holzmann, think the time before, and immediately after, the destruction of Jerusalem the period in which they were most probably produced. But this admission of their earlier date involves the view that the Gospels originated in a tendency, and implicates the apostles in the fictions supposed to be contained in them. That first step taken by Baur upon the soil of history—his declaration that the New Testament literature was an historical fact—required and involved, as we have seen, a second. The historical fact of the existence of Jewish and heathen Christians distinct from Judaism and heathenism, and forming, though not without internal differences, a unity, points irresistibly to the unity of a Founder, around whom both were gathered, though they gave, after their own manner, different impressions of the impulses they received from Him. Criticism was no longer able to take shelter, as it had so long attempted, under a skilfully maintained silence concerning Jesus Himself, which made it appear as though there were nothing positive, nothing certain, to be said concerning His Person. On the contrary, it was at last driven to attempt the solution of this problem which had been so often urged on the part of theology; and it was just a last attempt to avoid this, by transferring the main matter to a process *after* Christ, or to make it appear

[1] Even Baur confesses that Christianity was in Christ, but that a deep gulf separates the apostolic era from the life of Jesus (comp. Uhlhorn's before-named work). This may show a certain reverence for Christ's Person, but it not only makes His personal greatness impotent to produce decided effects upon others, though the fulness of the time was come, but represents even "the idea" itself as effecting but a vain work, if the treasures lavished upon Him could not really be transferred from Himself to mankind, and first of all to the apostles.

superfluous, which made the task of advancing from the first acknowledged fact of a duality of tendencies within primitive Christianity, to a second fact explanatory of the first, inevitable.

It is to Strauss that we are indebted for perceiving this; and in his new edition of the *Leben Jesu* "for the German people," he attempts to bring forward an historical and positive portraiture of Jesus as He really was.

In his first work he can scarcely be said, more than Baur, to have accomplished such a task: he had rather stated what Jesus could not have been, and had even, by this negative tone, exposed himself to the deserved reproof, on the part of Baur, that he had given a criticism of the Gospel history without a criticism of the Gospels themselves. He may now, on the contrary, with equal justice, reproach Baur with having *given a criticism of the Gospels without a criticism of the Gospel history* (id. p. 98). The results arrived at by Baur's criticism of the Gospels, which is essentially adopted by Strauss, necessarily involves farther historical conclusions; and Baur's standpoint can no longer, by withdrawing Christ into the region of the mysterious, elude that application of those conclusions which forms, at the same time, an unanswerable test. The idealistic period of thirty years since had lost the feeling for real history, and was contented with a history of the formation of "ideas," though even this, if it is to lead to any established results, must also fall back at last upon facts. But what a revolution had taken place, what an alteration of feeling had been introduced in the interval, by the revival, nay, the sway of the feeling for accurate investigation both in nature and history! The tendency of the age, from being philosophical and inclined to *à priori* construction, had become empirical; and even in theology the numerous investigations of historical details, the various monographs and the arduous labours in New Testament theology and criticism of documents, showed traces of a return to the same path and method.[1] It was this newly-awakened craving that Strauss desired to meet in his new edition of his *Leben Jesu*, and in doing so he pushed Baur's standpoint beyond its own limits.

[1] In the place of an idealism which avoided history, the endeavour was now frequently made to resolve even systematic theology into history, and that not merely, after the manner of Hase or Schleiermacher, into a description of present or past faith, but into a history of the past acts of God, which, if consistently carried out, would again transfer us to the stage of a mere *fides historica*.

It was not indeed in Germany, but in France, that negative criticism first gave up its affected non-knowledge of the Person and history of Jesus, and set itself to attain a concrete and real portraiture of His character. Renan admits the synoptical Gospels, whose antiquity he places at its usual date, and partially even that of St. John, to be historical documents. *But by bringing these narratives into so near proximity to the facts, he takes a step the portentous result of which is that he can only carry out his denial of the miraculous and the supernatural in the appearance of Jesus, at the expense of the character of Jesus and that of the Apostles.* He acknowledges that the origin of Christianity must be sought in Christ. If, however, He was the Founder of the Church, He could not have been simply a moral teacher, that impression of Him which is reflected in the Church demanding a personal and mental phenomenon of an overpowering kind, combined with a life corresponding thereto. Renan perceives also that the Christian faith in the Divine majesty of Jesus which the Apostles already possessed cannot be explained, unless by the admission that Jesus Himself gave rise to it by His own testimony to His Divine nature, and the claims He made to be the Son of God. Jesus is in his view a highly endowed "colossal" genius, filled at first with pure impulses, but who subsequently, when He met with opposition, contended against it by a gloomy fanaticism and undue self-exaltation, nay, who even advanced, for the sake of gaining adherents, to a frantic attempt at self-deification, to a participation in falsehood and deception, and who at last perished just at the right time.

Renan's step in advance is one in appearance only. He gives, indeed, a history of the life of Jesus, drawn in many of its details with much vigour and distinctness, but one which is, on the whole, romantic, capricious, nay replete with fictions, and which places Him on a level with other Eastern founders of religions, such as Buddha, Mani, and Mahomed.

Strauss avoids this romantic element. He regards the character of Jesus as being, in an historical and religious light, a higher union of the Hellenic and the Judaic spirit. "He derived his purely spiritual and moral representation of the One God from his Jewish education. To this was added the purity of his own nature. The Hellenic feature in his character was the cheerful activity arising from the joyousness and gladness

of His excellent disposition." Jesus appears to him to have been of a radically excellent nature, otherwise the scars of the conflicts He had gone through, a touch of the discordant, the harsh or the gloomy, would have appeared in his case as in that of a Paul, an Augustine, or a Luther. On the contrary, Jesus demanded, in opposition to the gloomy and servile feeling of Judaism and its self-righteousness, the affections of the heart. He thought of and knew God, not as the wrathful, jealous, and punishing Jehovah, but as a kind and long-suffering Father (Matt. v. 45), *i.e.* as of a moral disposition similar to His own, in the most exalted moments of His religious life. "Jesus, by cultivating a cheerful disposition, at peace with God, and by embracing all men as brethren, realized in Himself the prophetic ideal of a new covenant with the law written in the heart. To speak with the poet, He received the Godhead into His will; hence, in His case, the Godhead descended from the throne of the universe, the abyss was filled up, the fearful vision vanished. His nature had only to be developed from itself, to become conscious of itself with increasing distinctness and certainty, and needed not to be converted, or to begin a new life." Hence the fundamental thoughts of His religion were humanity, gentleness, toleration; he transferred the contemplations of heathen philosophers into religion. But all this, according to Strauss, is nevertheless only preliminary to the still future and greater perfection of human development. For Jesus was not free from isolated instances of vacillation and error; but, besides this, even if in the pattern which *he exhibited in His life and teaching*, everything relating to the love of God and one's neighbour, to individual purity of life and heart, were clearly and fully developed, still the true feeling for the state, for trade, for art, and for the pleasures of life, was absent in Jesus, and it is in these particulars that, according to Strauss, completion is needed.[1] Nay, the time is to be hoped for, in which the delusion of a supernatural, a personal God ranking above the world, and operating in it by His Spirit, will be overcome.[2]

Such is essentially what Strauss regards as historically established concerning the Person of Jesus Himself as a founder of religion. Such are the results he obtains from the ascertained facts of His public ministry and His fate, from the influence of

[1] *Ibid.* p. 626. [2] *Ibid.* dedication, p. ix., preface, p. xix.

His life and teaching upon the people, and from His conflict with the different Jewish parties. But, mindful of Baur's censure with respect to historical documents, he now, for the sake of getting rid of all supernatural elements, helps himself freely and according to fancy to Baur's hypothesis of the post-apostolic authorship of the New Testament and of the tendency which its writers had in view—a procedure which really approximates him to Renan. He confesses[1] "to having, in consequence of the proofs adduced by Baur—*who puts the notion of tendency in the place of that of myth*—allotted more space than formerly to the view of conscious and intentional fiction." And, in fact, it is not conceivable that subsequent *involuntary* fiction could have fashioned such circumstantial narratives with all their details of times, places, and names. Baur is certainly in the right when he says, that the only choice left is between intentional fiction composed with a tendency, and the admission of the actual authenticity of the narrative. But in saying this, Baur—though agreeing with Strauss in the conclusion that the gospels are not history because of their supernatural character—is already *commencing the destruction of the mythical explanation*, while Strauss, by helping himself to Baur's labours, is unfaithful to the fundamental thought of his first work, and confesses the impossibility of carrying it out. Compared with the prosaic, nay, coarse accusation of voluntary and designing fiction, in other words, of fraud, on the part of the writers of the New Testament, the mythic theory wore an agreeable, a flattering, nay, a poetic appearance. But now that it is necessary to come to closer quarters with history the charm disappears, the mythic theory disperses, and *there remains only the alternative between fiction with a tendency, and truth.* Strauss, indeed, seeks to mask this retreat, this retrograde movement to the position of the Fragmentist, by saying[2] that fiction may also be called myth if it is subsequently believed. He insists upon still calling his view the mythical *in this altered sense*, and surrounds the simple stem of his merely natural history of Jesus with groups of myths, resulting in part from involuntary fiction, and in part from intentional fabrication. Thus he regards the whole of the narrative preceding Christ's public ministry as being—apart from certain scanty historical allusions—a tissue of doctrinal notions.[3] In the

[1] *Ibid.* p. 158. Compare p. 99. [2] *Ibid.* p. 159. [3] *Ibid.* p. 402.

public life of Jesus, he considers the narrative of His relations to the Baptist, as recorded in the gospels, to have been fashioned with a tendency.[1] He thinks that John, indeed, administered to Jesus the baptism of repentance, but neither inaugurated Him in His office, nor was His forerunner. The miracles are all mythical, some being wilful fabrications, others narratives of certain natural cures performed by Jesus. The Transfiguration, much of the history of the Passion, and the Ascension, are equally mythical, whether invented with or without a tendency. The resurrection, however, is based upon the subjective visions of the followers of Jesus. Thus we see that Strauss' *method* has become an eclectic one, and that he is driven to this by Baur, in like manner as he, on his part, by insisting on the necessity of a critical *Life of Jesus*, urges the latter beyond the attempt to deduce Christianity from a process after Christ, and onwards to a *founder*.

By the adoption of a post-apostolic origin of the Gospels, Strauss—as also Baur—holds himself aloof from the view of Renan, who makes no ceremony of supposing Jesus Himself to be the subject of delusions, and implicating the apostles in literary fictions. But this half-standpoint is scarcely tenable, even if the probable date of these writings is alone considered (see above, p. 414); and still less so, because the main question still is: Does the portrait of Christ, as sketched by Strauss, satisfy the just demands of science, and can Baur's criticism of the documents stand the tests which science would apply? Or has criticism not yet run its course by these performances, and is it, on the contrary, pressing towards a new phase?

The portrait of Christ drawn by Strauss, far from being satisfactory in an historical sense, is not even free from internal contradictions, or historically possible.

First of all, it is insufficient to explain the fact in question, viz. *the historical fact of Christianity and the Church.* The task of the historian is to find a sufficient cause for every effect. Now, Christianity exists among other religions, as the religion of reconciliation and peace. Hence he will have historically to account for that consciousness of peace and redemption which the Church possesses, and which has from the very first distinguished her from the heathen and the Jewish world. He must not

[1] *Ibid.* p. 403, &c. and 409.

ignore that *historical nature* of the Christian Church by which it is characterized as a redeemed community, neither may he violate in this instance the law of causality, by admitting an effect without a corresponding cause, while appealing to this same law of causality against the possibility of the supernatural. He will thus be led, by the Church's consciousness of redemption, to fall back upon *One* in whom the power of redemption must have dwelt. But this Strauss does not do. That he thinks he may disregard this nature of the Christian Church, is proved by the fact that he treats the holiest and most certain experience of Christendom, viz. that of having found redemption in Christ, as non-existent. Thus, as far as in him lies, he denies the Christian Church, as that which it actually is, instead of attempting to account for it historically. The explanation of this may be partly found in his lax view of sin, and his naturalistic treatment of morality. It is this which makes it seem possible to him that one born free should proceed from a race of sinners under the bondage of the Law, this which enables him to overlook the need of reconciliation with God, a need which does not indeed exist where the highest attribute of God is said to be a kindness indifferent to the distinction between good and evil.

Again: it must be reckoned among the best-established data of history that this characteristic of the Christian religion points to its *Founder*, to His ministry, and to His own statements. It is utterly inconceivable that the post-apostolic era should, as all admit, have regarded Him as the Mediator between God and man, and as the Redeemer, if such had not been already, as even the Apocalypse shows, the tenor of *apostolic* preaching. And, further, such could not have been the preaching of the Apostles, the preaching for which they lived and suffered, unless *Jesus Himself* had declared Himself to be the reconciler of mankind, and the Redeemer from sin, guilt, and death, and had in this sense required faith in His Person, as a religious act, because such faith was the powerful means of bestowing peace through the Holy Spirit upon His Church. If this, however, is settled, it is fruitless to deny that the Apostles, nay, Christ Himself, are implicated in those statements which glorify Him, by relegating the New Testament literature to a later and post-apostolic period; and thus the motive for assigning to it a late date, in opposition to external

evidence, for the most part disappears. To this must be added, as Strauss himself admits, that the eschatological expectations which animated the primitive Church, and even its Jewish portion, undoubtedly arose from Christ's own statements concerning His return in the glory of the Father for the resurrection and judgment of the whole world. By these, as well as by the former statements, He placed Himself, as the Sinless One, in contrast to every other human being; for one who himself needed redemption could neither be the redeemer from sin nor the judge of the world. But if Jesus made these statements concerning Himself, as Strauss admits with regard to the eschatological expectations, and cannot deny with respect to His office of Redeemer, Strauss cannot escape the alternative, which leads to farther consequences, that either Christ was (as Renan does not hesitate to affirm) a fanatic, whose spiritual pride was even blasphemous; or that His statements were in consonance with his inmost consciousness and with truth.

Now, the moral and religious excellence of Christ being raised above all doubt, as even Strauss, according to what has been stated, admits, and self-knowledge and humility being, as every one knows, the basis of all vigorous, moral, and religious life, nay, growth in humility and in the consciousness of sin, where sin exists, being always proportionate to growth in religion and morality, Strauss' delineation of the character of Jesus cannot but be rejected as a self-contradiction, an historical impossibility, and a moral and religious monstrosity, inasmuch as it both insists upon His being thought of as a sinner, and yet is obliged to admit these exalted statements to be authentic. If He had been a sinner, and possessed of only an ordinary measure of humility, He could not possibly, against His own better knowledge, have ascribed to Himself sinlessness or even Divine Sonship, and have spoken of Himself with such boundless self-exaltation and falsehood. But He did make these statements concerning Himself. Hence it is not enough to concede to Him a surpassing moral and religious elevation, not wholly exempt from human weaknesses. It is the very nature of Christianity not to rest till it urges upon inquirers the last and extreme alternative. And this is: If He did not make these statements because they were true, He is a blasphemer, who would build up the Kingdom of God after having destroyed its very foundations

in Himself. This reduces the decision to a simple one, which may be confidently left to the moral and religious feeling of every unprejudiced mind.

Thus negative criticism, beginning with the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist, irresistibly hastens to complete its circle. If the above mentioned *statements* of Jesus concerning *Himself* cannot be denied, it is a trifle to concede also, as Renan readily does, that He made Himself the *Son of God*, not merely in an official but also in an ontological sense, or one which had respect to His essential nature. For in saying this, Jesus did but attribute to Himself that which was the alone sufficient foundation for the predicates He appropriated. In saying this, He did but specify the inmost source of that image of Christ held forth—to omit mention of others—by Paul, and in the Apocalypse. If, in His case, fanaticism and undue self-exaltation overstepped all human boundaries, there is absolutely no reason for denying that the faith of His followers in His Divine nature and majesty must have originated in His own declarations to that effect. In fact every motive for denying that the life of Jesus, and His statements concerning Himself, as contained in the New Testament, were recorded by the apostles, and for asserting them to have been the production of a later age, has then disappeared.

If we look forward to what will, in the nature of things, be the further development of that latest phase of modern negative criticism, in which Renan has somewhat the start, it is evident that the whole mythical hypothesis, even in that wider signification, according to which earlier or later disciples of Jesus are said to have allowed themselves to compose fictions with a tendency, which were subsequently believed, falls to the ground and becomes worthless, so far as the main question is concerned. If *Jesus Himself* affirmed concerning *Himself* the very utmost that could be stated, whether by the involuntary fiction or voluntary invention of his followers, it is a vain and almost meaningless inquiry whether the Church may not have fabricated certain lesser details for the embellishment of His image; and it is a matter of even greater indifference whether this were done purposely or not. Thus the mythical view, even in its more modern form, the moment it sets foot upon the ground of the actual history of Christ's words and deeds, begins to destroy its own foundations and to bring on its own crisis, and, though no

Penelope, to unravel the web it had itself woven. This its latest phase must moreover be its last. For if once it returns in essential matters to its first and older form, namely that of the Fragmentist, which opposes every moral, religious, and historical feeling, its sentence is passed, its course run. At first it endeavoured to keep aloof from the Fragmentist by interposing so lengthened a period between Jesus and His apostles, and the time when the gospels were written, as to be able to represent them as innocent of their contents. But historical common sense will be increasingly convinced that the apostles cannot but be regarded, as we have already shown, as implicated in the most important of those statements which the mythic theory attributes to involuntary fiction, or to fiction written with a tendency—because tradition could never have assumed such a form at the end of the century, if that which the apostles delivered had been entirely opposed thereto—nay, that the most exalted statements found concerning Jesus in the gospels must be referred to Himself. All this is, as has been said already, partly admitted by Strauss, and still more by Renan. Such admissions, however, lower very considerably the wall of partition between modern negative criticism and the Fragmentist. Indeed the difference between them now consists only in the fact that the former mingles a modicum of fanaticism with the supposed false self-exaltation of Jesus, and thus attributes to Him a certain amount of self-deception. But even this distinction cannot last long, partly on account of that lucidity of mind, that passionless tranquillity and moderation, which the portraiture of Jesus displays; and partly because His assertion that He, as the Sinless One, stood opposed in this respect to the whole race, must have been uttered against conscience and better knowledge, and could therefore have originated only in a deceitfulness that did not hesitate to deceive others for the sake of attaining its own aims, which in this case can only be conceived of as impure and selfish. This is actually to retreat entirely to the standpoint of the Fragmentist, so that the necessity of either advancing or retreating is in this case inexorable.[1]

[1] A. Schweizer, Keim, Weizmann, Ritschl, and others, as well as Ullmann, embracing Christ's sinless perfection—which even Schenkel admits—draw the inevitable conclusion of His miraculous origin, and show that that uniqueness of His

We have thus more closely considered the latest controversy affecting the central point of Christianity, in connection with the positions and progress of the chief ecclesiastical and theological parties. Having then hitherto followed the history of German theology, and considered its movements with regard to fundamental principles, we shall endeavour, in conclusion, to bring forward a short sketch of its present condition. We may thereby be convinced that, notwithstanding the serious contests just discussed, unanimity on the most important points has, on the whole, been to a very considerable extent reintroduced and maintained.

In doing this we shall be chiefly concerned to inquire whether *unity with the Reformation principle has been preserved*, in that regeneration of theology which began in the present century At the same time we shall not less anxiously ask whether any *acquisitions* can be shown in the way of profounder views, firmer establishment, and further development of this principle. If we are justified in answering both these questions in the affirmative, there can be no doubt that this *voluntary*, conscious, and more complete reunion with the Protestant principle must—after such storms as the Church has experienced—be so a strong proof of its intrinsic authority and Christian necessity, as may well fill us with confidence in the future of the Protestant Church, and in the vitality and fruitfulness of its principle.

This *principle itself* has indeed been frequently agitated even during the present century. It was necessary that the process should be repeated by which conviction of the indispensable necessity of embracing both its sides in their essential combination, and of overcoming all apparently possible divergences, had been arrived at.

The older rationalism took offence at the material principle, and only maintained its general tendency to mental certainty, while surrendering that evangelical matter which was

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connection with God, which they also acknowledge, leads of itself, when doctrinally utilized, beyond an Ebionite Christology, and at least to the economical or Sabellian doctrine of the Trinity. Schweizer strikingly says, in opposition to Idealism, that Christ separated from His idea is unhistorical and unreal, that if His Person can be distinguished from the idea in His state of humiliation, its correspondence with the idea is first absolutely effected in the state of glorification.

itself to furnish certainty of its truth, either subordinating the principle of Scripture to the subjective reason, or frittering away its meaning by criticism and exegesis. It was after the period during which this rationalism prevailed, that Delbrück again took up Lessing's not yet exploded question of *substituting* the apostolic symbol, or rule of faith, for the *principle of Scripture*, and was followed in this particular by Grundtvig and his school.[1] It was shown, however, that the apostolic symbol, or the Church's rule of faith, cannot be set up as formal principle instead of holy Scripture, unless ecclesiastical tradition and the authority of the Church are made the supreme principle in the authentication of all Christian truth, and the material principle is consequently desiccated and deprived of its independence. For if once binding authority is in principle vested in the Church, instead of in Christ and His apostles, it is mere arbitrariness to deny the same authority to its subsequent centuries and decisions—decisions by which the material principle, though required by the Canon, is not only impugned but denied. Hence the necessary consequence of such declension from the principle of Scripture, to that tradition which is to explain it, is a Catholicizing tendency, the extent of whose pretensions is ever increasing with respect to its power of securing reliable depositaries of genuine tradition, *i.e.* with respect to priesthood, ordination, the idea of the Church, the sacraments, &c.[2] When the conviction that there was a Christian necessity for acknowledging holy Scripture to be the formal principle once more prevailed, this acknowledgment was frequently made in such wise that the material principle only existed as the *chief doctrine* of holy Scripture, *i.e.* because, in its turn, holy Scripture *in nuce*,[3] or that

[1] Delbrück, *Phil. Melanchthon der Glaubenslehrer*, 1826; Grundtvig in the *Theologischen Monatschrift*, x. 122, &c., 133, &c. published by him in conjunction with Rudelbach.

[2] Compare the three theological epistles of Sack, Nitzsch, and Lücke, on the respect due to holy Scripture, and its relation to the rule of faith in the Protestant and in the primitive Church. Bonn, 1827. Also my treatise on the internal relation of the Protestant principles. *Theologische Mitarbeiten*, by Pelt, &c., iv. 3, 1841, p. 16, &c.; Martensen, *Til Forfvar mod den saakaldte Grundtvigianisme, Kjöbenhavn*, 1863; also his works, *I Anledning af Pastor Grundtvigs Oplysninger om Altarbogs-Daaben*, 1856, *Et Gjensvar i Striden om Altarbogs-Daaben*, 1856, *Apostlenes Inspiration*, 1863.

[3] As Kahnis still thinks; see his recent work, *Ueber die Principien des Protestantismus; Reformationsprogramm*, 1865.

holy Scripture in general was regarded as the whole and sufficient principle of Protestantism. This enabled Strauss to show, and not without success—though this might, since Schleiermacher, have been obvious to all—that the formal principle, if it stood alone, was an insufficient foundation. From this defensible position, however, he proceeded, besides attacking the Scriptural principle in general, to the assertion that even the material principle, together with the *Testimonium Spiritus S.*, could be no support of the formal, but must of itself necessarily lead to fanaticism.[1] Thus he, who had formerly bestowed upon holy Scripture a treatment which utterly ignored the saving contents of Christianity and of holy Scripture, among which the reconciliation and *justification* of man hold the first place, and who was therefore obliged *à priori* to deny also the external miracles of holy Scripture, now proceeded to isolate the *material principle* and to separate it from the formal. But while he was thus pursuing a policy of *Divide et impera*, which was not without the effect of agitating some, and driving many into the paths of a spurious ecclesiasticism, theology was turning with increasing certainty to a perception of the indissoluble combination of the two principles in their relative independence, and was applying herself to the task of showing that while neither of the two sides of the one Protestant principle is capable, if it stands alone, of furnishing all that is needed for the establishment of faith, and of the Church, each points through itself to the other, and secures and affords to the other that which it lacks; and therefore that their genuine union is proved to be the inseparable and energetic principle of Protestantism and of its theology.[2] It may be designated as the common conviction

[1] Strauss, *die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft*, 2 vols. 1840-1841, i. pp. 75-356, especially p. 282, &c.

[2] Schaff, *das Princip. des Protestantismus;* Chambersbury, 1845; Reuter, *Abhandl. zur syst. Theologie*, 1855. On the nature and duty of doctrinal proof, pp. 155-260, v. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, i. p. 1, &c.; Rothe, *zur Dogmatik*, 1863, p. 22, &c., in which it is remarked, in opposition to Schenkel, that when he opposes the duality of the principles, or sides of the principle, he overlooks the distinction between Protestant Christianity and the Protestant Church. Hence also Schenkel's attempt at improvement, by the addition of a third principle, namely that of the forming of a community, could meet with but little favour. Kahnis too, in his exhibition of *the principles of Protestantism* (Leipzig, 1865), finds in the

attained by modern theology,[1] that the two sides of the Protestant principle must, when viewed as distinct, receive equal acknowledgment; and that holy Scripture alone must not be regarded as the sole principle of Protestantism, whether after the old orthodox fashion by an appeal to that testimony of the Holy Spirit which is bound to holy Scripture, for the Divine authority of its form, or after the fashion of so-called biblical supernaturalism by an appeal to rational and historical demonstration. Also that, on the one hand, holy Scripture does of itself point to the believer, whose education it is intended to subserve, and who alone—other requisite qualifications existing—is competent to the task of interpretation and critical investigation of what is truly canonical and normative; while, on the other hand, evangelical faith is in need of holy Scripture both for its origin and its continuance and assured increase in strength and knowledge; that it needs it also that its consciousness may be historically acute, removed from the danger of subjectivism and imagination—a consciousness which may, on the contrary, be regarded as subjectively objective. It may farther be reckoned a common conviction—though some still continue to attempt a demonstration of Christianity, by means especially of historical proofs addressed to the understanding, after the manner of the

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nature of Protestantism three principles, viz., Scripture, the principle of salvation (fellowship with God), and the principle of the Church (p. 20). This last cannot be accounted a principle in the same way as the other two, because it is not characteristic of Protestantism as such, but is, according to the evangelical notion of the Church, one of the effects of the principle. Notwithstanding this, Kahnis now arrived at those results of mine to which he was formerly opposed, on which account I can well pass by his remaining misconceptions and inaccuracies. J. Beck (*Einleitung in das System der christlichen Lehre*, 1838, *Christliche Lehrwissenschaft*, i. 1, 1840), who has done such distinguished service, by promoting a reverent love for holy Scripture, gives, on the other hand, to the principle of Scripture too indifferent a position with respect to history and the Church. His views evidently afford no room for criticism, and he leaves the material principle as devoid of self-support, and as dependent upon holy Scripture, as was done in the early days of old orthodoxy.

[1] A conviction only strengthened by means of the recent discussions concerning the doctrine of justification. For the attacks upon this doctrine, directed from the self-styled Lutheran camp, could not but evoke the strongest reaction on the part of evangelical consciousness, and impel to fresh and deeper apprehension thereof. When this is attained, a process of purification commencing from within, and extending thence to externals, will have been effected, and those Romanizing views and practices which have crept in expunged.

old English evidences—that, to use the words of Twesten,[1] it is not possible to prove, independently of Christian faith, that there is a Divine revelation, and that this is deposited in holy Scripture, nor can such proof be the foundation of faith; and also that the method which would build upon a supposed self-evidencing theory of revelation and inspiration, as though it were a matter of knowledge that which is a matter of faith, and therefore rests upon an entirely different basis in the human mind, was that which had been opposed by Lessing in the controversy with Göze, which had called forth such objections, and exposed Christianity to such attacks, as those of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist. Such convictions imply that theology must not, as has been so long the case, act as if the very first thing to be evoked were faith in the normative authority or inspiration of holy Scripture, or of the apostles, but faith in Christ as the Redeemer, in other words, experience of justification before God through faith in Him. This it is which holy Scripture, as a means of grace, and as the documentary history of Christ, helps either directly or indirectly to produce; and this it also is which, when it has attained Divine assurance of the salvation to be found in Christ, cannot but ascribe with willing submission a normative authority to the apostles of Christ, and to their writings, through which alone reliable information concerning Him has been transmitted to us, nay, which still form part of the original facts of revelation. For the "word," or the perfect revelation of God, must either be contained in the memorials of the apostolic era, or be no longer found anywhere with certainty. It is however to be found; for the saving contents of holy Scripture accredit themselves, through the agency of the Holy Spirit, as that genuine truth which, being destined to be a blessing to the whole human race, can never be wholly lost to it. Besides, since it is on those truths of holy Scripture which are *necessary to salvation*, and which must have been delivered to mankind in their purity by the apostles, that faith lays hold, the existence and growth of faith are independent of such questions as whether holy Scripture is in other matters also—such as purity of diction, style, description of the historical stage upon which revelation appeared, &c.—raised above all imperfection and inaccuracy. For divine and self-conscious faith has a more

[1] Twesten, *Vorlesungen*, &c. i. 286, &c. 19, &c.

important object to contemplate, and possesses far more in the sacred authors when it feels the union of the Divine and human spirit realized in them, and recognizes in their writings the pulsations of a human heart, than if it were to regard them as the merely passive speaking-trumpets of Heaven, and their writings as the codex of Divine law. Hence, evangelical faith may fearlessly allow its full rights to *criticism* and to an *exegesis* now no longer under tutelage. To criticism—for it is just as much a matter of conscience to faith to regard nothing as normative which cannot accredit itself as canonical, as it is, on the other hand, to submit to the normative authority of every book to which such authority belongs. Genuine criticism can never renounce the sway of faith, but is, on the contrary, as has been shown above, bound by that vital law which ever requires its acknowledgment of historical documents, if it is to carry on historico-critical operations, instead of expatiating upon that which is devoid of all foundation. Criticism is, moreover, itself conditioned by faith, while faith maintains a relative independence with respect to criticism; for the fact of salvation experienced by faith cannot be made untrue by any critical conclusions whatever. Criticism is conditioned by faith, partly for the sake of the interpretation of documents, partly because without faith the correct eye for perceiving when a biblical book "does not deal in Christ," or when anything in it contradicts that Gospel which has proved its power to accredit itself to the heart, would be wanting. Since, however, such decisions of believing criticism must ever fall back upon the mutual support and independence of the different elements of the Canon, it follows that the work of theological criticism, especially in so far as it touches upon doctrinal matters, must always at last become a criticism, or a measuring, of Scripture by Scripture—in other words, the self-criticism of the Canon through the instrumentality of believing inquirers. And this is a work which must be beyond almost any other, a wholesome incentive to the attainment of a profounder acquaintance with Scripture, for the purpose of increasingly exhibiting the internal harmony and consistency of Christianity, as well as the abundance of its treasures under every aspect. So also, with respect to *exegesis*, it is admitted both that the laws of language, that grammatical and philological interpretation must form its immovable basis,

and that the exegete must be as mentally homogeneous with the author whom he would explain, as is universally required in the case of a profane author, *e.g.*, of a poet. But the exegete can be homogeneous with the Christian documents only through Christian faith, the theological element in interpretation; and if this be present there is no need of an ecclesiastical rule of faith as a standard for exegesis; nay, it is in faith that the *Analogia fidei* will be found in true and vigorous existence, and it is faith which will conduce to the discovery of that *analogia Scripturæ sacræ* which is to be attained by the *self-interpretation* of Holy Scripture.

It may be said that, in all these respects, modern German theology and its literature exhibit a more flourishing stage of exegesis than has existed in any previous age of the Christian Church, and that catholic theology also has its share in the same. Not only have the laws of interpretation been strictly investigated, and a science deserving the name of hermeneutics formed out of hitherto unconnected good rules;[1] not only have those auxiliary sciences of exegesis, history, geography,[2] and *philology* been greatly advanced by a comparison of the dialects, an investigation of the lexicology of the New Testament, and of the laws of Hebrew, Chaldee, and especially of New Testament

[1] After Bretschneider (1806), Keil and Griesbach, Lücke edited (1817) a sketch of New Testament hermeneutics and its history for academical lectures, as also (1838) Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics and Criticism with special reference to the New Testament; while Clausen and Wille wrote on the (1843) hermeneutics of the New Testament, and Lutz (1849) on biblical hermeneutics. When Olshausen (*Ein Wort über tieferer Schriftsinn*, 1824; *Die biblische Auslegung, noch ein Wort über tieferer Schriftsinn*, 1825) and R. Stier (*Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständniss im Ganzen und Einzelnen*, 1824) again advocated, though in a new aspect, a multiplicity of meanings in holy Scripture, and, together with Meyer of Frankfort, demanded a mystical interpretation besides the literal meaning, they were opposed from many quarters, because that which was justifiable in their demand seemed secured by the above-described theological exposition. Germar proposed a pan-harmonic interpretation of Scripture, Schleswick, 1821, and recommended it in 1828 and subsequently.

[2] Comp. Winer, *biblisches Realwörterbuch*, 2 vols. ed. 3, 1847. Keil's *biblische Archäologie*, 1859; *die Archäologie A. T.* by De Wette, 1814, 1842, and Ewald, 1844. Bähr's *Symbolik des mosaischen Cultus*, 2 vols., 1837-39. And the monographs of George, Hengstenberg, Kurtz, and Baur on festivals, sacrifice, circumcision, &c.; also the geographical works of K. Ritter, *Erdkunde*, pt. 15, 1, and K. v. Raumer, 1835, ed. 4, 1860, *über Palästina* and Kieperi's *Bibelatlas* in 8 maps.

grammar;[1] not only has excellent service been rendered towards the settlement of the original text, especially of the New Testament, by a series of labours as meritorious as they have been arduous;[2] but exposition also, especially that of the New Testament, has, during the last forty years, received an extraordinary impulse. The numerous excellent commentaries which we now possess on almost all the books of the Bible form a treasury of scriptural information and exposition, which not only furnishes an ever increasing corroboration of the fundamental evangelical views of Christian doctrine,[3] but contains also a multitude of germs and incitements for a freer and more copious elaboration of the evangelical principle, in doctrinal, moral, and practical respects.

The results of all these labours, collected as they are in the modern and now important science of the types of New Testament doctrine,[4] lead, by the very similarity and diversity of these types

[1] Winer, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms*, 1822, ed. 6, 1855; Al. Buttmann, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch*, 1859; and the works of Schleusner, 1792; Wahl, 1822, 1843; Bretschneider, 1824, ed. 3, 1840; Wilke, 1839, &c., 2 vols.; Schirlitz and Dalmer (1859) on the lexicology of the New Testament.

[2] Since the older editions of the Old Testament by Buxtorf, 1611; Jablonsky, 1699; van der Hooght, 1705; Michaelis, 1720; Houbigant, 1753; J. Simonis, 1752, &c.; Kennicott, 1776, 1780, no new acquisitions of any importance have been made in the modern editions of the text by Kahn, Theile, and Rudolph Stier. The text of the LXX. still requires much critical revision. All the more has however been effected with regard to the New Testament by the help of the Patristic (Lachmann), and the recent codices (*Codex Ephraem.* and *Sinaitic.*) of Tischendorf. Knapp, Schott, Lachmann, Göschen, Theile, Ph. Buttmann, and Tischendorf's, are good editions, Reiche's *Comment. criticus in N. T.* 3 parts, 1853 (uncompleted), is also a meritorious work.

[3] Besides those mentioned above p. 393, may also be named the critical and exegetical commentary on the New Testament of H. A. W. Meyer, distinguished for its sound criticism, as well as for a critical revision of the text. . This, like Rückert's commentary on Galatians and Romans, is a work of much philosophical accuracy. The same quality also marks Harless's commentary on Ephesians, ed. 2, 1858. The works of Stier and Olshausen, and Lange's Bibelwerk, though lacking this accuracy, are copious and thoughtful. The exegetical labours also of Philippi, Delitzsch, Luthardt, Lünemann, Huther, Düsterdieck, deserve mention. For the Old Testament we have, on the one side, the works of Drechsler, Keil, and Kurz, on the other those of Berthean, Thenius, Hitzig, Hupfeld, Ewald, Gesenius, J. Olshausen; and finally those of v. Hofmann, Beck, Auberlen, Schlottman, Diestel, and Sommer.

[4] After the works on biblical theology of Baumgarten-Crusius, 1828, and Dan. v. Cölln, ed. Dav. Schulz, 1836, on divinity, of De Wette, 1831, and Lutz, 1847, appeared Schmid's excellent work, *Biblische Theologie N. T.*, ed. Weizsäcker, ed.

of doctrine, onwards towards that fruitful notion of the mutual support and independence of the different elements of the Canon. Now distinction as well as union being indispensable to organization, the prerequisite was thus obtained for substituting in place of that former unhistorical view of holy Scripture which regarded the whole as uniform, accumulated passages taken at random from all parts of the Canon, and made the sacred books nothing more than an aggregate held together by that Divine signature which was common to them all, a view of holy Scripture and sacred history which was at once more vivid, historical, and organic, which entered more deeply into the matter of the Divine facts

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3, 1864. Messner treated on the teaching of the apostles, 1856; and G. L. Hahn undertook a theology of the New Testament, 1854. Neander also discussed the whole system of the New Testament in his history of the foundation and progress of the apostolic Church; as also Reuss in his *Geschichte der h. Schriften N. T.*, 1842, ed. 2, 1853, and in the *Histoire de la theol. chrétienne au siècle apostolique*, 2 vols. 1852, ed. 2, 1860. Baur, *Vorlesungen über neutestamentliche Theologie*, 1864, ed. Ferd. Fr. Baur, 1864. Numerous monographs have besides appeared on the separate doctrinal views of the New Testament, *e.g.* on St. James by Kern and Schneckenburger; on St. Peter by Meyerhoff and Weiss; on St. Paul by Usteri (1824), Dähne, Schrader, Baur (*Paulus*, 1845), Lipsius (the doctrine of justification); on the epistle to the Hebrews by Riehm (2 vols. 1858-59); on St. John by Fromman, R. Köstlin, Weiss. Biblical psychology was treated after Magn. Fr. Roos by Tob. Beck, 1843, and Delitzsch, 1855, ed. 2, 1861. The life of Christ was written on after Herder, Hess, Reinhard, Greiling, H. E. G. Paulus, and the authors mentioned p. 373, by Hase, 1829, ed. 4, 1854; Weisse (*die evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet*, 2 vols. 1838); Ammon (*die Geschichte des Lebens Jesu*, 3 vols. 1842-47); Theile, Lange (*das Leben Jesu nach dem Evangelium dargestellt*, 3 vols. 1844-48); Ebrard, *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelische Geschichte*, 2 vols. 1842, ed. 2, 1850); Lichtenstein, *Lebensgeschichte des Herrn Jesu Christ in chronologischer Uebersicht*, 1856; W. Hoffman, *Leben Jesu*, 1838-39; Kern, *die Hauptsachen des Lebens Jesu in der Tüb. Zeitschr.*, 1838. Ullmann, *Historisch oder mythisch?* 1838. *Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu*, ed. 7, 1863. Also, for general readers, in the writings of Krabbe, 1839, Stirm (*Apologie*, ed. 2, 1856), Jul. Hartmann, 1837, &c., A. Francke, 1838, Riggenbach, 1856, M. Baumgarten, 1859. The chief works on the apostolic age are, besides that of Neander, those of Rothe, *die Anfänge der christlichen kirche*, i. 1837; Gfrorer, Schwegler, after his own fashion (*das nachapostolische Zeitalter*, 1846, 2 vols.; Wieseler, *Chronologie des apostolischen Zeitalters bis zum Tode der Apostel Paulus und Petrus*, 1848); Schaff, *Geschichte der apostolischen Kirche*, ed. 2, 1854; Lechler, *das apostolische und nachapostolischer Zeitalter*, 1853-54; W. Baumgarten, *die Apostelgeschichte oder der Entwicklungsgang der Kirche von Jerusalem nach Rom.*, 1852, ed. 2, 1859, 2 vols.; Thiersch, *die Kirche im apostolischen Zeitalter und die Entstehung der neutestamentlichen Schriften*, 1852, ed. 2, 1858; and Ewald, *Geschichte des apostolischen Zeitalters bis zur Zerstörung Jerusalems* (the 6th part of his *Geschichte Israels*), ed. 2, 1858.

their distinction and intimate connection. It is thus increasingly perceived that the thoughts of God concerning man's salvation, as communicated to us in holy Scripture, form an organic whole, composed of different members, and the subject of an historical progress. In this sense and style it is, that the best modern masters of exegesis are fellow-labourers in a BIBLICAL THEOLOGY, which though it remains, indeed, an historical science, and is by no means capable of supplying the place of divinity and ethics, would hold up before these branches of knowledge, which form in a narrower sense the systematic course of theological instruction, that genuine and in many respects fuller model which is to be their standard. The normative importance of holy Scripture is being realized, and justice increasingly rendered to the claims of the formal principle of the Reformation, by the successful progress made in the construction of that biblical theology which must, as *material canonics*, take its stand beside formal canonics, *i.e.* the doctrine of the age, genuineness and integrity of the books of holy Scripture. This material canonics has both the right and the power to exercise a salutary and invigorating reaction upon the many vacillations into which formal canonics (or the "introductory science," as it has been called) is still frequently betrayed.[1] (Comp. above, pp. 415, 419, *sq.*).

It has been already remarked (p. 394) that theology had comparatively neglected the Old Testament. The old orthodox identification of the Old with the New Testament was followed by the rationalistic view which treated the religion of the Old Testament as a power uncongenial with, or indifferent towards, Christianity, and sought to explain the fundamental law of the Old Testament in particular, by mere respect to neighbouring nations and religions, or by the peculiar idiosyncrasy of Israel. This was done either in Spencer's manner (see above, p. 61), by ascribing it to Divine policy in the interest of monotheism, or, as

[1] Comp., *e.g.* with respect to the Old Testament, Hengstenberg's introduction, *Beiträge zur Einleitung ins A. T.* 3 vols. 1831-1839; Keil's *Lehrbuch der hist. krit. Einleitung in die canonischen Schriften des A. T.* 1868 (translated in *Foreign Theological Library*); on the other hand de Wette's *Beiträge zur Einleitung ins A. T.* 1870, or the critical works of Ewald, Hupfeld, and Riehm; and with respect to the New Testament, not to mention the extreme negative tendency, the still continuing controversy as to whether the Gospel of St. John or that of St. Mark, as many are now inclined to think, or that of St. Matthew, as Baur and Strauss insist, is to be considered the most trustworthy.

by J. D. Michaelis of Göttingen, to human legislative wisdom. The miracles and predictions by which the history of Old Testament revelation is accompanied, were got rid of by referring them to orientalisms or poetical language. A purely empirical view of the people and literature of the Old Testament, on the plea of judging of the Old Testament according to its own merits, and of being for this purpose unfettered by any kind of doctrinal prepossession, placed its internal connection with the New Testament, the monotheism of each perhaps excepted, entirely in the background. It cannot be denied that great progress has been made through the diligence and distinguished talents which many famous scholars have devoted to the fundamental work of understanding the text of the Old Testament. Gesenius has not only transformed its lexicology by the copious employment of other dialects, but has also, as well as Rödiger, rendered important service in Hebrew and Chaldee grammar. Ewald, endowed with an innate feeling for the spirit and organic constitution of oriental tongues, has given a still more rational form to Hebrew grammar; while J. Olshausen and Hupfeld are distinguished by the accuracy and acuteness of their philological observations. Progress has also been made in the exegesis of the Old Testament, and settled results to a great extent arrived at. This is shown by the commentaries of Rosenmüller, Kuinöl, and Maurer, and still more by the works of Gesenius, de Wette, and especially Ewald; also by the compendious exegetical handbook to the Old Testament, the Apocrypha included, 1841-61, in which, besides Hitzig, Bertheau, Knobel, Olshausen, Thenius, and Hirzel were fellow-labourers; while A. F. Fritzsche and Grimm treated on the Apocrypha. Also by the numerous recent commentaries on Genesis (by Bohlen, Thiele, Tuch, Knobel, Delitzsch), the many critical works on Genesis or on the whole Pentateuch by Bleek, De Wette, Ewald, Bertheau, Stähelin, Hupfeld, and Riehm; and on the other side by Kurtz (Genesis), Schulz (Deuteronomy), Ranke, Hävernick, Keil, and especially Hengstenberg (*Authentie des Pentateuch u. A.*). Likewise by the commentaries on Isaiah, by Gesenius, Knobel, Hendewerk, Umbreit, Hitzig, Ewald, Drechsler, and others, with treatises on different portions of the same book in Hengstenberg's Christology of the Old Testament (3 vols. ed. 2, 1854-56, translated in *Foreign Theological Library*), by Caspari, Stier, Kleinert, and others; on Jeremiah by Hitzig,

Umbreit, Nägelsbach, and Neumann; on Ezekiel by Hitzig and Hävernick; on Daniel, by Hitzig and Lengerke; and on the other side, by Hävernick, Auberlen (with reference to the Apocalypse, ed. 2, 1856, translated), as well as the portions respecting this book in Hengstenberg's Christology of the Old Testament, and especially in Bleek's treatise on Daniel. The poetical books of the Old Testament have been translated and explained by Ewald.[1] The Psalms in particular have been expounded by De Wette, Hitzig, Hupfeld (in 3 vols., 1856-61), J. Olshausen, 1853, Tholuck, Baihinger, Kramer, Hengstenberg (in 4 vols., 1850-52), and Delitszch (in 2 vols., 1867), translated into English, 1871; the Book of Job, by Umbreit, Ewald, Hirzel, Baihinger, Schlottmann, and Hahn; while Hengstenberg, Simson, Oehler, and others have also discussed the fundamental idea of this book. Solomon's Song was, after Herder, treated on by Kaiser, Ewald, Meier, Hitzig, Umbreit, Delitzsch, Hahn, and Hengstenberg.

The very names, however, which we have thus brought forward by way of examples from the recent copious literature of the Old Testament point to the great, and as yet unsettled, disputes which run through the whole of this branch of science. These relate both to questions of criticism—such as *e.g.* those concerning the Elohistic and Jehovistic records and their relation to Moses, the composition and authorship of the Pentateuch, especially of Deuteronomy, the authenticity of the second part of Isaiah and of parts of Zechariah and Daniel[2]—and also to questions of interpretation. All these differences, however, evidently spring from the different views of *the Old Testament religion and its history* with which these questions are approached by different individuals, and would be substantially rectified by the genuine historical view of the Old Testament if once it could be obtained and become common property.

And hopeful beginnings are not wanting. We still suffer indeed from the after-effects of the identification of the Old and New Testaments of a former period. For some, in their opposition to such a view, regard with indifference the internal connection of the two Testaments, and acknowledge scarcely

[1] *Die Dichter des alten Bundes.* New edit. 4 vols. 1854.

[2] Oehler, Bleek, and Dillmann are among the most impartial of critics. *Ueber die Bildung der Sammlung heiliger Schriften A. T., Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1858, p. 419, &c.

more than an external one.[1] Others still insist upon identifying the two Testaments, as much as possible,[2] whether, on the one hand, by explaining the Old Testament in a new Testament sense by means either of torturing the text, or of allegorical and mystical interpretations,[3] or, on the other, by suppressing all that is new in the New Testament, and making it nothing more than a purified Judaism.[4] Traces of this latter method often appear in combination with the former. Both parties, however, whether that which ignores the union between the Old and New Testaments, or that which would identify them in either of the above-described opposite modes, are, on the whole, affected by the same fundamental error, in other words, by the intellectualistic view of religion which prevailed in the times of old orthodoxy and biblical supernaturalism. For both assume it to be self-evident that religion is composed of doctrines or ideas. It is at this point that the neglect or contempt of the results obtained for the Church by Schleiermacher is avenged. It is here also, that a soil is deposited for those rationalistic elements which creep into the works of the staunchest supernaturalists, when treating of Old Testament subjects.

The supernaturalistic identification of the Old and New Testaments appears in a modified form in the older Tübingen school from Storr to Steudel.[5] Though Steudel, as well as his predecessor Hess, insists on Lessing's notion of a Divine education of the human race, as specially applicable to Israel, he yet makes this education consist merely in the gradual introduction of new doctrines, without bringing into view any development of knowledge, not to say any development of religion. Hengstenberg, on the contrary, recurring to the standpoint occupied by the supernaturalism of the older orthodoxy, not only endeavours, like Steudel, to exhibit general religious truths as common to both Testaments, but also to prove that those which are most peculiar to the New were already completed and established doctrines of

[1] So *e.g.* Eichhorn, De Wette, v. Cölln (*biblische Theologie*), Gesenius, Hitzig, Knobel; also Schleiermacher and many of his school.

[2] So, above all, Hengstenberg, on the other side, however, also Ewald.

[3] So *e.g.* Rud. Stier. (*Foreign Theological Library.*)

[4] So Ewald.

[5] Compare Oehler, *Prolegomena zur Theologie des A. T.*, 1845, p. 64, &c.; also his excellent remarks on Storr and Steudel (*Vorles. über Theologie des A. T.*, 1840).

the Old.[1] Ewald's labours have been devoted to a careful treatment of the external history of the people of Israel, the obscurities of which he has frequently cleared up, and to a restoration to their historical relations of many passages, especially from the Psalms and Prophets, which earlier theology had wrested from their actual connection, for the sake of referring them directly to the Messiah and His kingdom. But the internal and religious history of Old Testament development is not brought out by him. On the contrary, the religious matter of the Old Testament, the Messianic idea not excepted, dwindles in his writings into a few general abstract truths devoid of life or motion. He fails to perceive the progress of the history of revelation and its internal connexion with that national history which prepared for it. The true reason of this deficiency lies in the fact that he regards history in general, even with

[1] Comp. Oehler, *ibid.* p. 67, &c. Oehler continues: "This was required by this theologian's vigorous faith in revelation—a faith which denied all (?) the concessions made to rationalism—as well as by that tendency of his mind which urged him in all cases to final conclusions;" in proof of which he adduces that, in his treatises on the Divinity of the Messiah in the Old Testament and on the sufferings and death of Messiah in the Old Testament, the entire doctrine of the divine-human nature of Christ, and of an intrinsic distinction in the Divine nature, is transferred to the Old Testament, the only difference admitted being that these doctrines were there kept more in the background than in the New Testament. Hävernick also took up a similar standpoint in his Daniel, though in his case—as also in that of M. Baumgarten, in another fashion—a way was made for a more just appreciation of the difference between the Old and New Testament religions (comp. Hävernick's *Vorlesungen über die Theologie A. T.*). Hengstenberg also subsequently attempted to leave more room for an historical view of the Old Testament (see his work *die Bücher Moses und Ægypten*, 1841 (translated), and the concluding section of his *Christology of the Old Testament*, on the nature of prophecy, ed. 2, vol. 3, pp. 158-217). But even when he desists from showing a literal fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies, he still denies the admission of the *limited nature* of the Old Testament stage of revelation; and when he finds it impossible to carry out a literal interpretation, goes over to the "idealistic" treatment of the Old Testament. He thus makes prophecy nothing more than the symbolical covering of general eternal truths—a covering known to be such by the prophets, and the product of their conscious reflection. Comp. Oehler, *ibid.* p. 68. The bond of union between these two opposite methods is that zeal for formal evidence for which this theologian, like the older biblical supernaturalists, is distinguished. This it is which regards the chief labour of theology as completed, when the inspiration of the Old Testament is triumphantly maintained, and thereby favours a theory of inspiration in which the human element is so dwarfed that no more room is left for an actual history of the gradual development of revelation, which would need to be brought about by human instrumentality, than in those theories which diminish the Divine factor in favour of the human.

respect to Christianity, as a religious accessory, a mere means of communicating ideas and doctrines, but not as representing an integral aspect of the idea itself, viz. its saving reality. Hence he cannot recognize in the Old Testament, its history and literature, a growing preparation for the salvation of the New Testament. With regard to these opposite standpoints, however, we shall be constrained to say, with Oehler, that "the entire notion that the New Testament did but remove from the knowledge of truths contained in the Old Testament a certain imperfection of form is a wholly untenable one. It ascribes to the Old Testament *too much*, inasmuch as there is not a single scriptural doctrine which it does not view as fully disclosed in the Old Testament, and consequently as transferred, in an already mature state which required no farther development, to the New."[1] On the other hand, however, it would also be easy in this manner to ascribe too little to the Old Testament; for this view is always inclining to an idealistic evaporation of the concrete life of an ever-pulsating religion into abstract doctrines, and neglecting to follow with historic glance that movement towards a real union of God and man sought after in the Old Testament, and ever mutually carried on between heaven and earth. Hence, also, many of those germs contained in the Old Testament history which enable us to say that "there is in the New Testament no doctrine *entirely* new, but that, on the contrary, evangelical truth in its full extent and in all its parts, finds its fitting corresponding preparation in the Old Testament," are often unnoticed.

It may still cost much labour, and many conflicts may have to be waged, before this truth and the tasks it imposes are generally recognized. Theology, however, is evidently upon the right path towards the attainment of this end, and even the theologians already mentioned have, while pursuing other aims, furnished valuable contributions thereto. In Hengstenberg especially we have profound views of the holiness of God, of sin, of the law and its work in the heart of man. To this must be added another important element.

A higher, a vital, and an organic view of their history is now naturalized in almost all sciences. In this respect also, much is owing to Herder's suggestions, especially as concerns the history

[1] Oehler, *ibid.* p. 66, &c.

of religions. He regarded, indeed, even the Old Testament more in an æsthetic and poetical than a theological manner, and was hence unable to effect a regeneration of its treatment. Eichhorn too, who goes hand in hand with him in his poetical view, but has a more decided feeling for the religious sense of the "poetry of the Old Testament," which he seeks solely in religious truths or doctrines, finds the narratives of the Old Testament very unsatisfactory in this respect. He regards them as involuntary fictions corresponding with the lower religious standpoint of their authors, a view which led to the *mythic theory of the Old Testament.* Such is also the view of Gabler, Bauer, and De Wette. Genesis especially was subjected to this kind of observation, and the Pentateuch declared to be a great epic.[1] But the idea of humanity by which Herder was animated became a powerful incitement to regard the human race with its medley of religions as a unity, and thus to satisfy the higher requirements of science. While then it had hitherto been customary to theology to regard the Old Testament as a special world in itself, and as removed from all connection with other nations and their religions, such boundaries were now destroyed, and the zeal aroused for investigating the religions of antiquity, their origin, connection, and history, did not fail to react upon the view taken of the Old Testament. The study of the different national mythologies revived, chiefly by Heine of Göttingen, flourished to a degree never before attained, and certainly had this reactionary effect upon the theology of the Old Testament, that the religion of the Old Testament was now treated as a mythical religion like that of other nations, and placed merely on a level with them, if, indeed, it was not sometimes considered inferior. This, however, could only be done while the different religions were regarded as essentially one and the same, though under different names, and so long as no attempt was made, in consequence of a perception of progress in the religious process, to understand each according to its peculiar principle, instead of its external characteristics.[2] Creuzer's method, which inter-

[1] Gabler, *Anmerkungen zu Eichhorns Urgeschichte;* L. Bauer, *Mythologie der Hebräer,* 1802; De Wette, *Beiträge,* 1807, v. Cölln, *Bibl. Theol.* 2 parts, ed. D. Schulz, 1836.

[2] The notion cherished by Fr. v. Schlegel, Görres, Windischmann and others, that a sublime and pure religion, a golden age of piety, at first prevailed, and that from the earliest ages downwards, history has exhibited only an increasing decay

mingled all religions, and dealt in arbitrary etymologies, for the sake of establishing either their connection or actual identity, and which was for a time embraced also by Baur, was opposed by the flourishing school of Gottfr. Hermann, and Lobeck. Little as was the religious intelligence possessed by this school, it rendered, nevertheless, the important service of calling forth those more accurate investigations which were so successfully carried on by Ottfr. Müller, Stuhr, Gerhard, K. Fr. Hermann, Nägelsbach, Welcker, Schömann, Preller, Curtius, Hartung, Mommsen, and others; and which have been materially supported and encouraged by those oriental, philologic, and historical studies which have now again been so vigorously prosecuted with respect to the different Arian races.[1] On the one hand, access to the Chinese, Japanese, and various Buddhist archives,[2] and the investigation of the religions of North and South America,[3] have constantly extended the sphere of these inquiries; on the other, religious philosophy has seized with corresponding zeal these rich materials, many as are the gaps which they still exhibit, and has sought first to understand each of the religions according to its own nature and the principle by which it is governed, and then to arrange them all in homogeneous groups, and assign them their places in a series of progressive developments. Hegel's philosophy of religion, excellent as is much that it contains, does not indeed do justice to the Hebrew religion, which as "the religion of sublimity,"—a term more appropriate to Islamism,—is supposed absolutely to separate God from the world, and to be inferior to the religions of Greece and Rome, which, by the ideas of beauty and law, advocated the union of God with subjectivity.

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which has now left nothing but defaced ruins, contributed not a little to prevent the recognition of a progress in the history of pre-Christian religion. Thus the same fact was repeated in the history of religion in general, which we have before noticed in the history of the Christian Church, cent. xvi. and xvii., viz. an idealistic view of the commencement, combined with a pessimist view of succeeding ages.

[1] By Bopp, Lassen, Weber, Benfey, Max Müller, with regard to the Indians, by Roth, Spiegel, Westergaard, Anquetil du Perron, Kleuker, with regard to the Persians, and by W. Grimm, Lachmann, Müllenhoff, and others of this school, also by W. Müller, and Limrock, with regard to the ancient Germans.

[2] Compare Wuttke, *Geschichte des Heidenthums*, vols. i. and ii. 1852, 1853; Köppen, *die Religion des Buddha*, 1857, *Die Lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche*, 1859.

[3] J. G. Müller, *Geschichte der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basle, 1855.

He fails, however, to perceive that the Hebrew religion advances the mind of man by the stage of law, from the category of God's omnipotence to that of His holiness, whereby deeper aspects of subjectivity are called forth than the æsthetic or the legislative, and the conditions therefore furnished for a deeper union. Hence even Rust and Baur differ in this respect from Hegel, by placing the Old Testament, which, from its very beginning, bore within it the germs of an internal universalism, above the religions of Greece and Rome, which did but create an external and political universalism as a preparation for Christianity, and in other respects treated religion—after the fashion of heathenism in general—more as a means of common prosperity. Schleiermacher divided religions into the groups of fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. In the last group, however, he places Islamism, which he distinguishes as an æsthetic form, from the Christian and Hebrew as the theological forms of religion—a view which, logically considered, curtails Christianity of its due proportions, by assigning to it no rank peculiar to itself. At the same time the distinction which he makes between Judaism, as still infected with legal and eudæmonistic elements, and Christianity, is not devoid of injustice to the religion of the Old Testament. Religious philosophy, however, was generally inclined to regard the history of religions more as a mere evolution of the inner nature of man—a purely immanent, and so far a subjective process—a notion which most injured the religion of the Old Testament, and denied the character of the revelation and communication of the transcendent God to the human race.

Schelling's philosophy of religion,[1] which was built upon a theosophic foundation, opposed this view by carrying out the notion, that the history of the heathen religions also was conditioned not merely by human subjectivity, nor even, as Lobeck thinks, by the contingencies of empiric arbitrariness, but by the intervention of objective divine potencies, which, ever pressing onwards, increasingly bestowed upon life a more human form. This process continued until the absolute union of the Divine and human was attained in Christ, who after His

[1] Compare Schelling's *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*, 1856, *Philosophie der Mythologie*, 1857, and his *Philosophie der Offenbarung*, 2 vols., published after his death by his son Fr. Schelling. Works, div. ii. vol. i. 4; see above, p. 362.

previous agency in heathenism and Judaism—in which, on account of sin, He left His *tautousia* with God, and passed into *heterousia*,—appeared as the Lord of being, and by His moral self-sacrifice passed into *homousia* with the Father. The importance of this conception of the entire history of religion as a unity, lies in the fact that Schelling brings the whole process into relation with its object, viz. Christianity. And justly so. For if the aim of religion is the union of God and man, and if this union expresses its inmost tendency, an inward tendency towards Christianity must be innate in all religion; for in it alone is reconciliation and communion with God, the all controlling centre. But if this is certain, and if the absolute religion alone furnishes the key to the understanding and to the arrangement of all other religions, if in this process the distinction between God and man is, in opposition to every kind of Pantheism, embraced, and the nature of sin, which so enhances this distinction, appreciated, without which appreciation union with God would forfeit its moral character; if, moreover, the importance of the difference between polytheism, together with æsthetic or merely philosophical monotheism, and genuine teleological monotheism is perceived—as it is by Schleiermacher—then, even though the unity of that religious process which is ever aiming at Christ be admitted, the special dignity and uniqueness of the Old Testament religion cannot fail to be perceived by an unprejudiced mind. For it is in this religion alone, that a normal and continuous preparation for, and approximation to, Christianity takes place, in this alone that the twofold motion, viz. that arising with God and that proceeding from man, which is needed for the attainment of the goal in view, does not come to a standstill, but is carried on in spite of the power of sin, until the absolute union of both is accomplished. In the heathen religions, on the contrary, this process was interrupted, and though they are not to be thought of as simply forsaken by God, yet when compared to the well-fenced and carefully cultivated vineyard of Jehovah, they are rightly termed by Schelling "religions growing wild," and Israel the only nation in which God carried on connectedly the work of religion. They too were struggling in various manners towards the idea of the incarnation of God, but they were doing so amidst misconceptions of the nature of sin, impatient and arbitrary anticipations and mythical fictions, because they lacked the

great and firmly established discipline of the law. When it is considered, on the other hand, that the power of sin was present in Israel also, the continuous regular process of preparation for Christianity, the formation and maturing of a vital recipiency for it, which were here found, form as strong a proof of the interposition of Divine revelation and guidance in Israel's history, as it is possible, in a historical point of view, to require. Hence the extension of the range of vision in modern theology to the entire history and philosophy of religion, has already produced not only new problems, but brilliant and fruitful results, profitable not only to the theology of the New Testament, but also to the elucidation and historical confirmation of Christianity itself. One consequence is that *apologetics* have already undergone a change and assumed a broader basis.

Among those philosophers who view the history of religion in this sense may be mentioned Schiller, Wirth, and especially Chalybæus, and Braniss.[1] On the part of theology, Tholuck, Auberlen, Tobias Beck,[2] v. Hofmann, and Baumgarten,[3] and especially Oehler,[4] have applied the problems hence arising to the scientific knowledge of the Old Testament. The entire Old Testament and its religion is beginning to be treated—according to Herder's saying, which was taken up by Tholuck—as one great prophecy, a rich compensation for those individual prophecies which had to be given up as exegetically untenable. Thus the prophecy of events, including the typology thereby revived, has been brought into close connection with verbal prophecy.[5] On the one hand, however, typology is too much

[1] Chalybæus, *Philosophie und Christenthum*, 1853; Braniss, *Uebersicht des Entwickelungsgang der Philosophie*, 1842.

[2] Tholuck, *die Propheten und ihre Weissagungen*, Gotha, 1860; Auberlen, *die göttliche Offenbarung, ein apologetischer Versuch*, 1861, vol. i. (translated); J. T. Beck, *Einleitung in das System der christlichen Lehre*, 1838; *Die christliche Lehrwissenschaft nach den biblischen Erkunden*, div. 1, 1840.

[3] V. Hofmann, *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, 1841, 1844, *Schriftbeweis*, div. 2, 1852, ed. 2, 1857; Baumgarten, *Theologischer Commentar zum Pentateuch*, 1843, *Einleitung*.

[4] Compare *Prolegomena zur Theologie A. T.*, 1845; also his many excellent articles in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*, and his *Programm* of the year 1854; *Die Grundzüge der alttestamentlichen Weisheit*. He gives a sketch for the construction of an Old Testament theology in the *Proleg.* pp. 83-85.

[5] Especially in Sack's *Apologetik*, and Hofmann's *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, also by Baumgarten and Delitzsch.

treated as the source of verbal prophecy: on the other, the prophecy of events is too coarsely conceived of, when the view is embraced that a corporeal pre-existence of Christ was manifested in Israel, or when the theophanies of the Old Testament, *e.g.* in the Angel of the Lord, are treated as preparatory steps [*Anbahnungen*], or as it were (to speak with Tertullian) anticipative acts of the Incarnation of God. On the contrary, the notion that even the history of the Old Testament people is prophetic, and that it announces the existence of progressively higher forms of those ideas which find in it their initiative realization, cannot but be approved. All that is required is that the typical and the prophetic—properly so called—should be more clearly distinguished. For in the Old Testament a progress is accomplished not only by means of ever enhanced anticipations of Christ, whether in word or act, and therefore in a direct and positive manner, but also by reason of sin, by means of an increasing consciousness of the interruption of fellowship with God. We find not merely a consciousness of what Israel already possesses, and of the ever-growing fulness involved therein, but also a feeling of the emptiness and *inadequacy* of the Old Testament dispensation to allay the religious craving. In this respect it is that justice is not done in Hofmann's works, any more than formerly in those of Coccejus, to the legal dispensation, and that a main lever in the progress of the historical view is removed. Oehler, on the contrary, takes a more accurate view of the different periods of the inward history of the Old Testament people, and brings forward, as sources of that direct and indirect prophecy which was advancing together with their history, not only the positive, the symbolic, and the typical elements, but also the heaven-ordained reaction of the religious spirit against the merely legal standpoint, its deficiencies and limitation.

A review of the whole present state of science with regard to the Old Testament, and of those efforts which have led the way in this respect, scarcely as yet exhibits any definite tendency directing the whole course of individual labours. This shows most convincingly that a biblical theology of the Old Testament, corresponding to the claims and needs of the day, is still lacking, because no one with a special vocation for this important work has yet appeared. Still a retrospect of the fate of this science,

and the laws of its progress, also points surely onwards to the goal. If we do not as yet behold the land in its whole extent, yet peak after peak is coming into sight. It is, however, obviously of the utmost importance to Christian theology, in the narrower sense, that we should take full possession of the land itself. For it is of great moment, both to the confirmation of the historical character of primitive Christianity, especially of the portraiture of Christ, and to the unity and continuity of the history of Christianity, that the distinction between the Old and New Testaments should be duly estimated, while their firm and indissoluble connection is also made evident. If the historical succession is not here very strictly preserved, the misconceived mutual relation of the Old and New Testaments will be turned into a dangerous weapon for attacking Christianity. If, on the one hand, the connection between them is either severed or depreciated, Christianity will, by means of that character of novelty which is thus, in a onesided manner, impressed upon it, be placed in an insecure position, deprived of its historical basis, and exposed to the suspicion of having originated in subjective arbitrariness. If, on the other hand, the connection of the two is enhanced to actual identity, and not viewed as exclusively the connection between a deeply felt want and its supply (Matt. v. 3), the suspicion will arise—as many recent appearances show—that a transference of Old Testament occurrences, images, and Messianic features to the Person of Jesus of Nazareth, is the source of the gospel history. Such a suspicion it will be difficult to obviate on historical grounds, and all that is new in Christianity will thus be reduced to its carrying out of these principles to universalism. And the more literal the fulfilment of Old Testament sayings found in the New, the more difficult will it be to dispel the suspicion that the former is the source of the latter. But the more we succeed in showing, in a truly historical manner, that the essentially self-consistent image of Christ, found in the books of the New Testament, is by no means simply identical with the Messianic idea of the Old, and still less so with the discordant and self-contradictory Messianic expectations of His contemporaries, that, on the contrary, the fulfilment, both on the whole and in particulars, far surpassed those limitations by which even prophecy was restricted; that there is, moreover, a real teleological connection between the

gospel in general, and the one organic whole formed by the history of the Old Testament, so that what was deposited and prepared in remote ages attains its fulfilment in Christ—the more will both the novelty and originality, as well as the historical basis of the appearance of Christianity, "when the fulness of the time was come," be established.

Nor has modern theology manifested less progress in the department of *ecclesiastical history.* The history of all religions, as well as the history of civilization, and especially of philosophy, has been duly appreciated, the history of the age in which Christianity arose is being accurately investigated from all hitherto known and recently acquired documents.[1] "Monumental theology" too, has, by a most diligent employment of every kind of memorial, as well as of literary documents, contributed to throw much light upon and give much security, to the history of the Church and the history of doctrines.[2] The new science of the *ecclesiastic statistics of the present* has also been added by Schleiermacher to theology, and promises to be as fertile in results with respect to an enlargement of view, and an internal and external association of the different Evangelical Churches for mutual intercourse and assistance, as statistics in general have been in the department of politics. The comparatively recent science of the *history of doctrines* has been most diligently cultivated and enriched by labours whether of a monographic or more comprehensive kind.[3] There are few noted

[1] *E.g.* J. C. Thilo, *Codex Apocryphus N. T.* 1832; De la Garde, *Homil. Clementinæ*, 1866; Duncker, *Hippolyti Refutat. Hæres.* 1859.

[2] To this belong the works on Christian art and archæology of Augusti, W. Böhmer, 1830, 1839, H. Alt, 1850, &c., Rheinwald; Schnaase, *Geschichte der bildenden Künste*, 1844-1856, 5 vols.; H. Otte, *Handbuch der kirchl. deutschen Kunstarchäologie des Mittelalters*, ed. 3, 1854; Kugler, *Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte*, 2 vols. ed. 3, 1855-1859; Lübke, *Grundriss der Kunstgeschichte*, 1860, and especially F. Münter's *Sinnbilder und Kunstvorstellungen der alten Christen*, 2 nos. 1825, and F. Piper, *Mythologie und Symbolik der christlichen Kunst von der ältesten Zeit bis ins* 16 *Jahrhundert*, vol. i. 1, 2, 1847, 1851, *Einleitung in der monumentale Theologie*, 1867.

[3] W. Münscher, *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 4 vols. 1797, &c. His *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, first became valuable through the edition, with original authorities from the Reformation downwards, by Cölln and Neudecker, also Augusti, Bertholdt, 2 vols. 1822, &c. Ruperti and Lenz wrote on the history of doctrine. The more important modern works are Baumgarten-Crusius' *Handbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, 2 vols. 1832, and his *Compendium der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, 2 vols. 1840-1846; the *Lehrbücher* of Engelhardt,

church dogmatists who have not received their due monographic treatment.[1] With reference to the entire history of theology, admirable collections have furnished every kind of completeness, and a historical criticism of high pretensions is promoting their utilization. Moreover, the very art of writing history, though differently practised by its various masters, shows unmistakeable signs of general progress. For while it must ever be the first duty of the historian to assign to historical data a rank proportionate to their documentary authority, such a foundation will not be laid to be followed by a mere chronicle-like narrative, but by a connected review of the work of Christianity with regard to the human race, its knowledge and practice. Not that uniform progress is or always can be shown. History is the realm of freewill agency. The intensive and extensive processes alternate with each other in the Church's history, and the latter, though naturally arising from the former, brings the Church into a defiling contact with the world, from which it can only be delivered by a fresh concentration, and a recurrence to the purifying and intensive process. But the work of Christianity upon the human race is nevertheless a *progressive* one: hence the view is no longer favoured which supposed the highest point to have been already attained in the first days of the Church, which beheld in subsequent ages nothing but increasing declension, restrained perhaps for a season at the Reformation, and which—as though sin and man's need of redemption on the one hand, and the power of Christianity on the other, were not still the same as ever—could find comfort for the present only in arbitrary eschatological hopes and expectations. But as little can modern church history and the history of doctrine be satisfied with that so-called practical treatment, which regards history as the mere sport of human caprice and passions, without any independent objective aims to be attained by means of the intervention of specially gifted individuals, and of the joint course of human history. And though individuals may, in a onesided manner, view this

1839, 2 vols.; F. K. Meier, 1840; Hagenbach, ed. 4, 1857; Baur, ed. 2, 1858, (with his *Kirchengeschichte der neuern Zeit*, 1863, and his *Kirchengeschichte des* 19 *Jahrhunderts*, 1862); Mahreinecke ed. Matthies and Batke, 1849; Neander, 2 vols. 1857, ed. Jacobi; Gieseler, ed Redepenning, 1855.

[1] The chief monographs on church history and the history of doctrine are collected in Hagenbach's *Encyclopädie*, ed. 6, § 67, pp. 226-232, and § 73, p. 250.

aim from an exclusively Lutheran point of view, and make Lutheranism the critical standard of history,[1] while others regard the increasing prevalence of some philosophical idea which evaporates all that is essentially Christian as the standard of progress,[2] yet the majority maintain a freer standpoint and entertain a wider notion of Christianity and its mission.[3] The materials indeed are far from being as yet sufficiently sifted and separated, yet it is by this purer and freer idea of Christianity that the judgments of most are formed and the arrangement of materials is governed. In opposition to the harsh anathemas pronounced by a former age against Roman Catholicism and the middle ages, and especially against the hierarchical element as a hell-born iniquity—an age which went so far as to make it a principle to embrace whatever the Roman Catholic Church rejected—that historical justice has asserted itself, which not only has a more correct appreciation of the manner in which the hierarchical form of the Church originated, but which also impartially acknowledges the services it rendered to the nations in their nonage, whose first need was to be placed under legal discipline. The same impartiality, moreover, has become more or less prevalent, so far as *doctrine* is concerned, with respect to heretics and opponents of orthodox doctrine, the teaching or conscious faith of the Church, whether of primitive or reformed times, being no longer regarded as perfect, nor opponents looked upon as merely wilful enemies to the truth, already shining in full splendour. On the contrary, since the dogmatic form of Church teaching has been admitted to be one of continuous development, it is perceived that the incompleteness attending each of its stages gives a certain relative right to attacks and censures, and that even heretics fall into their errors, because, as Irenæus says, like unskilful wrestlers, they seize convulsively upon that limb of the truth which they fear will be misconceived. According to such a view, even erroneous doctrines form elements in the process of dogmatic history—elements indeed whose onesidedness must be, and is overcome, but which furnish at the same time a lever and an actual impulse to progressive motion.

[1] *E.g.* Guericke, Lindner, Kurtz.

[2] So Baur.

[3] So, besides Neander, Gieseler, Hase, Schleiermacher, and Niedner, Reuter, Hagenbach, Jacobi, Fricke, Schaff, Lange.

Though these features are more or less common to recent historical theology, there are still among its chief representatives differences, in the mode of delineation and in the form of treatment, so considerable, that the excellences of each may be said to supplement and complete those of others. Neander,[1] the father of modern ecclesiastical history, chiefly pursues, with true feeling for his subject, the theme of Christian *life* in its religious aspect; Ullmann treats on the same topic during the pre-Reformation period. Baur devotes himself to investigating the history of dogmas (of, *e.g.*, Gnosis, Manicheeism, the Trinity, and the Incarnation). His writings exhibit rare powers of combination, which indeed, with his idealistic standpoint, and his inclination to historical constructions, often lead him astray, but even in these instances never fail to afford important suggestions for farther research, and to open up new fields or new aspects, especially in the history of heretics. Niedner enlarges especially upon the ethical features of church history, even in its greater events. Hase brings forward, with much acuteness, the relations of the Christian Church to general culture, and especially to art; and, himself an artist, draws speaking pictures with a refined, nervous, portrait-like handling. Hundeshagen, endowed with a more profound comprehension of the Reformation synthesis of the intellectual, and the religious and moral factors, exhibits also an enlightened perception and a lively feeling for national and political life in its relations to Christianity. Finally, Gieseler, though still more nearly approximating the Kantian standpoint, shows himself a trustworthy and well-read author, by his copious and apt references to authorities—to which indeed the text of his works rather holds the proportion of a mere heading—and thus keeps faithful watch against all partial, arbitrary, or superficial treatment of the history, whether of the Church or of doctrines.[2]

Symbolics and the history of post-Reformation divinity have also been abundantly cultivated. The greater number of the more important works in the latter department have already

[1] The works of Hagenbach, Piper, Jacobi, Erbkam, and Schaff, are in the same spirit as those of Neander.

[2] The History of the early Church (down to about A.D. 600), by Ph. Schaff (3 vols. Clark, Edinburgh), is also, on account of the beauty of its descriptions, the lucid arrangement of its materials, and the moderation of its decisions, a very praiseworthy work. It has also done special service by its abundant employment of English literature.

been incidentally mentioned.[1] *Symbolics*, which is akin to divinity, has certainly been often influenced by the latter, and treated with a party spirit at variance with history.[2] The science of symbolics has also, since the publication of Möhler's *Symbolik* and its attacks upon Protestantism, frequently assumed, in the hands of Protestants, a more controversial character[3] with respect to the Roman Catholic Church. Numerous works on the two evangelical confessions are, however, characterized by historical impartiality, and have been on this account more favourable to the union.[4] Nor are just and impartial representations with respect to the Catholic Church lacking.[5] Nay, certain recent writers are more inclined to fundamentally catholicizing views than are compatible with the Protestant principle,

[1] Those, *e.g.*, of Tholuck, Gass, Henke, Hundeshagen, Göbel, Schmid (*Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche; syncretistische Streitigkeiten; Pietismus*), Schneckenburger, Franck, and others.

[2] *E.g.* by Rudelbach, *Reformation Lutherthum und Union*, 1859; Guericke, in his *Kirchengeschichte*, 3 vols., ed. 8, 1855, and in his *Symbolik*; also by Kurz, in his *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, ed. 4, 1860 (translated, 2 vols., Clark); and most of all by Graul. Schenkel's recompilation of his *Wesen des Protestantismus*, 1862 (the first edition of which, in three volumes, excited very general interest); also, *Die Reformatoren und die Reformation im Zusammenhang mit der evangelischer Kirche*, 1856, is a similar work on the other side.

[3] Marheinecke's important work, *Die christliche Symbolik*, vols. i.-iii., *System des Katholicismus*, 1810-1813, was still written in a pacific tone. But Nitzch's reply to Möhler's *Symbolik*, 1834, and Baur's *Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus nach den Principien und Hauptdogmen der beiden Lehrbegriffe*, 1834, as well as his reply to Möhler's *Neue Untersuchungen*, 1844, recurring to those principles which separate the two bodies, again make powerful attacks. The tone of Hase's *Polemik*, 1862, is irritating and provoking; instead of bringing out the full strength of the positive principle of the Reformation, which has also a pacific side, it deals too much in accessory matters, which cannot be laid to the charge of Catholicism, when viewed according to its principles.

[4] As M. Göbel's *Die religiöse Eigenthumlichkeit der lutherischen und der reformirten Kirche*, 1837; Hundeshagen's *Die Conflikte des Zwinglianismus Lutherthums und Calvinismus*, Bern, 1842; Matthes' *comparative Symbolik aller christlichen Confessionen vom Standpunkt der lutherischen Confession*, 1854; A. Schweizer's *Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der reformirten Kirche*, 2 vols. 1854; R. Hofmann's *Symbolik*, &c., 1857; J. Müller's *Die evangelische Union, ihr Wesen und ihr göttliches Recht*, 1854.

[5] Winer, *comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschiedenen Kirchenparteien nebst vollständigen Belegen aus der symbolischen Schriften derselben in der Ursprache*, ed. 2, 1837, 4; Baier, *Symbolik der christlichen Confessions- und Religionsparteien*, vol. i. 1; *Idee und Principien des römischen Katholicismus*, 1854; Marheinecke's *Symbolik*, and especially Köllner. See the next note. Hahn, 1853; Böhmer, 1857.

whether with respect to tradition, the doctrine of justification, or the hierarchy.[1]

With regard to *systematic theology*, and especially *divinity*, its most directly fundamental question, viz. that of the evangelical principle, has been already discussed. There is none of the more notable theologians who does not, though under manifold varieties of method, acknowledge, at least *in thesi*, living faith, or the material principle of the Reformation, to be the most direct assumption or source of dogmatic statements; none who denies the normative authority of holy Scripture, and therefore the formal principle. The majority entertain a firm persuasion that these principles are independent of the fluctuations of biblical criticism, and hence they can calmly contemplate its ever-recurring, but ever self-correcting excesses. Their *methods*, however, are certainly very various. *With some* faith or the material principle, is transformed into the common faith of their own confession, and they desire to construct a "church" system of doctrines,[2] a predicate which seems to them to express more than the epithet "Christian," which was used by the older great and truly orthodox divines of the evangelical Church. They are in danger of suffering the material principle to be again choked by tradition, and therefore by a spurious formal principle. With *others* faith is transformed into Scriptural doctrine. Regardless of the progressive labours of the Church in forming a body of doctrines, also unconscious how large a share subjectivity has in their own interpretation of Scripture, they desire to give simply the contents of Scripture, as though this were already an organ-

[1] *E.g.* Stahl's before-named work; Köllner's *Symbolik aller christlichen Confessionen*, 2 vols. 1837, 1844; and Thiersch's *Lectures on Catholicism and Protestantism*, 2 vols. 1845, 1848.

[2] As, *e.g.*, Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, vols. i.-iv., 1854-63; Kahnis, *Lutherische Glaubenslehre*, 2 vols. 1861, 1864. (The latter, in spite of the title he has chosen, takes up a freer attitude towards the symbols; his doctrine being with regard to the Trinity subordinationist, to the Lord's Supper Calvinistic, while his Christology is of a "*Kenotik*" tinge (see note, p. 105). He demands, in the place of a petrified Lutheran tradition, a *development of Lutheran individuality*, but does not sufficiently consider that neither collective Christian individuality, nor the individual is, according to the apostolic model and its types (Eph. iv.), justified in leading an always isolated existence, but is bound, while maintaining its own characteristics, to a life of social intercourse, especially where unity of principle exists, and the merely secondary importance of the complex Church is admitted). Thomasius, *Lehre von Christi Person und Werk; Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkt der Christologie*, 3rd pt. ed. 2, 1856-59.

ized body of divinity. They still, moreover, see the proof of the truth of a doctrine in the fact that the self-confirmation of its divine origin is inherent in holy Scripture *in toto*, and that therefore all that is contained in it bears for theologians the stamp of divine truth.[1] *Others*, and these are the majority, perceiving that this is not sufficient, award to the material principle its relative independence, and seek to develop therefrom doctrinal propositions in harmony with holy Scripture, whether in the way of reflection upon Christian consciousness,[2] or of recurrence to a more objective basis,[3] or progressively in a speculative manner.[4] On the other hand, it is pretty generally admitted that the requisite conditions of a body of divinity are that it should be scriptural, ecclesiastical, and scientific.

With regard to the *doctrine of God*, the first thing to be done was to recover and to advocate, in a scientific manner, the idea of a self-conscious God, free from the world, in opposition to the pantheistic systems of Hegel and Schelling. This was so effectually done, amidst essential assistance by the post-Hegelian philosophy of the younger Fichte, Weisse, Chalybæus, Trendelenburg, Wirth, Ulrici, and others, that about thirty years since the watchword was "the Absolute Personality of God," though H. Ritter, while substantially acquiescing in that absolute perfection, spirituality, and freedom of God which it was designed to express, maintained his objection to this formula. In fact, Herbartian religious philosophers also employed the word personality in such a sense as to distinguish God from other individuals only as an individual, though the Highest, without reflecting that He must also be the Being in whom all existence was originally comprised, and who must ever be the universal and

[1] As S. Beck, *christliche Lehrwissenschaft*, i. 1, 1840 (see above, p. 427).

[2] So Romang, in a religious and philosophical manner, like Schleiermacher; Schweizer, *Christliche Glaubenslehre nach prot. Grundsätzen*, 1863, pt. i.; Schenkel, *die christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkt des Gewissens*, pt. ii., 1858-59. Also, v. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis* (*Lehrstücke*), 2 vols., ed. 2, 1857-60; Twesten, *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik der evang.-luth. Kirche nach de Wette's Compendium*, vol. i. 2, ed. 4, 1837.

[3] As J. Müller, Nitzsch, *System der christlichen Lehre*, ed. 6, 1851; Lange, 3 pts., 1849, &c.; Ebrard, 2 pts., 1851, &c.; Hahn, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens*, ed. 2, 2 pts., 1857, 1858.

[4] As Weisse, *Philosophische Dogmatik*, 3 vols., 1855-62; Liebner, 1 pt., 1849; Martensen, Rothe, Schöberlein. Rothe, indeed, insists that "divinity" should only be regarded as such, if in accordance with Church teaching, and discusses it only in a critical and historical manner, but requires, besides divinity, a speculative theology, physics, and ethics. Comp. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, 1863.

vital potency of all existence. In this manner, moreover, the doctrine of the Absolute Personality might acquire a deistic tinge, and God be withdrawn to a state of false transcendentalism. It seems also that, subsequently to the prevalence of Pantheism, a deistic current set in. This was increased not merely by the physical sciences, which in many minds transferred the consciousness of God's existence to the background, by the prominence given to the fixity of natural sequences, but also on the theological side by that inherited, and not yet regenerated idea of God—carried out to its necessary results by Schleiermacher—which embraces the abstract simplicity and consequent unchangeableness of God, although the principles of cosmical multiplicity and historical organization must also be in God, who cannot possibly be conceived of as maintaining a perpetual indifference with respect to the world. Finally, this deistic feature has been much favoured, in our days, by the tendency which would treat the Church, or the ministry, or the means of grace, as substitutes for the presence of God, instead of connecting direct communion with God with these means for enjoying it. The elaboration of the *ethical idea of God*, now for the first time seriously taken in hand, seems to promise the attainment of the medium between the extremes of Pantheism and Deism, and of a correct combination of the self-equality and activity of God, of His transcendency and immanency.[1] Such labours continue the work of the Reformation, which found in the principle of faith the prototypical union of necessity (authority) and freedom, and provide it with an objective or absolute basis, by exhibiting in the moral God the same, but primary, union of necessity and freedom, which is to be manifested in a derivative manner, in man made in God's image.[2]

It is partly owing to the above described particulars in the modern doctrine of God, but still more, as in the first centuries of the Christian era, to Christology, that the *doctrine of the Trinity* has become the subject of renewed discussion.

According to *pantheistic opinions* God was only the unity immanent in the world for its multiplicity, and besides the fundamental

[1] It also furnishes the objective scientific basis for the idea of miracles. Comp. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, 1863, and J. Köstlin, *De miraculorum quos Christus et primi ejus discip. fecerunt, natura et ratione*, 1860 ; and, in an historical point of view, Steinmeyer, *die Wunderthaten des Herrn*, 1866.

[2] For further particulars, see *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1856, i. 2, ii. 3, iii. 4.

notion that the world was the Son of God, the Holy Ghost was conceived of as, at most, the principle ever re-conducting the world into God. By applying these notions to the history of the human race, and regarding Christ as the turning-point of history, a kind of Sabellian view of the Trinity might arise. As little too could *Deism* admit a triplicity in the inner life of God. The ethical idea of God was more favourable to the doctrine of the Trinity, because the moral activity of God will be conceived of as conditioned by a plurality of divine factors or modes of existence. Hence the view that Divine love multiplied itself, repeated itself in a threefold manner, that it might be able to exercise itself absolutely, or might have an absolute object for itself,[1] found great acceptance. This is a view however which, if no distinction is shown between the three Divine "Persons" (no *character hypostaticus* of the old divines), threatens to become Tritheism, in which the unity is only one of species, and a mere repetition of the same being; and which, if this self-repetition in the two other Divine Persons is ascribed to the Father alone, without participation by the Son and Spirit in the *aseitas*, involves subordinationism.[2] But subordinationism, by ascribing to the Father alone proper absoluteness of nature (*aseitas*), is on the very brink of a transition to recognizing in the Son of God only the very highest of creatures, or the sum total of creation, and denying an intrinsic Trinity. The former view, on the contrary, actually required three absolute, perfect, Divine egos, fully and essentially equal, but was in danger, on the one hand, of again forfeiting the advantage of the one absolute Personality of God (p. 452), and making the divine unity vanish in a mere oneness of species,[3] while, on the other, Christological difficulties presented themselves if the Divine hypostases, especially those of the Son, were taken in the sense of absolute Personality. Hence Reinhard had already called the Divine hypostases *personas incompletas*, and Martensen—with whom Kling agreed—understood by them the ego-points [*Ichpunkte*] of the One Divine absolute Personality. The question then still was to prove a plurality,

[1] So Sartorius, Liebner, Schöberlein and others.

[2] So *e.g.* Thomasius, Kahnis, Gess, *die Lehre von der Person Christi*, 1856, p. 157, &c.

[3] This is very plainly apparent in Plitt's above quoted work, i. p. 156, &c., which, after the manner of Zinzendorf, applies the image of the family to Father, Son and Spirit.

not of parts, or of mere qualities, but of modes of being, or, more strictly speaking, a triad of *special* modes of being, constituting the full idea of the one absolute Divine Personality. For this however, the derivation of the Trinity from the *self-activity* of Divine Love will not suffice. And this for two reasons, first, because this one Divine Personality is thus itself assumed, and secondly, because there results from it only that multifold repetition of equality which inclines to Tritheism, while love also requires distinctions which are not distinctions of mere number. Hence it seems that the demand must be made to conceive of the triplicity in the inner nature of God, not as, in the first place, the product of the activity of the absolute Divine Personality, or of God as absolute Love, but contrariwise, as the three diverse modes of existence of the one personal God, which after the manner of correlatives constitute, as indissolubly connected and mutually related co-efficients, the One Personal God in all His properties from aseity up to absolute self-consciousness and love; these all from aseity to self-consciousness and love being conceived of in a Trinitarian manner.[1] These threefold modes of existence in God, of which the constant *result* is the one absolute Divine Personality, and of which each bears in itself, after its own manner, all the Divine properties, will then all participate in this result. The one Divine Personality, knowing and willing itself in each of these (as the soul is present in the whole organism, and gives thereto a share in itself) eternal Divine modes of existence, has also its share in the Divine Personality, and hence cannot be called impersonal, but must, not indeed directly and separately, but indirectly, and in eternal union with the other modes of existence in the Divine nature, be designated personal.[2]

When the question: How the One absolute Personality of God can be reconciled with eternal triplicity in God, is correctly solved, the *Christological* difficulty may be obviated. This difficulty may be stated as follows: How the union of God, not merely under the type of an impartation of power, but of the incarnation of God, according to one of His special eternal modes

[1] As Nitsch especially strikingly requires.

[2] From the standpoint of orthodox divinity there arises out of the doctrine of the *immanentia*, the περιχώρησις of the hypostases into each other, to which also an effect must be attributed.

of existence, viz. the mode of being of the eternal "Son," who as the absolute image of the "Father" is also the archetype of the world and of mankind, can be consistent with the existence of a perfect, *i.e.* a personal man.[1]

Recent divinity, including that of the Reformed Church, is distinguished from that of the Reformation era, with respect to the doctrine of *man's moral freedom*, inasmuch as being influenced by the ethic interest, it leaves to this freedom an actual position both with respect to man's original state and the decision of his ultimate destiny. It thus rejects the doctrine of absolute predestination, both in its infralapsarian and supralapsarian forms,[2] without encroaching upon either the doctrine of the power of sin or that of the certainty of the salvation of the elect. In its doctrine of the *original state*, modern theology—again in the interest of ethics—turns to the second view left open by Melanchthon's apology, according to which perfect righteousness and holiness were the natural dowry of man only as an aim attainable but not as yet realized. In doing this, however, it does not consequently so regard the primitive condition of man as to make the realization of evil necessary.

In the doctrine of *evil*, the view that this consists in sensuousness is opposed by the view that it is essentially selfishness. A union of the two has been sought by saying, in accordance with Augustine, that evil is *creature love*, whether of self or of the world, of a *spurious* kind, *i.e.* as isolated from God and self-centred.[3] Of more importance is the fact that the notions of sin and personal responsibility play a more important part in modern divinity than in that of former times; and though the train of thought by which the most distinguished writer on sin of recent times is led to the acceptance of a pre-temporal individual fall of each human being has experienced, besides indi-

[1] The solution of this difficulty is the special endeavour of Beyschlag's Christological labours. It seems to me that his attempted solution is, according to what has been stated above, insufficient. But it is unbecoming in evangelical theology to attempt, as it has done, to suppress or intimidate by passionate and therefore unjust attacks, such earnest labours on a problem whose existence ignorance alone can misconceive, instead of co-operating in the work, and assisting such efforts by a profounder investigation of truth, in place of an imperious appeal to frequently misunderstood church tradition.

[2] Schweizer, Scholten, and Romang alone embrace Schleiermacher's absolute doctrine of predestination and denial of freedom.

[3] As by Liebner, who tries to unite the views of Röthe and J. Müller.

vidual instances of agreement, much opposition, yet the necessity of so carrying out the traditional doctrine of natural corruption, as to make the ultimate decision upon the definitive merit of the individual and his final lot depend not upon original sin, but solely upon personal relation to Christ, is admitted. At the same time a deeper personal consciousness of sin is evidenced in the recognition of the common guilt.

With respect to *Christology*, it is, as has already been shown, *Christ's true humanity* which has, with special zeal and success, been kept in view. This has been done both from an ethical motive and for the sake of implanting in the consciousness of His believing Church, a more vivid conception of His Person. Hence the doctrine—frequently advocated in older divinity, though expressed in no Church symbol—of the non-personality of the human nature of Christ has been pretty generally given up. The human conflicts and struggles of Christ and His real human development have also been more strictly kept in view, for the sake of a more just appreciation both of His example and of the value of His merits. The consequence of this has been however, in many instances, an Ebionite view, which places Christ only in the rank of those human heroes who may be succeeded by similar, or even more exalted beings. Against such a view, however, there has necessarily been a reaction on the part of evangelical theology, based as it is upon a divinely certain experience of Christ's redeeming power, and therefore requiring that God should be in Christ in a sense quite unique and enduring, in other words, an indissoluble union of God with the Man Christ Jesus. This, since God is in Christ not merely by His will, but by His being, points to an eternal and special mode of being of God truly manifested to the world in Christ. We have here the point of union which unites Christology to an immanent view of the Trinity, and will not suffer it to stop at a Sabellian one. The notion of the Second Adam or of the Son of Man, of the "express image of the Godhead," or of the "Ideal Man"[1] has become very important, as furnishing the middle term between the orthodox

[1] Or the central individual of the human race. This must not however be confounded with the universal personality [*Allpersonlichkeit*] a monstrous notion against which I have already more than once expressed myself. Nevertheless this very view has been imputed to me by Hase, *Kirchengesch.*, ed. 9, p. 580, while in vol. xi. of my Christological work, p. 1145, the opposite may be read.

doctrine of the God-man and the Ebionite view. Christian consciousness, however, forbidding an equalization of the redeemed individual with the Redeemer, even after the perfecting of the personality of the former, this middle term is only true when it does not trench upon, but subserve, the universal and eternally unique importance of Christ to the spiritual world. This it does by the acknowledgment that Christ can only be the Second Adam and the Son of Man because He is the Son of God, because a separate mode of existence of the Triune God is manifested in Him. It is indeed frequently the case that the mode of existence of God as the Son is, in opposition to those Church doctrines of the fourth and fifth centuries which were laid down for the establishment of the doctrine of the Trinity, so endowed with absolute personality as to make this belong *directly* to His *own* triune character. If this be done, the union of the Son of God with the human nature of Jesus, which must not be assumed to be non-personal, threatens a double personality, a Nestorianism which many seek to escape by modern "*Kenotik.*"[1] This however, though appealing to divine self-abasing love, supposes an act of violence which shakes the foundations of the Divine nature and of the Trinity, without really contributing anything positive to the actual union of the Divine and human natures. The removal of this difficulty, if it is to be attained without making the human the central point in Christology, can only be effected by carrying out that form of the doctrine of the Trinity which ascribes indeed to God the Son a separate divine mode of existence, but only *indirectly*, and not directly, a participation in absolute Divine personality. This makes a perfect self-impartation of God, as the Son, to the human nature possible, without coming into collision with human personality. And since through the περιχώρησις, and therefore indirectly, the Son participates in the one absolute Divine Personality, which wills and knows itself in three different modes, the human nature also is thereby inwardly united with the Divine personality.

In the rationalistic period, the *prophetic* office, the teaching and example of Christ, had been made all in all. This was followed by a frequent tendency to cast it into the shade, and to misconceive its special and saving value, although it forms the indispensable bridge to that Christian salvation which is, so to

[1] See note, p. 105.

speak, spanned thereby. An increasing importance with respect to sanctification was attributed to it, just in proportion as a more lively perception of the genuine human character in the image of Christ was attained. Nor can the *miraculous power* of Christ offer any real difficulty, if the miraculous origin of His Person in the midst of the human race is admitted —an admission which even those who merely recognize in Christ One absolutely pure and sinless, although they are unable to comprehend the ethical features of His manifestation in an ontological manner, must of necessity make. The doctrine of His *high-priestly* office has been, since Schleiermacher, somewhat discussed, but scarcely with any perceptible results.[1] Some declare war against any reference thereof to the penal justice of God in general, and, opposing both substitution and satisfaction, fall back at most upon the conformation thus given by Christ to Himself, in opposition to the temptations of the world and the devil, and thus see in His death nothing more than His personal moral perfection. Others embrace the theory of a juridical atonement, to the extent of making Christ the object of absolute Divine wrath, and representing Him as bearing intensively even the torments of hell, without indeed being able to show how it is that in this case forgiveness of sins is not a matter of lawful claim on the part of man, since the double discharge of a debt cannot be demanded from a merely juridical standpoint. In opposition to this a middle view has begun to prevail. This, instead of dwelling on the notion of the punishment inflicted upon Christ, turns to the notion of *expiation*,[2] and from the idea of the Head, and of substitutionary love, developes the notion that Christ necessarily bore by His sympathy our guilt and its consequent unhappiness before God, the just for the unjust, for the purpose of honouring, or offering expiation to, the justice of God, on the part of that humanity of which He forms a part, for the sake of which expiation God can regard the whole race of man, seen in Him, as reconciled, and can save them.

[1] In v. Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis* and his *Schutzschriften*, 1856. Thomasius, Philippi, Schmid, Delitzsch, Harnack, Ebrard, Weizsäcker, Ritzchl (*de ira Dei* and *Jahrbuch für die Theologie*, v. 4), Weber (*vom Zorn Gottes*. 1862), have chiefly taken part in this controversy. The treatise of Gess on the New Testament doctrine of the atonement, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1857-58, has found much acceptance.

[2] As by Stahl. Comp. Delitzsch, *Commentär zum Hebräerbrief*, 1854, p. 729, &c.

The legitimate efforts of the age to attribute more power to the *Church* and to its actual organization have called forth in many a tendency to oppose the application of the predicate invisible to the Church (see above, p. 404 *sq.*). This has chiefly taken the form of making baptism, *i.e.* infant baptism, the sole constituent factor of the Church, to the neglect of faith and the word. This attempt, however, at a retrograde movement on the part of Protestantism has encountered as persevering opposition as the revival of those hierarchical notions of the ministry of which we have spoken above. These, too, were founded on the legitimate feeling that it was not sufficient to conceive of the ministerial office as a *purely human* institution, or as dependent on human subjectivity or caprice. These hierarchical notions which had a tendency to combine with a catholicizing view of ordination, and had been zealously opposed at the period of the Reformation, made the constitution of the Church a *matter of doctrine*, and, as was rightly perceived by Höfling, Guericke, and v. Hofmann, even adulterated the material principle of the Reformation by making the agency of the "ministry of the means of grace" a new condition of salvation: thus exchanging one error for another of a still more dangerous nature. This antagonism can only be reconciled by the *ethical* view of Church organization, *i.e.* by the perception that, while arbitrariness must indeed be excluded, the legitimate Christian order of every age meets with the approval of the Holy Spirit, and that the province of ethics, in general, must not be regarded as merely human, but as having in its measure a Divine value also. With respect to the *means of grace* themselves, the magical view has been justly opposed by J. Müller, who insists on maintaining the independence of the agency of the Holy Ghost in a genuine Reformation sense.[1] This independence is not, however, infringed upon by the admission that spirit-engendered productions of every kind, where they meet with corresponding recipiency, show themselves to be indeed a beneficial causality. The question of *Infant Baptism* in particular has again been frequently discussed, and many have, in the interest of personal faith, if not of the possibility of a choice between differing forms of religion, declared themselves in favour of adult baptism, while several have insisted

[1] J. Müller's treatise on the relation of the agency of the Holy Ghost to the word of God as a means of grace.

on at least regarding Confirmation as the necessary *completion* of Baptism. The latter view, as involving an admission that Baptism is not complete in itself, undoubtedly encroaches upon the objectivity of the sacrament, and seeks to complete it in a subjective manner, which must certainly be lacking in the objective agency of Baptism in the case of infants. Those who embrace adult Baptism act, on the contrary, as if the *direct* benefits of that sacrament and a disposition affected by contact with Christianity had no actual share in the normal process of man's salvation, as though everything in the moral development were, on the contrary, to be based purely upon acts of reflection and of conscious life—a notion which would banish also the best influences of education, of Christian family life, &c., in short, of a Christian atmosphere. Nay, they ignore the fact that the basis for the prosperous development of a Christian's life is not his own acts or powers of action, but the fertile soil of God's preventing grace, the aim of which, indeed, must be *self-conscious personality.* This aim certainly gives to adult baptism a certain amount of justification, in opposition to the sloth-inviting view that Baptism, apart even from the consciousness and will of the baptized, can of itself really regenerate and impart salvation. This magical effect is, however, obviated when the preventing grace manifested in Baptism is regarded as a serious act indeed on the part of God, and an adoption into His family, but yet, so far as final salvation is concerned, as something only preliminary though fundamental, as that which does not receive its conformation till a personal decision is made—a decision whose favourable issue, however, is only prepared and effected by the proffer of God's preventing grace.

With regard to the *Lord's Supper*, the dissension between the two evangelical confessions is not indeed as yet entirely obviated. An important mutual approximation is, however, perceptible in a doctrinal point of view, though much timidity and bondage to forms which were in use neither in the primitive nor the mediæval Church, and cannot be essential to the Lord's Supper, are apparent. This approximation on the part of the Reformed is obvious from the fact that in Germany they almost universally entertain a higher view of the Lord's Supper than they formerly did, and recognize therein a Divine *gift*, and not a merely human act. On the Lutheran side it is manifested by ceasing, while insisting on the objectivity of the Sacrament and Christ's presence

therein, from any longer dwelling upon the participation even of the ungodly, and by urging the importance of the Lord's Supper in the aspect *also* of an act of mutual communion among believers. This had always been done by the Reformed, and had in many instances degenerated into a onesided view, which (as Zwingli desired) made the Lord's Supper an act of confession on the part of the Church, and one indeed which had respect to the doctrine held concerning this Sacrament; nay, the attempt had been made to make the form of distribution express such a confession. With regard to this Sacrament, however, the Union, especially in Prussia, gave legal protection to the standpoint of Reformation liberty and truth, and thus checked the introduction of an erroneous Zwinglian principle into the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, and secured the objectivity of the Sacrament against the advancing notion of a merely human act.

Finally, with respect to *the last things*, the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul had met with scarcely any opposition, except from the idealism of a portion of the Hegelian school, and from materialism. It now, however, received confirmation by being connected with the doctrine of Christ's Person, as the pledge of that perfection of individual personalities which makes them worthy of eternal duration. There were but few besides Rothe and Weisse who restricted immortality to the regenerate, and taught that the lost are to undergo a process of annihilation. The assumption that the termination of the earthly life is, in every case, the termination of the Day of Grace, has been pretty generally given up, on account of non-Christians who, never having heard of the Gospel, cannot be ripe for judgment. This has been a step towards naturalizing an alteration in the Reformation doctrine held concerning the *intermediate state*—an alteration which teaches that, even in the other world, a spiritual development, nay, probably a process of conversion, is conceivable, —and has already begun to exert a reactionary influence upon liturgies.[1] With respect to the *end of the world*, successful attempts have been made to introduce millenarian opinions, not merely into certain sects, but within the province of theology, and thus to secure to the present stage its eminent importance

[1] Comp. Stirm: *Darf man für Verstorbene beten? Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1861. Also Leibbrand, and a pastoral letter of General-Superintendent Hahn, 1864.

in the kingdom of God. It would detain us too long to describe the various modern forms of millenarianism, whether within the Church or among the Swedenborgians, Irvingites, Darbyites, Hofmannites, &c. Their common error, however, is to lay too much stress upon externals—upon sight instead of faith—with respect to the perfection of spiritual life, and thereby to damage the ethical origin of faith. One good result may, however, be hoped for. Millenarian notions, both in the early ages of the Church, and again in the times of Spener, were the means of presenting a concrete image of that kingdom of God which is yet to be expected on earth—a kingdom to be established, not, indeed, by abrupt acts on the part of God, but, as is ever His pleasure, by human co-operation. So now also these hopes, which hold up before the Church the end to be aimed at, may become moral impulses contributing to realize the highest purposes of the kingdom of God, according to the necessities of our age.

When we direct our attention to *ethics*, it is evident that, since the time of Schleiermacher, this younger and weaker sister of divinity has been diligently and successfully cherished. The impulse proceeding from Schleiermacher continued in full operation, and resulted in the acceptance, by all ethicists of note, of an ethical *doctrine of the highest good*, whether as the foundation or the result of the ethic process, and also an admission of the individual, as well as the general and identical factor. In consequence of this, it may already be perceived that the hitherto varying arrangement of material is gradually giving place to a settled and progressive organization. The deduction of individual obligations from the idea of individual gifts—an idea to be realized by the power of virtue in corresponding actions, has produced an increased perception both of the glory of the kingdom of God and of the vast, numerous, and varied excellences of its members, as well as given more objective support to the doctrine of individual obligation, and led from the ethics of the individual soul to that common ethic spirit by which the individual must be also animated in the performance of duty. Thus, besides the task imposed on each man of saving or perfecting his own soul, the whole scope of moral labour is now increasingly brought before the consciousness as a task in which each must co-operate; and thus individual morality is rescued from its former narrowness, and from that limited horizon by which its views were

bounded. This is a progress which assuredly demands caution and effort, lest the intrinsic value should lose in intensity as it gains in extension, but which must nevertheless be hailed as an advance. And this is the very progress which may chiefly be expected if the evangelical Church has indeed emerged, in this her fourth century, from a more spiritual and hidden existence in faith and doctrine, and entered into the more objective form of an organized association, whose bond of union is love. In fact, the habit of association, so powerful in the present age, has already made various practical beginnings; and Christian morality has enriched itself by a more thorough discussion of concrete moral questions of a social kind, such as the relation of the State to the evangelical Church, the nature of membership in the latter, the labour question, the state of prisons and the affairs of the inner mission in general, as well as of missions to the heathen. The endeavour to discuss all these questions on settled principles has begun to appropriate to morals departments of the utmost importance, which, though they always appertained thereto, had been hitherto left uncultivated. It may be said that, generally speaking, the increasingly deeper dealing of modern theological science with the essence of the Gospel, has contributed to open those practical sources whence a revival of the whole realm of theoretical theology proceeds. And this brings us to our last division, namely that of *practical theology.*

It is since the idea of the Church and of her essential functions and attributes has been more clearly recognized that practical theology, which was formerly, for the most part, an aggregate of rules and regulations without any organic connection between its several precepts, has been reconstructed. Nitzsch's practical theology, in particular, brings forward its connection with the other branches of theology.[1] *Systematic theology,* which is based upon exegetic theology and faith, and developed by the history of doctrines, exhibits *Christian truth* in the abstract, and therefore the ideal of faith and practice. *Historical theology,* finishing with a delineation of the present state of the Church, opposes the empiric *reality* and its defects to this ideal. The contrast between

[1] C. J. Nitzsch, *praktische Theologie,* 1847, &c., vol. i.: *Allgemeine Theorie des kirchlichen Lebens;* vol. ii. *Das kirchliche Verfahren oder die Kunstlehre.* Div. i.: *Dienst am Wort,* 2: *Der evangelische Gottesdienst,* 1848, 1851, vol. iii., div. i., *Seelenpflege,* 1857.

the two, the variance between the ideal and the real, produces the effort to reconcile this opposition by means of theological usages, in conformity with the requirements of the age. Thus practical theology, as a science, owes its origin to the ecclesiastical procedure of the times; and, as this is necessarily technical, practical theology is also a technical study. For this we are indebted to Schleiermacher, who called practical theology the crown of a theological course of study, and was the first to bestow upon it a scientific organization. In this labour he was laudably followed, not only by Nitzsch, but especially by Marheinecke, Ehrenfeuchter, Moll, Palmer, Hagenbach, and Schweizer. Most are agreed in describing practical theology as a science for the clergy, and thus not doing full justice to the vocation of the believing laity to Church work. Their rights, in this respect, have been chiefly made apparent by the hitherto much neglected theory of Church government, and by voluntary associations for inner missions. On the other hand, the just notion that, since the Church's existence and increase is brought about by constant reproduction, it is necessary to start *from the origin of the Church in individuals*, to proceed to their gathering together, and thence to the Church, may be designated as the prevailing tendency in the construction of a practical theology. Hence the theory of missions (called also Halieutics) and catechization, the aim of which is reception among the confirmed, form its *first main division. The second* embraces the doctrine of *worship*, or of the construction of the public services of the Church (*Liturgics*, with hymnology and sacred music and *homiletics*), the superintendence of the spiritual interests of individuals (cure of souls), and the direction of the flock (the pastoral office); while the organization of the Church, and the entire system of Church law, by which the activity, whether of the individual or the community, must be limited, forms a *third division.*

The theory of missions is in its infancy.[1] Catechization has, after Spener so promoted it, been from the time of Mosheim onwards chiefly devoted to the sharpening of the intellect. Hence, there necessarily arose, as the deposit of the rationalistic system which sees in Christianity nothing more than eternal

[1] Comp. Ehrenfeuchter: *Die praktische Theologie*, div. i. Gottingen, 1859. W. Hoffmann, *Missionsfragen*, Heidelberg, 1847. Calwer, *Beleuchtungen der Missionssache*, 1842.

ideas or truths, that so-called Socratic or erotectic method which seeks to elicit everything from the catechumens.[1] Such a method was, however, partially justified by its opposite, which imparted instruction in an utterly mechanical and external manner. The conviction is now general that, in instruction, the voluntary activity of the intellect and the religious affections must be claimed for the matter to be imparted, and that therefore the natural talents should be enlisted in such wise as to lead to an intelligent appropriation of the Gospel as a thing given.[2]

With respect to *public worship* in general, its idea is admitted to be that neither should God and His word be the only active element therein—the congregation maintaining a merely passive attitude—nor should man alone be active, but that a combination of the Spirit of God with the congregation should take place. In such combination, one or other element may, in the various acts of worship, have the preponderance, but both must be present in all; the human in *prayer* or sacrifice, the Divine in the word and Sacrament as the gift of God.[3] The minister must indeed conduct the worship; yet he is not above the congregation, but of it.

On the one hand, he is the representative of the Church in the individual congregation, and bound to her order in doctrine and ritual, especially when performing sacred acts in the name of the Church, and in common prayer. On the other hand, he is a member of the Church, appointed to speak both by the Church and congregation, and may, upon the foundation of the common faith, let his individuality appear for the general edification in prayer, exposition and prophesying, the chief matter of which is preaching. An agreement has been come to, in which the Reformed Church also coincides, that even *art* is a lawful element in evangelical worship. And that not merely in

[1] So Grässe, Dinter, &c.

[2] Palmer, *Katechetik*, 1844, ed. 4, 1856. *Christliche Pädagogik*, ed. 2, 1862. Stier, Harnisch, Kraussold, also Rütenick (of Schleiermacher's school) von Zezschwitz, *System der christlich-kirchlichen Katechetik*, vol. i., 1863.

[3] Comp. Marheinecke, *Entwurf der praktischen Theologie*, 1837. *Grundlegung der Homiletik*, 1811. Also the works of Gass, Nitzsch, Vetter, Gaupp, Kapp (1831), Ebrard, Höfling (1837), Ehrenfeuchter, Klöpper (*Liturgik*, 1841), Kliefoth, Bähr, Schöberlein (see below), Harnack, *der christliche Gemeindegottesdienst im apostolischen und altkatholischen Zeitalter*, 1856. Liebner, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1844.

church architecture, and the decoration of sacred places, but also in symbolical actions, in poetry and sacred music. Art must however never be the end in view, but only a subservient element, and must always show itself to be the natural and harmonious incorporation of the *religious* spirit. While during the last century Protestant worship had dwindled into dry preaching, rhetorical and sentimental prayers, and the singing of moralizing verses, the revival of the religious spirit introduced fresh vigour, fulness, and unction. A desire for a suitable form of public worship, combining its various parts, and a perception of the true idea of worship, from which its whole theory has been reconstructed, are widely spread, and the still frequently varying usages are approaching to a typical harmony, of which freedom and variety are the settled components. This result is becoming more certain in proportion as the recently discovered treasures of antiquity[1] form both the mind and taste, and fashion the skill and productivity of the age. The result of such an agency would be that the word of God, as the active principle of public worship, would be developed in all its various services, and, exerting an influence neither palæological, palæontological, nor neological, one equally removed from the deadness of an imitative Renaissance and from arbitrary experiments and artifices, would create services of worship not only beautiful in form but filled with spiritual energy.

With respect to *preaching*, the science of homiletics had, from the days of Pietism, risen superior to the luxuriant formalism of those numerous methods of preaching by which it was formerly attempted to compensate for the lack of matter, or, if possible, to invoke it, and returned to that more affectionate manner by which words spoken from the heart may reach the hearts of

[1] Daniel, *Codex liturgicus*, iv. pts. 1847-55. *Thesaurus hymnologicus*, 1841-46, 3 vols. Höfling, *liturgisches Urkundenbuch*, 1854. Koch, *Geschichte des Kirchenliedes und des Kirchengesangs der Christen, insbesondere der deutschen evangelischen Kirche*, 4 vols. Stuttgart, 1852-53. Ph. Wackernagel, *das deutsche Kirchenlied von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Anfang des* 17 *Jahrhunderts*, 1863, &c. (2 vols.) Schöberlein, *Schatz des liturgischen Chor- und Gemeindegesangs*, &c. Göttingen, 1864. Kliefoth, *liturgische Abhandlungen*, i.-iv., Schwerin, 1854-59. Ehrenfeuchter, *Theorie des christlichen Cultus*, 1840. Schöberlein, *der evangelische Gottesdienst nach den Grundsätzen der Reformation mit Rücksicht auf das gegenwärtige Bedürfniss*, Heidelberg, 1854. *Das Wesen des christlichen Gottesdienstes*, Göttingen, 1860. *Ueber den Ausbau des Gemeindegottesdienstes in der deutschen evangelischen Kirche*, 1859.

others. But the Church element was already receding before the subjective. This was still further the case in Mosheim, whose style rather resembles that of the models of classic eloquence, and reminds of Tillotson, and who may be said to form the point of transition to the rationalistic mode of preaching. This, in its earlier period, evinced, as far as its matter was concerned, a strong tendency to eudæmonism and secularity; the preaching of the word of God being exchanged for persuasive and intellectual advice, sage admonitions concerning the useful, directions for the preservation of the health, the cultivation of land, &c. Contemporary with such a state of preaching was the fact that, during the territorialist period, the Church was almost merged in the State. Later rationalism, since Kant, was the parent of moral discourses addressed to the will, with which were combined sentimental sermons appealing to the feelings. In the present century, Reinhard was long esteemed a model of correct style, though this correctness was devoid of animation, and exercised too much restraint upon his matter. He was succeeded by Harms, whose lively and popular manner revived the demand for individuality and animation in preaching.[1] Schleiermacher regarded preaching as a contemplative exercise, according to the measure given to each by the Spirit, as the utterance—though not without dialectic additions—of divine mysteries, in that faith which unites the preacher and the flock. Such a view is opposed to *awakening* preaching, which he leaves to missionary efforts. Some, on the contrary, make this very feature, viz. the awakening of the conscience, the main point; while others make the *didactic* the chief element, confining themselves principally to the form of lectures on church doctrines—a form which necessarily leads to the liturgical. It may be designated as the common persuasion, formed by the advocacy of all these methods, and by the classical models which are found of each, that preaching must be a growth of the word of God grafted upon the stock of a personality vitally rooted in evangelical truth, and therefore in the common faith; that it must be moreover neither entirely argumentative, nor merely monitory, hortative, or affecting; that one or other indeed of these

[1] Claus Harms, *Postillen und Predigten; Pastoraltheologie*, bk. i.; *Der Prediger*, bk. ii.; *Der Priester*, bk. iii.; *Der Pastor*, ed. 2, 1837. Compare his article on the gift of tongues, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1833, 3.

elements may predominate, according to the gifts of the preacher and the circumstances of the flock, but yet that it must be expected if not of every sermon, yet of a course of preaching, if it is to be of a really edifying character, that it should have regard to the whole man, and truly exhibit the instructive, the hortative, and the heart-appealing features. It is generally felt that while its structure and language must not be devoid of artistic excellence, yet that this must be seen to be not an independent object, but only the natural incorporation and manifestation of a mind which lives and moves and has its being in the element of Christianity.[1]

With regard to *Church law*, the territorial system was constantly extended during the past century, until *e.g.* even consistories were abolished in Prussia, and the minister of worship became the supreme ecclesiastical authority. In the beginning of the present century Schuderoff again advocated the collegial system, but he, as well as Wiese, Schmalz, Stephani, Krug, and Pfahl, did this from a rationalistic standpoint. Schleiermacher carried out this same system from his higher notion of the Church, and specially laboured, like Vinet, for the separation of Church and State, while Rothe, idealizing the Hegelian view, designated the independence of the ecclesiastical organization as an injustice sooner or later to be expiated in the Christian state which will comprise all that is Christian and moral. Stahl also advocates the idea of the Christian state, but in the form of an alliance between the State and the clergy, to whom he assigns the episcopal position, and thus attempts a new application of Episcopacy. He urges too directly the solidarity of their mutual interests, to the prejudice of the development of national and ecclesiastical liberty. His views are homogenous with those of the theologians described, p. 398 *sq.* On the other hand, a reconstruction of Church law has been commenced by Eichhorn, Puchta, and especially by Ludwig Richter, E. Herrmann, H. Jacobson, and Dove. The aim of the better tendency is the separation of the law of the Protestant Church from canon law, by the development and realization of Pro-

[1] Compare Nitzsch's before-named work. Palmer, *Homiletik*, ed. 4, 1857. Stier, *Kerytik*, ed. 2, 1844. G. Baur, 1848. Schweizer, 1848. Gaupp, *praktische Theologie*, 2 pts., 1848-52. Hagenbach, *theologische Encyclopädie*, 1861, § 106, &c.

testant ideas concerning the form and government of the Church in its intrinsic independence of the State, but in unison with the spirit of a national or congregational church, which seeks an organization conformable to its nature in the union of the fixed consistorial, and the variable presbyterio-synodal elements.

# SECOND DIVISION.

## The Reformed Nations beyond Germany during the Nineteenth Century.

ONE common phenomenon distinguishes the churches of the Reformation. It is that after the great intellectual revolution of which England was the subject in the former, and Germany in the latter half of the eighteenth century, they approximated each other in many important respects. This was manifest on the part of the Reformed out of, as well as in Germany. About 1750 the controversial element gave place among German-reformed, Swiss theologians, to a peaceful co-ordination with the Lutheran branch. This was exemplified in the divines J. C. Stapfer and D. Wyttenbach.[1] The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination was almost universally abandoned, the German philosophy, viz. that of Leibnitz and Wolff, and subsequently of Kant, also attained an influence among them,[2] though the standpoint of biblical supernaturalism, so homogenous to the Reformed Church, was adhered to.[3] After 1750, the boundary lines between Lutheran and Reformed

[1] Stapfer, *Grundlegung zur wahren Religion*, Zürich, 1746-53, 12 pts. Wyttenbach of Berne, Prof. at Marburg, *Tentamen theolog. dogm. methodo scientifica pertractatæ*, 3 vols. Berne, 1741 ; Francof. 1747. *Compend. theol. dogm. et mor.* Francof. 1745.

[2] Bernsan (*Theol. dogm. methodo scientifica pertract.* pt. i., Hal. 1745, pt. ii., Lugd. 1747, 4to.), subsequently of Franeker, was, like Stapfer and Wyttenbach, a Wolffian. The polemical works of Stapfer (5 vols. 1744, &c.) and Wyttenbach (2 vols. 1763-65) treat Lutheran doctrine as essentially one with Reformed. Stapfer wrote also a course of ethics (in 6 pts. 1756). So also did Wyttenbach and Endemann.

[3] *E.g.* by Endemann of Hanau (*Institut. theol. dogm.* 2 vols. 1777, and *Comp. theol. dogm.* 1782), by S. Mursinna of Halle (*Comp. theol. dogm.* Hal. 1777), and Stosch of Frankfort on the Oder (*Introd. in theol. dogm. et Institutiones theol. dogm.* 1779). Muntinghe of Harderwyk (*Pars theol. christ. theoretica*, 2 vols. 1800) and Heringa of Utrecht occupied, long after, a similar position both with respect to conciliation and biblical supernaturalism.

theology are so obliterated that a separate theological literature can scarcely any longer be spoken of amongst German-speaking Protestants as pertaining to one or other of the two Protestant confessions. And analogous with the relation existing between the foreign German-Reformed churches and the entire Protestant Church of Germany is that between the latter and English and Dutch theology, which may be described as one of mutual friendly intercourse.

It was not only that the differences between the two evangelical confessions appeared comparatively unimportant in the eyes of a religious indifferentism; not merely that confessional controversy was silenced among the representatives of orthodox theology, because they were engaged in deeper and more serious conflicts than those with their fellow Protestants. The most intelligent, the most vitally religious, were the very men who were, in virtue of the critical element inherent in sound faith, most profoundly convinced that a distinction must be drawn between religion and hereditary forms of belief, between faith and theology, and that it is not every member of the body which can occupy the position, or assume the importance of the head or the heart, unless an adulteration of truth is to be the result. Hence, even so early as the latter half of last century, the two confessions often exercised upon each other a salutary influence, which each acknowledged with gratitude. Such men as v. Haller, Euler, Lavater, and Hess, had as large an influence in Germany as in Switzerland. It was, however, the Zürich school of poets (Breitinger, Sal. Gessner) that was the first thus to affect its German neighbours. On the other hand, the influence of a Herder was widely felt in Switzerland, and, even from the beginning of the present century, Basle on the one hand, and Nuremberg on the other, were centres of friendly intercourse, and of a common spirit of Protestant freedom unrestrained by the obligation of forms. As the first streams of fresh life began to pour forth over the Protestant nations, this spirit of union busied itself in extensive Christian undertakings, on a far larger scale than the Christian associations founded by Urlsperger. Among these mention must be made of the missionary society of Basle. This, after the decline of the Halle associations, which were dependent upon Denmark and England, was the first to give the signal for a native fulfilment of this essential vital function of a

flourishing church. It was this institution which, in conjunction especially with that of Wurtemburg, first made the cause of missions to the heathen and the Jews popular. At about the same time a powerful impulse proceeded from England, which resulted in the foundation of hundreds of Bible societies in Germany. Its guidance and nutriment by means of holy Scripture were not to be lacking to the revived material principle, in other words, to conscious individual piety. All this, though proceeding from the Reformed Church, experienced the less opposition, and found the more willing reception, inasmuch as the positive Lutheran theology of the age had, as biblical supernaturalism, clothed itself in a form which was scarcely any longer distinguishable from the positive tendency in Reformed theology. On the other hand, regenerated German theology exercises, in the present century, a very powerful influence upon foreign Reformed churches. Since about 1750, indeed, their own theological activity may be said, in many instances, to have stagnated; they have therefore been the more easily affected, though some decades subsequently, by the movements of German theology.[1]

It is, moreover, another common feature of the churches of the Reformation that, after a period of prevailing unbelief again gave way to renewed love for the gospel, they recurred to the Reformation era, and chiefly to its unanimous confession, for the sake of giving permanence and stability, as well as historical and ecclesiastical standing, to religious movements. In the Reformed Churches out of Germany however, dissensions, nay, divisions, as to the best kind of church regeneration have arisen even among friends of the Church. This has been the case wherever a revival of religion has been experienced in different proportions by the different classes of society, and the zeal for such revival has not been unmixed, on the part of the party of progress, with impatience; wherever this zeal has in a rash and uncritical

[1] The more important works of German theology, whether exegetic, historical, or systematic, have, during several years, been translated into English. Clark's *Foreign Theological Library* gives an entire series of translations from German works. An interest in German theology and literature was first introduced into Britain from America. It first and gradually found acceptance in Scotland and Ireland. Recently, however, a more intimate relation with German theology has prevailed in England also. The negative tendencies having been transplanted from Germany, the necessity of taking notice also of the opposition these have there experienced was at last recognized.

manner struggled to restore the decayed or discarded authority of the confession, advancing even so far as to insist, *e.g.*, on a double doctrine of predestination, and has at the same time delighted in ancient forms of worship; or wherever the enthusiasm for the primitive idea of a free church government has insisted upon a speedy decision to carry out this idea in its purity, before the church feeling necessary for such a purpose was regained. The dissensions alluded to have taken place in France and Geneva, in Holland and England; the divisions in the Canton de Vaud and Scotland. The fact indeed must be admitted that in the above named Reformed Churches, that of England excepted, the parties which laid claim, and for the most part justly, to special Christian zeal, have proceeded to secessions from the national Church. Such secessions have weakened the power of extension, and interrupted the process of recovery, a result to which, indeed, the indifference and dulness of the opposite party has not a little contributed. In such instances there has been an absence of theological science able to fulfil its rightful office of estimating such differences at their true value, of guarding the movement from a premature decision on one side or the other, of approximating the opposing parties, and bringing them for their mutual advantage to a better understanding, both by reviving and spreading among them a feeling of deeper wants, and by developing those germs of truth which are common to both.

In France[1] the Protestant Church had been almost extinguished by its terrible dispersion under Louis XIV. It was not till towards the close of the eighteenth century (1787) that she again entered, with the recognition of government, among the ranks of her sister churches, after having passed her "life in the wilderness, poor in scholarship but rich in faith," amidst the sufferings of Ant. Court, Paul Rabaut, Russel, Durand, Desubes, Benezet, and others. But the times were unfavourable, society was stirred to its very depths, not only by a political, but especially by a mental and religious revolution, which affected even her evangelical convictions, and her theology assumed a defensive or even passive attitude in the presence of the superficial culture

[1] G. de Felice, *Histoire des Protestants de France, depuis l'origine de la Réformation jusqu'au temps present*, ed. 2, 1855, translated into German by Pabst, 1855; Guizot, *Méditations sur l'état actuel de la religion chrétienne*, Paris, 1866, pp. 111-374, especially p. 127, &c.

and illuminism of the age. Direct attacks upon the Trinity, indeed, such as that made by Prof. Gasc, of the newly acquired theological faculty of Montauban, were not tolerated, and the Protestant faith found in Danl. Encontre a staunch defender in Montauban. Men, however, like Sam. Vincent, to whom the essence of Protestantism consisted in free inquiry, or still more like Athan. Coquerel, who failed to perceive that a common belief was necessary to a church, were those whose opinions were more followed. This was a consequence not only of the influence of German rationalism, but of the state of the Church of Geneva, which, together with that of Lausanne, had, since the eighteenth century, become the spiritual metropolis of French Protestantism. For the Genevese Church had long been caught in the toils of Rationalism.[1] The absolute adoption of the theocratic system during the seventeenth century had been succeeded by a shallow formalism; and the confessions of the Reformation were given up first in Geneva, and afterwards in France.[2] A new religious movement, however, of a somewhat methodistical tinge arose in Geneva after 1816, chiefly through the efforts of Robert Haldane, a pious Scotchman. This movement was joined by Malan, Bost, Gonthier, Merle D'Aubigné, and Gaussen, and soon spread into France, Encontre entering into friendly relations with Haldane, and Mark Wilks, an English dissenting minister, exercising a similar influence in Paris. Hence this revival in France was, at first, to a certain degree dependent upon the religious history of Geneva and its Methodism. The more zealous Methodists in Geneva, with Malan and Bost at their head, seceded from the Genevese national Church, because it forbade them to express their own "opinions," or to combat the opinions of others, concerning the union of the two natures in Christ, the agency of grace, and original sin. This secession was followed by the foundation of the dissenting theological school and Church (Oratoire) under Merle, Gaussen, Steiger, Hävernick, and others. The movement, which had spread into France, there stumbled at similar obstacles as in Geneva and the Canton de Vaud, and refused to accede to the acceptance of a settled confession of faith. Hence, in France

[1] J. Vernet, *Instruction chrétienne*, 3 vols. Geneva, 1754, already shared such opinions.

[2] Comp. H. v. d. Golz, *die reformirte Kirche Genfs im* 19 *Jahrhundert*, 1861, i. 22, &c. 49, &c.

also, a certain portion, consisting for the most part of men worthy of all honour, and bearing by this very deed active testimony to the power of Christianity, separated from the national Church, determining to rely upon their own resources instead of deriving their dignity and power from the State, and became models of zeal for the salvation of souls. Men like Felix Neff, Pyt, Gonthier, Audebez, Cook, Wilks, and Haldane, exercised upon youthful theologians, as well as upon the people, an influence which entails a debt of gratitude upon the Church. Haldane and Gaussen, however, introduced into the movement elements of dogmatic legality, of intolerance, and arbitrariness which materially contributed to a separation, which was joined by Count Agenor de Gasparin, Fr. Monod, and others.

This dogmatic legality, which also partially leant towards dualistic predestination, and a most unyielding theory of inspiration, met with opposition within the French Church from men of a genuine church spirit, such as Encontre and Ad. Monod.[1] It was also soon afterwards opposed by names of note in the ranks of the separatists or "Free Church," *e.g.* by Alex. Vinet and E. de Pressensé.

Ad. Monod especially expected success, and looked for a gradual victory, not from the legal stringency of symbolical obligations, but from the united power and perseverance of religious courage and theological attainments, without desiring to fetter the free development of the Church by the ordinances of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, &c. The uncongenial elements which had been engrafted into the French Reformed Church were gradually banished, and while the relation of the Church to the State was still variously regarded, all were agreed that it was advisable to allow a certain amount of latitude in doctrinal matters, and to require an acknowledgment of fundamental facts and truths only.

But a conscious recovery of the complete Reformation principle, for the sake of possessing an internal standard of all further theological movement, and of directing its course, was now the question. Especially was it necessary, with regard to the formal principle, that the ancient form of the doctrine of inspiration—the last appeal of which was, after all, to the authority of the

[1] Ad. Monod, *Pourquoi je demeure dans l'Eglise établie*, Paris, 1849.

Church—should be altered, for the purpose of its due combination with the material principle. In fact, further movement in this direction did not at first proceed from rationalistic tendencies. It was, on the contrary, in the Free Church that the perception was first arrived at, that the Evangelical Church cannot be based solely upon the *formal principle* (to which the *Réglement organique* for the Genevese National Church, after its reconstruction in 1849, alone recurred), but that to rest satisfied with historical or rational proofs of the Divinity of holy Scripture is to lessen and obscure the standpoint of Protestantism, and to abridge the claims of the material principle. In fact it was not till the Christian experience of faith and the power of the Gospel to be its own evidence to the mind were recurred to, that the Reformation position was really recovered. Now this could not, for any length of time, tranquilly endure that antiquated form of the theory of inspiration so strictly insisted on by Haldane and Gaussen. The two would be sure to come into collision, both on account of the authority claimed by this merely ecclesiastical dogma, and because the *material principle* had, from the first, occupied an important position among the Seceders, while this theory of inspiration, suppressing the claims of the human element, remains entirely exterior to the analogy of the process of faith. It was at all events necessary that the consciousness of what evangelical faith and its claims are, should be revived, in opposition to Gaussen and his friends. Adolphe Monod has, in most attractive language, and with heartfelt delight in holy Scripture, brought forward, in his *Adieux*, the thought, how much we lose when we insist upon regarding holy Scripture as only divine, while its divine-human character "lets us also feel the pulsations of a heart filled with human thoughts and emotions." But it was chiefly Alex. Vinet, with his deep piety, his large and highly cultivated mind, his elevated and ardent eloquence and powers of description which recall Pascal, who sought, like Schleiermacher, to supply this deficiency in a scientific manner also, and to advocate, under the certainly unfortunate term of "individualism," the material side of the Reformation principle, nay, to associate it on equal terms with the formal. Edm. Scherer, whose disposition was a happy one, and whose mind was truly penetrated by the material principle, showed himself to have been originally a man of a kindred spirit. But the sharp

conflict with Gaussen's standpoint unfortunately made him lose his balance. Not being able to attain to that inward union of the formal principle, or of Christian objectivity with the freedom of the subject, which he required, he retreated to an even more reserved and inimical position towards this objectivity, without whose complete interpenetration the religious consciousness is barren and unformed, while faith and assurance, being without an object, must consequently become extinct. Scherer by degrees advanced so far in a negative direction that it was only his energetic moral consciousness that any longer afforded him any firm support.[1] Vinet's influence, on the contrary, favoured by the Government persecution of the Church in the Canton de Vaud, and the sympathy excited for its sufferings, and also by the position which he took up with regard to the State as essentially inimical to the Church, a position readily accepted by the Free Church of France, spread increasingly in the Romance countries, and produced a powerful effect among the free Churches which had originally adopted Gaussen and Gasparin's standpoint.

Edm. Scherer is a monument of the fact that the material principle will in the end be undermined if it is exalted to the sole supremacy, that a subjectivity which severs itself from all objective power, for the sake of freedom, is sure to languish under the doom of a restless motion and an aimless activity, of effort without progress, of desire without satisfaction. In him one of the most hopeful spirits fell a sacrifice, not indeed without his own concurrence, to the obstinacy which supposed itself to be advocating pure Christianity in opposing him, and which took offence at the claims of faith, even with respect to the criticism of the canon. Vinet's "individualism" also was undoubtedly inspired by opposition to a *legality* alien to the spirit of evangelical piety, and expressed in a literal scripturalism. His view is unclouded when the question is, to rebuke that false self-destroying standpoint of objectivism which he saw must logically culminate in pantheism. Vinet eloquently brings forward the fact, that moral personifications, *e.g.* the Church and the State, cannot, as such, be pious, or virtuous, or possess faith; that

[1] Colani of Strasburg also advocated with much ability the ethic consciousness. He, however, unnaturally severs the ethic element from ontology and metaphysics, and thus attains to no metaphysical importance of Christ. The ultimate reason for this will be found to be his failing to develop the ethical idea of God.

religion, on the contrary, can dwell only in individuals. At the same time, however—and in this respect Schleiermacher appears in advantageous contrast with him as the far more reflective and moderate spirit—he neither perceives that that alone is the truly evangelical idea of a community which has its existence in individuals animated by a common spirit and its vital law; nor that moral personifications are not truly such until the common consciousness of the genus is in harmony with the personal consciousness of the individual, nay, until they are voluntary instruments of the genuine common spirit.

A medium tendency however, obviously not uninfluenced by recent German theology, arose, occupying a position between that of Scherer and of biblical supernaturalism, which was also advocated in the National Church of France and Geneva. Its chief representative is the clever and talented E. de Pressensé. A firmer adherent than his opponents to the Reformation principle of faith, he was able, by this very fact, to occupy a freer position towards the old theory of inspiration and the criticism of the canon, and has boldly and intelligently espoused the interests of true theological science, and asserted its necessity for the French Church. In his history of the three first centuries,[1] he has shown himself a worthy disciple of Neander, and has, both by his acute criticism of Renan's work, and more especially by an excellent larger work of much research on the same subject, taken part, in the most efficient manner, in the modern discussions on the life of Jesus.[2] His periodical[3] gathers to it a numerous staff of talented young writers, both in and out of the National Church (*e.g.* E. Bersier, Bonifas junior, and others), forces the rationalistic party in that Church to a crisis whose issue can scarcely be doubtful, proves that the spirit of genuine theological science can, at least inwardly, rise above a schism, and shows that even a minority may keep clear of a spirit of sectarianism, and be led by a true Church spirit.[4] It may be

[1] *Histoire des trois premiers siècles de l'église chrétienne*, 2 vols. 1858. *Deuxième série*, 2 vols. 1861.

[2] E. de Pressensé, *Jésus Christ, son temps, sa vie, son œuvre*, ed. 2, 1866, xv. and 684.

[3] *Revue chrétienne*, with the *Bulletin théologique.*

[4] On the left side may also be named Mich. Nicolas Coquerel fils, A. Reville, and Pécaut; on the right, Astié, L. Thomas of Geneva, Lutteroth, R. Hollard, Bois, Bouvier, Jean Monod, A. Schäffer, and Sabatier.

hoped that a theology exercising a rejuvenescent power upon the whole French Church may proceed from the men of this tendency.[1] And it is a special cause of rejoicing that a man of Guizot's mental calibre should be essentially in its favour, and combine with it in its opposition of both a deistic and pantheistic denial of the supernatural, and in its juster view of the inspiration of holy Scripture.

While the wrong position in which the Free Church had at first placed itself is thus being corrected from within, and a more friendly relation to the National Church restored in France, the latter has, by means of such men as Ernest Naville,[2] Godet (of Neufchatel), Fred. de Rougemont, Bungener, and others, so intellectually and efficiently regained French Switzerland, that all excuse for separation is fast disappearing.

With respect to *German Switzerland*, the history of her theology has, since the preceding century, been identical with that of Germany, as is shown by the names of Hess, Lavater, J. G. Müller, Hagenbach, Gelzer, Auberlen, Stockmeyer, Stähelin, and Riggenbach the younger, and also of Schulthess and Alex. Schweizer. Numerous German theologians, such as de Wette, Hitzig, Elwert, Schneckenburger, Beck, Hoffmann, Auberlen, Gess, Held, Keim, and Schulz, all found there a field of activity during a longer or shorter period. Basle is the chief point of communication between German and Swiss theology. Berne is more akin to Basle, through such men as Güder, Immer, Romang, and Wyss, while Zurich rather represents the tendency to moderation in the midst of a fermentation whose free course is restrained by the authority and partiality of the secular Church government. It must, however, be considered that the revival of the Protestant Churches both of Switzerland and France has proceeded from foreign, and especially from methodistical influences, which have restrained a healthy development on the part of science, between which and this revival a certain amount of opposition has existed.

*Holland* also, whose theology, distinguished during the eighteenth century for linguistic attainments,[3] went over into

[1] See above, and *Méditations sur l'Essence de la Religion Chrétienne*, 1863.

[2] Comp. E. Naville, *La vie eternelle*, 1861; *Maine de Biran; Le Père céleste.*

[3] Besides Clericus and the critic Wetstein, Alb. Schultens, the creator of *Modern Hebrew Grammar* (1748), 1686-1750, and his grandson, Heinrich Alb. Schultens, the orientalist, are names of note.

biblical supernaturalism, which, on its side, mingled more and more, as far as matter was concerned, with rationalism, experienced a revival during the first thirty years of the present century. We do not here allude so much to the "separated church," with its narrow, old-Reformed spirit, for after its partial departure it acquired but little theological leadership of any importance. More efficient with respect to the arousing of the Dutch people was the religious and methodistic influence of England and Scotland, but most important and enduring of all has been the influence of German theology and science upon the Dutch universities. It was chiefly by means of Schleiermacher, Neander, and Ullmann that more life and activity entered the Dutch universities. The *Gröningen* school, which regards the Socratic Van Heusde as its founder, and numbers among its followers Hofstede de Groot, Pareau, Van Oordt, and others, is tinged by Schleiermacher's views. It opposed the rationalistic supernaturalism which prevailed in a very moderate form (Heringa, Royards) at Utrecht. It seeks to give prominence, both theoretically and practically, to the human and moral elements of Christianity, to connect itself with à Kempis, Wessel, and other pre-Calvin forerunners of a native Reformation, denies predestination, but also the immanent Trinity, and expresses itself vaguely as to the doctrine of God and the Person of Christ in general. It acknowledges all the miracles in the life of Christ, but denies His Godhead, and seeks especially to give prominence to His human nature. Its most flourishing period was from 1840 to 1850. Since that time its influence has been eclipsed by the Leyden school, at the head of which is Scholtens, author of an historical work on the doctrine of the Reformed Church according to its fundamental principles.[1] He resembles Alex. Schweizer, and brings prominently forward the idea of God, dwelling, however, chiefly upon His infinity and power. Like Schweizer, he transforms the predestination of the Reformation era into philosophical supralapsarian Determinism, with an apokatastasis. He lays more stress upon the metaphysical necessity resulting from the Divine omnipotence than upon moral bondage by reason of sin. His speculation is deficient in deep moral and religious feeling. Christ is, in his view,

[1] *De Leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare Grundbeginselen*, 1855. He was opposed, among others, with much critical acumen, by Dr. Chantepie de la Saussaye, 1859.

the man who perfectly manifested the Divine image. He fluctuates between deistic and pantheistic notions. He regards the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* as a *testimonium rationis Christum agnoscentis,* while the material principle is the acknowledgment that the absolute sovereignty of God, and especially His grace, is the sole cause of salvation. No metaphysical interest leads him to deny miracles, while, on the other hand, no religious interest induces him to maintain them. His denial of free will, moreover, being necessarily identical with dependence upon the course of nature, tends towards Deism, unless religion obtains a more essential and independent position. Hence, while in his avoidance of mysticism, he would willingly stop at theological idealism, others, partly of his school, have allied themselves with the so-called exact or empiric method introduced into theology from natural philosophy. Among the advocates of this method is Opzoomer, professor of moral philosophy at Utrecht, who formerly adhered to the Krausian philosophy, represented at Brussels by Ahrens. In 1845 he proclaimed man's reconciliation with himself by means of reasoning, but subsequently, like Pierson and Busken Huët, he made external experience, in opposition both to external authority and speculation, the only means of certainty: as if there could be a knowledge worthy of the name without self-evident ideas, or as if the religious were not, as well as the sensuous, a matter of experience. Hence his position is inimical to Christianity.

All these schools, however, including the first-named, do not satisfy the national religious feeling of Holland, and there has now for a long period existed, besides these, another tendency akin to modern German theology, though without academical patronage, which promises to be prolific of theological results. Its beginnings were rude and austere, nay, it inclined to a legal juridical theology, after the manner of Stahl, and sought to put a stop to the above described separation, by more strictly enforcing the ancient ecclesiastical confessions and ordinances. It numbers among its adherents the statesman and scholar, Groen van Prinsterer, the poet Wilhelm Bilderdyk († 1831), and the converts from Judaism, Isaac da Costa († 1859) and Abr. Capadose, the latter of whom entertains hopes of the latter-day glories of Israel similar to those of Auberlen, Baumgarten, and v. Hofmann. From this school was gradually separated an

estimable company of closely allied friends, who more duly appreciated science and laboured for a regeneration of believing theology, unfettered by a literal adoption of the symbols. They established journals of their own, viz. *De Vereeniging* and *Ernst en Vriede.* To this party belong, besides the practical Heldring and Van Rhyn, the theologians Van Oosterzee[1] and Doedes, now, together with Ter Haar,[2] professors in Utrecht, Chantepié de la Saussaye of Haag,[3] and Beets.[4] These insist upon maintaining the mystical element of faith, which was increasingly lost sight of by the Gröningen school. They seek to construct a theology, uniting the speculative and the historical, the real and the ideal, and advocate also the Reformation synthesis of the ethic and religious with the intellectual. It is upon its internal strength that the hopes of the Dutch Church, which since its reorganization and the declaration of the general synod of July 25, 1865, has been wholly deprived of all legal protection of its reformed or Christian confession,[5] must henceforth chiefly depend.

We must now glance at the *Scotch Church.* After the "dark age" of the eighteenth century, the evangelical party, then called the "Wild-men," who opposed the moderates, and especially Robertson, attained increasing importance. The piety of the more peaceable, who adhered to the customs of their forefathers and maintained their form of worship, their diligent Bible-reading, the ministerial office of the head of the household, and the strict observance of the Sabbath, and who were also reinvigorated by English Methodism, gradually obtained eminent spiritual leaders, among whom Chalmers was the most celebrated. With him were associated the noted Church historian Thomas M'Crie, Welsh, Candlish, and others. The question concerning the rights of patrons however arose, and entailed serious conse-

[1] Van Oosterzee's work on *Christology*, in 3 vols., 1859. *Evangelium Lucæ*, *Pastoralbriefe*, and *Jacobus* in Lange's *Bibelwerke* (translated in Clark's *Foreign Theological Library*). *Jahrb. für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1853, &c.

[2] Doedes has treated on baptism and the Lord's Supper, as well as on the Resurrection of Christ. Ter. Haar, *Geschiedenis der christelyke Kerk.*

[3] *Gedanken über das Wesen und das Bedürfniss der Kirche*, and other works. See above, p. 481.

[4] *Paulus*, translated by Gross, 1857.

[5] Comp. *Contemporary Review*, March 1866; *The Freest Church in Christendom*, pp. 459, &c.; and Köhler, *die niederländische reformirte Kirche*, 1856.

quences to the Church. Christ's sole sovereignty in the Church, which had already been insisted on in the Westminster Confession, seemed to a powerfully stirred Church consciousness irreconcilable with the right of patrons to nominate a minister to his parish.[1] Parliament protecting the rights of patrons, a secession from the Established Church took place, and the Disruption of 1843 divided the Scotch Church into two almost equal parts. The Free Church, with Chalmers at its head, was obliged to turn to the voluntary principle, though Chalmers still advocated the *idea* of a national church, in opposition to Dr. Wardlaw, a celebrated Independent minister. Much as this schism may be lamented, the devoted love of a nation to its Church, and the power of self-sacrifice, never received a more striking exemplification. The matter itself in question was one concerning relation to the State—viz. whether the latter could be entitled to maintain and defend a privilege, in opposition to the declared will of the Church, because this privilege had assumed the character of a private right, while the Church, which had also formerly esteemed it such, was now convinced that it was an important and public concern of the Church. The contest was analogous to that against patrimonial jurisdiction within the State. But certain as it is that the opponents of patronage had a more exalted notion of the Church than its advocates, it is equally so that their proceedings were also materially influenced by the fact that they were transforming into doctrine not a doctrinal, but an ecclesiastico-political proposition. Neither could they make it self-evident that absolute independence of the State and of the patron is a necessary and essential quality of the Church, nor that every kind of dependence thereon is a violation of the sole sovereignty of Christ. For this sovereignty is not in such wise abdicated to the existing Church, that an injury to its sovereignty is an injury to that of Christ, nor is it necessary absolutely to deny that Christian laymen may, in virtue of a privilege formerly conceded to them, co-operate, as representatives of the common choice, in the appointment to benefices.[2]

[1] The Westminster Confession admits indeed an intimate connection between the Church and the civil power, but one more of a theocratic than of a Cæsaro-papistical kind.

[2] It seems possible to reduce the right of patronage to co-operation, by increasing the strictness of the tests and conditions of qualification for the ministerial office, since the patron can choose none but such as are ecclesiastically approved.

Such opposition to the State, which can only be carried out in cases where a school system common to both Church and State is wanting, must consistently, though involuntarily, lead to opposition to a national existence of the Church in general. This fact is increasingly evident in the Free Church of France, and its significant expression is a growing opposition to infant baptism, which is however strenuously upheld, in opposition to the Baptists, by both the Presbyterians and Congregationalists of Scotland. The Free Church of Scotland, true to the instinct of Chalmers, still seeks to maintain its national character,—an endeavour in which it is restrained by no doctrinal impediments. A mutual understanding, moreover, with numerous previous seceders (the United Presbyterian Church) has been brought about. The Free and the National Churches vie with each other, not only in practical expressions of Church vitality, but also in scientific labours. On the whole, the formal principle still preponderates, and Gaussen's work on *The Verbal Inspiration of Holy Scripture* expresses the present prevailing orthodoxy of Scotland. Many Scottish divines, however, have already taken up a somewhat freer position with regard to the doctrine of predestination. The modern Church of Scotland is also far removed from the flights of a theocratic spirit, and the claims therein involved of prescribing both means and end to the State. Finally, it must be admitted that Scotland is increasingly entering into contact with the German Church and German science, and that her youthful theologians are manifesting a lively feeling for science.[1] The names of chief note are those of Candlish, Hanna, Fairbairn, Cairns, and Norman Macleod.

[1] With all respect for the mental acuteness of Sir William Hamilton (see above, p. 97) and his conciseness of language, the Scottish mind has not yielded itself captive thereto. He has found in Mansel of Oxford (*Limits of Religious Thought*) a follower who carries his doctrine, that the Unconditioned, the Infinite, must *be believed*, while the reason, the organ of all knowledge, can see only contradictions therein, so far as to make non-knowledge the basis of theology, and to evaporate faith into an utter vagueness, which can only be filled up by positive authorities, *i.e.* by holy Scripture, the divine nature of which he considers sufficiently proved by the old English system of evidences. He has been however encountered not only by such men as Maurice (not to mention J. Mill, the positivist, in the sense of Auguste Comte's absolute sensualism), but also by the Presbyterian theologians M'Cosh (*Divine Government*, ed. 3, 1852, and *Intuitions of the Mind*, 1860) and Calderwood (*Philosophy of the Infinite*, ed. 2, 1861). For further particulars, see below, p. 494.

On the other hand, Scotland has exercised an influence upon the Continent, and especially upon Germany, by means of Irvingism. Edward Irving was a famous Scotch preacher in London, 1822-32, whose leading ideas can only be understood when viewed as the result of a reaction against the supremacy of the formal principle.[1] He perceived that by the latter alone, Christianity can neither be correctly expounded nor proved to be truth. The usual *evidences*,[2] whether in their historical or their rational form, did not content him, while Romish tradition appeared to him petrified and immovable, as well as convicted of manifold errors. On the other hand, he does not so far comprehend the active tradition of the Holy Spirit in believers, in whom the fact of redemption is continually renewed, as to perceive that the outward form and organization of the Church are fitly relegated to the second place, when compared with present salvation through justifying faith, the principle both of love and wisdom, and of genuine Church organization. On the contrary, he has a Catholicizing preference for the outward form of the Church, and also places sanctification before justification through faith. He requires a *Divine* origin for church organization, and divine authority for the interpretation of Scripture, for which faith is in his view insufficient. He thus arrived, not without an admixture of Millenarian notions, at the view, that the safety of the Church depends upon a return to a divinely-instituted apostolate, by which both the right interpretation of Scripture and the distribution of powers and offices is to be determined. In Germany, Irvingism obtained the advocacy especially of Thiersch. It is however obvious that in the course of generations, if the sect last so long, the inordinate craving for liberty, appeased as it is in an enthusiastic form, must, as in Montanism, degenerate into the legalism of authority and a dependence of posterity upon a dead and past tradition, because that true union of liberty and authority found in

[1] Irving, *For the Oracles of God*, ed. 3, 1824. *Babylon and Infidelity Foredoomed of God*, 1826. *The Last Days*, 1828. *Homilies on the Sacraments*, 1828. *Sermons, Lectures, and Discourses*, 1828. *Explanation of the Apocalypse*, 4 vols. 1831. *The Orthodox and Catholic Doctrine of Our Lord's Human Nature*, 1831. (Sin was in His flesh, but not in His will.)

[2] Of which Haldane's work, *Evidence and Authority of Divine Revelation*, 2 vols., edit. 3, 1839, is a recent specimen.

the combination of the formal and material sides of the evangelical principle is lacking.

With respect to the *Anglican Church*, the horrors of the French Revolution, and the conflicts waged till 1815 by England against France, contributed to revive the fear of God and an active Protestant feeling among the people, while the nation received, by means of those after effects of the Methodist movement which were felt within the Church, a new religious impulse without a new schism. On the contrary, this revival of the Church from about the end of last century was of a scriptural and Christian, but not of a specifically confessional character. The deistic period had resulted in an extension of the right-hand of fellowship over many a wall of separation both within and without the Church. Churchmen and dissenters co-operated in missionary, tract, and Bible societies. Men full of faith, like Rowland Hill and the noble layman Wilberforce,[1] Jos. Gurney and F. Buxton, jointly advocated Christianity and the principles of humanity, *e.g.* the emancipation of slaves, both in Parliament and in private circles. The flourishing period of this movement, whose organ was the *Christian Observer*, extended to about 1830. Its tendency being however an entirely practical one, its advocacy confined to three points, viz. the necessity of conversion, justification through faith, and the sole authority of holy Scripture, and its logical deficiencies obvious, it was not long before a uniformity of expression and a tradition leading to a mechanical and got-up phraseology were formed. Thus the "Evangelical," called also "the Low Church party," became, in the opinion of its adversaries, the *low and slow church.* A more active movement however again burst forth among a portion of the evangelicals. This was occasioned by schemes for the conversion of England on the part of the Romish Church, and by the Catholicizing tendencies of Puseyism. Something of the old Puritanism revived among the Recordites (so called after their organ, the *Record*), but in such wise that they took up too legal an attitude, and in their doctrinal timidity, nay, narrowness, regarded with suspicion every freer movement of even believing science. They again partly bring forward the old-reformed doctrine of predestination, and indeed lay stress upon personal assurance of salvation, in the

[1] R. Hill, *Village Dialogues*, 1829. W. Wilberforce, *A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System contrasted with Real Christianity*, 1826.

form, however, of a consciousness of belonging to the elect, the totality of whom they regard as constituting the Church. They view holy Scripture as verbally dictated by the Holy Spirit. They are most strenuously opposed to all Romanizing and hierarchical tendencies, and require, when seeking to fashion the Church after their notions, in place of the three above-named fundamental dogmas of the evangelical party, the prevalence of what is almost equivalent to old-Reformed orthodoxy.

The second leading tendency is the *High Church party*, which till about 1830 was chiefly represented by a political party (the Tories) and by formalistic Churchmen,[1] who treated the Church as a means, and dwelt chiefly upon the baronial rights of the episcopate. When however the independence of religious life increased and the Church inclined to reforms, when admission to Parliament was conceded to dissenters and Roman Catholics, the danger of the close alliance hitherto maintained with the State became obvious. Hence a movement arose which desired to recur to something whereby the Church would be an association independent of the State. This was found by a circle of young men in Oxford, and chiefly members of Oriel College, in the Sacrament as the internal, and in the episcopate as the external bond of union. Pusey, Newman, Keble, Oakley, Palmer, Ward, Hook, and others, united for frequent participation of the Lord's Supper, and for the development of those ideas on which they believed the regeneration of the Anglican Church to depend. Among themselves again there arose this distinction, that while some, especially Keble and Pusey, favoured poetical and sacramental mysticism, after the fashion of Port-Royal Jansenism, others, as J. H. Newman, manifested chiefly an interest for the outward form of the Church, its constitution and authority. The latter soon seceded in considerable numbers to the Church of Rome. And even the former oppose the objectivity of the Sacrament, not only to an anti-mystical subjectivism, whether intellectual or moral, but also to evangelical justifying faith, in so far as this, being an independent source of divine assurance of salvation, assumes a critical position with respect to the authority of the Church. They require, on the contrary, a

[1] Wordsworth and others are not however Puseyite High Churchmen. The organs of the High Church party are at present the *Quarterly Review* and the *Guardian*. The organ of the Puseyites is especially *The Christian Remembrancer*.

subjection to the Church involving a renunciation of religious independence. Thus the mysticism of this party is not a mysticism free towards God, but one which makes itself passively dependent upon the ordinances of the Anglican Church, its tradition and episcopate. Robt. Wilberforce, who subsequently seceded to Rome, raised the latter to the importance of an official continuation of the incarnation—a notion which was hand in hand with the inclination to return to the doctrine of transubstantiation. The Puseyites stated their views in the *Tracts for the Times*, whence they obtained the name of Tractarians.

Apostolical succession is regarded by them as essential to the idea of the true Church. Christ, say they, not only chose to have a visible Church, but also to arrange and settle its constitution. The duly constituted bishop is the representative of the apostles, and the laying on of his hands endows the priest with power to consecrate the elements, to bestow absolution upon penitents, and, as the mediator of the congregation, to offer a priestly sacrifice in prayer. Especially have priests, in virtue of their ordination, which is regarded as a sacrament, power to regenerate and wash away sins by baptism, and to combine the elements with the body and blood of Christ by consecration. Both sacraments operate *ex opere operato*. It is for the clergy to exercise discipline; there is no right of private judgment in matters of faith. Doctrinal decisions rest with the episcopate. There is no divine assurance of faith; in other words, no assurance either of personal salvation or of the truth of Christian doctrine, but it is by the authority of the Church that this truth is guaranteed. Sanctification is extended to the inclusion of justification; and the latter being weakened, nay, the assurance of it denied, the Christian is deprived of the possibility, nay, of the right, to be anything else than a dependent member of the Church. It is indeed admitted *in thesi* that the Church, *i.e.* the hierarchy, may err, but asserted that she never did err so long as she remained one, *i.e.* previous to the great schism between the Greek and Western Churches, and that therefore ancient Catholic doctrine must be combined with holy Scripture in forming the rule of faith. This necessarily involves the fact, that patristic studies have obtained a certain degree of cultivation among this party. The Church in England moreover is said to be at present the only still genuine continuation of the

Catholic Church. To designate the uniqueness of her advantages, it is said that she is distinguished from the Romish Church by purity of doctrine and an anticurialistic episcopacy, from the Greek Church by at least purity of doctrine, and from the Continental Churches by her apostolical succession. She is the true Catholic Church on earth. Since the sacraments can be lawfully and efficaciously administered only by episcopally ordained pastors, many Puseyites doubt whether the Continental Churches have efficacious sacraments. They have introduced an oblation at the Lord's Supper, as an unbloody sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ offered by the priest, sanctioned a belief in a purgatory, though not in the Romish doctrine of purgatory, and allowed the veneration of pictures and relics and the invocation of superior spirits as intercessors. Robt. Wilberforce sought to give a doctrinal substructure to these views, by the theory which strives to conceive the whole life of the Church as a continuous incarnation of the Divine life in the form of the ecclesiastical ministry—a theory which reminds of Möhler. It can be no matter of surprise that many clergymen and laymen of this party have gone over to the Church of Rome, a proceeding from which others have been restrained only by feelings of patriotism and English independence. Pusey himself has been preserved from such secession by the secondary importance which he ascribes to the external validity of the Church when compared with piety. Many have remained in the hope of transforming the whole Church by a counter-reformation. This party, which at first increased with great rapidity, sought also to fashion the customs and worship of the Church according to its own principles (Ritualism). This practical development of its principles however brought Puseyism into collision with the English people, who are Protestant at heart. In their horror of a hierarchy, they only the more firmly embraced an episcopate appointed by the Crown. Besides the opposition of the evangelicals, and especially the Recordites, scientific attacks, upon Reformation principles, have been undertaken against this tendency.[1] The controversies, which naturally discussed its theory

[1] *E.g.* by W. Goode and the *Contemporary Review*, Jan. and April 1866; by Isaac Taylor, *Ancient Christendom* and *The Restoration of Belief*, 1855; and by the Congregationalists, Halley, Dr. Vaughan, Davidson. Comp. *Judgments of the Privy Council*, 1865, pp. 117, 154, 176.

of ministerial sacramental grace, proceeded from *Holy Baptism* to the *Lord's Supper*, and thence to *confession* in the form of private auricular confession. In the contest between Gorham and Philpott, Bishop of Exeter, 1848, it became evident that they laid more stress upon baptismal regeneration than upon justifying faith; that while their doctrine of baptism would transform regeneration into justification, the personal faith required for the latter is by no means specially taken into account. Baptism not only operates without previous faith, but it also operates beneficially without producing personal faith. Baptism bestows the forgiveness of sins and justification; the latter however still denotes rather indwelling than imputed righteousness. Judgment was given in favour of Gorham, but the Puseyite doctrine of baptism was left uncensured. The second stage of the controversy, viz. that which touched on the Lord's Supper, placed the Puseyites in a less favourable position. The Puseyite Denison not only approximated to the Lutheran Church, in opposition to the Thirty-nine Articles, with respect to the real presence of Christ's body and blood, but laid excessive stress upon their reception by the unworthy as well as the worthy, and united with this magical notions of the power of priestly consecration. The leaders of his party made his cause their own, but he was condemned by the archiepiscopal court of Canterbury. Puseyites are gradually disappearing from the episcopacy, their chief supporters being chiefly the Bishop of Oxford and a few Scotch bishops. Finally, Poole endeavoured to restore *private and auricular confession.* This however excited much commotion, and sentence was pronounced against him. A widespread reaction against this catholicizing tendency is already evident among the English people; but, unfortunately, when the people turn from their teachers as heretics, the result of such a state of affairs is, that they fall into irregularities of all kinds, that an anti-Christian spirit is aroused, to which the materialistic disposition nourished by the restless spirit of commerce, and the powerful development of the natural, without an adequate counterpoise of the moral, sciences, not a little contributes. On the whole, the English mind has shown an antipathy to a symbolical religion which delights in twilight and sentimental obscurity, and the Puseyite movement is already rapidly declining.[1]

[1] Comp. *Contemporary Review*, Jan. 1866.

A *third party*, on which the name of *Broad Church* has been bestowed, is more favourable to the progress of science than either of the two last described. It must not be confounded with the latitudinarianism of the Anglican Church of the seventeenth century, which fell into Arminian superficiality, and reappeared about 1750, after the prevalence of Deism. The freer tendency which has increasingly prevailed since the revival of the religious spirit about 1830, assumed a nobler and more solid form. Without desiring themselves to form a party, the men of this tendency occupy a middle position between the High Churchmen, to whom the Church is everything, and the Low Churchmen, to whom the individual believer is everything. They seek to unite both, for the purpose of thus elevating and ennobling the national mind of England in moral, religious, and scientific respects. Thomas Arnold, the well-known master of Rugby school,[1] who was at the head of this tendency, was, together with the talented writer and poet Coleridge, favourable to the Reformation synthesis of the intellectual and the moral. A number of highly-gifted men, *e.g.* Julius Hare, Stanley, Kingsley, Temple, Pattison, Wilson, Tait, and others,[2] may be reckoned as belonging to his school. Maurice, formerly professor of King's College, an advocate of a general restoration of all things, and of a doctrine of redemption which reminds of Schleiermacher and v. Hofmann, is a man of kindred tendencies.[3] He exhibits a congeniality of mind with Coleridge, the disciple of Schelling. His friend Trench, Archbishop of Dublin, has treated the Sermon on the Mount, the idea of miracles, and the miracles and parables of Christ, in an admirable manner, and one which

[1] *Sermons, Church Reform, Miscellaneous Works, Life*, by Stanley, ed. 2, 1844.

[2] Julius Hare, Archdeacon: *Charges, Victory of Faith, The Mission of the Comforter, Vindication of Luther against his recent English assailants, The Contest with Rome* (against Newman, in opposition to whose Essay on Development Archer Butler's Letters on Romanism were also written); Charles Kingsley, *Alexandria and her Schools*, and other works; Stanley, besides his Sermons and Essays, wrote a *Commentary on the Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1847, and a *History of the Jewish Church*, 2 vols. 1865.

[3] Maurice, *Kingdom of Christ*, ed. 2. 1842; *The Religions of the World*, 1847; *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, 1850; *Theological Essays*, 1863; *The Word; Eternal, and the Punishment of the Wicked; Eternal Life and Eternal Death*. He has also discussed the scriptural doctrine of sacrifice, and written on the patriarchs and lawgivers, the prophets and kings of the Old Testament, and on the Gospel of St. John.

shows him to be conversant with German literature. These men are not only intimately acquainted with, and favourable to, German theology, but have also in some respects equalled it.

A glance at the general condition of theology in Great Britain shows that a lack of scientific activity is, as has been already hinted, a main defect of the evangelical party, while the Puseyite tendency has confined its services in this respect chiefly to the revival of patristic studies. Exegetic and critical investigations have, for the most part, been hampered by the old theory of inspiration. Alford, however, who has published a commentary and edition of the New Testament (1849), and some others, form notable exceptions.[1] In systematic theology, apart from the above mentioned controversies, works of an apologetic character (evidences) have alone excited much interest.[2] Till very recently, works of the former century, the productions of Lardner, Butler, and Paley, were regarded as so classical and unsurpassable, that the youth of Britain had to learn them by heart, and were then held to be fully armed and equipped against all attacks, although the method of these writers is only that of biblical super-

[1] Other exegetes are, Webster and Wilkinson (*Greek Testament with notes*); Trollope, Conybeare, and Howson (on St. Paul); Ellicot, Bishop of Gloucester, *Pauline Epistles and Life of Christ;* Jowett, *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles*, and opposed to him Davies, *St. Paul and Modern Thought;* Westcott, *History of the Canon of the New Testament; Exegesis of the Old Testament;* Wright, Candlish, J. J. Howard, *On Genesis;* A. B. Davidson, *Commentary on Job*, 1862; Henderson, *On Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the minor prophets;* Pye Smith, *The Scripture Testimony to the Messiah;* Tregelles and Pusey, *On Daniel.* Dr. S. Davidson has written Introductions to the Old and New Testament, Kitto, Smith, Fairbairn, biblical dictionaries. *The Judgments*, p. 247, &c., leave room for biblical criticism.

[2] The *Congregational Lectures* contain a valuable collection of doctrinal and moral articles, *e.g.* Henderson, *On Divine Inspiration*, which he does not view as literal; Payne, *On Original Sin;* Gilbert, *On the Christian Atonement;* Pye Smith, *The Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ;* Halley, *The Sacraments*, 2 parts; Wardlaw, *Christian Ethics.* Many treatises on the atonement, by theologians speaking the English language, have lately appeared. Jowett advocates Socinian notions, F. D. Maurice insists upon regarding the work of Christ from the point of view of an ethical sacrifice, without seeking any closer relation between Divine penal justice and the atonement. A third view, approaching to that of Park of Andover (see below, p. 500), is advocated by John Cotter Macdonnell, *The Dotrine of the Atonement*, London, 1858. This follows in the steps of Archbishop Magee's work (*Atonement and Sacrifice*, about 1800), and insists on the distinction between expiation and punishment (p. 197), since Christ, being guiltless, could not have suffered punishment properly so called, but might bear an expiatory penalty proportionate to the requirements of the law. Thompson, Beysie, John Macleod Campbell, and others, hold similar views.

naturalism, which arrives, by means of a contemplation of nature and historical considerations, at certain probabilities in favour of Scripture. The progress of German theology, however, began to take effect in England also, and to shake the confidence felt in this method by stirring the minds of men to demand greater certainty and more knowledge, while Puseyism was regarding personal assurance of salvation as enthusiastic, Methodistic, and destructive to the Church, because leading to private judgment. It was then that Professor Mansel of Oxford[1] attempted to regain a more favourable position for the old formal system of evidences, and to revive its authority by trying, with considerable acquaintance with German philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Schleiermacher, to prove that there are in the doctrines of revelation no difficulties to the reason which are not also difficulties, nay, contradictions which the reason cherishes in itself. Basing his theory upon Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy of the conditioned (see above, p. 97), he sought, and not without acuteness, to prove that man, as a finite being, cannot help conceiving of God as finite, *i.e.* in an anthropomorphic manner. On the other hand, however, man has the feeling that God is not finite; hence a necessary error is already imposed upon him by his mental constitution, if he attempts to *know* anything in the province of religion. He can only be free from contradictions when, absolutely renouncing the knowledge of things divine, he admits that he exists only for what is practical. Far from attempting to construct a theology on the *feeling* for the Infinite, he denounces it under the name of intuitional theology, and is driven by his thesis that the reason cherishes within itself the same enigmas or contradictions that revelation does, to admit that there is not only no religious knowledge, but no knowledge of what is good, or absolutely valuable or moral. For this too would be a knowledge of something infinite. On the contrary, the moral is, in his view, nothing else than that which God wills that we should do or leave undone. There is nothing good in itself, nor any knowledge of such good, but only a knowledge founded upon the positive assertions of historical revelation. Hence what God has commanded at one time He may forbid at another. According to Mansel, God may even break the moral laws, and this he calls moral miracles. Now

[1] *Limits of Religious Thought.*

even revelation can, on the other hand, reveal to man nothing that is infinite and Divine, if such matters are absolutely inaccessible to him. Hence he also asserts that revelation is only symbolical. Human reason is, moreover, incapable of criticizing revelation. Nevertheless, reasoning may lead towards revelation, if only too much be not required, *i.e.* if we will renounce knowledge in things Divine, and rest satisfied with probabilities. And these, he thinks, are sufficiently given in those works of Paley and Butler, to which he finally refers in the hope that he has revived their fading glory. His intention is to serve the cause of orthodoxy, but such an orthodoxy as would finally subject us to the mere authority and assertions of the Church. He regards rationalism and dogmatism as equally erroneous, because both maintain the possibility of knowledge, but does not perceive that he makes the incarnation, atonement, &c., mere symbols, transforms the Christian into a pre-Christian religion, a religion of symbols, and thus, with all his opposition to speculation and intellectual knowledge, falls into the very midst of rationalism. Finally, he does not see that he is condemning man to a perpetual dualism and bondage, by asserting that though he possesses a certain notion of God, without which no religion could exist, yet, that this idea of God is not of a positive, but only of a negative nature, and must have the effect of denoting all our thoughts of God as necessarily untrue. He has been triumphantly encountered by Maurice[1] and Professor M'Cosh of Belfast;[2] both have exposed the obscuration of the Reformation principle of faith involved in this theory, and many men of note in England have been led, by means of this controversy, to turn their attention to that restoration to their proper position of the much misconceived material principle of the Reformation, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit to Christianity, which may prescribe more modest limits to formal evidences, and involve the admission that it is as impossible, as it is superfluous, to found upon them the assurance of faith properly so called.[3]

[1] *What is Revelation?* 1859.

[2] *Intuitions of the Mind*, 1860.

[3] The author of *Ecce Homo*, a survey of the life and work of Jesus Christ, ed. 4, 1866, has entered, in an original and attractive manner, into the Continental controversy on the life of Jesus. Possessing a sound and acute vision for reality, such as the theologically trained eye seldom enjoys, and appealing to those

But in connection herewith another serious crisis for old English and Scotch theology seems to be approaching from the other side. A more negative tendency has also been formed, and has found speech in the *Essays and Reviews*, which produced, as it were, an explosion in England, especially because the authors of these seven treatises were mostly dignitaries of the Anglican Church.[1] In this work, Temple, Arnold's successor at Rugby, so conceives of the education of mankind as to make the development of the human race appear an immanent one, and the result of inherent powers, without maintaining a secure position for Divine agency. Jowett, a meritorious and acute commentator on the Pauline epistles, denies inspiration, original sin and the atonement. Roland Williams, an enthusiastic admirer of Bunsen, denies the Divinity of Christ and the incarnation. Baden Powell attacks the evidences of Christianity, and especially miracles, without apparently seeking to prove the truth of Christianity in any other manner. On the other hand, some of the labours of the essayists are praiseworthy, and in keeping not only with science but with positive church teaching.[2] Convocation pronounced its condemnation of the work in 1864, but it is self-evident that questions of this kind can neither be decided nor silenced in this official manner, nor could a sentence against its authors be obtained from the highest court of appeal. Hence nothing remains but a scientific refutation of its errors, and this will not misconceive the amount of truth which is to be found in the essays with respect to Puseyite notions of authority, biblical supernaturalism, and unscientific notions.

This negative tendency has already been opposed with sound scientific ability by (see above p. 493) the able exegete and

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facts and sayings of the life of Christ which are most indisputable, he brings forward, in a striking and simple manner, the new pneumatico-ethical nature of Christianity, and showing that the teaching, life, and sufferings of Jesus are intimately connected with the nature of the Gospel, he both produces an impression of the internal truth of Christianity, and naturally rises above the theories of both an intentional and an unintentional invention of such a life and personality.

[1] *Essays and Reviews*, Oxford, 1860, a work which was regarded as the programme of a party distinguished for scientific acquirements. It has been opposed by Tait, Taylor, and others.

[2] Especially Pattison's excellent article on the *History of the English Church*, from 1689 to 1750.

critic, Alford, Dean of Canterbury (†), Stanley, Dean of Westminster, Conybeare (†), Kingsley, C. T. Vaughan, Laing, Ayre, Cowper, and especially by Maurice and Trench.[1] These writers, incited for the most part by German theology, either by means of Schleiermacher or of Coleridge's version of Schelling's ideas, take up a somewhat freer position than the old English and Scotch theologians. Some of them also perceive the weakness of their old system of evidences, and recur to the Reformation way for the attainment of certainty. When we consider the exalted mission entrusted to Britain with regard to Protestantism and its future, in other parts of the world, in Africa, in Asia, and especially in India and China; when, on the other hand, we reflect that the reception given to Bishop Colenso's work on the Pentateuch, the reviving spirit of inquiry and the progress of natural science give reason to anticipate that the as yet inconsiderable party of the Essayists may expect important accessions in the immediate future; it is much to be wished that the advocates of Christian theology, against adversaries whose attacks are sharpened by German weapons, may cultivate an increasing acquaintance with that German science which is of a positively constructive kind, and derive therefrom that which may turn to their own advantage. A promising beginning for fresh flights in the realm of science was made by the establishment of that great periodical, the *Contemporary Review*, in 1866, among whose contributors may be named, besides many of the above, Cheyne, Tulloch, Stead, Cheetham, Benj. Shaw, Perowne, Plumptre, J. C. Howson, and Lake. It is their intention to advocate a spirit of true catholicity, and instead of forcibly repelling the Puseyite party from the Church, they hope that it may be overcome from within, if only free scope is given to the spirit of Christian science. Dr. Pusey has lately (1866) published his *Eirenicon*, a work in which (as in Tract 90 of *Tracts for the Times*) the strictly binding nature of the Thirty-nine Articles is denied for those of his own tendency. The *Contemporary Review* (April 1866), in an article by Stanley, is willing to leave him this resource, though upon other grounds; but requires from him, on

[1] We may here include the whole of the new Cambridge School in general, to which belong the historians Hardwick and Merivale. the divines Harold Browne (*Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, ed. 2, 1854), Westcott, Thos. Birks, and others.

the other hand, a more large-hearted disposition towards dissenters and theologians who deviate from the Thirty-nine Articles in another than a Romish direction. They are to be made binding in a general, and not in a particular sense. It may, in any case, be asserted that in the Anglican Church unity does not depend solely on the Thirty-nine Articles, but is based also upon the Common Prayer Book and the constitution of the Church.

In *North America*, theology, so far as we are able to survey it, has as yet no connected literary history.[1] The numberless parties there existing, immersed for the most part in practical matters, have not as yet been able to do much for the cultivation or advancement of theological science. But the introduction of English, Scotch, and especially of German theology now abundantly taking place, is transporting into that country many elements of culture, and theology will, in the midst of this increasing scientific traffic and intercourse, undoubtedly obtain in that country—though it may do this by first passing through a process of fermentation—a new, and indeed an independent form and combination, which by reason of the perfect independence of the State enjoyed by religious communities, may in many respects resemble the development of the Church in the first centuries. German theology, represented especially by Professor Schaff and his like-minded colleague Nevin, but more or less known to all the more able theologians through its literature, may expect to obtain, by means of the German immigration, and the educational institutions connected therewith, a lasting hold upon the country.

After the Presbyterians, the Baptists and Methodists have become the most influential sects. A feeling for science has chiefly been shown among the Presbyterians and Congregationalists, who are also gradually effecting a union, though indeed in a superficial manner, both having, till about 1830, in many

[1] Henry Smith of New York has written a *History of the Church of Christ*, in chronological tables (with two supplementary tables on the History of the Church in North America), 1861; he has also edited and enriched with copious additions a text-book of the *History of Doctrines* by D. Hagenbach (translated by C. W. Buch), 2 vols. 1867. In this work there is an admirable and intelligent arrangement of British and North American theological literature. On the other hand, comp. the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and *Biblical Repository* of Edwards, Park and Taylor (1830), &c.

instances degenerated, especially in Massachusetts, into Rationalism, Socinianism, and Unitarianism. The most able among the Unitarians are Channing and Parker.[1] The former († 1842) was a man of profound genius, refined moral judgment, and energetic character, distinguished also by his ardent patriotism. His writings display a mystic element, a lively faith in the supernatural world, and its wonderful influence upon the visible; he also embraces the inspiration of Scripture, and, though rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity, entertains not an Ebionite but a Sabellian view of Christ.[2] Parker, on the contrary, gave more promise than was justified by the result, and gradually fell a prey to a passionate negativism. Like modern Unitarians in general, he surpassed the deistic idea of God, but did so by the assistance of pantheistic influences. He admits of inward influences or revelations of God, but denies miracles and the inspiration of Scripture. The talented Congregationalist Bushnell teaches Sabellianism in a theopaschitic form.[3] It seems, indeed, as if the new world were about to repeat, theologically and christologically, the advance exhibited during the first Christian centuries, from the most indefinite to the more definite tenets. Since the Revival of 1831 and Parker's extravagances, a reaction against Unitarianism and Ebionitism has taken place, even among the Unitarians, whose organ is the *Examiner*.

A separation took place within Presbyterianism (1837) subsequently to the attempted union with the Congregationalists. It resulted in the "Old School" with its essentially Scotch theology, which prevails in the Princeton Seminary and Review,[4] and in the "New School," whose theology is scarcely to be distinguished from that of the modern Congregationalists (in Andover, &c.). This *modern American theology*, which is supremely anthropological, though far from being either rationalistic or Socinian, modifies Calvinistic doctrine in the dogmas of original sin, its

[1] Compare Cheetham's admirable work *Theodore Parker and American Unitarianism, Contemp. Rev.* March, 1866. It contains also an excellent delineation of Channing. Also Gelzer's *Monatsbl.* Feb. 1866; *Will. Channing, Charakterbild eines amerikanischen Unitariers.*

[2] Compare his excellent treatise on the moral character of Christ.

[3] In a recent work, Bushnell approximates to Irving's Christology. He embraces a power of evil even in the nature of Jesus.

[4] Comp. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1863, pp. 561-635. To the Old School belong Breckenridge, Rice, and H. Woods. Its present leader is Hodge.

guilt and imputation, of freedom, grace, atonement, and regeneration. Among its representatives may be numbered Witherspoon, Taylor, Robinson, the famous traveller in the Holy Land, Moses Stuart, the New Testament exegete, Park,[1] the editor of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, the most widely circulated of theological periodicals, the philosophical Church historian, Henry Smith of New York, and others.[2] In the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, the Presbyterians have, in many respects, turned from Calvin's fuller view to those of Zwingli, while Nevin, of the German-Reformed Church of North America, who brought to mind the genuine doctrine of Calvin,[3] and lamented the endless sectarian divisions, was, on this account, suspected by many of catholicizing tendencies.

America is, as yet, merely on the threshold of its theological existence; but the future of Protestantism greatly depends upon the further development of this powerful nation, delivered, as it now is, from the curse of slavery. It is on this account that the

[1] Edwards A. Park, *The Atonement; Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxey, Emmons, Griffin, Burge and Weeks, with an Introductory Essay.* Boston, 1860. The sufferings of Christ, upon which he lays the chief stress, were not designed, he says, to render God propitious towards us, or to pay a price for the favour which He will show us; they had not to satisfy a *justitia commutativa* or *distributiva*, nor to take away guilt by such a special amount of penal suffering as would be the exact equivalent of our debt of obedience, or of the punishment due to us, but to remove an obstacle to our forgiveness, by manifesting the righteousness of God notwithstanding His grace. The main object was that God's law and His holiness should be as fully honoured by the Atonement as they would have been by the execution of legal punishment (lxix.). It is not a matter of mere sovereignty that God forgives sin only for the sake of Christ's sufferings: if He did so without them He would be unjust to His law, His kingdom, nay, to Himself. The objective fact, however, of the sufferings of Christ gives no man a claim to grace: this remains subject to the absolute sovereignty of God; for the merits of Christ are not a matter of trade or barter, as between *meum* and *tuum*. These merits are nevertheless universal and all-sufficient, in support of which he cites Watts, the Synod of Dort and Calvin (pp. 375-388, 525); God's sovereign will, however, has determined to impart the grace made possible by Christ's merits to believers only (xi. xliii. lii. lvii. 59, 525, 527, 513-17, 525-27). This is most essentially the leading theory of this work, though with recurrence to the holy self-consistent nature of God.

[2] Recently the Old and New Schools seem again to have approximated [re-united in 1870].—Besides the above, may be mentioned Shedd, the Church historian (*Discourses and Essays; Lectures upon the Philosophy of History*); Hackett, *Commentary upon the Acts of the Apostles*, 1858; Conant (a Baptist), *The Gospel by Matthew* (revised version, with critical and philological notes), for the American Bible Union, 1860.

[3] *The doctrine of the Reformed Church on the Lord's Supper*, by J. W. Nevin, Mercersburg, 1850.

maintenance and increase of its acquaintance with German theology and its acquisitions is of incalculable importance. At present the disruption of parties is great, and their opposition often more a matter of caprice or external interests than one likely to result in earnest scientific controversy. But the more a feeling for theological science increases, and with it that power of reasoning in which a unifying power is inherent, because its aim is the universally and absolutely true, the more will many of the existing denominations necessarily disappear, and others enter upon such a process of mutual understanding as will secure a common history of their intellectual and religious life, which, like that of Great Britain, may vie, on equal terms and with fruitful results, with German theology.

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